South Korean Prostitution

South Korean Prostitution Index
South Korean Prostitution Index 1
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Inherency- US troops= driving force 20
Inherency- US presence Key—US-ROK relations 21
Inherency- Presence= forced prostitution 22
Gender adv- “failed women” 23
Gender adv- racial violence 24
Gender adv- demeaning 25
Gender adv- laundry list 26
Gender adv- objectification/ violence 27
Gender adv- Patriarchy= root cause of war 28
Gender adv- overlooked/ tools of the nation 29
Gender adv- sexism 30
Gender adv- sexism 31
Gender adv- patriarchal norms 32
Gender adv- agency ext. 33
Gender adv- agency ext. 34
Case outweighs 35
Solvency—deconstructing key 36
A2: camptown cleanup CP 38
A2: camptown cleanup CP 39
A2: Prostitution Good 40
A2: Util Good 41
A2: Util Good 43
A2: Realism 46
A2: DA’s 47
A2: North Korean invasion 48

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Contention One: Inherency

US military presence in South Korea has produced a system of state-sponsored prostitution
Katharine H.S. Moon, Department of Political Science and Chair of Asian Studies @ Wellesley College, 1997, “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations”, 1997, Columbia University Press, Page 1-2

The selling and buying of sex by Koreans and Americans have been a staple of U.S.-Korean relations since the Korean War (1950-1953) and the permanent stationing of U.S. troops in Korea since 1955. It would not be far-fetched to say that more American men have become familiar with camptown prostitution in Korea since the 1950s than with military strategy and Korea’s GNP figures. Since the war, over one million Korean women have served as sex providers for the U.S. military. And millions of Koreans and Americans have shared a sense of special bonding, for they have together shed blood in battle and mixed blood through sex and Amerasian offspring. U.S. military-oriented prostitution in Korea is not simply a matter of women walking the streets and picking up U.S. soldiers for a few bucks. It is a system that is sponsored and regulated by two governments, Korean and American (through the U.S. military). The U.S. military and the Korean government have referred to such women as "bar girls," "hostesses," "special entertainers," "businesswomen," and "comfort women." Koreans have also called these women the highly derogatory names, yanggalbo (Western whore) and yanggongju (Western princess). As this study reveals, both governments have viewed such prostitution as a means to advance the "friendly relations" of both countries and to keep U.S. soldiers, "who fight so hard for the freedom of the South Korean people," happy. The lives of Korean women working as prostitutes in military camptowns have been inseparably tied to the activities and welfare of the U.S. military installations since the early 1950s. To varying degrees, USFK (U.S. Forces, Korea) and ROK authorities have controlled where, when, and how these "special entertainers" work and live. The first half of the 1970s witnessed the consolidation of such joint U.S.-ROK control.


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The South Korean government facilitates this prostitution to encourage the US military to stay
Choe Sang-Hun is a staff writer for the New York Times. 1-7-09, “Ex-Prostitutes Say South Korea and U.S. Enabled Sex Trade Near Bases” (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/08/world/asia/08korea.html?_r=2&emc=eta1, The New York Times)
South Korea has railed for years against the Japanese government’s waffling over how much responsibility it bears for one of the ugliest chapters in its wartime history: the enslavement of women from Korea and elsewhere to work in brothels serving Japan’s imperial army. Bae at 29. Now 80, she lives on welfare and uses an oxygen machine. Now, a group of former prostitutes in South Korea have accused some of their country’s former leaders of a different kind of abuse: encouraging them to have sex with the American soldiers who protected South Korea from North Korea. They also accuse past South Korean governments, and the United States military, of taking a direct hand in the sex trade from the 1960s through the 1980s, working together to build a testing and treatment system to ensure that prostitutes were disease-free for American troops. While the women have made no claims that they were coerced into prostitution by South Korean or American officials during those years, they accuse successive Korean governments of hypocrisy in calling for reparations from Japan while refusing to take a hard look at South Korea’s own history. “Our government was one big pimp for the U.S. military,” one of the women, Kim Ae-ran, 58, said in a recent interview. Scholars on the issue say that the South Korean government was motivated in part by fears that the American military would leave, and that it wanted to do whatever it could to prevent that. But the women suggest that the government also viewed them as commodities to be used to shore up the country’s struggling economy in the decades after the Korean War. They say the government not only sponsored classes for them in basic English and etiquette — meant to help them sell themselves more effectively — but also sent bureaucrats to praise them for earning dollars when South Korea was desperate for foreign currency. “They urged us to sell as much as possible to the G.I.’s, praising us as ‘dollar-earning patriots,’ ” Ms. Kim said. The United States military, the scholars say, became involved in attempts to regulate the trade in so-called camp towns surrounding the bases because of worries about sexually transmitted diseases. In one of the most incendiary claims, some women say that the American military police and South Korean officials regularly raided clubs from the 1960s through the 1980s looking for women who were thought to be spreading the diseases. They picked out the women using the number tags the women say the brothels forced them to wear so the soldiers could more easily identify their sex partners. The Korean police would then detain the prostitutes who were thought to be ill, the women said, locking them up under guard in so-called monkey houses, where the windows had bars. There, the prostitutes were forced to take medications until they were well. The women, who are seeking compensation and an apology, have compared themselves to the so-called comfort women who have won widespread public sympathy for being forced into prostitution by the Japanese during World War II. Whether prostitutes by choice, need or coercion, the women say, they were all victims of government policies. “If the question is, was there active government complicity, support of such camp town prostitution, yes, by both the Korean governments and the U.S. military,” said Katharine H. S. Moon, a scholar who wrote about the women in her 1997 book, “Sex Among Allies.” The South Korean Ministry of Gender Equality, which handles women’s issues, declined to comment on the former prostitutes’ accusations. So did the American military command in Seoul, which responded with a general statement saying that the military “does not condone or support the illegal activities of human trafficking and prostitution.” The New York Times interviewed eight women who worked in brothels near American bases, and it reviewed South Korean and American documents. The documents do provide some support for many of the women’s claims, though most are snapshots in time. The women maintain that the practices occurred over decades. In some sense, the women’s allegations are not surprising. It has been clear for decades that South Korea and the United States military tolerated prostitution near bases, even though selling sex is illegal in South Korea. Bars and brothels have long lined the streets of the neighborhoods surrounding American bases in South Korea, as is the case in the areas around military bases around the world. Bae, 80, a former prostitute at an American base, covers her face in her room in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. But the women say few of their fellow citizens know how deeply their government was involved in the trade in the camp towns. The women received some support for their claims in 2006, from a former government official. In a television interview, the official, Kim Kee-joe, who was identified as having been a high-level liaison to the United States military, said, “Although we did not actively urge them to engage in prostitution, we, especially those from the county offices, did often tell them that it was not something bad for the country either.” Transcripts of parliamentary hearings also suggest that at least some South Korean leaders viewed prostitution as something of a necessity. In one exchange in 1960, two lawmakers urged the government to train a supply of prostitutes to meet what one called the “natural needs” of allied soldiers and prevent them from spending their dollars in Japan instead of South Korea. The deputy home minister at the time, Lee Sung-woo, replied that the government had made some improvements in the “supply of prostitutes” and the “recreational system” for American troops. Both Mr. Kim and Ms. Moon back the women’s assertions that the control of venereal disease was a driving factor for the two governments. They say the governments’ coordination became especially pronounced as Korean fears about an American pullout increased after President Richard M. Nixon announced plans in 1969 to reduce the number of American troops in South Korea. “The idea was to create an environment where the guests were treated well in the camp towns to discourage them from leaving,” Mr. Kim said in the television interview. Ms. Moon, a Wellesley College professor, said that the minutes of meetings between American military officials and Korean bureaucrats in the 1970s showed the lengths the two countries went to prevent epidemics.


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While prostitution is currently illegal in South Korea, it thrives because of U.S. military presence. Without a withdrawal of troops, neither government would put an end to the Camptowns.
Dujisin 9, Zoltan, July 7 2009, “Prostitution Thrives with US Military Presence”, Inter Press Service News Agency, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47556

Since 1945, U.S. troops have been stationed in the Korean peninsula, with their current strength estimated to be 28,500. The country plunged into civil war between 1950 and 1953 and since then, U.S. troops have remained there, claiming to act as a deterrent against North Korea, the country’s communist neighbour. Prostitution in the region is a direct result of their presence, local observers say. Russian and Chinese troops also had troops stationed on the Korean peninsula in the aftermath of the civil conflict, but "have since left the area while U.S. troops are still here, in almost 100 military bases," Yu Young Nim, the head of a local non-governmental organisation which provides counseling, medical and legal care for sex workers, told IPS. Yu Young Nim’s office is located at the Camp Stanley Camptown, a few metres away from local Korean restaurants, home in the 1980s to U.S.-imported Kentucky Fried Chicken and Subway logos. Locals attest to the slow decay of a town. In front of one of these restaurants, sits a 36-year old former "mama-san", which in Korea denotes women supervising sex-work establishments. Like many other retired sex-workers, she looks older than her age, and has decided to open a restaurant. The "mama-san" prefers catering to U.S. soldiers instead of the more demanding Korean clientele. "G.I.s eat their food without complaints," she told IPS. "Koreans always expect to be served like kings." It was in camps such as these that a new dish called Pudaettsigae entered the Korean diet: Poor Koreans took ingredients such as sausage, beans, processed cheese from leftovers at the U.S. camp and mixed them with home-grown ingredients. After being a sex worker for much of her youth, during which she had a son with a U.S. soldier, like other "mama-sans" she opened her own club, where she employed other girls. She had to shut shop three years ago due to declining incomes. "If the base closes, I’ll try moving to the [United] States; it would be good for my son," she says. Her son lives in Korea and speaks the language well enough, but got his primary education in English. "I don’t think he could attend a Korean university, but the U.S. universities are too expensive for us." She could only wish his father was there to help. "I have some contact with the grandfather, but barely with the father. He doesn’t send my son gifts, not even a Christmas card. He has so much more money than me and doesn’t do anything for his son," she says. "My son [believes] he has no father." Several U.S. soldiers have married local prostitutes, in many cases impregnating them, only to later abandon them. "Even in those cases of couples living together, these women can be easily abandoned by their husbands or boyfriends, and are victims of physical, mental and financial abuse," says Young Nim. "The women mostly come from broken families, backgrounds of sexual abuse or domestic violence, and there is no protection from victims of these crimes," he says. "After entering the prostitution business they can’t get out." U.S. officials have made statements condemning prostitution but have done little to stop it. "They think this system should exist for the U.S. soldiers. Superficially they stand for a zero tolerance policy but practically they know what is going on and use this system," Young Nim told IPS. There has been a reduction in prostitution of Korean women, which "has more to do with the work of non-governmental organisations and the fact that Korea has developed economically," while "there is no contact with the U.S. authorities. They have a legal office and counseling centre but only for their own soldiers and relatives." After the negative publicity, the top military officials of the U.S. army have slowly became more outspoken in their condemnation of prostitution. U.S. soldiers were discouraged from frequenting traditional entertainment districts in central Seoul, although locals say that did little to stop them. A turning point was the violent murder of a prostitute in Dongducheon in 1992. The finger of suspicion pointed at U.S. troops, though action against them is difficult given they enjoy a special legal status since 1945. While prostitution is illegal in South Korea, camp towns are practically exempted from crackdowns, and US military anti-prostitution policies have forced these places to minimize their visibility.


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The problem is endemic—forced prostitution will remain as long as the US military does
Kirk and Okazawa-rey 1998-(writers for The Women and War Reader, “Making Connections Building an East Asia-U.S. Women’s Network against U.S. Militarism” New York University Press. http://www.gwynkirk.net/pdf/making_connections_paper.pdf

Participants shared the view that violence against women is an integral part of U.S. military attitudes, training, and culture. It is not random, but systemic, and cannot simply be attributed to “a few bad apples’ as the military authorities often try to do. We noted the many reports of rape, assault, and sexual harassment within the U.S. military that have come to light over the past few years. We also noted that U.S. military families experience higher rates of domestic violence compared to nonmilitary families. But the main emphasis of our discussion concerned crimes of violence committed by U.S. military personnel against civilians in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, especially violence against women, and the institutionalization of military prostitution. Crimes of Violence Women from all countries represented, including the United States, reported crimes of violence committed by U.S. military personnel against local women. Okinawan women emphasized violent attacks of women and girls by U.S. military personnel, especially the marines who are in Okinawa in large numbers. In May 1995, for example, a 24-year old Okinawan woman was beaten to death by a G.I. with a hammer in the doorway of her house. On their return from Beijing Conference in September1995, Okinawan women immediately organized around the rape of a twelve-year old girl, which had occurred while they were away. This revitalized opposition to the U.S. military presence in Okinawa and drew worldwide attention to violence against women on the part of U.S. military personnel. The National Coalition for the Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea, which comprises human rights activists, religious groups, feminists, and labor activists, was galvanized into action by a particularly brutal rape and murder of a bar woman, Yoon Kum E, in 1992. Korean participants commented that pimps and G.I.s try to intimidate the women against speaking out; women are also afraid of public humiliation. Drawing public attention to such crimes is embarrassing to the U.S. military. They are usually denied and covered up.


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Contention Two is Gender

Trafficking and forced prostitution denigrate women—treating women as commodities
Enriquez 99, Jean, Executive Director of Coalition Against Trafficking In Women-Asia Pacific, “Filipinas in Prostitution around U.S. Military Bases in Korea: A Recurring Nightmare”, Seoul, South Korea, November 1999

CATW asserts that trafficking in women is inseparable with the issue of prostitution. The gender-based nature of trafficking exposes itself as serving the purpose of ensuring the steady supply of women to areas where men demand sexual services. We deplore trafficking and prostitution as violations of women’s human rights. We cannot consider it work, because among others, it compels women to perform acts that denigrates their person — their integrity as human beings. The impact to women of sexual exploitation is hardly healed by time. Amerasian children, estimated at 30,000, were born to Filipinas prostituted around the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. They receive no assistance from either the U.S. or Philippine government. Economically, ‘working in the clubs’ meant irregular earnings and slavery, as many of them would be withheld of their salaries or are fined for any ‘misconduct’. The women were abused physically, psychologically and emotionally. Some were murdered. With the Visiting Forces Agreement recently signed between the Philippine and U.S. governments, 22 ports will be opened to foreign troops and more women will be abused in the remote rural areas of the country. In Korea, our women are once again subjected to the same brutality. The same experiences continue to haunt our women. In Korea, the Philippines and elsewhere, the women are viewed as commodities to be bought, and being Asians, they are certainly perceived as less than human. Trafficking and prostitution have reached crisis proportions in the Asian region, with the entry and maintenance of foreign military troops, and worsening globalization of economies. The R & R policy of U.S. military and its surrounding industry rely heavily on the buying and luring of women not only in Okinawa, Korea, and the Philippines, but more women from other countries including Russia, China and Thailand. Its twin menace, the unrestricted and globalized trade, rides on the continuing export of labor, as a convenient channel to traffic women for slave-like work or prostitution. Every month, 200-400 women and girls from Bangladesh are trafficked to Pakistan in the guise of labor migration. Yearly, 5,000 Nepalese women and girls are brought to India and Hong Kong on the same pretext. Currently, studies estimate that 150,00 Filipinas are exploited in the entertainment industry of Japan. More and more women from E. Europe are transported to the West and to Asia for prostitution. It might surprise many that Africa is also becoming a destination for trafficking. In 1992, 8 Filipinas were tricked that they will work as waitresses in Germany but were instead brought to clubs in Nigeria. Trafficking and prostitution, thus, need to be understood as problems arising from contexts not only of poverty and unemployment, but also maintained and promoted by economic interests and political policies that thrive on the subordinated status of women in our societies. As significantly, there are long-held definitions of masculinity, reinforced by the military institution, that are satiated by trafficking in women.

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Women in Camptowns are given quotas on their sexual performances and are trapped in a cycle of debts that prevents them from leaving, denying them the possibilities that are implicit in human agency.
Katharine Moon is head of the Department of Political Science and Chair of Asian Studies at Wellesley College, 1997, (“Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” Columbia University Press)

There are two types of kijich'on prostitutes, the registered and the unregistered, or so-called streetwalkers. This book is about the first group of women, who are the governmentally recognized"special entertainers." Registered women sell drinks, dance with GIs, and pick up their customers in the kijich'on clubs. These women have more job security than streetwalkers because they have official sanction to sell their flesh. Moreover, they have a regular establishment from which they can attract customers, and they will not be hauled off to jail for prostitution, unlike streetwalkers, unless their official identification cards are invalid. In order to work in the clubs, a woman must go to the local police station to register her name and address and the name of the club where she will be working. She must also go to the local VD clinic, undergo gynecological and blood examinations and receive a VD card. To maintain her status as a"healthy" hostess, she must go once a week for VD examination and get her card stamped"healthy" by the clinic;"healthy" means she is free of VD infection. She pays for each clinic visit, and if she fails the exam, she cannot work in the club-- she must also pay for medical treatment--until the clinic certifies that she is"healthy." The club woman must carry the registration and VD cards with her at all times. The Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MoHSA, formerly called the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare) has been supervising the formulation and enforcement of these regulations since the early-mid 1960s, but until the early 1970s, enforcement was highly inconsistent throughout the numerous camptowns. Prior to the 1960s, U.S. medics conducted VD examinations of the women; even in the 1970s, U.S. camps in areas where the Korean authorities were lax about such regulations continued to check the prostitutes. Once in the club, the woman's life revolves around the schedule of the local GIs and the business demands of the club owner or manager, who serves as her pimp. On a typical weekday, she dresses and puts on her make-up in mid-afternoon in preparation for the GIs who "pour out of the [camp] gates at the end of the [work]day." 5 From around 4 or 5 p.m. until midnight to 2 a.m., she sells drinks, flirts and dances with men, and solicits customers for the night club-- she must also pay for medical treatment--until the clinic certifies that she is"healthy." The club woman must carry the registration and VD cards with her at all times. The Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MoHSA, formerly called the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare) has been supervising the formulation and enforcement of these regulations since the early-mid 1960s, but until the early 1970s, enforcement was highly inconsistent throughout the numerous camptowns. Prior to the 1960s, U.S. medics conducted VD examinations of the women; even in the 1970s, U.S. camps in areas where the Korean authorities were lax about such regulations continued to check the prostitutes. Once in the club, the woman's life revolves around the schedule of the local GIs and the business demands of the club owner or manager, who serves as her pimp. On a typical weekday, she dresses and puts on her make-up in mid-afternoon in preparation for the GIs who"pour out of the [camp] gates at the end of the [work]day." 5 From around 4 or 5 p.m. until midnight to 2 a.m., she sells drinks, flirts and dances with men, and solicits customers for the night. On the weekends, her workday begins earlier and ends later. The club owner/manager requires the woman to sell as many drinks to GIs as possible--alcohol for the men and "ladies' drinks" (usually soft drinks) for herself. Ladies' drinks are particularly high-priced, now about $5 a small glass; the goal is to get the GI to buy many drinks in order to increase the club's revenues. Historically, women have received 10 to 20% of the income from the drinks they sell. 6 Many clubs have drink quotas for the women: if they do not sell at least 150 drinks per month, they do not receive their share of the revenues. In some clubs, if a woman sells more than 600 drinks in a month, she gets a gold ring; if she sells more than 1,000 drinks in a month, she receives a"special bonus." 7 Pushing drinks on the soldiers means the woman also has to keep drinking; on the average, a club woman drinks 20 glasses of soft drinks and/or a mixture of whiskey per night. 8 Moreover, to sell drinks, she must mingle with various GIs in one night, fondling them and being fondled by them in return. On the average, in the mid-1990s, clubs were paying a hostess $250 a month. 9 Selling drinks, however, has never been the mainstay of the women's earnings: Women are expected to sleep with GIs for the bulk of their income because their cut from selling drinks cannot support them, and"[m]any places don't pay any salary." 10 In Uijongbu in the mid-1980s,"long-time" (overnight) was $20, while"short- time" (hourly rate) was $10. 11 Owners and pimps generally take 80% and give the prostitute 20% of her earnings per trick. Most women do not come into the clubs equipped with "hostessing skills" and the willingness to share flesh with GIs. For women who are new to the club scene, an initiation process often takes place. Some women attest to having been raped by their pimp/manager; others have been ordered by the club owner to sleep with a particular soldier; yet others stumble into bed with GIs on their own; some receive advice on the type of man to avoid (e.g., violent types) from more experienced prostitutes. In Let the Good Times Roll, " Ms. Pak" expresses her confusion, curiosity, and fear at beginning work at a GI club in Osan. Although she had sold her body to Korean men before entering the kijich'on, she had a difficult time adjusting to her new situation--she had never seen an American before and worried how she could handle their large bodies. 12 Black men were even more strange to her. At the prospect of her first black patron, she wondered to herself how dark his penis would be and"If I do it with him, will my skin turn black?" 13 Her first sexual encounter with an American took place at the order of her club owner, who "warned that I had to do it." 14 Most of the women have taken to alcohol or drugs to help them get through their sex work. 15 Sometimes women pick up customers; at other times, the GIs express their interest in a particular woman to the club owner/manager, who then tells the woman to sleep with the soldier. The GI and club woman go to her room, which is usually attached to or located near the club. Her room is part of a complex of rooms lined up in a row and separated by very thin walls; other prostitutes live in those rooms. The complex usually belongs to the club owner, who places a watchman or -woman by the entrance to monitor who goes in and out, to receive payments for the sex, and to insure that no woman runs away. In some of the older complexes,"pimp holes" were made in the rooms so that the pimp or monitor could watch over the woman while she sold sex and make sure that she was not scheming with the GI to run away. Moreover, such peeping Tom activities were intended to prevent GIs from avoiding payment--many GIs would claim that the the prostitute never "put out," even if the woman had provided the agreed-upon sexual service. Both the prostitutes and U.S. military officials have observed that club women aggressively seek out customers. In Camp Arirang, Kim Yonja recalls how she and other women grabbed onto men in order to make money. One U.S. Army chaplain commented that"in Korea, the guy is inundated with prostitutes." 16 And an Army captain who had served in Korea during the early 1980s noted that young, inexperienced enlistees were most susceptible to getting duped into serious relationships with prostitutes who sought to"exploit the boys for money." 17 How prostitutes fare physically, financially, and emotionally in the kijich'on environment depends to a great extent on the particular club owner/manager and GI customers she encounters. As"Nanhee" says, some GIs are mean and nasty, especially when they are drunk; others are nice and gentle. 18 At worst, a woman encounters a GI who beats her and murders her, as Yun Kumi did in October 1992. Private Kenneth Markle was convicted of killing her; her landlord found her body--"naked, bloody, and covered with bruises and contusions--with laundry detergent sprinkled over the crime site. In addition, a coke bottle was embedded in Yun's uterus and the trunk of an umbrella driven 27 cm into her rectum." 19 At best, a GI provides money and other necessities, is faithful and caring and ultimately marries her."Oon Kyung," who had married"Jack," was one of the lucky ones. He had"scrape[d] and save[d] to pay to get Oon Kyung out of a club." 20 Afterward,"he work[ed] alongside guys who had slept with her when she was working as a prostitute before they were married." 21 No club woman I spoke with ever referred to club owners and managers as nice, kind, and gentle. Some are not as abusive as those who beat and rape the barwomen, but it is apparent that the owner/manager is responsible for the bulk of the everyday exploitation of the women. Ms. Pak states that"owners usually take advantage of [the women]" by not paying them their share of revenues from drinks and sex. 22 Women who move up in the hierarchy of sex work can become club managers, and they do not necessarily treat the prostitutes with compassion. Kim Yonja, who had worked as a madam in Kunsan, recalled how tough she had been on her hostesses; she had scolded them and pushed them to bring in income for the bar. 23 Thomas Kelly, a former GI and VD officer (he had to help the military track down prostitutes who were alleged to have transmitted the infection), noted how the madams would send out"slicky boys" to"rough up the girls who [didn't] pay [their club debts]." 24 The"debt bondage system" is the most prominent manifestation of exploitation. A woman's debt increases each time she borrows money from the owner--to get medical treatment, to send money to her family, to cover an emergency, to bribe police officers and VD clinic workers. Most women also begin their work at a new club with large amounts of debt, which usually results from the"agency fee" and advance pay. Typically, (illegal) job placement agencies which specialize in bar and brothel prostitution place women in a club and charge the club owner a fee. The owner transfers the fee onto the new employee's"account" at usurious rates; Ms. Pak mentions one club owner charging 10%. 25 Often, women ask the owner for an advance in order to pay off her existing debts to another club, and the cycle of debt continues. Owners also set up a new employee with furniture, stereo equipment, clothing, and cosmetics--items deemed necessary for attracting GI customers. These costs get added to the woman's account with interest. In 1988, the left- leaning Mal Magazine (Malchi), reported that on the average, prostitutes' club debts range between one and four million won 26 ($1,462 and $5,847 respectively in 1988 terms). For this reason, women try to pick up as many GIs as possible night after night, and for this reason, women cannot leave prostitution at will. Nanhee sums up the debt-ridden plight: In some American [camptown] clubs, if you have no debt, they see to it that you incur some. If you had no debt, you would have the choice of going to another club, a better club. But if the woman has debts, she can't leave before she pays up. Escaping from a club isn't easy to do. The women with a conscience stay and work [to pay off the debt]. 27 The great majority of women who enter kijich'on prostitution have already experienced severe deprivation and abuse--poverty, rape, repeated beatings by lovers or husbands. The camp followers of the war era lived off their bodies and fed their family members with their earnings. Korean camptown officials who had lived through the war expressed sympathy for the early generations of prostitutes when I interviewed them in 1992.

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Women suffer constant and concealed abuse, denying them agency
Katharine Moon is head of the Department of Political Science and Chair of Asian Studies at Wellesley College, 1997, (“Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” Columbia University Press)

To expect club owners and managers, who served as collective pimps for the hostesses working in their establishments, to educate these women was a naive assumption on the part of the U.S. military authorities. It was common knowledge among camptown residents, both American and Korean, that club owners' only concern for the women was their ability to increase club revenues. The U.S. side was fully aware that many club owners/managers mistreated the women by physically beating them, psychologically harassing them, and keeping them in debt bondage. Demanding that these owners/managers increase control over these women's conduct was tantamount to increasing and legitimating the former's exploitation and abuse of the latter. The former U.S. chair of the Subcommittee from December 1971 to October 1972 responded frankly to my question, "What kind of carrots and sticks were used to enforce nondiscrimination by club women?" Answer: "Generally, a visit to the bar owner would either get her fired or get her head screwed on straight. Give pressure to the bar owner and they usually carried through." 32 Besides the power of hiring and firing, the club owner had other means of cutting off a prostitute's livelihood, e.g., confiscating her VD/registration card so that she would not be able to work. Kim Yonja stated that because most club women avoided the monthly "Etiquette and Good Conduct" lecture, some club owners/managers helped out the local Korean authorities who sponsored the meeting by confiscating the club women's VD cards as a way to force the women to attend: "If there were going to be a meeting tomorrow, then the owner would take away the VD card the night before, at closing time, and prohibit the women who don't go to the meeting from coming to work at the club for several days. Without the VD card, women could not work." 33 Another woman emphasized that there was virtually no legal or political recourse that women could take against the abuses: "If a woman is abused by the owner, unless the woman gets bruises that take months to heal, then, things just get covered up." 34 The women's limited power over their own lives was sharply reduced because of the political power the owners held over camptown life. According to Kim Yonja, who was active in the camptown politics of Kunsan and Songt'an in the 1970s and 1980s, Most club owners in camptowns are village leaders. They hold power. It's not that the original residents become the owners, but owners have arrived from other areas. By establishing their business and earning money, they become owners, Special Tourist Association leaders, etc. So, if a woman is physically abused by the owner, or if a woman is murdered by a GI, she had nowhere to turn to: She would be told (by the Korean authorities), "Look, the American soldier is here to help Korea-- they put their lives on the line for Korea." 35


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Prioritizing the military over women’s agency and quality of life, permeates all levels of US foreign policy
Katharine Moon is head of the Department of Political Science and Chair of Asian Studies at Wellesley College, 1997, (“Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” Columbia University Press)

In the late 1930s Virginia Woolf challenged the notion that states function to protect, preserve, and promote the interests of the people. Ahead of her time, she began the process of deconstructing the concepts, "national interest" and "national security." For her, "national interests" represented the interests of men, particularly the privileged, and "national security" did not eliminate the physical, economic, legal, and social insecurity of women. More than fifty years later, women and men echo Woolf's bold assertions. Contemporary feminist academics and activists, ranging from liberal critics of Realism to postmodernists, women and development advocates, and peace activists, all challenge the role and capacity of the sovereign state to know and best fulfill the needs and interests of a nation's people. With respect to women and security, Spike Peterson and Judith Stiehm go so far as to describe the modern state as a patriarchal protection racket, 6 and many Asian feminists living with U.S. military bases and camptown prostitution in their countries consider their states collective pimps. Feminists charge that states have made women's lives insecure by fixating on military buildup, stand-offs, and adventurism. They have noted that women, if given the chance, would define security less narrowly to include "safe working conditions and freedom from the threat of war or unemployment or the economic squeeze of foreign debt." 7 Mary Burguieres advocates feminist approaches to peace which would espouse Johann Galtung's conceptualization of peace as "an absence of both personal and structural violence." 8 She adds that such approaches are important because they "loosen" governmental policies for peace from their "exclusive association with defence and foreign policy" and link peace efforts with social policy in general. 9 My interviews with Korean former prostitutes support the basic feminist claim that states' definition of "national security" is often irrelevant to the security of women's lives, and that state pursuits on behalf of national security often exploit and oppress women. The kijich'on women ridiculed the Korean government's efforts in the Clean-Up Campaign to label them as "personal ambassadors" and their selling of sex as patriotic service. Most women admitted that they were unsure of the meaning of "national security" (kukka anbo) and that governmental actions generally were oblivious to their needs for physical and economic well- being. Kim Yonja, a 25-year veteran of camptown prostitution, sharply articulated that the Korean and U.S. governments' rationales for or public professions of security policies had no connection to the actual needs of camptown women for protection. All of the women I interviewed stated that their greatest need for ROK government protection (after the Korean War) was not from North Korean threats but the exploitation and abuse of club owners/pimps, local Korean police and VD clinic officials, and the power of the U.S. bases. In other words, they needed protection from a Korean law enforcement system that inadequately provided for their legal, economic, political, and human rights and a Korean government too cowardly and self-interested to protect them against violence and abuse by U.S. soldiers. Rather than feeling protected by the Korean government and U.S. soldiers, all of the women stated they felt used and betrayed by both Korean and U.S. authorities. The first of the two most common complaints against the U.S. military was that the Americans, who were in Korea to help Koreans, considered the women mere sex toys, concerned only with the health and well-being of the GI. The second was the violence of the U.S. soldiers toward the women and the lack of legal accountability on the part of the military authorities for the soldiers' criminal behavior. Mrs. Ch'oe recalled that she had been beaten by a U.S. serviceman and had reported the incident to the Korean police and the U.S. military police but that the soldier was allowed to go free. In Mrs. Pak's case, she experienced the irresponsibility and injustice of the U.S. military authorities in the extreme. Her sister, also a camptown prostitute in Osan, was mutilated and murdered allegedly by a U.S. serviceman in the early 1970s, but U.S. authorities never turned the man over to the ROK authorities (as provisioned in the Status of Forces Agreement) to be tried in the ROK legal system. Mrs. Pak bitterly recounted that the U.S. military offered neither apology nor financial compensation to her family and that camptown residents had to collect money from one another to pay for the funeral expenses. According to Mrs. Pak: "U.S. law in the U.S. was good--but in Korea, it was never upheld. The U.S. lawyers simply protected U.S. soldiers but did not seek the truth and real justice. The U.S. government did not give any compensation to Koreans for the wrongs that U.S. soldiers committed." All the women emphatically repeated that the ROK government did nothing to improve their welfare. They particularly complained against the impotence and/or unwillingness of the Korean police to prevent abuses against the women and to help them leave prostitution. Mrs. Chang stated that when she had tried to run away from her club owner and had gone to the local police for help, the police kept her in the station overnight, then called her owner to come get her. The owner showed up at the station and "dragged her back to the club." 11

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This patriarchal framework drives and sustains wars
Karen J. Warren, Philosophy Professor, Macalester, and Duane L. Cady, Philosophy Professor, Hamline U., Spring 94, Hypatia 9:2
Conceptually, a feminist perspective suggests that patriarchal conceptual frameworks and the behavior they give rise to, are what sanction, maintain, and perpetuate "isms of domination"-sexism, racism, classism, warism,4 naturism5 and the coercive power-over institutions and practices necessary to maintain these "isms." If this is correct, then no account of peace is adequate which does not reveal patriarchal conceptual frameworks; they underlie and sustain war and conflict resolution strategies. (Examples of why we think this is correct are laced throughout the remainder of the paper.) One glaring example of how the dominant cultural outlook manifests this oppressive conceptual framework is seen in macho, polarized, dichotomized attitudes toward war and peace. Pacifists are dismissed as naive, soft wimps; warriors are realistic, hard heroes. War and peace are seen as opposites. In fact few individual warists or pacifists live up to these exaggerated extremes. This suggests a reconceptualization of values along a continuum which allows degrees of pacifism and degrees of justification for war (Cady 1989).










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And you must prioritize our impacts. They can’t access our depth of the effects of militarism against women. The negative distracts from the widespread state-sponsored violence.
Cuomo, Chris J. Associate Professor of Philosophy and member of the Women's Studies Program at the University of Cincinnati. War is not just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence. 5-27-1996
In "Gender and 'Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an event-based conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances. Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analysis. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state




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And set the bar high for their DAs. Their impacts overlook the value of human life in their neutralizing conception of the world.
Jack Donnelly, College of the Holy Cross, The Concept of Human Rights, 1985, p. 55-58

Basic moral and political rights are not just weighting factors in utilitarian calculations that deal with an undifferentiated 'happiness'. Rather, they are demands and constraints of a different order, grounded in an essentially substantive judgement of the conditions necessary for human development and flourishing. They also provide means - rights - for realising human potentials. The neutrality of utilitarianism, its efforts to assure that everyone counts 'equally', results in no-one counting as a person; as Robert E. Goodin puts it, people drop out of utilitarian calculations, which are instead about disembodied In Aristotelian terms, utilitarianism errs in basing its judgements on 'numerical' rather than 'proportional' equality. For our purposes, such differences should be highlighted. Therefore, let us consider utilitarianism, whether act or rule, as an alternative to rights in general, and thus human rights as well. In particular, we can consider utility and human rights as competing strategies for limiting the range of legitimate state action. Once again, Bentham provides a useful focus for our discussion. While Bentham insists on the importance of limiting the range of legitimate state action (1838:11, 495, VIII, .557 ff.), he also insists that (natural) rights do not set those limits. In fact, he argues that construed as limits on the state, natural rights 'must ever be, - the rights of anarchy', justifying insurrection whenever a single right is violated (1838:11, 522, 496, 501, 506). For Bentham, natural rights are absolute rights, and thus inappropriate to the real world of political action. In fact, though, no major human rights theorist argues that they are absolute. For example, Locke holds that the right to revolution is reserved by society, not the individual (1967: para. 243). Therefore, individual violations of human rights per se do not justify revolution. Furthermore, Locke supports revolution only in cases of gross, persistent and systematic violations of natural rights (1967: paras 204, 207, 225), as does Paine. The very idea of absolute rights is absurd from a human rights perspective, since logically there can be at most one absolute right, unless we (unreasonably) assume that rights never come into conflict. A more modest claim would be that human rights are 'absolute' in the sense that they override all principles and practices except other human rights. Even this doctrine, however, is rejected by most if not all major human rights theorists and documents. For example, Article I of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, after declaring that 'men are born, and always continue, free and equal in respect of their rights', adds that 'civil distinctions, therefore, can be founded only on public utility', thus recognising restrictions on the continued complete equality of rights. Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 29) permits such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and free- doms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights includes a similar general limiting proviso (Article 4) as well as particular limitations on most of the enumerated rights. Rights ordinarily 'trump' other considerations, but the mere presence of a right - even a basic human right - does not absolutely and automatically determine the proper course of action, all things considered. In certain exceptional circumstances, needs, utility, interests or righteousness may override rights. The duties correlative to rights, and even the trumping force of rights, are prima facie only. But other principles also have prima facie moral force. Sometimes this will be sufficient to overcome even the special entrenched priority of rights. The obligations arising from such rights therefore ought not to be discharged, all things considered. In such cases, we can speak of the right being 'infringed', since the (prima facie) obligation correlative to the right is not discharged, but it would be seriously misleading to say that it had been 'violated' (Thomson 1976, 1977). But if even basic human rights can be justifiably infringed, aren't rights ultimately subservient to utility? If recalcitrant political realities sometimes require subordinating natural rights, aren't we simply suggesting that human rights are merely utopian aspirations inappropriate to a world in which dirty hands are often a requirement of political action - and thus where utility is the only reasonable guide? Such a response misconstrues the relationship between rights and utility and the ways in which rights are overridden. Consider a very simple case, involving minor rights that on their face would seem to be easily overridden. If A promises to drive B and C to the movies but later changes his mind, in deciding whether to keep his promise (and discharge his rights-based obligations). A must consider more than the relative utilities of both courses of action for all the parties affected; in most cases, he ought to drive them to the movies even if that would reduce overall utility. At the very least he must ask them to excuse him from his obligation, this requirement (as well as the power to excuse) being a reflection of the right-holder's control over the rights relationship. Utility alone usually will not override even minor rights; we require more than a simple calculation of utility to justify infringing rights. The special priority of rights/titles, as we have seen, implies that the quality, not just the quantity, of the countervailing forces (utilities) must be taken into consideration. For example, if, when the promised time comes, A wants instead to go get drunk with some other friends, simply not showing up to drive B and C to the movies will not be justifiable even if that would maximise utility; the desire for a drunken binge is not a consideration that ordinarily will justifiably override rights. But if A accompanies an accident victim to the hospital, even if A is only one of several passers-by who stopped to offer help, and his action proves to be of no real benefit to the victim, usually this will be a sufficient excuse, even if utility would be maximised by A going to the movies. Therefore, even recasting rights as weighted interests (which would seem to be the obvious utilitarian 'fix' to capture the special priority of rights) still misses the point, because it remains essentially quantitative. Rights even tend to override an accumulation of comparable or parallel interests. Suppose that sacrificing a single innocent person with a rare blood factor could completely and permanently cure ten equally innocent victims of a disease that produces a sure, slow and agonising death. Each of the eleven has the 'same' right to life. Circumstances require, however, that a decision be made as to who will live and who will die. The natural rights theorist would almost certainly choose to protect the rights of the one individual - and such a conclusion, when faced with the scapegoat problem, is one of the greatest virtues of a natural rights doctrine to its advocates. This conclusion rests on a qualitative judgement that establishes the right, combined with the further judgement that it is not society's role to infringe such rights simply to foster utility, a judgement arising from the special moral priority of rights. Politically, such considerations are clearest in the case of extremely unpopular minorities. For example, plausible arguments can be made that considerations of utility would justify persecution of selected religious minorities (e.g. Jews for centuries in the West, Mormons in nineteenth-century America, Jehovah's Witnesses in contemporary Malawi), even giving special weight to the interests of members of these minorities and considering the precedents set by such persecutions. None the less, human rights demand that an essentially qualitative judgement be made that such persecutions are incompatible with a truly human life and cannot be allowed - and such judgements go a long way to explaining the relative appeal of human rights theories. But suppose that the sacrifice of one innocent person would save not ten but a thousand, or a hundred thousand, or a million people. All things considered, trading one innocent life for a million, even if the victim resists most forcefully, would seem to be not merely justifiable but demanded. Exactly how do we balance rights (in the sense of 'having a right'), wrongs (in the sense of 'what is right') and interests? Do the numbers count? If so, why, and in what way? If not, why not? Ultimately the defender of human rights is forced back to human nature, the source of natural or human rights. For a natural rights theorist there are certain attributes, potentialities and holdings that are essential to the maintenance of a life worthy of a human being. These are given the special protection of natural rights; any 'utility' that might be served by their infringement or violation would be indefensible, literally inhuman - except in genuinely extraordinary circumstances, the possibility of which cannot be denied, but the probability of which should not be overestimated. Extraordinary circumstances do force us to admit that, at some point, however rare, the force of utilitarian considerations builds up until quantity is transformed into quality. The human rights theorist, however, insists on the extreme rarity of such cases. Furthermore, exotic cases should not be permitted to obscure the fundamental difference in emphasis (and in the resulting judgements in virtually all cases) between utility and (human) rights. Nor should they be allowed to obscure the fact that on balance the flaws in rights-based theories and practices seem less severe, and without a doubt less numerous, than those of utility-based political strategies.

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Treat negative arguments with skepticism – the data behind their arguments are politically biased to prop up the current system of subordinating women’s concerns
Tickner 6, Feminist Methodologies or International Relations, J. Ann Ticker: Professor, School of IR at USC, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly: Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt University, Maria Stern: Lecturer and Researcher at the Department of Peace and Development Research, Goteborg University, and Jacqui True: Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Auskland, New Zealand, 2006, Cambridge University Press p. 37

These two cases, as with most feminist IR research, have avoided quantitative methods. As my case studies have demonstrated, fitting women and other marginalized people into methodologically conventional quantitative frameworks has been problematic. Many of the experiences of women’s lives have not yet been documented or analyzed, either within social science disciplines or by states. The choices that states make about ‘which data to collect is a political act. Traditional ways in which data are collected and analyzed do not lend themselves to answering many of the questions that feminists raise. The data that are available to scholars and, more importantly, the data that are not, determine which research questions get asked and how they are answered. Marilyn Waring describes how national accounting systems have been shaped and reshaped to help states frame their national security policies — specifically to understand how to pay for wars.22 In national accounting systems no value is attached to the environment, to unpaid work, to the reproduction of human life, or to its maintenance or care, tasks generally undertaken by women (Waring 1988: 3—4). Political decisions are made on the basis of data that policy elites choose to collect (Waring 1988: 302). Waring goes on to assert that, under the guise of value-free science, the economics of accounting has constructed a reality which believes that “value” results only when (predominantly) men interact with the marketplace (Waring 1988: 17— 18).

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Solvency:

The securitizing forced prostitution is uniquely damaging and must be resisted in all instances.
Sealing Cheng is a Sealing Cheng is the Henry Luce Assistant Professor in the Women’s Studies Department. She joined Wellesley in spring 2005. Her courses include: Introduction to Women’s Studies; Global Feminism; Love and Intimacy; and Asian Women on the Move. 2010, “On the move for love : migrant entertainers and the U.S. military in South Korea” (Pensylvania Studies in Human Rights)
Gijédmn-U.S. military camptown in South Korea-are not “really” what Korea is about. For example. My twenty-year-old Seoul National University friend told me that I as a foreigner, should not be going there because he felt ashamed of them; my sixty-year old landlord just frowned and turned her face away the few times I talked about my trips to Dongducheon; and a senior Korean anthropologist asked me to studydusa (ancestor worship) and shamanism instead if I “really wanted to learn about Ko-rean culture.” These reactions illuminated for me howgijichon symbolizes the antith- esis of what the ideal Korean nation should be. From the perspective of Koreans who shared in so many ways. The national discourse of economic suceess and globalization in the late 1990s, foreigners who want to learn about Korea should do so either through its heritage (shemanism, ancestral rites), through its economic achievement in becoming one of the Aslan miracles of the 1980s, or both. Politically. U.S. military presence in violates the ideal of national sovereignty. Culturally and socially, gijchon challenges the homogenous ideal of the nation that state and popular discourses promote. Katherine Moon has describe gijchon as “neither America nor Korea”-“hybrid towns, poaaesaing elements of America and Korea in the border of the residents. English and Korean language store signs. U.S. military slogans and logos juxtaposed with dolls garbed in traditional Korean dress."' In other words, their hybridity is in- consistent with the imagined nation. Koreans-not just giiichon women working as hostesses in the clubs, but everyone whose livelihood depends on the presence and needs of the U.S. military-therefore become internal. Geographically a part of South Korea, gijidron is politically. culturally, and socially a borderland, and gijchon Koreans are best kept on the margins of the nation. From the perspective of the anthropologist, this common tendency in mainstream Korean society to demarcate gijidson as "un-Korean” and (therefore) a site of danger makes griichon an illuminating site For the study of the constructions of Korean nationhood and oontagion. Mary Douglas suggests in Purity and Danger that "ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating, and punishing transgressions have as their main function to im- pose system on an inherently untidy scenario, certain moral values are upheld and certain social rules defined by beliefs in dangerous contagion. Gijchon speaks neither to the pride nor the sucess of South Korea as a modern nation-state. In fact. it interferes with the dominant fantasy of a globalized. modem South Korea. What gijidson represents, therefore, is what needs to be purged from the Korean nation. Foreign presence is a constant source of “internal cultural debates"’ about the nation. ln 2008 the world was surprised by the nicely candlelit vigils of millions in Seoul protesting the suspension of the ban against U.S. beef imports on the grounds of health concerns about madcow disease. U.S. and Korean, including Secretary of State Condoleeua Rice, repeated that the beef was safe but were oblivious to the het that the protestors’ concerns went way beyond the beeé in 2008 “mad cow" symbolized South Korean discontent about both domestic politics and relations with the United States. Apart from accusations that the South Korean govemment outlawed to U.S. demands so lift the ban in return for a Free Trade Agreement, the neollberal principles of privatization and redevelopment championed by President Lee Myung-balt promised eco- nomic and physical displacement for many, at a time when me South Ko- rean economy was reaching stagllation.


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In particular, US military officials prop up the current framework of masculinity. Only a movement against Korean prostitution would open up the possibility to reevaluate US foreign policy at a global level.
Gwyn Kirk is a founder member of Women for Genuine Security and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus. 3-14-08, “Gender and U.S. Bases in Asia-Pacific,” (http://www.fpif.org/articles/gender_and_us_bases_in_asia-pacific, Foreign Policy in Focus)

For the U.S. military, land and bodies are so much raw material to use and discard without responsibility or serious consequences to those in power. Regardless of gender, soldiers are trained to dehumanize others so that, if ordered, they can kill them. Sexual abuse and torture committed by U.S. military personnel and contractors against Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison illustrate a grim new twist on militarized violence, where race and nation “trumped” gender. White U.S. women were among the perpetrators, thereby appropriating the masculinized role. The violated Iraqi men, meanwhile, were forced into the feminized role. Gendered inequalities, which are fundamental to U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific region, affect men as well as women. Young men who live near U.S. bases see masculinity defined in military terms. They may work as cooks or bartenders who provide rest and relaxation to visiting servicemen. They may be forced to migrate for work to larger cities or overseas, seeking to fulfill their dreams of giving their families a better future. U.S. peace movements should not only address U.S. military involvement in the Middle East, but also in other parts of the world. Communities in the Asia-Pacific region have a long history of contesting U.S. militarism and offer eloquent testimonies to the negative impact of U.S. military operations there. These stories provide insights into the gendered dynamics of U.S. foreign and military policy, and the complicity of allied nations in this effort.




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We must contesting patriarchy in the debate space is critical to solve for status quo. A vote affirmative can bring about similar revolutions.
Jarvis 2000 D. S. L. Jarvis, 2000. [University of South Carolina Press, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline, p 155].

For feminists the most immediate remedy to masculinist androcentrism in International Relations and global politics is, then, an empirical one: add more women and stir. Reconstituting International Relations in fundamentally new ways involves bringing more women into the academy and into positions of power in international politics. By adding more female researchers, for example, feminists argue the proclivity to "malestream" theory can be checked by breaking down the boys' dub syndrome .71 Gender equity that and affirmative action policies as a means to engineer socially an end to overt discrimination have thus been the first order of business. From here, feminist women, "less bounded by any narrow disciplinary 156 International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism lens," can then "examine insights from diverse locations, situate them in larger transdisciplinarv contexts, and weave new understandings out of these multiple threads" by virtue of the "episternic advantage" they enjoy over men knowers.74 This, of course, is not just about more female representation as so-called empirical feminists would argue, but, from the perspective of standpoint feminists, about the ontological primacy of "women as knowers" combined with an attempt "to eliminate the fascism in our heads... build upon the open qualities of human discourse, and thereby intervene in the way knowledge is produced and constituted at the particular sites where a localized power-discourse prevails."' Equality in representation is only the first of many revolutions, a necessary-but-hardly sufficient condition to meet the challenges of thinking differently about how we think and know, and a recognition of how "gender both creates and reproduces a world of multiple inequalities that today threatens all of us."' Thus, "the task of ungendering power," notes Peterson, "is twofold-adding women to the existing world politics power structures and transforming those very power structures, ideologically and materially." This project has been common enough in International Relations, evidenced by increasing calls for more women researchers, more feminist analyses of international politics, and increased efforts to bring gendered perspectives and issues to bear upon the study of global events and processes. Yet, if these attempts appear diverse, all tend to be analogous, united by the common penchant to "reclaim the private." "The personal is political," writes Enloe, echoing the words of Susan Moller Okin.7' "Feminist tracings of early state formation," for example, have sought to highlight the "emergence and consolidation of public political power and the centralisation of authority" which concomitantly "constituted a sepa- rate domestic or private sphere that came to be associated with women and the feminine."" This false public/private dichotomy feminists see as an artificial dualism intended to sideline women into domestic servitude while depoliticizing the domestic sphere. That the "personal is political," suggests Enloe, means "that politics is not shaped merely by what happens in legislative debates, voting booths or war rooms." Rather, men, "who dominate public life, have told women to stay in the kitchen,. . . [and] have used their public power to construct private relationships in ways that [bolster] their masculinized political control."' Historically, men have thus appropriated public/political power, thereby denying women a legit- imate political voice and making them dependent. New feminist under- standings and research thus attempt to show how a reclamation of the private as political redefines the questions of International Relations and yr. Feminist Revisions of International Relations 157 the research agenda's scholars should otherwise be engaged with. "Accept- ing that the political is personal prompts one to investigate the politics of marriage, venereal disease and homosexuality," claims Enloc, "not as mar- ginal issues, but as matters central to the state. Doing this type of research becomes just as serious as studying military weaponry or taxation policy." The cult of masculinity, as V. Spike Peterson terms it, extends down into the depths of what otherwise appears as natural or given. The "cult of motherhood" and the notion of "women's work," for example, represent patriarchal norms culturally ingrained in the modem nation-state that jus- tifies "structural violence-inadequate health care, sexual harassment, and sex segregated wages, rights, and resources" for women .12 Indeed, for Peterson, the state is complicit in structural violence, albeit indirectly, "through its promotion of masculinist, heterosexist, and classist ideolo- gies-expressed, for example, in public education models, media images, the militarism of culture, welfare policies, and patriarchal law." Through "its selective sanctioning of nonstate violence, particularly in its policy of nonintervention in domestic violence," and through direct male brutality like "murder, rape, battering, [and] incest," Peterson claims that male domination is constantly reproduced, reaffirming the subjugation of wo-men as "the objects of masculinist social control." Reclaiming these "private spaces," events, and acts as public-political spaces demystifies the patriarchal base of the state and how it constructs and manipulates "the ideology describing public and private life." More importantly, this strategy opens up International Relations to a multiplicity of subjects, issues, and research agendas with all of them attempting to disrupt the boundaries imposed by the "radical bifurcation of asymmetrical public and private spheres"; so begins the project of "ungendering world politics.""
Inherency- US troops= driving force

US troops are the driving force behind the prostitution
Chunghee Sarah Soh, prof of Anthropology at San Francisco State, 1996, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 12, Page 1230

Moreover, economic development policies of the South Korean government since the early 1960s have included the exploitation of young women not only as cheap laborers at manufacturing companies but also as sex workers in international tourism. To help earn foreign currency, the government has condoned, if not openly promoted the commoditization of sex by using young women as kisaeng (professional female entertainers) for foreign male visitors. The kisaeng party became so popular among male Japanese tourists that a national women’s organization in Japan sent a letter of protest to the Korean tourism in 1973. In addition, the continued presence of U.S. troops in South Korea has unequivocally contributed to the creation and maintenance of the localized sex industry and military bases. Ironically, the media still use the world wianbu (“comfort women”) to refer to the women who cater to the sexual desires of American troops. The sexual violence against contemporary Korean “comfort women” by the American soldiers has been reported in the Korean mass media from time to time, but the unequal terms in the Status of the Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the low social status of the women involved in sex crimes committed by the US military have combined to help the criminals get away unpunished. The exploitation of Women’s sexuality as a commodity prospers under the political economy of transnational capitalism in contemporary South Korean patriarchy.




Inherency- US presence Key—US-ROK relations

Korean prostitutes are seen as “personal ambassadors” whose aim it is maintain the US-ROK relations.
Katharine Moon is head of the Department of Political Science and Chair of Asian Studies at Wellesley College, 1997, (“Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” Columbia University Press)
What began as a joint USFK-ROK venture to improve the discipline, welfare, and morale among U.S. troops in Korea turned Korean camptown prostitutes into instruments of foreign policy. Through the pursuit of the ROK government's "people-to-people diplomacy" toward the United States, the women became "personal ambassadors" who would be responsible for improving U.S.-ROK civil-military relations. During the Clean-Up Campaign, the prostitutes bore the burden of reconciling the differences between two races (blacks and whites) and two governments. Joint U.S.-ROK control over their bodies and behavior, through VD examinations and supervision of their interactions with GI customers, became an indicator of the status of base-community relations and the willingness of the ROKG to accommodate U.S. interests. Although they did not dictate policy, the women became transnational actors through their indispensable, though mostly involuntary, participation in the Clean-Up process. The women's key role in the Clean-Up was based on their function as the glue of USFK-ROK community relations. The prostitutes were the primary and often sole contact with Korean society that GIs had on a daily basis. A "Human Factors Research Report" on troop-community relations stated unequivocally, "Fraternization [in the form of prostitution] is near the core of troop-community relations here." 1 The same study found that "there is a significant number of men in most units who believe that more male-female fraternization here endears the American to Korea--makes him more willing to fight for Korea" and that "[m]ost officers believe that fraternization is generally a constructive force." 2 According to a key U.S. initiator of the Clean-Up, the Korean government also believed that prostitution facilitated security relations between the United States and Korea: As a general rule, I know that the [ROK] government was benevolent about prostitution because it was a real source of U.S.-Korean friendship and friendliness. If a fellow is that far away [from home], his sexual appetites are met, he's feeling pretty good, and he'll serve better. I think both sides didn't try to stamp out prostitution but rather to keep it within bounds. 3 The above supports Enloe's observation that women, whether wives of diplomats or military nurses, have been used to facilitate relations among men and "soften" the harsh and impersonal political environment in which men perform their public duties. 4 Korean women and their sexuality (within the boundaries set by the military and local authorities) were considered necessary to the smooth operation of the U.S. military organization in Korea.

Inherency- Presence= forced prostitution
Women are mistreated and abused in Korea by military personnel
15 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 230, 2000, Page 229-230 http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/berkwolj15&id=236&type=text&collection=journals

There is a core contradiction inherent in U.S. military policy and practice in East Asia. The security treaties and the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) that provide for U.S. bases, military operations, and port visits in South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines also compromise the security of local people. Negative social effects of the U.S. military presence on host communities include military prostitution, the abuse of local women, and the dire situation of mixed-race children fathered by U.S. military men. Grassroots organizations in South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines are trying to assist women and children in these communities by providing services and pushing for reform of the SOFAs. This article begins by examining the history and current status of U.S. military bases in South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, and the U.S. justifications for maintaining a strong military presence in East Asia. It will then discuss the effects of military training and culture on the host communities. The article will go on to provide a critique of the SOFAs. Finally, this article reviews grassroots activism and its efficacy. The article urges that significant changes in U.S. military policy and practice are necessary to safeguard host communities in East Asia from crime committed by U.S. military personnel, and to provide for the needs of mixed-race Amerasian children who are a result of relationships between East Asian women and U.S. military men.

Gender adv- “failed women”

Forced to provide sexual services, looked down upon as “fallen women”— they’re beaten into submission and forced to provide sexual services both directly and by circumstance.
Katharine Moon is head of the Department of Political Science and Chair of Asian Studies at Wellesley College, 1997, (“Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” Columbia University Press)

Still others were physically forced into prostitution by flesh-traffickers or pimps who waited at train and bus stations, greeted young girls arriving from the countryside with promises of employment or room and board, then"initiated" them--through rape--into sex work or sold them to brothels. Women also fell into prostitution by responding to fraudulent advertisements which offered appealing calls for employment as waitresses, storekeepers, singers, and entertainers. Some ads even promised"education" (kyoyuk) without specifying what the women would be expected to learn. 32 For example, one woman who had answered an advertisement for a job in a restaurant found that she was taken to a GI bar. There"[s]he was made to die [sic] her hair blond and wear braless T-shirts and hot pants" and was"beaten into submission" and"forced to provide sexual services" to GIs. This came at the heels of a history of deprivation and abuse; she had been orphaned as a child,"adopted" by a Korean family who used her as a"slave" to take care of the family's four boys, raped by the father, and kicked out by the sons. Then she went to work at a factory and married the owner's son, who physically abused her and abandoned her and their newborn son. 33 The overwhelming majority of the prostitutes have experienced a combination of poverty, low class status, physical, sexual, and emotional abuse even before entering the kijich'on world. Their identities had already become one of"fallen woman." Having lost their virginity and not having much family connections or education to fall back on, these women often expressed that there was not much else they could do; they were already"meat to be slaughtered on the butcher's block" (toma wi e innun kogi). Kim Yonja, who is unusual for having completed high school in the late 1950s, often speaks about being raped at 11 years of age by her cousin as one reason why she entered the kijich'on world. She believes this rape would not have occurred and that her life would have turned out better if her mother had been at home to protect her; but her mother had to work as a traveling peddler because her father had abandoned them. The youth and lack of formal education among the women who fell into kijich'on life made them vulnerable to the abuse and exploitation of owners and pimps. As mentioned in the Prologue, the vast majority of prostitutes from the 1950s to the 1970s had barely completed elementary school. During the spring of 1992, I met several old women, who had either worked as prostitutes or were then working as madams, who were illiterate. New initiates have also tended to be very young in age, from the late teens to the early twenties. The ROK Ministry of Health and Social Welfare reported that among 36,924 prostitutes documented in 1977, 21,305 were between 20 and 24 years old and 7,669 were between 15 and 19. 34 Nanhee reveals that she was too old, at 29, to"get to know this kind of world." 35 Many girls and young women have literally grown up in the camptowns, with the pimp or owner functioning at times as a parent/authority figure, disciplining women and bailing them out of financial straits (at high interests). Older, experienced prostitutes have also served as maternal figures and big sisters, teaching the women how to avoid pregnancy and trouble with the police and manage abusive owners. The women's unfamiliarity with English compounds their sense of abuse and humiliation. They feel that they cannot hold their own--in negotiating a price or terms of sexual service--in relation to GIs because they cannot understand the men or express themselves clearly and fully to them. Nanhee states that she"didn't know a word of English" when she began work in a kijich'on club:"If they [Americans] asked my name, I just said 'yes.' They would laugh and make fun of me. I was so embarrassed." 36 Similarly, Jin Soo, in the film Camp Arirang, expresses her frustration and resentment at the GIs who treat her as if she is"stupid" because she cannot understand them. If a woman begins work with a knowledge of"ABCs," she is ahead of others.

Gender adv- racial violence
Camptowns are the root cause of racial violence and social problems in South Korea. Club owners allow discriminatory practices for revenue.
Katharine Moon is head of the Department of Political Science and Chair of Asian Studies at Wellesley College, 1997, (“Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” Columbia University Press)
The U.S. military and the local Korean authorities pinpointed kijich'on prostitutes as the source of social problems and unrest, especially with respect to racial violence. 5 Most of the retired and current USFK community relations officials and former Subcommittee members whom I interviewed acknowledged that the "business girls" were the source of off-post black-white conflict in the early 1970s primarily because they were labeled as "black" or "white." Black prostitutes were looked down upon by Korean camptown residents, white servicemen, and "white" prostitutes alike. Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, most camptown R&R (Rest and Relaxation) establishments were segregated, not by policy but by choice and habit of the GI patrons. Accordingly, women generally worked in either "all-white" or "all-black" bars/clubs and tended not to mix their customers. But with the rise of black militancy in the U.S. military in the late 1960s and the social confusion wrought by the movement of troops and prostitutes during the early years of the Nixon Doctrine, prostitutes and GIs would sometimes cross the racial lines, both deliberately and inadvertently. Such mixing of racial partners sparked often violent reactions among the GIs. Fights between black and white soldiers were, in a sense, over territory, that is, who possesses which women and who is trespassing on whose women. Many Korean prostitutes did discriminate against black servicemen because of their own racial prejudices and ignorance. But they also kept their distance from the black soldier out of economic necessity, which was informed by the racial hierarchy imposed on them by white soldiers, club owners, and other prostitutes. First, there were more white bars/clubs than black ones, meaning more white customers to sell drinks and sex to. Second, many, if not most, of the white clubs prohibited blacks from entering the establishments, which meant that most prostitutes did not have to make the choice of accepting or rejecting black offers for drinks or sex. Even if the women did interact with blacks, the club owner could fire them because the owner himself often feared offending and losing white patrons who opposed mixed-race patronage. Third, and most serious, the women feared that fraternizing with black servicemen would mean physical abuse and/or loss of income from white servicemen. 6 Regardless of the women's motivations, their display of "white favoritism" provoked the anger and frustration of black servicemen. Correspondence from installation commanders to the Commanding General of the EUSA and the Joint Committee, as well as reports from the USFK Civil Affairs Conference, 7 pinpointed the bars/clubs as the loci of camptown racial unrest and emphasized the need to make club owners control their employees' (particularly the prostitutes') discriminatory conduct. The head of the U.S. Army Garrison in Yongsan (USAGY), near It'aewon in Seoul, 8 stated the seriousness of discriminatory practices and the consequent imposition of off-limits decrees: An extensive study of the clubs of the Itaewon area by members of this headquarters has revealed that intolerable discriminatory practices are being allowed, or at least passively condoned, by club managers. . . . USAGY and members of the Equal Opportunity Council met with the seven Itaewon club owners and pointed out to them that they were showing discrimination toward the black soldier versus the white soldier in the areas of overall attitude, greeting, seating, and the actions of the ir entertainment girls. . . . [Soon after,] [a]ll but the King Club had made tremendous improvements. . . . The King Club of the Itaewon area will be Off Limits effective 2 June 71, in accordance with EA Reg. [Eighth Army Regulation] 192- 96. 9







Gender adv- demeaning
The use of Korean comfort women is widespread and demeaning. They’re called derogatory names, and blame them for their situation. Regulation of this prostitution has empirically failed.
Na Young Lee is a Professor of the Department of Women’s Studies at the University of Maryland, 9-22-07, Feminist Studies, “The construction of military prostitution in South Korea during the U.S military rule, 1945-1948.” (http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=2&hid=104&sid=93c32b30-26b1-48d9-bf04-d95ce917b36c%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mfh&AN=31861077, EbscoHost)
SINCE SEPTEMBER 1945 when the 24th Army Corps, consisting of some 70,000 soldiers and led by General John R. Hodge, arrived to accept the transfer of power over Korea from the Japanese empire, U.S. soldiers stationed on military bases have had a significant presence in Korean society. With the formal independence of South Korea, the number of U.S. personnel was reduced to 22,823 in 1948, and the withdrawal of occupation forces began on June 30, 1949. (1) Soon, however, the Korean War turned the peninsula back into a zone of protracted military confrontation. According to a Korean nongovernmental organization (NGO), 101 military facilities, including fifty camps, entangle the Korean territory in a complex web. (2) Despite the decline in the number of bases as the political atmosphere has changed over time, the United States had at least 35,000 troops in South Korea in the early 2000s. Small villages that depend entirely on the U.S. military economy have developed around the main U.S. bases. These "camptowns" (in Korean, gijichon (3)), with their commercial districts filled with clubs, bars, brothels, convenience stores, pawnshops, barbershops, tailor shops, photo and portrait shops, and drug stores, center on selling sex to soldiers. Gijichon prostitution is a large-scale activity; for example, in Gyeonggi Province prostitution is concentrated in four large camptowns: Dongducheon, Pyeongtaek, Paju, and Uijeongbu. More than one-tenth (11 percent) of the total population of the province is engaged in military prostitution. The number of so-called entertainment workers with health certificates, required to enter and work in the camptowns, reached around 30,000 in the 1960s and remained around 20,000 in the 1970s and 1980s, amounting to approximately one sex worker for every two to three soldiers at that time. (4) Despite the official illegality of domestic prostitution, the Korean government tacitly condones and actively regulates prostitution around U.S. military bases. As Katharine Moon has shown, camptown prostitution has actually served the economic development of Korea, as well as its national security. The presence of U.S. troops contributed 25 percent of South Korea's GNP, playing an especially important role during the 1960s, and prostitution and related business supported over half of the U.S. camptowns' economy. (5) The Korean government has demarcated these spaces as open only to U.S. military personnel and foreign tourists; the two largest gijichon, Dongducheon and Pyeongtaek, were designated as Special Tourism Districts in 1997. (6) Women working in the entertainment industry of these areas must be registered and are subject to regular examinations for sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). Other Koreans commonly call these sex workers derogatory names, such as yanggalbo (Western whore) and yanggongju (Western princess). The demeaning treatment of these women as pariahs, dirty trash, and immoral or "fallen" blames them personally for their situation, differentiates them from women identified as chaste daughters and faithful wives, and ultimately helps to maintain Korean national pride. The Korean government has successfully ghettoized the gijichon as buffer zones that prevent U.S. soldiers from entering Korean society and prohibit ordinary Koreans, especially "respectable" Korean women, from interacting with U.S. men, while reaping the economic benefits that the U.S. military presence and the sex trade serving foreign soldiers provide. The presence of prostitutes around military bases and the state regulation of sex workers who serve soldiers have been common features of European, U.S., and Asian military systems, especially in situations of imperial occupation or colonial domination. Rita Brock and Susan Thistlethwaite indicate that the sex trade in the vicinity of military bases is ubiquitous; indeed, camp followers have customarily accompanied European armies since at least the seventeenth century. (7) Britain maintained a system of regulated prostitution in its colonies, including Bombay, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai, after domestic prostitution was abolished in 1886, and women serving British soldiers were required to undergo regular examinations designed to detect STDs. (8) Since World War II, the large-scale sale of women's sexual labor to U.S. soldiers has aroused public outrage in Okinawa, the Philippines, and Thailand. (9) Feminist scholarship has analyzed not only the control of military prostitution by states, occupying armies, and colonial regimes but also the connections among militarism, sexuality, nationalism, and colonialism as interlocking forces that construct and maintain military prostitution. (10) However, the process through which U.S. camptown prostitution became entrenched in South Korea remains unexplored. Few analyses consider both the asymmetrical power relationships that have existed between Koreans and foreign occupiers and the symbiotic relationships that were constructed between the U.S. military and local governments, which must be understood within the context of Korean history, culture, and society. Korean feminist NGOs have had significant success in bringing military prostitution into Korean public consciousness, while challenging patriarchal assumptions and shifting attention from the personal characteristics of sex workers to structural, systemic, and social problems. (11) For them, all forms of prostitution are inherently coercive and abusive and constitute violence against women, and the suggestion is that prostitution has been introduced or at least greatly fomented in Korea through colonialist or imperialist interventions by other countries.

Gender adv- laundry list

These women suffer from disease, unwanted abortions, mental illness, physical violence, racism and sexism.
15 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 230, 2000, Page 243 http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/berkwolj15&id=236&type=text&collection=journals

The women work from early evening until dawn, encouraging the men to buy drinks, and making arrangements for sex. The sexual arrangements may last for what is referred to in the bars as a "short time," meaning an hour or two, or they may last overnight. Some women work on contract to one man for his tour of duty and live that entire time in a room that he rents. A woman involved in prostitution may take on a soldier's homesickness, frustration, alienation, boredom, or fear, and, at the same time, deal with his sexism and racism. She may drink or do drugs as a way of coping with the job."' Militarized prostitution has had very serious effects on women's health, including HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, drug and alcohol dependency, and mental illness."' Women who work in the bars, massage parlors, and brothels near U.S. bases are also particularly vulnerable to physical and sexual violence."






Gender adv- objectification/ violence

The Camptowns prosper as a result of agreements between the U.S. and South Korean governments. Only a pullout can solve the widespread objectification of women.

Chunghee Sarah Soh, prof of Anthropology at San Francisco State, 1996, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 12, Page 1230

Moreover, economic development policies of the South Korean government since the early 1960s have included the exploitation of young women not only as cheap laborers at manufacturing companies but also as sex workers in international tourism. To help earn foreign currency, the government has condoned, if not openly promoted the commoditization of sex by using young women as kisaeng (professional female entertainers) for foreign male visitors. The kisaeng party became so popular among male Japanese tourists that a national women’s organization in Japan sent a letter of protest to the Korean tourism in 1973. In addition, the continued presence of U.S. troops in South Korea has unequivocally contributed to the creation and maintenance of the localized sex industry and military bases. Ironically, the media still use the world wianbu (“comfort women”) to refer to the women who cater to the sexual desires of American troops. The sexual violence against contemporary Korean “comfort women” by the American soldiers has been reported in the Korean mass media from time to time, but the unequal terms in the Status of the Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the low social status of the women involved in sex crimes committed by the US military have combined to help the criminals get away unpunished. The exploitation of Women’s sexuality as a commodity prospers under the political economy of transnational capitalism in contemporary South Korean patriarchy.




Gender adv- Patriarchy= root cause of war

Patriarchy is the root cause of war – without confronting militarized masculinity, peace is unsustainable
Cockburn 10, Cynthia Department of Sociology, The City University London, UK b Centre for the Study of Women and
Gender, University of Warwick, UK (2010) 'Gender Relations as Causal in Militarization and War', International Feminist Journal of Politics, 12: 2, 139 — 157

By contrast, patriarchal gender relations as a cause of war, I would suggest, most often fall in the ‘root cause’ or ‘favourable conditions’ category, and here we have to pay attention to culture. With the exception of the abduction of the mythical Helen of Troy (and the spurious attempt of George W. and Laura Bush to portray the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 as a war to save Afghan women from repression by the Taliban) wars are not fought ‘for’ gender issues in the way they are sometimes fought ‘for’ oil resources, or ‘for’ national autonomy. Instead, they foster militarism and militarization. They make war thinkable. They make peace difficult to sustain. As noted above, women close to militarization and war are observant of cultures, cultures as they manifest themselves in societies before, in and after armed conflicts. If we think of the war system as having a cyclical or spiralling life, as a continuum over time, proceeding from the discourse of militarist ideology, through material investment in militarization, aggressive policy-making, outbreaks of war, short firefights, prolonged stalemates, ceasefires, demobilization, periods of provisional peace, anxieties about security, rearmament and so on, and if we look closely at the social relations in which individuals and groups enact these various steps, that is where it is possible to see gender relations at work, pushing the wheel around. The above account of a feminist standpoint, generating an understanding of war that contradicts the hegemonic view, is derived first and foremost from my empirical research among women’s antiwar organizations and networks. But, closely involved with that movement, there is a world of feminist scholars (men as well as women) who have striven over the past three decades to articulate in a growing library of written work the understandings arising among women war survivors and activists. Many collected editions bring together research and reporting from a range of different countries and periods (for instance, Cooke and Woollacott 1993; Lorentzen and Turpin 1998; Moser and Clark 2001; Giles and Hyndman 2004). Research-based monographs show the influence of gender relations at points along the continuum of militarization and war. Robert Dean (2001), for instance, in his study of the Kennedy administration taking the USA to war in Vietnam, shows masculinism at work in preparation for war. Susan Jeffords (1989) in The Remasculinization of America, shows, through an analysis of films and novels, national efforts to salvage masculine pride after such a defeat. Many firsthand accounts show in painful detail how, in military training, patriarchal masculinity lends itself to exploitation for war-fighting, and how violence is eroticized in masculine fantasy (Theweleit 1987). Together such studies articulate the feminist perception that patriarchal gender relations are among the ‘root causes’ of militarism and war.

Gender adv- overlooked/ tools of the nation

Sex workers are tools of the nation. South Korean government forces these women into a cycle of prostitution by classifying their line of work as patriotism.

Katharine Moon is head of the Department of Political Science and Chair of Asian Studies at Wellesley College, 1997, (“Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” Columbia University Press)
But more significantly, the active involvement of U.S. military personnel in prostitution control points to a larger disparity in power between the U.S. and Korean governments in the early 1970s that helped effect a major shift in the ROK government's attitude toward prostitution and VD control. With this change, the USFK could politically afford to "interfere" in the "internal affairs of the host nation" without seriously risking Korean resistance and criticism. It was the Korean government, not the U.S. military, that was placed in the position of defending its actions and inactions regarding camptown prostitution and other problems plaguing the GI's life. U.S. assistance to ROK health authorities served as practical means of getting the Koreans to do what they were willing in spirit, though sometimes lacking in know-how and funds, to do. The Nixon Doctrine and the reduction of U.S. troops in Korea allowed the USFK to place the burden of official responsibility and accountability for camptown prostitution fully on the Korean government. Although the reduction of VD rates among U.S. servicemen was the primary goal of prostitution/VD control for the USFK, the improvement of U.S.-ROK relations through local-level cooperation and the enhancement of Korea's image was the driving force behind the ROK government's control effort. Without doubt, the Korean people regarded camptown VD as such'i byong, or "disease of shame," 82 which generated a negative image of Korea. 83 The MoHSA official who oversaw the various prostitution/VD control programs in 1971-72 stated clearly that the purpose of the control effort was "to give a cleaner impression of camptowns and of Korea" and emphasized that the BCCUC's purification movement was not intended for the entire nation but solely for U.S. camp areas, especially those with large concentration of troops. 84 Only camptown prostitutes, not Korean prostitutes in general, were examined for VD (in the beginning of the Campaign). 85 The Korean government intended to mobilize camptown prostitutes to serve as "personal ambassadors" to the numerous GIs she sexually contacted, and the task of the Purification Movement was to transform her from being a bad ambassador to a good one. The Blue House Political Secretary who oversaw the BCCUC programs stressed that camptown prostitutes needed to be taught how to work correctly. He recounted his visits to camptown areas, where he asked the women, Why did Japan develop from nothing to greatness? He answered for them by emphasizing that they should imitate the spirit of Japanese prostitutes who sold their bodies to the post-1945 U.S. occupation forces: The Japanese prostitute, when she finished with the GI, did not get up to go get the next GI (for more money) but knelt before him and pleaded with him to help rebuild Japan. The spirit of the Japanese prostitute was concerned with the survival of her fatherland. The patriotism of the Japanese prostitute spread to the rest of the society to develop Japan. 86 Such a view clearly established camptown prostitutes' sex work as a vital form of patriotism, and lower-level Korean officials echoed such words in their regular educational lectures to the women. For example, women were urged during such classes in the Uijongbu area to "take charge of national prestige" (Kugwi rul tamdang hara). 87 One former camptown prostitute who worked in Tongduchon and Songt'an in the first half of the 1970s recalled: During every Etiquette and Good Conduct Lecture [sponsored monthly by local camptown officials], the local mayor or local public information officer or public peace officer would . . . give the introductory remarks. They would say, "All of you, who cater to the U.S. soldiers, are patriots. All of you are nationalists working to increase the foreign exchange earnings of our country." They said that we are servants of the nation and that we should live and work with pride. And then they told us not to show humiliating things [behavior] to the U.S. soldiers, to maintain our dignity as Korean women. 88 The control of camptown women's bodies and sexual health was integral to improving deteriorated USFK- ROK relations in the early years of the Nixon Doctrine. Just as the Clean-Up Campaign in general helped mitigate tensions between the ROK government and the USFK, the Subcommittee found that those camptowns which addressed the VD problem to the satisfaction of the local U.S. command leaders possessed a "spirit of mutual cooperation . . . between the Base Command and local Korean officials" and to have "excellent" civil-military relations. 89


Gender adv- sexism

Military systems cause violence against women and sexism. These must be rejected in all instances.
15 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 230, 2000, Page 240-241 http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/berkwolj15&id=236&type=text&collection=journals
According to feminist scholars of military systems and international relations, militarism depends on a clearly gendered division of labor and the maintenance of hierarchy, including sexism and violence against women. Military socialization involves the construction of a militarized masculinity that emphasizes heroism, physical strength, emotional detachment, the capacity for violence and killing, and an appearance of invulnerability." This view of masculinity involves the construction of male sexuality as assertive and controlling," and results in three consequences: the need for the institutionalization of military prostitution, U.S. military abuse of women in host communities, and sexual abuse of women in the military.


Women are coerced into being military prostitutes. This reinforces patriarchal norms.
15 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 230, 2000, Page 242 http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/berkwolj15&id=236&type=text&collection=journals
South Korea serves as a good demonstration of the impact of military prostitution. The U.S. military insists that women who work in the clubs, bars, and massage parlors of the "GI Towns" be tested regularly for sexually-transmitted diseases. In South Korea, women must obtain a weekly ID number from an official clinic as proof of their "clean" health status before being allowed to enter such bars." If they do not pass this test, they are quarantined until they do so." As further protection for U.S. military personnel, clubs and bars that employ women without ID numbers are deemed off-limits by U.S. military officials. The assumption is that the women are the source of sexually transmitted diseases, not the men. In 1989, roughly 18,000 women in South Korea were registered with the local health authorities, and, thus able to work in the bars and clubs. In 1999, it was estimated that "over 10,000 domestic women and 2,000 immigrant women serve[d] as sex providers in Kijich'on" [GI Towns] in South Korea.' Typically these are women who come from poor, rural families and who move to urban areas to work in factories. They are drawn to the bars as a way of making more money than they could at factory jobs.' Military prostitution "[buys] off women . . . with higher wages than they can earn in the industrial wage labor sector,", and is, in effect, "a dumping ground ... between the patriarchal family structure and the industrializing labor force."


The impact to such treatment of women is a series of dehumanizing acts that include disease, unwanted abortions, mental illness, physical violence, racism and sexism.
15 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 230, 2000, Page 243 http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/berkwolj15&id=236&type=text&collection=journals
The women work from early evening until dawn, encouraging the men to buy drinks, and making arrangements for sex. The sexual arrangements may last for what is referred to in the bars as a "short time," meaning an hour or two, or they may last overnight. Some women work on contract to one man for his tour of duty and live that entire time in a room that he rents. A woman involved in prostitution may take on a soldier's homesickness, frustration, alienation, boredom, or fear, and, at the same time, deal with his sexism and racism. She may drink or do drugs as a way of coping with the job."' Militarized prostitution has had very serious effects on women's health, including HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, drug and alcohol dependency, and mental illness."' Women who work in the bars, massage parlors, and brothels near U.S. bases are also particularly vulnerable to physical and sexual violence."



Gender adv- sexism

Prostitution in the military leads to objectification, racism, colonialism, and dehumanization, all of which need to be rejected
15 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 2001, page 631, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ndlep15&id=637&type=text&collection=journals
The attitudes and communication of military personnel in social situations during downtime displays this objectification. "[T]he guys are talking to one another, relating to one another" while surrounded by prostituted women, who are waiting to supply the flesh for sexual transactions. The American Soldier commonly refers to Filipina women as "Little Brown Fucking Machines Fueled by Rice,"5s "succinctly racializing and colonializing ('little brown,' 'powered with rice'), sexualizing ('fucking') and de-humanizing ('machines') Asian Pacific women, in just seven words."59 The woman-objectifying environment, need for a pressure valve, and desire of the military to pacify its troops synergetically encourage the consumption of prostitution. Through both action and inaction, the military continues to provide this necessary luxury item.


Troops are trained to look at the ‘enemy’ as inhuman. This mindset spills over, causing violent interactions between them and women.
15 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 230, 2000, Page 249-250 http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/berkwolj15&id=236&type=text&collection=journals
This physical, economic, and cultural separation reinforces the emotional separation that troops learn as part of their training for war. This training relies on their being able to objectify and dehumanize "the enemy.” This emotional distancing process, as well as the experience of combat, can make troops edgy, fearful, frustrated, alienated, and aggressive. These negative feelings are displaced onto the people in host communities through the actions of the U.S. military personnel, including reckless driving, assaults on local civilians, and violence against women.'



Security concerns within the South Korean government force a panic-driven decision to maintain the status quo, continuing the cycle of violence against women.
15 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 230, 2000, Page 251-252 http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/berkwolj15&id=236&type=text&collection=journals
Differences in the SOFAs can be explained in terms of legal, political, and economic considerations. SOFAs depend in part on the laws of the host countries. Host governments can argue that U.S. military operations must conform with their national laws. Although there is a power differential among East Asian governments, none of them negotiates with the United States as an equal partner. The governments of South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines see their national security as intertwined with that of the United States, partly because they continue to depend on the United States militarily, politically, or economically.' They are willing to maintain local conditions that will support U.S. military bases and operations in their countries, even if this means going against public opinion, or paying scant attention to military violence against women or the treatment of Amerasian children.


Military systems cause violence against women and sexism. These must be rejected in all instances.
15 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 230, 2000, Page 240-241 http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/berkwolj15&id=236&type=text&collection=journals
According to feminist scholars of military systems and international relations, militarism depends on a clearly gendered division of labor and the maintenance of hierarchy, including sexism and violence against women. Military socialization involves the construction of a militarized masculinity that emphasizes heroism, physical strength, emotional detachment, the capacity for violence and killing, and an appearance of invulnerability." This view of masculinity involves the construction of male sexuality as assertive and controlling," and results in three consequences: the need for the institutionalization of military prostitution, U.S. military abuse of women in host communities, and sexual abuse of women in the military.


Gender adv- patriarchal norms

Women are coerced into being military prostitutes, thus reinforcing patriarchal norms.
15 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 230, 2000, Page 242 http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/berkwolj15&id=236&type=text&collection=journals

South Korea serves as a good demonstration of the impact of military prostitution. The U.S. military insists that women who work in the clubs, bars, and massage parlors of the "GI Towns" be tested regularly for sexually-transmitted diseases. In South Korea, women must obtain a weekly ID number from an official clinic as proof of their "clean" health status before being allowed to enter such bars." If they do not pass this test, they are quarantined until they do so." As further protection for U.S. military personnel, clubs and bars that employ women without ID numbers are deemed off-limits by U.S. military officials. The assumption is that the women are the source of sexually transmitted diseases, not the men. In 1989, roughly 18,000 women in South Korea were registered with the local health authorities, and, thus able to work in the bars and clubs. In 1999, it was estimated that "over 10,000 domestic women and 2,000 immigrant women serve[d] as sex providers in Kijich'on" [GI Towns] in South Korea.' Typically these are women who come from poor, rural families and who move to urban areas to work in factories. They are drawn to the bars as a way of making more money than they could at factory jobs.' Military prostitution "[buys] off women . . . with higher wages than they can earn in the industrial wage labor sector,", and is, in effect, "a dumping ground ... between the patriarchal family structure and the industrializing labor force.



Gender adv- agency ext.

The devaluation of agency eradicates the capacity to make meaningful political judgments. Agency is a prerequisite for every value and a necessary condition for establishing a just society.
Anthony Lang, Jr. The American University in Cairo, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5 (1): 67-107, 1999, p. 77-79
This article proposes that the attribution of state responsibility undermines the agency of individual citizens. This consequence is morally important because agency is the basis of first generation human rights, or political and civil rights. Without agency, individuals will be subjects and not citizens, that is, they will become pliant adherents to the will of the government and not political actors interested in and able to affect the future of their political community. Certainly, other factors will contribute to the undermining of' first generation human rights, ones that have no relation to the attribution of state responsibility, or even a relation to foreign policy. But, as this article will argue, the attribution of state responsibility contributes toward the undermining of those rights in a number of ways. What is agency, and why is it so important for civil life? The concept of agency has been a part of' sociology since Max Weber's analyses of it (Weber, 1964: 87﷓157). In the past 15 years, it has found its way into the discipline of International Relations as well, specifically through the works of Alexander Wendt (Wendt, 1987) who has generally followed the debates in sociology that focus on agency and structure. The debate in International Relations parallels that between Weber from Marx ﷓ are individual, goal seeking persons or social and political structures more important in understanding human interaction? In International Relations, the question has been posed as ﷓﷓ are individual, goal seeking states or the structure of the international system more important in understanding the outcomes of international political interaction? While drastically simplified, this question captures the debate in the social sciences, including International Relations, concerning the question of agency. The notions of agency that underlie the arguments of' this article, however, are drawn more from political philosophy than from the sociological literature. More specifically, my notion of' agency draws on three political philosophers. Hannah Arendt has argued that action defines the human person in the political realm, that without the ability to remake the web of social and political relations that action provides there can be no separate sphere defined as the political (Arendt, 1958). Charles Taylor has also placed agency at the center of his attempts to understand the political. He has argued persuasively that human agency is primarily the ability to interpret the self's actions in a meaningful way, i.e. a self﷓ interpretation that cannot be reduced to mere biological desire (Taylor, 1985). Richard Flathman's analyses of liberalism rely on a form of agency in his argument that liberalism requires individuals who are able to resist the encroachments of normalization and institutionalization as they assert themselves through their actions, words and thoughts (Flathman, 1992). Following these three thinkers, I assume the following meaning for agency ﷓﷓ agency is the ability to act and speak publicly with meaningful intentions in such a way as to have an effect on the world. It requires the ability to interpret those actions in ways that may not always be communicable at first, but do presume some sense of shared meaning (Taylor, 1985: 25).18 Furthermore, following Arendt, the ability to act is central to the creation of the political sphere. Without action, politics could not take place, for it is through actions that communities are constituted. Finally following Flathman, strong notions of agency are necessary for liberal and democratic citizenship. Unless individuals can think and act qua individuals, they will be unable to create a political community in which their rights are protected. Agency is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for creation of a community that respects civil and political rights. While this definition cannot be considered final, the elements of meaningfulness, publicness and willfulness are all central to the understanding of agency I am using here. How does the attribution of state responsibility undermine individual agency? Because the attribution of state responsibility does not depend on the responsibility of individuals within the state, there is a prima facie sense in which individual agency is irrelevant to considerations of international responsibility. While being irrelevant does not cause something to disappear, it certainly does not help in making that thing an important consideration. But even more importantly, certain manifestations of state responsibility tend to undermine individual responsibility and agency. This article focuses on three aspects of agency ﷓﷓ physical, legal and political. Each one of these aspects of agency is necessary to be an active citizen as opposed to simply a pliant subject of a community. Physical agency means having a level of health and welfare that would allow one to pursue political activity. Legal agency means having the legal status as a citizen necessary to protect one's civil rights. Political agency, perhaps the most difficult to identify, is the set of political beliefs and ideas that prompt an individual to act on behalf of his or her own interests in the public sphere. Again, Arendt's work on political action captures the idea suggested here ﷓﷓ the idea that political action is not just an addition to our daily lives, but something ﷓which distinguishes us from animals and which is necessary for our happiness. To inculcate the idea that political action is a value in and of itself is a necessary step in the direction of a true democracy (Arendt, 1958)


Gender adv- agency ext.

This concept of agency outweighs all other impacts. Establishing a framework in which life is worth living is a prerequisite to ethical decision-making.
Jeffrey Isaac, Professor of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, American Political Science Review, March 1996 v90 n1 p61(13)
Action, then, represents a kind of civic initiative whereby humans resist degradation and assert their dignity. When we act we define ourselves for ourselves, and in so doing we inscribe the world as our world.(18) This sheds a different light on why Arendt laments the "politically pernicious doctrine" that life is the highest good. It is not because she devalues life but precisely because she values living freely - both terms are important here - that she places so much emphasis on the capacity to begin anew, the basis of courageous civic initiative. A careful reading of the chapter on labor in The Human Condition reveals that the "philosophy of life" Arendt deplores is not really a strong conviction about the dignity of the human personality or the sanctity of human life; it is the ethos of consumption that she associates with modern mass society, the idea that the essence of life is the appropriation of material objects, and that human productivity is the preeminent criterion of human well-being. It is this idea she resists. Yet, she is careful not to dismiss categorically the emphasis on basic material thriving that is the product of the Enlightenment. She describes it as politically rather than humanly pernicious. Why? Perhaps because she does not wish to deny completely the value of such an ethos but only to caution against its hegemony. The emphasis on basic human needs that has informed so much of modern moral philosophy has helped to advance the idea of an elemental, universal humanity, an idea Arendt does not reject but cannot embrace. For the irony is that the modern age, which proclaims the value of life above all else, is also the age of genocidal mass murder. This was surely not an irony lost on Arendt. I would suggest, then, that when she places action over life, she is not endorsing a mystique of heroic sacrifice or the existential confrontation with death but, rather, a conception of civic initiative that alone can affirm basic human rights and dignities. She wants to resist the enormous brutality and suffering characteristic of the twentieth century. She does so, however, not by appealing to a doctrine of natural rights before which men are passive recipients but by emphasizing the activity of human beings, who can only achieve their dignity by doing something about it. In a world filled with cruelty, mendacity, and callous indifference, such activity will surely often involve danger, and the person who acts will be a person of courage, willing to endure sacrifice and perhaps risk death in the name of a higher value. But the risk is endured in the name of a higher value - human dignity - and not out of an existential attraction to limit-situations


Case outweighs

Refuse the the negative’s impact calculus – their body counts uphold disembodied political subjects while ignoring the politics of the everyday
Jennifer Hyndman, Geography Professor, Simon Fraser University, 2/07, The Professional Geographer 59:1

Jenkins, Jones, and Dixon (2003, 58) ponder a related question, asking whether there is ‘‘a distinct critical edge to feminist research’’ in geography. That is to say, is feminist geography the same as or different from critical approaches in geography generally and in political geography specifically? Feminists, queer theorists, and scholars of racism have demonstrated that the political cannot be contained by a class-based analysis: the personal, the sexual, the cultural and the corporeal are all political too (Sparke 2004). Nor is the political solely the domain of states, their relations of power to one another, their institutions, and relations to their citizens. Feminists have long argued that the personal is the political, while eschewing the privatization of such politics in the domestic sphere. The political is constitutive (Martin 2004); that is, it ‘‘implies an approach to the political as an ongoing process in which societies are made— constituted—in and through struggle’’ (Staeheli and Kofman 2004, 3). Feminists both inside and outside of geography have also been advocates of reconceptualizing what constitutes the big ‘P’ political, the proper subjects of political geography. Much ‘‘contemporary political geography describes a ‘world without people’ or at least a world of abstract, disembodied political subjects…The ways in which knowledge is produced within political geography constitute a masculinist practice. It yields a kind of knowledge that is claimed to be universal (or at least all-encompassing) and impartial’’ (Staeheli and Kofman 2004, 5). Critical geopolitics, a camp within political geography, has undertaken the challenge of questioning, deconstructing, and exposing dominant political scripts that make such universal claims (Dalby 1994;O ´ Tuathail 2000). It questions assumptions in a taken-for-granted world and examines the institutional modes of producing such a world vis-a`-vis writing about its geography and politics (Dalby 1991). If critical geopolitics undermines the universality of knowledge claims from the realist/international relations traditions within geopolitics, then the question remains whether feminist geography, or feminist geopolitics specifically, contributes something distinctive. It does. Like scholars of critical geopolitics, feminist geographers have illustrated that the ‘‘global visions and grand theorizing’’ of political geography in the main have meant that the politics of the everyday is elided (Sharp 2004, 94). Critical geopolitics, however, has been charged with being disembodied and free-floating in its own problematic ways (Sharp 2000). While arguing against positions that are unmarked, unmediated, and transcendent, critical geopolitical writing can unwittingly become part of this category (Sparke 2000). Embodied vision, that is to say ontologically committed partial perspectives, may have the potential to subvert dominant geopolitical narratives, actions that might have concrete effects on the lives of people who are players in such events (Hyndman 2004). As Dalby (2003, 4) cautions, ‘‘recent debates under the rubric of critical geopolitics are always in danger of becoming discussions of social science method rather than engagements with politics, discussions of the relative merits of various theorists rather than critiques of the geopolitical reasoning in vogue in world politics.’’While reclaiming method as a key part of claims to knowledge, feminist thinking in political geography aims to rectify disembodied knowledge production and promote epistemologically embodied ways of knowing.


Solvency—deconstructing key


By deconstructing the system of forced prostitution we deconstruct the ideology behind it.
Na Young Lee is a Professor of the Department of Women’s Studies at the University of Maryland, 9-22-07, Feminist Studies, “The construction of military prostitution in South Korea during the U.S military rule, 1945-1948.” (http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=2&hid=104&sid=93c32b30-26b1-48d9-bf04-d95ce917b36c%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mfh&AN=31861077, EbscoHost)

The system of camptown prostitution prevailing today was constructed under U.S. Army Military Government rule between 1945 and 1948. Despite formal prohibitions against traffic in women and licensed prostitution, the U.S. military government continued to regulate prostitutes and control the spread of STDs among its troops by utilizing the infrastructure initially created by the Japanese, but now shifting public brothels to camptowns near bases and delegating responsibility for the medical surveillance of prostitutes to local authorities. The practice and policies of military prostitution in South Korea were erected and deployed through the two phases of colonization. The foundations of the two major elements of gijichon--red-light districts as commercialized spaces centered on brothels and a government-controlled registration system with compulsory STD examinations--were established by the Japanese with their system of licensed prostitution. Military prostitution for U.S. forces in Korea began as soon as Korea was liberated, when the United States took over the remains of Japan's colonial infrastructure and adopted policies to control STDs that tolerated the concentration of gijichon prostitution in camptowns near bases. Because Korean prostitutes were seen as conduits of STDs, concerns about the health of U.S. soldiers led to the continued exercise of military control over prostitutes. The continuity between Japanese policy and U.S. practice calls into question the U.S. claim of being "liberators" rather than occupiers and as being essentially different from Japanese imperialists. After the official abolition of prostitution, another form of control similar to licensing was put into place with the assistance of Korea's elite leaders: tolerating prostitution in very visible camptowns, while outlawing it elsewhere in Korean society. Ostensibly, "licenses" for "prostitutes" ceased with the nationwide abolition of legal prostitution, but only to be replaced by the registration of "entertainment workers" within camptowns who are still required to undergo regular health examinations assuring that they are free of STDs. It is ironic that the shift from licensed prostitution in state-regulated brothels to camptown prostitution, in which regulation is left to the local Korean authorities, was adopted under the pretense of abolishing prostitution. In fact it amounted to a policy of safeguarding military personnel from STDs while ensuring their access to the market in sex. Since then, the legal prohibition of prostitution by the U.S. and Korean governments has coexisted with regulated prostitution in camptowns serving U.S. military bases. Since the mid-1990s, foreign women have replaced Korean women in the gijichon. According to research conducted in 2004 by a feminist NGO, 90 percent of gijichon prostitutes are now Russians and Filipinas.( n61) That same year, a member of the Korean National Assembly confirmed that Filipinas number 730 (81 percent), Russians 81 (9 percent), and Koreans 88 (9.8 percent) among 900 licensed gijichon entertainment workers in Gyeonggi province.( n62) The women employed in clubs or bars in U.S. military camptowns are supposed to receive regular health examinations, including an HIV test every three months, at designated clinics. Without health records that confirm that they have done so, they cannot work there.( n63) It is the women, not the U.S. soldiers, who are required to demonstrate that they are free of communicable diseases. Women's bodies are still treated as sources of crime and danger and subjected to monitoring and control for the sake of U.S. soldiers' health and military security. Current U.S. policy concerning STDs and prostitution in Korea essentially resembles past policies. Feminist scholars often emphasize conflicts between policies that prohibit prostitution on the one hand, and policies that seek to decriminalize and regulate it on the other, but this case suggests that the variety of policies that deal with sexuality may be complicated by the different concerns policymakers bring to bear in specific situations. Although the U.S. military bases' primary aim was to protect soldiers from STDs, South Korean policymakers were divided between those who sought to prohibit prostitution and those who drew on the Japanese model of regulated interaction between soldiers and local women, hoping to protect South Korean society in general by limiting prostitution to restricted areas directly around the bases and to women who have been marked by their employment there so that they will not easily, if ever, be integrated back into Korean society more broadly. During the fifty years that U.S. bases have existed in South Korea, the camptowns created by these interacting policies have created a strange borderland culture around the edges of U.S. military bases. Would a different set of policies--specifically, policies allowing U.S. soldiers to bring their families to live near them in South Korea as they do on bases in Europe and elsewhere--have produced a different result? The policies that produced South Korea's camptowns reflect complex and sometimes contradictory motives on the part of different actors, complicating our understanding of the interaction between military occupation and state efforts to regulate sexuality. A more precise theoretical conceptualization that reflects the complications that arise out of the competing power dynamics that are in play in systems of prostitution will help shape a more complex feminist theory of prostitution and military prostitution, as well as feminist theories of gender, sexuality, and nation. By understanding how and which complex power dynamics and ideologies of gender and sexuality have been mediated in constructing military prostitution, we may shift its positionality toward a better place, reconstitute it in a different way, and eventually deconstruct it.


A2: camptown cleanup CP

Simply outlawing or reforming prostitution fails—only leads to privatization.
Na Young Lee is a Professor of the Department of Women’s Studies at the University of Maryland, 9-22-07, Feminist Studies, “The construction of military prostitution in South Korea during the U.S military rule, 1945-1948.” (http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=2&hid=104&sid=93c32b30-26b1-48d9-bf04-d95ce917b36c%40sessionmgr110&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mfh&AN=31861077, EbscoHost)
After the enactment of Public Act No. 7, the U.S. military government ostensibly attempted to suppress prostitution in accordance with this policy. Former prostitutes became subject to "clearance" and were strongly encouraged to return "home" or confined as diseased objects to be "cured."( n44) However, abolishing prostitution turned out to be merely abolishing the licensing of prostitution. Because of the extreme poverty of the women returning from overseas, the lack of employment opportunities, and the lack of welfare assistance, the Korean policy--including the efforts of the Korean women's movement--to abolish the official licensing of prostitutes led only to the "privatization" of prostitution. Faced with this privatization, it became hard for the U.S. military to systematically control prostitutes. Regulatory measures such as compulsory STD exams and enforced confinement within designated areas could not be imposed on prostitutes who were scattered throughout the country. The fear of losing control over prostitutes escalated with a sharp rise in STD rates among U.S. soldiers. By September 1948, soaring STD rates connected with visibly active prostitutes and pimps embarrassed unit commanders and even attracted the attention of President Harry S. Truman. It was reported that STD rates in 1948 averaged 100 per 1000 soldiers. Among Koreans, according to a 1948 survey conducted by the Korean National Hospital and the Department of Public Health and Welfare in Korea, two-thirds of kisaeng, waitresses, servants, dancers, and other types of prostitutes turned out to be infected with STDs. Many military officers complained that enforcement of Public Act No. 7 outlawing legalized prostitution had limited their ability to control the activities of prostitutes, pointing to the legislation as the main reason for the dispersion of prostitutes over the whole area. Some argued that prostitution should be handled by segregation and continued medical inspection.( n45) The disparity between actual U.S. military practice and its stated policy prohibiting prostitution is apparent in another report from a military surgeon: On 14 February 1948, Public Act No. 7 was placed into effect by the Interim Korean Government. This law prohibited legalized prostitution. Prostitutes formerly were confined to small areas which could be guarded successfully by Military Police detachments. Outlawing of their activities soon resulted in a widespread scattering. Formerly the professional prostitute and her representative, the panderer, displayed little interest in Americans. However, with the moving into widespread areas their activities became centered on obtaining the American dollar and goods. To counteract this practice, the Military police utilized vice squads who sought offending military and native personnel. Prostitutes and panderers when apprehended were brought before the Provost Court and given jail sentences. This procedure succeeded in markedly curtailing their activities until August 15, 1948. On that day the new Korean Government was inaugurated and shortly thereafter assumed full jurisdiction over Korean Nationals. With the authority of the Army Provost Court removed, the illicit operators intensified their activities, a factor which contributed greatly to the marked rise in venereal disease rates occurring since that time.( n46) A special meeting was held at the Bando Hotel in Seoul on May 7, 1948, to discuss the reasons for rising STD rates and coordinate plans for control measures. Because the issue of STDs had always been formulated in relation to the problem of prostitution, anxiety about controlling it led military authorities to mount attacks on prostitutes themselves. Accordingly, the Provost Marshal of the U.S. military police organized "vice squads" in Seoul and Pusan to arrest active prostitutes and pimps. Arrested women, who were assumed to carry STDs and treated as criminals, were subject to mandatory STD exams and treatment under detention if found infected. According to the minutes of a VD Council meeting, 191 former licensed prostitutes were treated in the outpatient service at Sunwha Hospital in Seoul and detained at the women's jail until they were completely cleared of STD infection.( n47) Koreans were tried in the U.S. military court and sentenced to imprisonment under the U.S. military government. However, U.S. military officers were convinced that once their authority to try Koreans had been removed and full jurisdiction handed over to Koreans with the inauguration of the Korean government in August 1948, prostitutes' activities could not be effectively checked and, as a result, would intensify. The increased attention the U.S. military authorities gave to prostitution was related to the Korean government's stubbornly uncooperative attitude, because Korean courts were not willing to punish or detain violators of Public Act No. 7.( n48)




A2: camptown cleanup CP

Camptown cleanup resulted in controlling women more
Cynthia H. Enloe, Ph. D in Political Science from University of California, Berkely, 2K, “Manuevers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives”, (University of California Press)
The two sets of officials together devised the "Camptown Clean-Up Campaign." The solution to these two governments' respective political anxieties about racial conflict, global security, compromised sovereignty, regime stabilitywas to control more tightly those Korean prostitutes servicing American soldiers. As Katharine Moon's research demonstrates, it was not the entire elaborate web of relationships that constituted the military prostitution industry that was chosen as the target of new control. Rather, policy makers on both sides of the table felt more comfortable focusing on that part of the whole system over which they could exert the most control at the lowest ideological price: the prostitutes. Thus "purifying" the camptowns in the name of improving U.S.-ROK alliance relations was translated into purifying the women who worked as prostitutes. Their bodies would be more stringently controlled to ensure their purification and thus, by extension, the purification of American-Korean relations. In reality, this decision meant controlling access to these women's bodies so that they were equally distributed between U.S. white and black male soldiers. It meant, at the same time, enacting more interventionist measures to prevent women who had contracted venereal disease from infecting American male soldiers of any race. Tightening the control over women's bodies, the diplomatic negotiators implied, would reduce soldiers' interracial hostilities, sustain solutions.




A2: Prostitution Good
A2: Util Good

There is no neutral form of reason. Utilitarianism is deployed by political strategists to justify and create wars.. The rational act is to end the wars we are in now, not maintain them.
Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer at School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, 2005 (Iraq: Strategy‘s Burnt Offering,‖ Global Change, Peace & Security, Volume 17, Number 2, June 2005, P. 191 - 213//DN)
Just over a year before the Cuban missile crisis, the physicist and civilian leader of the Manhattan Project J. Robert Oppenheimer gave a speech at the University of Puerto Rico. Perhaps, a little removed from American soil, he felt freer to express his thoughts-profound, untimely and all the more remarkable thoughts coming from a man who had spent many years close to the US military establishment, and who was so imbued with the positivist and instrumental traditions of post-Newtonian science. He had helped to create the most fearsome weapons known to humanity, had tried to prevent the development of the even more fearsome thermonuclear weapons, and it was their role in American nuclear strategy and political culture that now weighed on his mind.3 He complained that ‗there has been no ethical discourse of any excellence or nobility of weight, dealing with how one should handle, how one should regard . . . atomic weapons‘: What are we to make of a civilization which has always thought of ethical questions as quite essential in human life, and which has always had a deep, articulate, fervent conviction, probably never a majority conviction but always there, that the returning of good for evil was the right way to behave, what are we to think of such a civilization which has not been able to talk aboutthe prospect of killing everybody, or almost everybody, except in terms of calculation and prudence?4 Oppenheimer spoke of a hypothetical-if still alarmingly possible-future in which the survival of humanity seemed to be at stake; if for us the stakes appear a little lower, the outcomes are more concrete. A ‗war on terror‘ has been initiated, first against Afghanistan and then Iraq, with the certainty that many thousands are dead, amid intense debate about whether the wars have enhanced global security or merely given greater impetus to future instability and terror.The more than 3000 civilian dead in Afghanistan, the well over 15,000 in Iraq, and the thousands more wounded, maimed and terrorised-what discourse governed their fate?Calculation and prudence. Oppenheimer‘s words resonate well beyond 1960. What is so remarkable about the speech is that Oppenheimer had not only questioned US strategy and the weapons themselves (this he had been doing since 1949) but brought into question the silence that had surrounded them, that constrained debate about their existence and potential use. Oppenheimer had raised questions far more profound than those contained within a policy debate, or even a debate about the merits or dangers of a particular weapons system-he had asked questions that brought that debate itself into question.He had questioned an entire system of thinking and understanding whose purpose was toconstrain the activity of thought itself-and which, in particular, constrained the possibility of thinking ethically about the use and politics of force, outside the iron walls of calculation and prudence.5 He had raised questions about the boundaries of an entire discourse, even if he only poorly understood its origins, and was groping blindly for a way to challenge and escape it. Our challenge is to understand the origins and depth of this discourse-an instrumental discourse linking war, politics and technology that we know asstrategy-and to understand how it forms a matrix of common assumptions and cultural truth beneath the apparently profound disagreements over the legitimacy and prosecution of the 2003 Gulf War. These disagreements have taken many forms-whether or not it should have been authorised by a UN resolution, whether it met the criteria for ‗just war‘, whether it was a prudent or ‗necessary‘ use of US power and resources in the war on terror-and I do not wish to belittle their importance or value. However, what does need to be questioned is the assumption underlying them that, under varying circumstances,war is necessary and right-that war is a rational mechanism for the pursuit of policy goals, that it has a place in modern politics and that it can be waged with discretion and control. This, following Anatole Rapoport6, I will call the ‗political‘ theory of war, which derives from Carl von Clausewitz‘s argument that war ‗is a mere continuation of policy by other means‘. War, he famously wrote, was ‗not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means‘. War is not an extraordinary event in the life of a state, but part of its lifeblood; it is not a terrible and dangerous escalation of violence, difficult to predict and control, but is rather ‗a pulsation of violent force . . . subject to the will of a guiding intelligence‘.7 The claim to war‘s rationality here, however disturbing, must be taken seriously. It is a marker of strategy‘s embeddedness in a deeper system of modern political and technological reason. Michael Howard makes an important point when he argues, in The Causes of Wars, that the conflicts ‗which have usually led to war have normally arisen, not from any irrational or emotive drives, but from almost asuperabundance of analytic rationality . . . Men have fought during the last two hundred years not because they are aggressive nor because they are acquisitive animals, but because they are reasoning ones.‘8 In his Postmodern War Chris Hables Gray rightly challenges the value judgement implicit in Howard‘s argument-‗ if this is truly so‘, he writes, ‗we should start to worry that maybe something is wrong with rationality . . . it is only the most shallow rationality that is used to justify wars, especially in the modern era‘-but by doing so perhaps Gray devalues the power both of the claim to rationality and the larger system of instrumental reason that provides Clausewitzian strategy with such depth and ongoing force.9 While the emotive and superior connotations of rationality certainly act as a powerful form of justification, we need toshift analytical framesto understand its true power. ‗Rationality‘ can then be thought of in more neutral terms as theoperation of specific political and cultural deployments of power that combine discursive, institutional, legal, economic, technological and scientific frameworks in a strategic fashion, according to primarily utilitarian criteria of effectiveness and efficiency. As Michel Foucault argues, in the exercise of political power it ‗is not ―reason in general‖ which is implemented, but always a very specific type of rationality‘. He argues for an investigation of the links between rationalisation and power which does not take ‗as a whole the rationalisation of society or culture‘, but analyses ‗this process in several fields‘-not to question whether political practices ‗conform to principles of rationality‘, but to discover the ‗kind of rationality‘ that is in use.10 At the same time, it is also possible to identify a particularly sweeping and dominant form of instrumental reason at work in strategic thought and policy. Its claims and features, and its continuing power over Western policy towards Iraq, is the subject of this essay.

A2: Util Good

The technological rational discourse of utilitarianism marginalizes non-Western populations who have not adopted this technocratic view, justifying intervention in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, and reduces humans to a standing reserve of tools for mass murder.
Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer at School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, 2005 (―Iraq: Strategy‘s Burnt Offering,‖ Global Change, Peace & Security, Volume 17, Number 2, June 2005, P. 191 - 213//DN)
I am not seeking to argue that the scientific method, and the modern rationalism it underpinned, has no value-indeed it has brought advances that have cured diseases, fed the hungry and enriched human culture with new forms of political practice, communication and artistic endeavour. However, its legacy has been ambivalent, and rarely more so than in its translation into modern strategy, weapons and warfare. Empirical claims to truth and certainty, while they may partially hold for many areas of natural science, have been mapped onto social realityand thus deny its irrefutable status as a construct of human power and thought. Furthermore, as Arendt suggested, the scientific method is nested in an instrumental, utilitarian attitude that ‗degrade[s] nature and the world into mere means, robbing both of their independent dignity‘, importing these values into human action in a way that has disturbing (and unpredictable) political and ethical consequences.48 Even though he could not predict it, and can hardly be blamed, Bacon‘s technological hubris emerges in the language and ontology of the modern strategist in the form of Henry Kissinger‘s 1969 argument that post-war US foreign policy had been based ‗on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in emerging countries‘. This ‗scientific revolution‘ had ‗for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy‘. At the same time, Kissinger clung to the view that the West is ‗deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data-the more accurately the better‘. This, he claimed, has since the Renaissance set the West apart from an ‗undeveloped‘ world that contains ‗cultures that have escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking‘ and remain wedded to the ‗essentially pre- Newtonian view that the real world is almost entirely internal to the observer‘.49 Two implications flow from this-firstly, that the instrumental policymaker seeks to alter and shape the world to their will, but refuses to accept (ethical) responsibility for doing so; and second, it provides a licence for Western interventioninto the developing world because, as James William Gibson writes, by doing so the West believes itself to be ‗bring[ing] reality to the Third World‘.50 Such convictions draw on Orientalist discoursesthat justified colonial and imperial controlby appeal to the West‘s civilising mission, technological advancement and martial power. In Orientalism Edward Said places Kissinger on an imperial continuum with Arthur Balfour and the former British governor of Egypt, Lord Cromer: is not Kissinger‘s hunger for international order, he asks, ‗similar to Cromer‘s vision of a harmoniously working machine designed ultimately to benefit some central authority, which opposes the developing world‘?51 In this view, as Aaron Beers Sampson writes, rationality, civilisation and modernity are opposed to less developed societies whose actions are seen as ‗products of passionate reflexes‘. Early anthropology and social theory, strongly embedded in Orientalist traditions, portrayed such societies as ‗decentralised, disorganised and anarchic‘, which the West then naturally had a role to organise and control.52 Sampson shows how such divisions wereinternalisedby modern international relations theory, especially Realism, which draws on British social anthropologyand the functional sociology of Emile Durkheim to portray the international system as a ‗primitive‘ form of ‗tropical anarchy‘. Influential US realist Kenneth Waltz identified this as a justification for America‘s ordering mission during the Cold War: the dangers of international anarchy can be moderated by ‗transforming an anarchic system into a hierarchic one‘. He wrote that just as Imperial Britain claimed the ‗white man‘s burden‘ and Imperial France her mission civilisatrice, ‗we, in like spirit . . . say that we act to make and maintain world order‘. While Waltz took the view that nakedly imperial ‗global burden bear[ing]‘ would be detrimental to American interests, his preferred solution, ‗the detached management of world affairs‘, nonetheless betrayed the same mechanistic hubris central to Kissinger‘s vision of US power.53 This matrix of cultural and epistemological assumptions is central both to modern strategy and US foreign policy towards the Middle East, played out as a ruthless Cartesian search for geopolitical certainty, order and control. Immediately following his hubristic boast that ‗technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system‘ Kissinger was to write that ‗this direct ―operational‖ concept of international order has proved too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.‘54 Kissinger‘s frustration was later visible when in 1975, using the pseudonym ‗Miles Ignotus‘, he published an article in Harper‘s entitled ‗Seizing Arab Oil‘. This argued that ‗we could solve all our economic and political problems by taking over the Arab oilfields [and] bringing in Texans and Oklahomans to operate them‘. In the same year he told Business Week that the US could bring oil prices down though ‗massive political warfare against countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran to make them risk their political stability and maybe their security if they did not cooperate.‘55 Now, it seems not accidentally, Americans are indeed running Iraqi oilfields.56 Kissinger‘s article helped father the policy now pursued by the Bush administration and, as Robert Dreyfuss shows, began the process of deepening US intervention in the Persian Gulf through the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force and Central Command (CENTCOM) in Florida, and the forward deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar.57 In short, despite writing that a direct ‗operational‘ concept of order was ‗too simple‘, Kissinger could not let go of it. Visible here is a vicious, historic irony played out two decades later in Iraq: a desire to utilise and control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought. Martin Heidegger shows us both why it was so difficult for Kissinger to rethink his Cartesian investment in technology and order, and why Oppenheimer‘s anguish about the imperviousness of calculation to ethics continues to haunt us. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger‘s startling argument is that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a ‗means to an end‘ (that we assume humans might be easily able to control and subordinate to other values like ‗ethics‘). Rather technology has become agoverning imageof the modern universe, one that has come toorder, limit and definehuman existence as a ‗calculable coherence of forces‘ and a ‗standing reserve‘ of energy. ‗Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology,‘ Heidegger writes, ‗whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral.‘58 (How revealing then that the influential strategist Colin Gray recently argued that ‗strategy is, and can only be, a value-neutral tool‘.)59 Technology is not a neutral instrument subordinate to humans, but has become the verydefinition of humanity. This derives not merely from scientific discovery and invention, but from a larger structure of thinking which defines humanity‘s relation to itself and to the world in a new and instrumental way, and for which the work of Newton, Bacon and Descartes formed a prophetic template. This is a sobering realisation: as Heidegger writes, ‗the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.‘60 Heidegger describes the modern technological existence as only possible within a form of ‗revealing‘ which is now also a ‗challenging‘-one that ‗puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored [for use] as such‘. He contrasts the modern ‗challenging‘ of nature with an older form of revealing which resulted in a ‗bringing- forth‘ or ‗unconcealment‘ of things-of the kind achieved by the craftsman, the artist or the peasant tilling a field in order to ‗take care of and maintain‘ the soil and nurture its possibilities for growth. He argues that in this earlier form of revealing, the craftsman or farmer was simultaneously ‗responsible and indebted‘ to and for what they had brought forth, and that this is how we must think about causality: as not merely a ‗result‘ or ‗effect‘. We should not think of technology as simply a tool or a means to an end, without thinking morally and responsibly about the entire creative process (scientific, social, political, ecological) that brought it about and into which it enters. Heidegger laments that ‗today we are too easily inclined to understand being responsible or indebted moralistically as a lapse‘.61 Yet under the technological understanding of being humankind has become obsessed with the causa efficiens-the end result-and no longer ‗takes care‘ of the earth but ‗has come under the grip of a different kind of setting-in-order which sets upon nature . . . in the sense of challenging it‘: Agriculture is now the mechanised food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium; uranium is set up to yield atomic energy, which can be released either for destruction or atomic use.62 Heidegger argues that this in turn becomes paradigmatic for modern science, whose ‗way of representing pursues and entraps nature . . . as the chief storehouse of the standing energy reserve‘. This process Heidegger calls ‗enframing‘ and through it the scientific mind demands that ‗nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information‘. This is Oppenheimer‘s problem: an ‗ethical‘, questioning relation to technology and strategy cannot challenge prudence and calculation because the enframing technological mode of being ‗has already claimed man and has done so so decisively that he can only be man at any given time as the one so claimed‘.63 Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes trapped within its logic. This is what is at stake when strategy is assumed, when debate takes place only within its frame. Man becomes not only unable to think outside enframing and calculation, as a user and controller of nature, but becomes an orderable resource itself: [Man] comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall . . . where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only in so far as it is his construct.64 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource: matter to be mined, ordered, enhanced, driven, destroyed. In strategy and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: humans are made ‗citizens‘, patriots and soldiers; desires for freedom or selfdetermination become weapons to be directed at enemies, or ‗threats‘ to be managed or eliminated; resistance and protest become ‗instability‘ to be stabilised; human lives become tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter. Michel Foucault‘s and Giorgio Agamben‘s analyses of ‗biopower‘ have analogies to Heidegger‘s insights here. In an incisive commentary Julian Reid shows that Foucault saw biopower as a ‗life-administering power‘ that developed at the same time as a ‗strategic‘ formation of tactical and productive power began to spread through western societies. Biopower, argued Foucault, sought to ‗incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimise and organise the forces under it . . . distributing the living in the domain of value and utility‘.65 Agamben, while he did not specifically refer to strategy and war, identified in the emergence of ‗biopolitics‘ a disturbing convergence between democratic and totalitarian power. Biopolitics simultaneously makes all life ‗political‘ and reduces some to ‗bare life‘ that ‗may be killed and yet not sacrificed‘. While Agamben argued that the ‗camp‘66 was the paradigmatic space of this transformation, I would also argue that such a form of power in which ‗human life is included in the juridical order solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed)‘ is operating in any space where the ‗exception‘ is put into play (the border, the war zone, the geopolitical zone of ‗containment‘), where the rule of law and prohibitions on suffering and murder are suspended or qualified.67 (In this sense the US prisons at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay are not only disturbing evidence of a new extra-legal norm in US security policy; they form a natural continuity with the callous attitude to ‗life‘ typical of modern war.) Reid also refers to a humanistic protest against such power visible in Paul Virilio‘s view that the rationalising war-politics relation ‗disrupts the ‗essential values of the human disposition, turning all human beings into nodes within the logistic networks of war preparation‘.68 This certainly evokes the experience of Iraq, as do Foucault‘s bitter remarks in his essay ‗The Right to Death and Power over Life‘: ‗wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilised for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital‘.69

A2: Realism

Realist conceptions of IR ignore the suffering of women - particularly epistemological violence caused by the rhetoric of needing to save the Afghan women as a justification for the war
Kevin Ayotte, Associate Professor of Communication @ CSU Fresno, and Mary Husain, Lecturer of Communication @ CSU Fresno, 2005 (Securing Afghan Women, Feminist Formations 17.3, Project MUSE, p. 112-3)
The concept of ―security‖ has not always been considered particularly problematic in the study of international relations. For much of the twentiethcentury, and to a signifi cant degree today, much of the theory and practice of international relations has been conducted from within the perspective of political realism, realpolitik, or its derivative, neorealism(Desch 1996, 361; Vasquez 1983, 160-72). Within the realist paradigm,security fl ows from power, specifi cally state power and military strength. Recent feminist scholarship has challenged this notion of security on the grounds that women have never been secure r within (or without) the nation state-they are always disproportionately affected by war, forced migration, famine, and other forms of social, political, and economic turmoil (Mohanty 2002, 514; Tickner 2001, 50-1). The statist theoretical framework of political realism is thus inadequate to explain the myriad conditions that make women insecure in the world today. In the wake of the ―war on terrorism‖ and its mobilization of women‘s bodies to justify U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan, feminist analyses of international relations must broaden the concept of security, in J. Ann Tickner‘s words, to ―seek to understand how the security of individuals and groups is compromised by violence, both physical and structural‖ (2001, 48). To the types of violenceexamined by feminist international relations scholarship, we would addthe concept of epistemic violence (see Spivak 1999, 266).While the physical and structural violence inflicted upon womenmust remain a central component of feminist theory and criticism, the war on terrorism in Afghanistan also demonstrates that the Western appropriation and homogenization of third-world women‘s voices perform a kind of epistemic violence that must be addressed along with material oppressions.1 This essay argues that representations of the women of Afghanistan as gendered slaves in need of ―saving‖ by the West constitute epistemic violence, the construction of a violent knowledge of the thirdworld Other that erases women as subjects in international relations. In claiming to secure Afghan women from the oppression of the Taliban, the United States has reinscribed an ostensibly benevolent paternalismof which we should remain wary. In particular, the image of the Afghan woman shrouded in the burqa has played a leading role in various public arguments seeking to justify U.S. military intervention in Afghanistanfollowing the 9/11 attacks. This rhetorical construction of Afghan women as objects of knowledge legitimized U.S. military intervention under the rubric of ―liberation‖ at the same time that it masked the root causes of structural violence in Afghanistan. The pursuit of gender securitymust therefore account for the diverse ways in which the neocolonialismof some Western discourses about third-world women creates the epistemological conditions for material harm. Although the distinctionsamong epistemic, physical, and structural violence in this article allowfor analytic precision in the sense that these forms of violence are indeed different in kind, we must recognize their complicitous relationship.


A2: DA’s

The State came to control by monopolizing power and this knowledge it produces inevitably state-centric. Be skeptical of the opposition’s evidence.
Shapiro is a ______, 1999 (Michael J., Social Text, 60, U of Hawaii, Muse) JLR
Nevertheless, there are alternative ways to tell the story of how nations became states. As in the case of historical attempts to consolidate Christendom, those who help reproduce the nation-state's claims to the attachments of its constituency must deal with states' ambiguous spatiotemporality, which is reflected in the hyphenated term nation-state. While a state is understood (within dominant narratives) as a territorial entity that historically expanded its political, legal, and administrative control by monopolizing violence and incorporating various subunits into a legal and administrative entity with definitive boundaries, the primary understanding of the modern "nation" segment of the hyphenated term is that it embodies a coherent culture, united on the basis of shared descent or, at least, incorporating a "people" with a historically stable coherence. Inasmuch as states that contain coherent historically stable communities of shared descent are largely absent, the maintenance of the coherence of the nation-state requires, at a discursive level, a management of historical narratives along the deployment of a juridical/political discourse on territorial sovereignty. Those who support states' aspirations to nation- state existence become state biographers, writing a story that imposes a coherence on what is instead a series of fragmentary, arbitrary, and power-driven conditions of historical assemblage,masked in various mythic narrations of emerging . In order to appreciate this aspect of the complicit biographical performances legitimating the contemporary nation-state, it is useful to turn to Jtirgen Habermas's recent enactment of it in his reflections on the impact of globalization on civic attachment. His discussion is an exemplar of attempts to impose a democratic consensuality on arbitrary and disjunctive structures of allegiance.





A2: North Korean invasion

No longer a need for American military support in South Korea. North Korean military is not a threat and South Korea’s development has give it the advantage.
Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, 7/14. “The U.S.-South Korea Alliance- Outdated, Unnecessary, and Dangerous.”
Seoul’s need for a U.S. security guarantee long ago disappeared. South Korea has upwards of 40 times the GDP of the North. The ROK also has a vast technological edge, twice the population, and a clearly superior international position. Pyongyang is left with only the People’s Republic of China as a serious ally, and even the PRC is unlikely to intervene in any conflict now, in contrast to 1950. The ties between the PRC and South Korea have grown at an extraordinary rate. Today 50 times as many South Korean as North Korean students are studying in China. Chinese trade with the South is roughly 70 times the amount of that with the North.18 The DPRK does retain a numerical military edge in personnel and such weapons as tanks and artillery. This advantage is more menacing in appearance, however, than reality. Notes Larry Niksch, recently retired from the Congressional Research Service, “exaggerating the North Korean military threat to South Korea” is a problem in both the United States and the ROK.19 doubt South Korea should prepare for such a contingency. But, again, the responsibility for defending Seoul lies with the ROK, not the United States. The South should develop and deploy the forces and weapons necessary to thwart such an attempt. Obviously, it would be expensive for Seoul to replicate U.S. military capabilities. According to South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) enable South Koreans to reduce our defense spending, which contributes to our continued economic development. If we take into account all the equipment and materials that the USFK maintains in-country as well as the several billion dollars it spends on maintenance and operations, its opportunity cost is tremendous. If the USFK should be withdrawn, it would take an astronomical amount of additional defense expenditures to compensate for its absence.24 The argument that the South would need to undertake an “astronomical” increase in defense spending is, however, a self-serving exaggeration. Seoul does not need to replicate America’s military to defeat the North’s military. Notes Jae-Jung Suh of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies: “while the U.S. military adds to the South’s capability, some of its contribution may be superfluous, especially given that Seoul is already enjoying military advantages over Pyongyang. The alliance’s supplementary effect, therefore, [is] smaller than it seems at first.”25 also announced plans to cut the estimated budget for the Defense Reform 2020.27