Tuesday, August 27, 2013

Sino German cooperation HAPRO deliver in 1939 part2

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Refers to document No. 456, and reports Ciano has
informed him of visit by British Ambassador, who brought
memorandum containing British reply to Mussolini's
question about British Government's attitude to Anglo-
Italian Agreement of April 1938. Has been furnished with
copy of memorandum and transmits summary

Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weitsacker

Letter describing conversation with Ciano who attributed
to inadvertence failure by Serrano Sufier to mention in his
speech Germany's share in Franco's victory. Ciano sug-
gested that Sufier be invited to pay official visit to Germany.

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Conversation with Mussolini and Ciano regarding a report
from the Italian Ambassador in Moscow who had been
informed by his German colleague of proposals the latter
was making to Berlin. Mussolini approved these proposals.

Doc.JTo. Page

426 561























Doc. No- Page

Juno 14

Juno 14

June 14

Juno 16

June 19

June 19

June 20

June 23

Juno 24

June 26

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Continues document No. 523, and reports Mussolini s
views on significance attaching to present visit to Berlin of
Japanese Ambassador in Rome.

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Continues document No. 524 and reports Mussolini a
account of his conversations -with Serrano Suiier on Spain s
relations with the Axis and on German relations with the

The Stale Secretary to the Ambassador in Italy

Encloses a copy of document No. 459 and Ribbentrop s
reply, which is to be transmitted to Ciano. Reply welcomes
arrival of Count Cavallero to further Italo-German military
collaboration, and states that Hitler's views on Mussolini s
memorandum have been transmitted through Attohco.

Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsdclcer

Letter, referring to document No. 523, giving Mussolini s
opinion of Soviet Charge d' Affaires in Rome and enclosing
memorandum on confidential statements made by the latter
as to Soviet view of present Anglo-Soviet negotiations: no
concessions to be made in Europe without guarantee of
Soviet interests against Japan ; Moscow aware of Japanese
decisions on alliance with Axis.

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Has informed Italian Ambassador that Germany has no
concrete aims aa regards Spain beyond still unratified secret
Treaty of Friendship.

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Conversation with Italian Ambassador who recently trans-
mitted to Rome German reply to Mussolini's letter to Hitler.
Ambassador stated Mussolini welcomed Hitler's suggestion
for meeting.

The Head of the Ausland&organisation to the Embassy in Italy
Instructions to all branches of the AO in Italy, especially
in former South Tyrol, that no friction or differences with
the Italians over South Tyrol question must be allowed to
arise. Unqualified support must be given to view that
renunciation is final.

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

Records telephone conversation with State Secretary m
Berlin on possibility of Mackensen intervening further in
favour of Ortsgruppenleiter Kauffmarm, who is charged
with offence against Italian authorities in South Tyrol.

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in
Italy ,

Gives decisions taken at a meeting between the Reichs-
fiihrer-SS and Italian representatives on effecting transfer
and resettlement of the South Tyrolese.

Counsellor of Embassy Tippelshirch to Senior Counsellor
Schliep ,

Letter describing informal conversation with the Italian
| Ambassador, who had been informed that his Government
believed moment had arrived for thwarting Anglo-Franco-
Soviet negotiations. Since Rosso not clear how to proceed,
awaiting return of German Ambassador to Moscow.























June 27

July 1

July 6

July 7

July 7

July S

July 10

July 11

July 12

July 12

July 13


Boo. No.

State Secretary Weizsacker to Ambassador Mackensen

Letter acknowledging document No. 536 and stating that
position still not clear over resumption of German-Soviet
economic negotiations, or over probable outcome of Anglo-
Franco -Soviet negotiations.

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Conversation with the Italian Ambassador, who gave Mm
a document from the Italian Consulate General in Danzig,
setting out Professor Burekhardt's views on the deteriora-
tion of the situation in Danzig.

Memorandum by an Official in the Office of the State Secretary
Records information from the Reichsfiihrer-SS, that latter
had submitted to Hitler a draft communique' on the re-
settlement of Reich Germans from the South Tyrol. Hitler
had forbidden publication, or any future press announce-
ments on the subject without his permission.

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Reports account received from Ciano of conversation
between Mussolini and British Ambassador, at which the
latter presented an aide-mimoire from Chamberlain warning
Mussolini of the dangers inherent in the Danzig situation.

Ambassador Attolico to Foreign Minister Hibbentrop

Letter requesting that further consideration be given to
question of a communique stressing voluntary character of
South Tyrol migration, as Italian Government desire.

Minute by the Foreign Minister

Information given to Italian Ambassador as to German
intentions respecting Danzig and Poland.

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy and the Consulate
General at Milan
States that nothing will appear in German press about
South Tyrol resettlement operations, and gives instructions
on what may be said in conversations, where these are un-

Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizsacker

Letter sending copy of a letter from Mussolini to be
delivered to Franco by Ciano ; Mussolini warns of dangers of
monarchical restoration in Spain and of unreliability of
Britain and Prance.

The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

Reports that Mussolini's order expelling all foreigners from
Province of Bolzano in South Tyrol, being applied to
German Air Attache. Is making representations to Italian

Ambassador Attolico to State Secretary Weizsacker

Letter recalling German undertaking to supply Italy with
anti-aircraft artillery, and asking that Italian request for
early delivery of 50 batteries be dealt with.

The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry

Reports arrival of Ciano in Spain, and latter's account of
his conversation with Franco.



























poc.Ko. 1 Page

July 14

July 24

July 24

July 25

July 29

July 29


The Director of ilie Political Department to the Embassy ≫n
Italy and the Co7isulate General in Milan
Explains reasons fox departing from policy previously
agreed with Italians on publicity over South Tyrolese
migration; distorted account in Temps required issue of
denial through DNB.

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Has been informed by the Italian Ambassador in con-
fidence of certain basic principles which Mussolini will put
forward when he meets Hitler on August 4.

State Secretary Weinsacker to Ambassador Maekensen

Letter enclosing copies of documents Nos. 578, 706 (see
under Hungary) and related correspondence, and stating
that meeting of German and Italian commissions on military
policy and war economy now postponed until possibly mid-

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
Conversation between Ribbentrop and Italian Ambas-
sador, who brought with him four memoranda containing
Mussolini's views about projected Hitler-Mussolini meeting.

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Communication made by the Italian Ambassador, that
repeated telephone conversations with Ciano had shown
that Mussolini still favoured his idea of an international
conference. Attolico believed there would be no Italian
objection to postponing Hitler-Mussolini meeting, if German
Government accepted principle of peaceful development.

Ambassador Attolico to Stale Secretary Weizsdcker

Letter giving Ciano's views concerning reply to the two
letters from Count Teleki (document No. 712 ? see under

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Italian Ambassador, on Ciano's instructions, has stated
that Mussolini feels meeting with Hitler might usefully be
postponed until outcome of Anglo -Soviet negotiations
known, but considers that Ciano and Ribbentrop should
meet as soon as possible.

[See also under Albania, Far East, Spain, Turkey and











739 1018



Latin America


June 12


Unsigned Memorandum . ,

Record of first meeting of conference on Latin America
held at Foreign Ministry between Heads of German Missions
and Party (AO) officials Discussion of division of spheres
of responsibility between Reich Missions and Party (AO)






Doc. No.


Mar. 31

The Head of the Volksdeutscke Mittelstelle to' the Foreign
Keports on attempts to organize a putsch for forcible
union of Liechtenstein with the Reich, and on action taken
by Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle to prevent international



Middle East



Doc . No.



Mar. 31

The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Afghanistan

General instructions on the attitude to be adopted in
social relations with members of the Soviet Russian Mission.



May 2

Minister Grobba to Under State Secretary Woermann

Letter again raising the question of German lack of interest
in establishing closer ties with King Ibn Saud, and giving
reasons for requesting that this attitude be reconsidered.



May 22

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII

Reviews German policy towards Saudi Arabia, and
recommends receiving a special envoy from King Ibn Saud
and granting King's request for economic cooperation.



June 20

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII

Conversation between Bibbentrop and King Ibn Baud's
special emissary, Khalid Al Hud, in which latter expressed
King's desire to enter into relations with Germany and
obtain German assistance in building up armed forces inde-
pendently of Britain.



June 20

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VII

Records reception of King Ibn Saud's special envoy by
Hitler: conversation on German-Arab relations. German
economic assistance for purchase of arms to be given after
receipt of Italian views.



Militaey Directives



Doe. No.



Mar. 25

Apr. 3

Apr. 11

Directive from the FiXhrer to the Commander in Chief of the
Army on March 25, 1939
Policy concerning Danzig, Poland, the Slovak question,
the Czech Protectorate and the Balkans.

Directive by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht
Instructions for "Operation White" (attack on Poland}
preparations should be made so that the operation can be
put into action by September 1; OKW to prepare precise
timetable and synchronize timing between the three
branches of the Wehrmacht.

Directive by the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

The Wehrmacht to be prepared for "Operation White"
(attack on Poland) and possible surprise occupation of
Danzig independently of "Operation White".











Don, No.


May 23

Minutes of a Conference on May 23, 1939

Hitler's review, at a conference with senior officers of the
Wehrmacht, of the present situation in foreign policy and the
conclusions to be drawn from it.





Mar, 25


Mar. 29


Apr. 13

Apr. 22

Apr. 25

May 6

The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Reports that the Secretary General of the Netherlands
Foreign Ministry has denied any knowledge other than press
reports of a Franco-British agreement to defend the Nether-
lands frontier in the event of a German attack and has
stated that the Netherlands would never accede to such
agreements but would defend their neutrality in the event
of war.

The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Reports has been informed Krupps have refused delivery
of war material to the Netherlands Army. Requests that
Krupps be prevailed upon to fulfil this order.

The Minister m the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Reports has been told by Netherlands M.F.A. that latter
does not believe that an Anglo-French agreement on mutual
assistance in the event of an attack on the Netherlands has
been concluded.

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy
Has been informed by Netherlands Military Attache that
Netherlands still attach importance to placing orders for
field howitzers with Germany, but require these by specified

Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Mbbentrop

Reports visit from Mussert, the leader of the Dutch
National Socialist Party, who expressed his views on the
European political situation for communication to Ribben-

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

Conversation with Netherlands Minister with whom Rib-
bentrop Taised question of rumours of German intentions
against Netherlands and of military measures taken by the
latter. Minister gave assurance of Netherlands' strict
neutrality. Gave Minister assurance of German respect for
Netherlands' neutrality in peace and war.

The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

Reports conversation with M.F.A. who quoted statements
attributed to the Chief of.OKW that recent Netherlands
mobilization measures were primarily directed against
Germany, M.F.A. denied this and denied any military con-
nections whatever with Britain, but repeated assurances of
Netherlands' neutrality.




















Doc. No. Page

Apr. (

July 12

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department
Refers to negotiations between Krupps and Netherlands
Government regarding supply of howitzers, and states
Netherlands Government request formal German assurance
that contract will not be interrupted in the event of outbreak
of wax. Views of competent German authorities being

Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

States that Krupps have obtained contract from Nether-
lands Government for supply of howitzers . Wehrmacht has

[See also under Belgium.]

1103 No. (a)

1103 No. (b)

Northern States


Doc. No


Mar. 29


Apr. 12

Apr. 17

Apr. IS

Apr. 19

. Apr. 21

Minister Blucher to Stale Secretary Weizscicker

Letter recommending early reply to Finno-Swedish Note
on Aaland Islands, since continued" non-arrival of a German
reply places Finnish M.F.A. at a. disadvantage, which is not
in Germany's interests.

Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department

Reviews position under the Aaland Islands Convention of
1921 and the Finnish and Swedish Notes of January, 1939,
concerning alterations to the Convention; Germany's atti-
tude to a partial fortification of the islands.

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Has informed Swedish Minister of German attitude to
Finno-Swedish proposals on the Aaland Islands and has
suggested a declaration by the Swedish Government to the
German Government that, in the event of war, Sweden
would ensure that normal exports to Germany would suffer
no prejudice.

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Reports views of Finnish M.F.A. on German-Swedish
negotiations on Aaland Islands question.

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

Records that Swedish Minister has communicated orally
reply of his Government to German request, made on
April 12, for official Swedish statement, and has given expose
of Sweden's attitude to the Aaland Islands question and of
her foreign trade policy in the event of war.

The Director of the Political Department to tlte Legation in
Refers to document No. 212 and describes unsatisfactory
results of the German -Swedish conversations; Finnish
Minister has been similarly informed and told that Germany
has no objection to the fortification of Aaland Islands by

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

Has replied to Swedish Minister's statement on Aaland
Islands, made on April 18, by expressing disappointment.
Has suggested to Swedish Minister new formula for Swedish
statement on neutrality and the conduct of commercial
relations in the event of war.



145 ■ ISO















Doc. No. Page


Apr. 25

Apr. 28





May 10

May 10

May 10

May 11

Minister Renlhe-Fink to Senior Counsellor Grundherr

Letter enclosing a report from the Consulate in Aabenraa
dealing with the recruiting of an SS Company from young
Volksdeutsche in North Schleswig; asks what is the official
view of this matter.

The State Secretary to the Legations in Sweden, Norway, Den-
mark and Finland
In connection with Hitler's speech, the Ministers of
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Latvia, Finland and Estonia
are being informed by Ribbentrop that Germany is pre-
pared in principle to conclude non-aggression treaties with
their Governments.

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to the Finnish Minister in Berlin
Note accepting the Finno-Swedish proposals .for the
amendment of the Aaland Islands Convention of 1921.

The Minister in Finland to tlie Foreign Ministry

Reports that M.F.A. has expressed his Government's
satisfaction over German Note (document No. 312) and that
his Government agree in principle to a non-aggression pact
with Germany, although possible repercussions on Finnish
policy of neutrality are being studied.

The State Secretary to the Legations in Norway, Sweden, Den-
mark, Finland, Latvia and Estonia
Refers to document No. 284 and transmits text of draft
treaty handed to Estonian Minister.

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI

The Finnish Counsellor has given the Finnish Govern-
ment's views on the German offer of a non-aggression pact;
this question being considered in relation to Finnish
neutrality. Has given Counsellor informally German draft
for such a treaty.

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Conversation with Swedish Minister, whose attention he
drew to the fact that the Swedish Government had still not
replied to Germany's offer of a non-aggression pact, and
whom he asked what attitude Swedish Government meant
to adopt.

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Conversation with the Danish Minister, who personally
expected to receive shortly his Government's assent, in
principle,to projected German-Danish non-aggression pact.
German draft to be transmitted as soon as such assent

The Minister in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry

Reports has learned that M.F.A. is disappointed at results
of Stockholm conversations, where opposition to proposed
non-aggression pacts with Germany, led by Swedish M.F.A.
proved unexpectedly strong. Denmark now faced with
question whether to accept German offer by herself.

The State Secretary to the Legation in Norway

Refers to report from confidential source that British
Minister in Oslo enquired of M.F.A. what the reply would
be, if, in the event of war, Germany should demand a base
in Norway. Recommends warning Norwegian M.F.A.
against British incitements.

265 333



312 402












357 467









Dm. No,



May 11

May 11

May 16

May 16

May 17

May 18

May 20

May 22

!?■■ May


|: May 24

May 27

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI

Telephone instructions given to Legations in Denmark
and Finland concerning replies to be made to objections
raised by Swedish M.F.A. to proposed non-aggression pacts
(document No. 358).

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI

Record of telephone conversation with Minister in Copen-
hagen, who reported action taken on instructions in docu-
ment No. 365, and views of Danish Government.

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Conversation with Finnish Minister, who Tead out an oral
reply from his Government declining the German offer of a
non-aggression pact.

Note by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department
Discussion with two officials of the Volksdeutsche Mittel-
stelle on the question of recruiting SS-men from the German
minority in North Schleswig and Estonia.

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Conversation with the Danish Minister who brought his
Government's reply to the German offer of a non-aggression
pact and a communique to be published in Copenhagen on
May 19.

The State Secretary to the Legations in Denmark, Norway,
Sweden and Finland
Informs them of the replies from the Governments of the
four Northern States to Germany's offer of non-aggression

Memorandum by an Official of the Dienstslelle RibbenXrop

Reports statements said to have been made to a journalist
by the Danish Minister in Berlin that, at the Stockholm
Conference, main opposition to acceptance by Northern
States of Germany's offer of non -aggression pacts came from
Swedish M.F.A.

The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has learned from King of Sweden that difficulties
have arisen in Geneva over Aaiand Islands question, owing
to a change in Soviet policy. Swedo -Soviet negotiations to
take place.

Senior Counsellor Grundherr to Minister Renthe-Fink

Letter describing a conference with representatives of the
Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, and Moller, a leader of the
German minority in Denmark, on the policy to be followed
by Moller. Moderation urged on him.

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Reports Finnish reaction to latest Soviet proposal to
Britain to include Finland among the countries to be
guaranteed and to Soviet desire to become a guarantor of the
Aaiand Islands.

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Reports that Finnish representative in Geneva has been
instructed to try to ensure that, in Aaiand Islands question,
League confines itself to taking note of consent of signatory
Powers and of any Russian protest.


























May 31

June 15

July 1


Doc.No. Page



July 11

July 26

July 27

German-Danish Treaty of Non-Aggression

Germany and Denmark undertake not to go to war or
resort to force against each other, not to lend support to a
third party taking such action against either State. Proto-
col of Signature defining terms in relation, to commercial

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Reports information from M.F.A. about Russian insistence
on being informed about Aaland Islands fortifications, and
about an assurance from Britain that she would not conclude
an Anglo-Soviet agreement guaranteeing Finland.

Minister jRenthe-Fink to Senior Counsellor Grundherr

Letter drawing attention to a speech by a leader of the
German national group in Denmark, which contained un-
desirable references to frontier question and to Hitler's
future plans.

The Director of the Political Department to the Legations in
Finland and Sweden
Transmits information obtained by German Ambassador
in Moscow from his Finnish colleague that the Soviet
Government claim equal rights with Sweden respecting
Aaland Islands, Instructions to inform Finnish (Swedish)
Government that Germany expects rejection of this claim.

The Acting Director of the Political Department to the Embassy
in the Soviet Union
Informs of instructions sent Helsinki and Stockholm in
document No. 612, and of reply from Helsinki that Finnish
M.F.A. refused Molotov's demand over Aaland Islands.

Counsellor Hensel to Senior Counsellor Grundherr

Letter referring to document No. 600; does not consider
Mo'Iler's explanation of his speech satisfactory.

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Reports M.F.A. has spoken to him about German-Russian
talks, repeating rumour that Germany intends to concede
Baltic States to Russia as a sphere of interest. Requests

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in
Refers to document No. 724 and states that this rumour
is a malicious invention ; German-Russian talks are confined
to the attempt to steer economic relations into more normal

[See also under Baltic States and Europe: General.]











653 901





Poland and Danzig


Mar. 16


The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Reports conversation with M.F.A. who complained about
incidents on the Polish frontier during the German march
into Czecho-Slovakia and failure to observe demarcation
line. Presented notification of the Hacha agreement.
Beck expressed satisfaction at Slovakia obtaining inde-

Doc. Ho.





Mar. 17

Mar. 18

Mar. 21

Mot. 21


Mar. 23

Mar. 24

Mar. 24


Doe. No.

The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Reports that M.F.A. desires information on significance of
Germany's promise of protection to Slovakia. As the
announcement has caused considerable nervousness in
Poland, recommends that Beck be given information cal-
culated to allay fears of infringement of Slovak independence
and of military pressure on Poland from Slovakia.

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland

Refers to document No. 12 and states that import of the
promise of protection for Slovakia has not yet been settled,
but measures will not be so far-reaching as in the case of

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

Records conversation with Polish Ambassador in Berlin,
to whom he explained reasons for Germany's action in
Czecho-Slovakia; stated that Protectorate over Slovakia
was not directed against Poland, and hinted that question
might later be made subject of German-Polish discussions;
drew Ambassador's attention to anti-German activities in
Poland; suggested that Polish M.F.A. should visit Berlin;
put forward proposals for German-Polish settlement, on
basis of return of Danzig to Reich, extra-territorial com-
munications between East Prussia and Reich and in return
German guarantee for Corridor. Asked Lipski to report
personally to his Government.

Counsellor of Embassy Wiihlisch to Senior Counsellor of
Legation Schliep
Letter commenting on unfavourable influence of American
Ambassador in "Warsaw; suggests tapping latter's telephone

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Poland

Draft telegram, cancelled on Hitler's orders, of instruc-
tions to Ambassador to seek immediate interview with
M.F.A. and put before him German attitude to German-
Polish relations; points to be specially emphasized: settle-
ment of Danzig question, a German quid pro quo for Danzig,
and future attitude to Slovakia.

The Consul General in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

Reports on conversation between President of the Danzig
Senate Greiser and Polish Diplomatic Representative
Chodacki on elections for Danzig Diet and Senate's proposal
to issue ordinance prolonging term of Diet.

The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Refers to document No. 58 (see under Europe: General)
and reports that he has established that the British demarche
involved two separate moves. Regarding the demarche
about the threat to Rumania, Arciszewski has remarked that
Poland would fight only in defence of her own interests.
Has learned nothing definite about the other British sug-
gestions, but assumes Poland would be reluctant to join any
combination, unless it increased her security in the event of
a German attack.

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

Records telephone message from the Consul General in
Danzig on defensive measures taken by Poland in the
northern part of the Corridor.





















Mar. 24

Mar. 25

Mar. 26

Mar. 27

Mar. 27

Doc. So.


Mar. 28

Mar. 29

Mar. 29

Mar. 29

Mar. 29

State Secretary Weizsdcker to Ambassador Moltke

Letter explaining circumstances which led to Ambassador
being asked to cancel arrangement for conversation with

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Depart-
Information from Canaris about Polish military measures
in the North and the views of General Keitel on Polish

Memorandum by the Foreign, Minister

Records conversation with Polish Ambassador on memo-
randum presented by the latter, setting forth the views of
the Polish Government on the German proposals respecting
the question of transit traffic between the German Reich and
East Prussia across the Polish Corridor, and about the future
of the Free City of Danzig.

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland

Transmits an account of Ribbentrop's interview with the
Polish Ambassador (see document No. 101).

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
Records conversation between Ribbentrop and Polish
Ambassador. Ribbentrop accused Polish authorities of
condoning anti-German incidents and complained that the
Polish Government had given an evasive answer to the
generous German proposals.

The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Describes the reaction of Polish public opinion to the re-
incorporation of Memel in the Reich. Belief prevalent that
Danzig question may become acute at any moment.
Military measures taken by the Government have aggra-
vated the existing war psychosis.

The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Reports has been summoned by M.F.A., who stated that,
in view of Ribbentrop's statement to Polish Ambassador in
Berlin on March 26 (document No. 101) that a Polish coup
against Danzig would constitute casus belli for Germany, he,
Beck, was compelled to state that a German attempt to
alter status of Danzig would constitute casus belli for

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Records questions put by the President of the Danzig
Senate and Staatsrat Dr. Botteher on Danzig's future
attitude to Poland and to the League of Nations High
Commissioner in Danzig, and the advice given them.

The Minister of the Interior to the Head of the Reich Chancellery
Reviews German -Polish negotiations on questions concern-
ing national groups, and concludes that, in view of Polish
attitude, no constructive results could be achieved in these

Senior Counsellor Schliep to Ambassador Moltke

Letter informing him of the advice regarding the attitude
Danzig should adopt to Poland given to President of Danzig
Senate by Woizsiickec and Ribbentrop.






















Subject boc.No.! Page

Apr. 3

Memorandum by an Official of the. Protocol Department

Describes interview -with Polish M.F.A. ■who was passing
through Berlin.



Apr. i

The, Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Reviews the attitude of Polish press and public opinion
after Chamberlain's declaration on British assistance to



Apr. 4

The Consul in Gdynia to the Foreign Ministry

Assesses attitude of Polish population in his district to an
incorporation of the Corridor in the Reich.



Apr. 5

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland

States that Lipski will be told that German offer to Poland
will not be repeated, and that Polish counter proposal has
been rejected. The Embassy should refrain from discussing
the matter.



Apr. 6

The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Reports remarks made by Polish M.F.A.'s Chef de Cabinet,
who said that Polish Government still desire a genuine under-
standing with Germany,



Apr, 6

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Conversation with Polish Ambassador on Beck's visit to
London. Lipski stated that Poland wished to abide by 1934
Agreement, and that Anglo-Polish Agreements were bilateral
and purely defensive.



Apr. 11

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

Reports assessment by the Intelligence Department of
OKW of the present military situation in Poland.



Apr. 18

The Embassy in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Reports statements said to have been made by Beck to
foreign diplomats in Warsaw about the Anglo-Polish
declaration of guarantee and his London visit.



Apr. 22

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland

Instructions to maintain complete reserve in conversations
on the general political situation and on German-Polish



Apr. 25

The Embassy in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Reviews public opinion in Poland; fear of Germany has
consolidated the various political elements, and the Army's
political influence has been strengthened.



Apr. 27

The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland

Instructs Charge' d' Affaires to arrange for interview at
Foreign Ministry on April 28 to deliver a memorandum, at
a time to coincide with start of Hitler's speech.



Apr. 27

Note to the Polish Government

The German Government consider that, by entering into
treaty relations with Britain, Poland has unilaterally nul-
lified the German-Polish Declaration of 1934 and has
rejected the German proposals for a Danzig settlement.







Doc, No. Page


May I

May 6

May 9

May 10

May 10

May 11

May 13

May 15

May 1G

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Polish Charge d' Affaires has presented a memorandum
containing the Polish Government's reply to the German
Memorandum of April 28 (document No. 276). Polish reply
rejects German accusations regarding incompatibility of
Anglo-Polish' Mutual Guarantee with the 1934 Declaration,
but states that nevertheless the Polish Government would
be wilting to entertain suggestions for regulating Polish-
German relations on a good neighbourly basis by means of
a treaty.

Circular of the State Secretary

Instructions to German Missions on the line to be taken
on Beck's speech of May 5 and on the Polish Memorandum
(document No. 334).

The Foreign Ministry to the President of the Reich Labour and
Unemployment Insurance Institute and the Reichsfiihrer-
SS and Chief of the German Police
Enquiries whether there are any objections, on economic or

other grounds, to retaliatory measures against Poles in the

Reich, in view of growing oppression of German community

in Poland.

The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Reviews effect on Polish public opinion of Beck's speech
on May 5, and discusses certain economic developments,
which might in time affect Polish morale. Influence of
recent events in Moscow on Polish attitude.

Counsellor Bergmann to Consul General Janson

Letter giving State Secretary's views, expressed to Presi-
dent of Danzig Senate, that it would not be proper to
influence League High Commissioner, Professor Burckhardt,
over his return to Danzig, and stating present position over
visit of German warships to Danzig.

Circular of the Foreign Ministry

Refers to increasing oppression of German community in
Poland and to the attitude of the Polish Government, from
which can be concluded that they are neither able nor willing
to prevent it. Sends Missions reports of excesses for
appropriate use.

The Foreign Ministry to the Consulate General in Danzig

States that German cruiser KSnigsberg will visit Danzig in
August, and requests that Danzig Senate bc informed.
Instructions have been given to Warsaw Embassy to
announce visit formally to Polish Government.

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
Submits two memoranda on the question of taking
reprisals against the Polish minority in Germany for oppres-
sion of the German minority in Poland. First memorandum
deals with general questions; second with possible economic

The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Reports information from a reliable source about Potem-
kin's visit to Warsaw.

334 430





















Doc. No.


May 16

May 17

May 17

May 17

May 21











Ambassador Molike to State. Secretary Weizsdcker

Latter deprecating the activities of the Japanese Ambas-
sador in Warsaw in concerning himself 'with the improve-
ment of German-Polish relations.

The Consul General at Geneva to the Foreign Ministry

Reports views expressed by the League High Commis-
sioner, who did not expect a formal meeting of the Com-
mittee of Three in view of Polish desire that Danzig
questions be not now discussed by the Committee.

The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Has caused serious representations to be made to the
Polish Foreign Ministry about incidents in Tomaszow;
Polish authorities consider they have done everything pos-
sible to prevent recurrence of such incidents.

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

Comments on information from the German Consul in
Lw6w on the attitude of the Ukrainians in Poland and
recommends that the Consul make no official statements
in support of the autonomy movement, but only personal
expressions of goodwill.

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

Gives an account of an incident at Kalthof, on the Danzig-
Polish frontier; of Note of protest sent by President of
Danzig Senate and of conversation between the latter and
Polish Diplomatic Representative Chodacki.

The Polish Diplomatic Representative in Danzig to the Presi-
dent of the Danzig Senate
Note describing the Kalthof incident, and complaining of
lack of security for Polish officials.

The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Reviews various indirect efforts made by the Poles to
resume conversations with Germany and suggestions made
by Japanese Ambassador in Warsaw for Italian mediation.

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Conversation with league High Commissioner in Danzig,
following latter's conversation with Ribbentrop. Professor
Burckhardt's impressions from his recent talks with Beck
and Halifax.

The President of the Danzig^ Senate to the Polish Diplomatic
Representative in Danzig
Note stating that, having received no satisfactory reply to
various communications complaining of frontier incidents
and conduct of Polish officials, he has ordered Danzig
officials serving under Senate to break off contact with
Polish persons concerned in Kalthof incident.

The President of the Danzig Senate to the Polith Diplomatic
Representative in Danzig
Note protesting against increase m, and conduct of, Polish
Customs officials in Danzig. Danzig officials instructed to
accept no instructions from Polish officials. Previous under-
taking to abstain from administering oath of loyalty to
National Socialist leadership to Danzig Customs officials
now withdrawn.
























June 7

June 1 2

June 10

June 21

June 22

June 29

July 1

July 6

July 8

July 10

July 11


Doc. No.


Staatsrat BSltcher to Consul General Janson

Transmits minute on a conversation between President of
Danzig Senate and League High Commissioner, in which
latter described his recent conversations in Berlin with
Weizsacker and Rfbbentrop and gave his own views on

The Consul General in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

Summarizes and reports on Polish Note of June 10 in
reply to Danzig Note of June 3 (document No. 471), which
refused to permit any restrictions on the rights and numbers
of the Polish Customs Inspectors in Danzig.

The High Command of the Army to the Foreign Ministry _

States that certain officers have been granted permission
to travel through the Danzig Free State in civilian clothes.

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I

Arrangements for a visit to Danzig in June by a German
naval contingent and for a visit in August by German cruiser
K&nigsberg for commemoration ceremony; proposed plans
for a visit this year by a German naval squadron await a
decision by Hitler.

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division 1

Gives information obtained from the High Command of
the Navy as to action so far taken about a German naval
visit to Danzig and Hitler's instructions.

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in
Instructions to report on whether formal announcement
has been made to Polish Government of visit to Danzig by
German cruiser Kdnigsberg.

The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Reports on reaction of Government and press to events in
Danzig, notably formation of a volunteer defence corps and
arrival of guns from East Prussia.

The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Keviews attitude of Government and public to events in
Danzig; Government unlikely to adopt aggressive tactics;
general determination to fight if Poland's rights in Danzig
clearly violated.

The Office of the Wehrmacht Adjutants attached to the Fiihrer
and Chancellor to the High Command of the Navy and the
Foreign Ministry
States that Fiihrer has decided manner of announcing

German naval visit to Danzig and will later decide what ships

shall take part.

Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of
the Danzig Senate
Conversations with League High Commissioner on latter s
return to Danzig. Professor Burckhardt's views on political

The Consul General in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

Refers to sentence passed on a Danzig Customs official by
Polish authorities and possibility of arranging for an
exchange against a Polish Customs Inspector about to be
prosecuted by the Danzig authorities.



























July 14

July 17

July 18

July 19

July 20


July 22

July 25

July 31


Memorandum by the State Secretary

In reply to enquiry from Keitel about political advisability
of publicly displaying certain guns now in Danzig, OKW is
to be informed that it would be expedient to wait a little
longer before parading guns.

Minute by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Department of
the Danzig Senate
Conversation between President of Danzig Senate and
League High Commissioner; latter had been informed by
Gauleiter Forster that the Gauleiter was now sole ruler in
Danzig and was seeing Hitler to obtain approval of con-
versation with Polish representative Chodacki,

Memorandum by the President of the Danzig Senate

Describes informal conversations with Smogorzewski,
Berlin representative of Qazeta. Polsha, and with Polish
Diplomatic Representative, Chodacki, on Danzig situation.

Memorandum by the State Secretary

States has submitted to Ribbentrop view that a decision
on proposed naval visit to Danzig concerns the Foreign
Minister and that latter should submit matter to Fiihrer
before July 22.

Memorandum by the Director of the Foreign Affairs Depart-
ment of the Danzig Sen-ate
Conversation with League High Commissioner, who de-
scribed a recent conversation with Gauleiter Forster, in
which latter had told Professor Burckhardt that Germany
would not relinquish her demands over Danzig, but that
developments could still wait for another year or two.

The Consul General in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

Refers to document No, 515 and reports about Polish
Note of July 19 to Danzig Senate which complains of Polish
Customs Inspectors being obstructed in the performance of
their duties and requires statement from Senate that con-
ditions for Polish officials to perform their duties freely will
be guaranteed. Note further announces economic counter
measures in form of withdrawal of Polish Customs control
from Danzig margarine factory "Amada-Unida" from
August 1,

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I

Records information from the High Command of the
Navy as to Fiihrer's decisions in respect of German naval
visit to Danzig and points still outstanding.

Minute by the President of the Danzig Senate

Describes conduct of Gauleiter Forster, who had informed
League High Commissioner that Poles were setting up art
armed railway guard and told Professor Burckhardt he
should protest to Polish authorities. Deplores Gauleiter's
incorrect handling of this affair and failure to refer to proper
Danzig authorities.

The Consul General in Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

Reports that two Danzig Notes sent in reply to Polish
Notes of June 1 and July 19. First Danzig Note lists cases
of espionage by Polish Customs officials and rebuts Polish
contention as to number of officials. Second Danzig Note
declares Polish threat to withdraw customs supervision from
Danzig Amacla factory to be inadmissible action directe.







686 039


















Aug. 1








The A?nbassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Reviews state of Poland's moral and material powers of
resistance, on the basis of reports received from the various
German Consulates there. Concludes that previous report
from Poznan Consulate about decline in Polish morale is not
confirmed by other evidence.

The Consul at Dwcw to the Foreign Ministry

Describes feelings amongst Ukrainians in Poland since
German-Polish tension and discusses their probable attitude
should war come.

jTfte Polish Diplomatic Representative in Danzig to the Presi-
dent of the Daniig Senate
Note complaining of tone of Danzig Note of July 29 and
rebutting charges and claims made therein in respect of
Polish Customs Inspectors. Offer to conduct direct con-
versations to settle existing problems as soon as situation
has returned to normal in respect of activities of Danzig
Customs Board and Polish Inspectors.

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

Consul General in Danzig has telephoned information from
League High Commissioner about statements and requests
made by Gauleiter Forster. Action taken by Professor
Burckhardt with Polish Diplomatic Representative.

The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Reports reactions of Polish press and Government to
latest phase in controversy over Polish Customs Inspectors
in Danzig. Believes British Ambassador to have enquired
as to point beyond which Poland could not go.

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

Information telephoned by Vice-Consul, Danzig, con-
cerning new Polish Note. Text of Note of August 4
attached; this states that certain local Danzig Customs
authorities have announced intention of resisting Polish
Customs Inspectors in performance of their duties. Note
insists on cancellation of any such instructions and warns of
Polish counter measures should such obstruction take place.

The President of the Danzig Senate to the Polish Diplomatic
Representative in Danzig
Note denying contention in Polish Note of August 4
(document No. 774), and protesting at Polish threat of

Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

Information from President of Danzig Senate, that
Gauleiter Forster was having conversations with Hitler at
Obersalzberg ; Polish Government believed to have decided
not to send further Note in reply to last Danzig Note.

[See also under France, Great Britain and Italy-I









773 1068


1070 -






Mm. 16

Mar. 26

Mar. 27

July 18

analytical list of documents




Doc, No.


Memorandum by the State Secretary '

Instructions given to German Legation in Prague that
Weizsaeker suggests Chvalkovsky instruct Czech Missions
abroad to notify to Governments cessation of their functions
as Czech representatives, and to ensure smooth transfer of
their Missions to German, diplomatic representatives.

The State Secretary to the Legation in the Protectorate

States that as certain former Czecho-Slovak Missions are
resisting instructions to transfer their affairs to German
representatives, counter measures must be taken. Instruc-
tions to inform Chvalkovsky of what general measures the
Prague Government should now take.

TJie Legation in the Protectorate to the Foreign Ministry

Refers to document No. 102 and reports on disciplinary
measures so far taken.

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

Reviews position about granting the British, French and
U.S. Governments exequatur for Consul General in Prague
whilst these Governments still do not recognize the Protec-









Mar. 15

Mar. 16

Mar. 16

i/Har. 17


The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Reports M.F.A. has told him that Rumania would respect
the situation created by the Vienna Award but was prepared
to participate in a possible reorganization as regards the
Carpatho-Ukraine though was disinterested in Czechia and
Slovakia. Rumania would not tolerate occupation by
Hungary of Rumanian villages and railway lines in the
Carpatho -Ukraine .

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Refers to document No. 2 and reports that Rumanian
Government have declined to follow, without German
approval, Poland's advice to occupy Rumanian villages and
railroads in the Carpatho-Ukraine, but do not wish their
claims overlooked should the Carpatho-Ukraine position be
revised owing to the Hungarian advance.

The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania

Refers to document No. 2 and states that Rumanian
Government should be informed that the terms of the
Munich and Vienna agreements are now superseded.
Germany has not seen fit to protest against Hungarian

The Slate Secretary to the Legation in Rumania

Refers to document No. 6 and transmits text of document
No. 7 (see under Hungary) with instructions to inform
M.F.A. that although Germany is interested in a peaceful
settlement of the Carpatho-Ukraine question, she does not at
present intend to mediate, as she believes that direct settle-
ment between Rumania and Hungary is feasible.

Doc. No.








Doc. No. Page

Mar. 18

Mar. IS

Mar. 18

Mar. 20

Mar. 22

Mar. 23

Mar. 24


Mar. 25

Mar. 30

Mar. 31

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Refers to document No. 13 and reports that M.F.A. stated
Rumania had no intention of marching into the Carpatho-
"Ukraine but hoped to obtain certain areas by diplomatic
means. Recommends that Hungary should agree to cede
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Reports that Crown Council have approved M.F.A. s
policy on not invading the Carpatho-Ukraine and the pro-
posed economic (Wohlthat) agreement with Germany.
Gafencu has denied reports of German economic pressure
on Rumania but fears consequences of Italian aims and
German colonial demands.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Reports request from M.F.A. for release of war material
from a Czech firm, destined for Rumania, and held up by
Germany on the Polish frontier.

The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania

Refers to documents Noa. 29 and 30 and states that
Germany still declines to act as intermediary in Hungarian-
Rumanian relations ; reports of German aggressive intentions
towards Rumania to be denied.

The State, Secretary to the Legation in Rumania

Instructions to enquire of Rumanian Government the
reason for certain military measures.

German-Rumanian Economic Treaty

Treaty for the promotion of economic relations between
Germany and Rumania, with Confidential Protocol of Signa-
The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Has been informed by M.F.A. of the attitude of the
Rumanian Minister in London, and of latter's recall.
Gafencu complained of pressure on Rumania not to conclude
economic agreement with Germany and stated that he had
caused the King to deny to British Minister in Bucharest
allegations of an economic ultimatum from Germany.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Reports that Rumanian Government wish to propose that
the Hungarian troops be withdrawn from frontier, where-
upon both countries should demobilize.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Refers to document No. 58 (see under Europe: General)
and reports that Rumanian M.F.A. has asserted that no
British demarche has been made to Rumania for an associa-
tion of peaceful Powers.

Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat to State Secretary Weizsdcker

Letter transmitting report on his negotiations in Bucha-
rest, which resulted in the signature of the German-
Rumanian Economic Treaty.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Reports that M.F.A. intends, in the Hungarian-Rumanian
conversations being conducted in Budapest, to try to obtain
from Hungary a mutual declaration of non-aggression, to he
agreed upon with Yugoslavia also. Has expressed his
doubts to Gafencu as to this course.
















97 ;


92 112








Apr. 4

Apr. i


Apr. 11

Apr. 14

Apr. 14

t Apr. 18

Apr. 19

May 3

it' May


Doc. So.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Reports that Rumanian Air Ministry has placed orders for
aircraft and wishes to appoint commissions to handle orders
under Economic Treaty.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Reports is informed by Rumanian M.F.A. that Rumania
will begin demobilization although Hungary refuses to make
declaration concerning the frontier or non-aggression.
Gafencu has affirmed his opposition to encirclement policy
and his intentions of extending politico-economic relations
with Germany.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Reports that Rumanian M.F.A. has told him of informa-
tion received from Beck about the latter's new attitude to
the mutual assistance pact -with Britain. Gafencu stated
that Rumania's attitude remained unchanged.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Reports appeal from Rumanian M.F.A. to Reich Foreign
Minister to prevail upon Budapest to declare that Hungary
is prepared to respect the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier and
to negotiate with the Rumanian Government on frontier

The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania

Refers to document No. 180, and states that instructions
to inform M.F.A. of Hungarian dementi are not intended as
German mediation between Hungary and Rumania.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Reports explanation given by Rumanian M.F.A. about
the attitude of his Government towards British guarantee ;
Gafencu would welcome a German declaration of guarantee

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
Records conversation between Ribbentrop and Gafencu ;
iatter questioned about Rumania's determination to carry
out Economic Treaty. Ribbentrop's views on British
opposition to Germany: Gafeneu's account of Rumania's
relations with other Powers, attitude to British proposals,
relations with U.S.S.R., Turkey, attitude to President
Roosevelt's message. Discussion of German-Rumanian
relations; Hungaro-Rumanian relations.

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal
Record of conversation between Hitler and the Rumanian
M.F.A.; Gafeneu's views on the British guarantee; Hitler's
account of his political aims; German-Rumanian relations
assured as a result of mutual trade interests.

Note by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department
Has severely warned the leader of the German national
group in Transylvania against introducing militant organiza-
tions on the German model.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Reports that, at audience with King Carol, latter com-
plained of German refusal to supply Rumania with military
equipment from Protectorate, as being contrary to previous
promise. Recommends making at least a gesture over this.



153 189






















May 8


May 10

May 13

May 13

May 17

May 23

June 7

June 10

June 12

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Has learned that Gafencu, during his recent tour, stated
Rumania's policy to be no alliances against Germany and
no dealings with tF.S.S.R. Gafencu had told British states-
men he was.convinced Hitler did not want war, but wanted
understanding with Britain.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Has learned that Deputy People's Commissar Potemkin,
during his visit to Bucharest, made no offer to Gafencu nor
was the question of a guarantee or of assistance broached.

The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Legation in Rumania
Refers to document No. 337 and contradicts statement
that none of the military equipment available from the
Protectorate can be given to Rumania; but deliveries are
likely to be on a small scale in view of German requirements.

The Minister in Rumania to the. Foreign Ministry

Refers to document No. 349 and reports that M.F.A.bas
read him an account of Potemkin's visit, according to which
Gafencu stated Rumania did not wish to enter into an
alliance with either TJ.S.S.R. or Axis Powers.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry . _

Refers to document No. 354, and states has communicated
contents to Minister President, who expressed himself as
unable to understand German attitude over supplying
Rumania from Czech military stocks. Recommends adopt-
ing generous attitude towards Rumania.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Reports that King Carol has expressed the desire to have
Colonel Gerstenberg as Air Attache in Bucharest, to super-
vise Rumania's air rearmament and recommends adopting
the King's suggestion.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Transmits information supplied by M.F.A. about latter s
recent conversation with Yugoslav M.F.A. Both agreed
that in order to maintain Balkan Pact Balkans must retnam
independent, and that Anglo-Turkish agreement must not
extend to Balkans.

The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania

Instructions to see M.F.A. before latter's departure for
Ankara, and inform him that Germany expects him to make
absolutely clear to Turks that Balkan Pact States will not,
either directly or indirectly, become an object of Anglo -
Turkish agreements.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Refers to document No. 488 and reports action taken.
Gafencu said he adhered firmly to the view, as agreed with
Yugoslav M.F.A. , that Anglo-Turkish agreement must in no
way refer to the Balkans.

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

Reports conversation with Rumanian M.F.A., who attri-
buted proposed Anglo-Turkish treaty to effect on Turkey of
Italian occupation of Albania. Gafencu believed his efforts
had been successful in excluding Balkans from final version
of this treaty.







375 484

















June 24

June 2;j

July 6

July 7

July 7


July 8


July 8

July 11

:july 13




The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 001

Conversation with M.F.A. on latter's return from Ankara ;
Gafencu stated he had definite promises from Turks that
Balkans would not be mentioned in final treaty with Britain
Had warned Turkish M.F.A. against including Balkans in
Franco-Turkish Declaration.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 567

Refers to document No. 561 and transmits further account
of Gafencu' s conversations in Ankara, derived from protocol
on these negotiations which latter read out to him. Gafencu
further stated that he had again rejected Turkish proposal
for a Bla-ck Sea Pact.

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 621

Reports conclusion of negotiations with Rumanian
Ministers on war material questions, and gives details of
terms of payment agreed.

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 625

Reports statements from German press published in
Rumanian papers that Germany is prepared to support
Bulgaria's revisionist claims against Rumania, and requests

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 627

Refers to document No. 625 and reports conversation with
M.F.A. who was unable to understand support given in
German and Italian press to Bulgarian claims against

The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 032

Refers to document No. 621 and reports signature of Pro-
tocols on deliveries of war material and aircraft. Gives
details of further economic questions remaining for decision
by Government Committees.

The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania 633

Refers to document No. 625 and denies that any comment
in German press has supported Bulgaria's revisionist claims
against Rumania.

German-Rumanian Secret Protocol ggg

Terms on which competent Rumanian authorities may
place orders for war material with firms in Germany.

The Rumanian Minister of Economics to Minister Clodius 639

Letter confirming that Rumanian Government agree that
payment for German deliveries of air armament material be
made by additional deliveries of Rumanian petroleum.

The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania 651

Refers to document No. 627, and requests that M.F.A. be
promptly informed that there is no deviation in German
policy towards Rumania. Understanding for Bulgarian
aspirations shown in German press not at expense of

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry 662

Refers to documents Nos. 633 and 651 and reports has
communicated their substance to M.F.A. Has again dis-
cussed with Gafencu question of British and French agree-
ments with Turkey.















Doc. No,


July 30

27ie Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Legation in Rumania
States that Air Ministry have now approved agreement of
July 8 for supplying German aircraft material to Rumania,
and requests urgent action to obtain additional Rumanian

[See also under France, Great Britain, Hungary, Turkey,
U.S.S.H. and Yugoslavia.]








Doc. No.

Mar. 10

Mar. 18


Mar. 25

Mar. 27

Mnr. 2S

Apr. 13

Apr. 19

Circular of tlie State Secretary

Sends text of Slovak Minister President's request to Hitler
for German protection and Hitler's reply.

German-Slovak Treaty of Protection

German-Slovak Treaty by which the German Reich
assumes protection of the political independence and terri-
torial integrity of the Slovak State and receives the right to
set up military installations in a certain zone, with Confi-
dential Protocol on economic and financial cooperation
between the German Reich and the Slovak State.

Editors' Note

German policy towards the Sid organization and the

The Consul-General and Charge d : 'Affaires in Slovakia to the
Foreign Ministry
Transmits and comments on a note verbale from the
Slovak Foreign Ministry, and points out the prejudicial
effect produced by the removal of material by German
troops from the occupied area.

Minute by an Official of Political Division I

As instructed, has informed OKW that the Foreign
Ministry ■ attaches importance to Bpeedy evacuation _ of
occupied Slovak territory beyond the Treaty demarcation

M emorandmn by the. Head of Political Division I Vb

Gives account of the Hungarian-Slovak frontier incident
on March 23, and subsequent developments.

Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IVb

Lists points made in a discussion in the General Staff, at
which Foreign Ministry was represented, on Slovak com-
plaints against German military authorities.

i Unsigned Foreign Ministry Memorandum

Lists requirements which OKW expects Slovak Govern-
ment to fulfil under the Treaty of Protection.

Unsigned Memorandum

Record of conference in the German Foreign Ministry with
the Slovak Ministers on questions arising from the Treaty of
. Protection,















206 254

235 294





June 21

June 22

July 3

July 10

July IS

July 21

July 31

Aug. 4


The Charge d' Affaires in Slovakia to the Foreign Ministry

Transmits an aide-mfynoire from the Slovak Foreign
Ministry giving the Slovak view as to how the German-
Slovak Treaty should be interpreted, and complaining of
the conduct of the German military authorities in Slovakia,

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

Conversation with Slovak Minister about German-Slovak
politico-military negotiations. Minister informed that
demands of German Military Delegation in Bratislava are
made in the name of the German Government.

Memorandum by the Slate Secretary

Conversation with Slovak Minister who raised objections
to way in which Treaty of Protection was being applied by
the German military delegation in Bratislava.

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in
Instructions to ensure that Slovak Government grant all
necessary facilities for execution of certain German military
works, even when outside the zone of protection.

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Has explained to Slovak Minister impossibility of Slovaks
seeing Ribbentrop or Hitler, and has stressed that German
negotiators in Bratislava were acting on instructions from
the Reich authorities.

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

Information, telephoned by Consul General in Bratislava,
about the action taken by the Slovak Minister of War in
ordering a Slovak battalion to move into the protected zone,
protests by the German Military Mission, and the situation
resulting therefrom.

The Minister in Slovakia to the Foreign Ministry

Reports that negotiations on the German -Slovak treaty
on zones of protection now concluded ; some Slovak amend-
ments will require German political and military approval.
Slovak attitude about German restrictions on strength of
Slovak army.

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Poland

States German demands made to Slovak Government to
stop any Slovak contacts with Poland contrary to German

[See also under Hungary.]



~>5<) 611 644 667 696 747 768 Page 755 774 S40 890 016 952 1025 1063 Spain ajmd Portugal Unto Subject Doc. No. Page 1939 Apr. 18 The State Secretary to the Legation in Portugal States is informed that Spanish Ambassador in Lisbon has been instructed to sound Portuguese Government on Portuguese accession to Anti-Comintern Pact. Results to be awaited before taking further steps. 224 274 LXXII ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS \ Date Subject Doc. No. Page 1939 Apr. 21 June 1 1 Juno 13 July- July 2 July 8 July 16 The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry Has raised unobtrusively question of Portugal's accession to Anti-Comintern Pact with Spanish Ambassador there; latter considered this is out of the question for the time being. The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry Reports conversation with Serrano Sufier, who explained how welcome a German-Vatican detente would be to foreign policy of Franco's Government in combating anti-Axis propaganda in Spain ; Mussolini shared this view. - Ambassador Mackensen to State Secretary Weizidcker Letter reporting information from Ciano that Serrano Sufier had referred to the remarks of a German liaison officer attached to Franco'sH.Q., as conveying an unfortunate impression of the Third Reich to Spaniards. The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry Has received assurance from Spanish M.F.A. that, con- trary to press reports, no important negotiations will be conducted with the Italians during Ciano's visit to Spain. The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry Reports has discussed with the Spanish authorities state- ments attributed to two Spanish generals about Spain's attitude in a future war. The State Secretary to the Embassy in Spain Instructions to state that a visit to Germany by General Franco would be welcome as would also a visit by Serrano Sufier. The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry Has been informed by Franco that latter recommended to Ciano bringing pressure to bear on the Vatican to influence American Catholics against Roosevelt's re-election as President. [See also under Italy.] 241 507 522 604 60S 634 301 G97 719 830 830 882 920 S v Switzerland Date Subject Doc. No. Page 1939 Mar. 27 Mar. 30 Apr 11 Memorandum by the Stat-e Secretary Conversation with Swiss Minister about press reports that Paris and London had been in touch with Berne over a Franco-British agreement to protect Swiss neutrality. Memorandum by the State Secretary The Swiss Minister has stated that Swiss Government were not involved either officially or semi-offieially in Anglo- French discussions on protection of Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands, and regard these discussions as res inter alios acta. The Minister in Switzerland to the Foreign Ministry Reports reasons given by Federal Councillor Motta for Swiss call-up and frontier defence measures on March 24; latter also gave an account of conversation which the Swiss Minister in Paris had had with French Foreign Ministry concerning Anglo-French guarantee. 109 129 181 136 158 218 Wr ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS LXXIII Date Subject Doc.Ifo. Page 1939 May 2 Memorandum by the State Secretary Has informed the Swiss Minister that the reactions of the Swiss press to Hitler's speech were more hostile than those of any other country. 310 401 May 15 The State Secretary to the Legation, in Switzerland Refers to document No. 181 ; states that the reply on the subject of Anglo-French guarantees of Swiss neutrality is not satisfactory and sends instructions to raise the matter again. 384 300 July 10 Memorandum by the State Secretary In view of decision by Ribbentrop to stiffen attitude of countries affected by British policy, proposes to make representations to Swiss Minister on recent Swiss statements. 646 893 July 13 Memorandum by the State Secretary Conversation with Swiss Minister, to whom he represented that Swiss attitude to the Franco-British offer of a guarantee was not beyond reproach. 666 915 July 20 Memorandum by the State Secretary Conversation with Swiss Minister, who, in response to previous remonstrances, presented a Note defining Swiss attitude towards neutrality and towards promises of help by other Powers. 692 048 TU&KEY ≪■ I: Date Subject Doc. No Page 1939 i Mar. 15 The Chargi d' 'Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Reports has learned that French are negotiating with Turks over uniting Hatay to Turkey in return for a pact of mutual assistance. 3 5 Mar. IS The Charge d' Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Reports conversation with Secretary General of Turkish Foreign Ministry, who stated Turkey was willing to co- operate in making the Balkans an economic hinterland for Germany, if the latter would refrain from pressing the Balkans to take sides in the ideological struggle. Requests instructions. 32 32 Mar. 21 The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey Refers to document No. 3 and sends instructions to inform the Turkish Government that Germany regards the proposed Franco-Turkish mutual assistance pact as in contradiction to previous Turkish assurances to Germany. 59 68 Mar, 23 The Charge a" Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Refers to document No. 59 and reports has been told by M.F.A. of tentative Franco-Turkish conversations on Hatay, and of certain French proposals, but that, in accordance with previous declarations, Turkey continues to decline to conclude a general treaty of assistance with any Great Power. 72 84 Mac 31 The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey Refers to document No, 32, and states that the Embassy should let it be known that Germany welcomes Turkey's attitude to new situation and her readiness to cooperate in development of German economic relations with Balkans. 133 168 LXXIV ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS Date Subject Doc.KoJ Page 1939 Mar. 31 Apr. Apr. 18 Apr. 25 Apr. 28 Apr. 29 May May- May 3 Mav The Charge d' Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Refers to document No. 83 (see under Europe: General) and gives precise terms of Turkish reply to British demarche as ascertained from Numan Menemeneioglu who added that Turkish policy had not changed from that repeatedly explained to Ribbentrop. Memorandum by the Foreign Minister Has been assured by Turkish Ambassador that rumours of Turkish Government adopting favourable attitude to British encirclement plans without foundation. The Charge aV Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Reviews Turkish policy; considers Turkish Government desire to adhere as long as possible to line of strictest neutrality; stresses importance of Italian policy in deter- mining Turkish attitude. Circular of the State Secretary Transmits confidential information that the Turkish Government have apparently entered into conversations with the British Government of a more far-reaching nature than they care to admit to the Germans. The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey Reviews available information on Anglo-Turkish and Turco -Soviet negotiations, and requests report. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Reports conversation with President, whom he reassured about Polish question, Italian aspirations, and German intentions towards Balkan Pact; Papen repeated that Germany expected strictest neutrality from Turkey in event of war in Mediterranean. Circular of the State Secretary According to reliable information, the Turkish Govern- ment have replied to the British offer of a pact with certain proposals which show that the conclusion of on Anglo- Turkish pact depends on the result of negotiations with the U.S.S.R. Italian counter action desired. The Ambassador in Turlcey to the Foreign Ministry Has again ascertained, in conversations with Turkish Minister President and M.F.A., that deterioration in Turco- Italian relations is causing Turkey to draw closer to Britain. Recommends that Italy make some positive contribution towards improvement. Memorandum by the State Secretary Telephone conversation with Goring who, with Hitler's agreement, does not wish Turkey to receive the heavy guns she has ordered. Some excuse must be found for non- delivery. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Conversation with Secretary General of Turkish Foreign Ministry has confirmed Papen s own view of the situation as- previously reported. Ciano's assurance to Turkish Ambas- sador insufficient to restore the situation. Papen promised to ask Ribbentrop to discuss matters further in Italy. 134 151 226 259 169 276 323 2S1 355 288 305 315 321 324 364 397 408 416 418 -ssr ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS LXXV Sate 1939 May 5 May 6 May 9 May 12 May 13 May 20 May 24 May 30 June P.\ June 5 Subject Doc. No. Page The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 333 430 Refers to document No. 324, and expresses his conviction that only a complete reorientation of Rome to the Balkan Pact would make it possible to detach Turkey from her ties with Britain. Recommends that Ribbentrop discuss this question in Rome. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 336 436 Regrets has failed in his endeavours to persuade Turkish Government to await outcome of talks between Ribbentrop and Ciano before announcing agreement with Britain. The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey 347 457 Refers to documents Nos. 315, 324, 333 and 336, and states that no information is yet available on conversations between Ribbentrop and Ciano. Instructions not to allow impression, to be created of any difference between German and Italian views on Balkan Pact. Editors'" Note Anglo-Turkish Declaration on mutual assistance in the 483 event of war in the Mediterranean, The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 374 484 Reports has ascertained from conversation with M.F.A. that conclusion of final Anglo-Turkish pact will take some weeks. Considers this will allow of ascertaining whether German- Turkish relations can be maintained. Believes Turkish policy could be changed were Italian threat to dis- appear. Ambassador Papen to State Secretary Weizsdcker 413 544 Encloses a copy of a memorandum which he lias sent Ribbentrop for his conversation with Ciano, putting the case for Italian assurances to Turkey in order to try to detach Turkey from British leading strings. Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart- 435 581 ment Record of an interdepartmental conference on deliveries of war material under contract to Turkey, and on the policy to be adopted with respect to various economic agreements with Turkey. Memorandum, by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy 454 610 Department After discussions with relevant Ministries and with German Ambassador to Turkey, submits proposals on policy to be adopted towards Turkey over extension of economic agree- ments and deliveries of war material. Memorandum by the State Secretary 472 (533 Conversation with Turkish Ambassador on Germany holding up deliveries of certain war materials, and on alleged Turkish ban on chrome exports to Germany. Re- assurances to Ambassador regarding Italian intentions towards Turkey. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry 475 63S Conversation with Turkish M.F.A., to whom he expressed, as instructed, Reich Government's profound surprise at political course taken by Turkey. ! LXXVI ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS t'': Bate 1939 June 6 June June 8 June S Subject Doc.TSo. Page June 12 June 13 June 16 June 22 June 23 June 24 Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre- tariat Ruling by Ribbentrop that Turkish representatives are not to be received in the Foreign Ministry. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Reports conversations with Turkish Secretary General and President on whom he impressed that maintenance of German friendship must be made dependent on extent and duration of Turkish commitments to Britain. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Refers to documents Nos. 475 and 489 and sends more detailed account of conversations recorded therein. Unsigned Memorandum Conversation betwoen Ribbentrop and Turkish Ambas- sador. Complaint that, in spite of Germany's friendly conduct, Turkish policy on Anglo -Turkish Declaration amounted to attempt to take part in encirclement of Germany. Ambassador replied by giving Turkey's reasons for anxiety regarding Axis policy. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Reports conversation with M.F.A. who referred to recent serious conversation between Ribbentrop and Turkish Ambassador in Berlin and asked the reason; Papen replied that intention was to make clear to Turkish Ambassador gravity of situation that had arisen in consequence of Turkish policy. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Reports he has made clear to Turkish Secretary General the need to leave the Balkan Powers out of forthcoming Franco -Turkish declaration. Numan replied that Franco- Turkish declaration would be similar to Anglo -Turkish one, but gave assurance that Balkans would not be included in final pact. The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey Refers to document No. 518, and expresses surprise that, if Balkans not to be brought into final pact with Britain and France, they should be included in Franco-Turkish declara- tion : instructions to press that this paragraph of declaration be omitted. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Refers to document No. 533 and reports conversation with Secretary General on forthcoming Franco -Turkish declaration which Numan refused to modify in sense desired by Germany. Numan's views on extent of Turkish commitments in possible cases of conflict ; Turkish partici- pation in a world war would be purely defensive. Editors' Note . Signature of Franco-Turkish Declaration of Mutual Assist- ance and Agreement on cession of the Hatay to Turkey. Circular of the Foreign Ministry Transmits confidential information on recent discussions in Ankara between Rumanian and Turkish M.F.A.'s. Gafencu given assurance by Saracoglu that reference to ■ Balkans would not be included in final Anglo -Turkish treaty : j policy towards Bulgaria also diwussed. 483 489 495 496 650 658 666 670 512 518 709 714 533 556 732 764 563 777 779 ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS LXXVII 1939 June 24 Subject Doc. No Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department Conversation with Turkish Counsellor who requested reply- to previous questions about start of German-Turkish economic negotiations and about Germany withholding delivery of certain war materials. No definite reply given on either point. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Has learned that British wish Turkey to guarantee Rumania's non-Balkan frontiers, in return for British guarantee of Thracian frontiers. Is making strong rep- resentations about this and recommends similar action in Bucharest. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Reports conversation with Numan about terms of political treaty under negotiation with Britain; signature expected shortly. The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry Believes that his efforts to persuade Human to limit extent of fresh political commitments have resulted in Turkish decision not to conclude bipartite pacts with Britain and France, but a tripartite pact instead. Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Depart- ment Has reviewed, with Reich Ministry of Economics, question of countering Turkey's political change of course by economic measures; proposes restricting economic relations with_ Turkey to minimum compatible with Germany's requirements of Turkish raw materials, particularly chrome. [See also under Europe; General, France, Great Britain, | Italy and Rumania.'] 565 590 616 730 782 Page 784 814 846 1009. 1081 Usited States Subject The Charge d'AJJaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Reports has formally notified U.S. Government of the establishment of the Protectorate. Has been informed that U.S. Government have decided to impose "countervailing duties" on imports from Germany. Tlie Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Refers to document No. 27 and suggests that, as reply to imposition of "countervailing duties", German measures against imports of U.S. cotton would be efficacious. The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the United Slates Refers to document No. 14 and sends instructions to protest to the U.S. Government against the imposition of "countervailing tlutins". Doc. No. Page 14 24 27 14 26 28 LXXVHI ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS Sate 1939 Mar. 18 Subject Doc. No. Page Mar. 18 Mar. 21 Mar. 22 Mar. 23 The Charge d'Ajfaires in the United States to the Foreign Refers to document No. 27 and reports that U.S. Treasury has announced decision to impose "countervailing duties on all dutiable imports from Germany, and for what reasons. The Charge, d'affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry . , Reviews reactions of U.S. press and public opinion to events in Czecho-Slovakia. The Charge oV Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry . Refers to document No. 33 ; reviews effects of the imposi- tion of "countervailing duties" on German imports and suggests German counter measures. | The- Charge a" Affaires in the United States to the Foreign, Ministry . I Has learned from Japanese Counsellor of Embassy that British soundings about American support in the event ot a conflict between Britain and Japan over Hong Kong received a negative reply. The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the United States Instructions to represent to U.S. Government that, the U S. Treasury order of March 18, suspending most favoured treatment for products from Bohemia and Moravia, does not take account of actual conditions, and to report whether the U.S. Government are ready to rescind this order. The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Refers to document No. 56 and reports efforts to obtain release of certain German imports from the imposition of provisional additional duties; recommends abolition of the Inland Account Procedure. The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Refers to document No. 71, and states has transmitted a Note to U.S. Secretary of State. The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry . Reviews U.S. foreign policy with particular reierence to the situation in Europe. Consul General Wiedemann to State Secretary Weizsacker Letter describing his reception in San Francisco ; discusses the American attitude towards Germany, and his own plans. Mar. 30 | Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Depart- ment a , Reviews effect of economic measures taken by tlie uk>a
in consequence of the incorporation of Bohemia and
Moravia, and discusses possible German counter measures.

Apr. f. I The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign

Ministry .. , .

Refers to document No. 89, and requests authority to liolU

informal discussions with U.S. Customs Bureau and to

promise abolition of Inland Account Procedure if removal

of the additional duties can thereby be obtained by AprU ZA.


Mar, 25

Mar. 27

Mar. 2*















107 129



157 194




ft." 1939

! Apr. 11

§: Apr. 15

Apr. 15

ft':' Apr. 17

Apr. 18

Apr. 20

It Apr. 22


Doe. No.

§, Apr.


1 ■ Af-


If. Apr.


&.■ .

Bi: Apr..


I: : /

The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the. Foreign
Reports on impression made in USA by Italian action
against Albania, and forecasts effect on U.S. policy.

President Roosevelt to the Fithrer and Chancellor

Message appealing to Hitler in interests of world peace, to
give assurance that he will not attack or invade certain
specified independent nations of Europe and Near East,
from which President will obtain reciprocal assurances.
On basis of these assurances President proposes prompt
discussion on general disarmament and on development of
international trade.

The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Has learned confidentially that President's appeal was
brought about by news of failure of Anglo-French alliance

Consul General Wiedemann to State Secretary Weizsdcker

Letter describing his efforts to influence U.S. opinion in
favour of Germany.

The, Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign


Forecasts issue of fresh regulations on countervailing

duties and recommends waiting for them before starting

negotiations between German Embassy and U.S. Treasury.

The Charg6 d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Reports on the reaction of American press and public to
President Roosevelt's peace appeal.

The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Reports further on reaction of American press and public
to President Roosevelt's peace appeal; press agitation
against Germany continues unabated.

The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Reports on flood of suggestions reaching Embassy from
all sections of the population for Hitler's forthcoming
speech. Lists main arguments advanced against President's
peace appeal.

Note by Ambassador Dieckhoff (Berlin)

Proposes that Thomsen be consulted about President
Roosevelt's alleged declaration on sending an expeditionary
force to Europe. Expresses own fears of the likelihood of

The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in the
United States
Refers to agency report that President Roosevelt has
stated that no American expeditionary force will be sent to
Europe during his tenure of office, and requests report.

The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
Refers to document No. 267 and reports that despatch of
an American expeditionary force in the first six months of a
European war is unlikely.



























IDoc. Xo.j Page

Apr. 28

Apr. 28

Apr. 29

May 1

May 2

May 6

May 9

Directive by the State Secretary fiharee

Prescribes formal statement to be made to TJ.Ss. Wiarge

d'lSs whenhandmghim, at noon, text of Hrtte* speech.

The Charged Affaires in the United States to the Foreign

ReS ^ first reactions to Hitler's speech; reply to
President's peace appeal has made great wnpress.on.

The Charge V Affaires in the United States to the Foreign j

Refers to document No. 283, and report, further reactions !

to Hitler's speech. i

The Charge $ Affaires in the United States to the Foreign \

Reports that American press is now devoting attention to I
that part £ 'Hitler's speech which answered Pres.dent
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign j

Re^fp'rovisional situation arising on expiry of the |
"cash and carry " clause of the Neutrality Act. j

State Secretary Weizsacker to Consul General Wiedemann

T^tef mW>ly to two letters from Wiedemann; trusts
latter does noT^an he has sought political discussions with
Heait and Hoover; considers reception of Communist
delegates contrary to German diplomatic practice.

280 354

283 357





308 399

340 443

May 17

May 26

May 29

June 16

June 22

The Charge tf Affaires in the United States to the Foreign
ReS' American views on German-Italian military
alliance, and on fall of Litvinov.
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign

AnSTattitude of American public to neutrality, and
distusseTmXds employed by Roosevelt to overcome
isolationism in the event of a European war.
The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign

RefSlrrest of Kuhn, leader of the German-American
Bund, for embezzlement, and speculates on the political
Ss which may influence proceedings agamst him.

The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign

ReferftoVcument No. 308 and reviews Secretary of
SWs proposals for revision of the neutrality legislation.

The Charge d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign

Petrifaction of public opinion to the Anglo-Japanese j
conflict in Tientsin, and forecasts probable course of U.S. j
policy. < The Chargi d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign ReSpolioy of Roosevelt Government in the Far East I an d conXdes tLt this will be to avoid as long as possible , driving Japan still closer to the totalitanan Powers. I 348 457 403 439 526 5SS 448 600 531 731 557 766 ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS LXXXI Date 1939 July 10 July 11 July 24 July 26 July 31 Subject Doc. No. Aug. 10 Consul General Wiedemann to State Secretary Weizsacker Replies to document No. 340, and explains his conduct. Describes attitude of public towards Germany, and com- ments on impression made by various recent German visitors. The Charge d' 'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Reports that Senate Foreign Relations Committee have adjourned discussion on neutrality question till next session, and discusses present position. The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Reports on use of press material supplied to the Embassy, and submits proposals for improving German methods of propaganda in the USA. The Chargi d'Affaires in the Unit.ed States to the Foreign Describes reaction of press and public to the Wohlthat- Hudson conversation and to British concessions to Japan in Anglo- Japanese negotiations. The Chargi a" Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Refers to document No. 725 and reports has learned from well-informed source that President anxious about possi- bility of Soviet unwillingness to conclude alliance with Britain and France. Assumes U.S. Ambassador in Moscow has received special instructions. Memorandum by an Official of the Press Department Describes visit of American Postmaster General, Farley, to Berlin ; attempts made to get him away from undesirable influence of the American Embassy in Berlin. 649 650 709 725 750 781 Page 895 899 967 1002 1028 ■i l 1078 U.S.S.R. Date Subject Doc. No. Page 1939 Mar. 13 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Reviews Stalin's speech at the Congress of the Communist Party on March 10. 1 1 Mar. 19 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Reports receipt of Soviet Note of protest about German action over Czecho- Slovakia and conversation with Litvinov as to the practical import of this Note. 43 47 .. * Mar. 20 The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Refers to document No. 43 and states that British and French Ambassadors have been told that their protests over Czecho-Slovak affair were unacceptable. Instructions that discussions on the matter in Moscow are also to be declined. 46 49 i Mar. 20 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Refers to document No. 43 and transmits text of Lit- vinov's Note of March 18 in which the Soviet Government state they cannot recognize incorporation of Czechia and 50 52 Slovakia into the German Reich on the grounds that this has no legal validity and violates the principle of self- determination of peoples. LXXXII ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS Subject IDocKo. Page 1939 Mar. 20 Mar. 21 Mar. 23 Mar. 24 Mar. 27 Apr. Apr. 17 Apr. Counsellor of Embassy Tippelskirch to Senior Counsellor Sckliep , . , Extract from a letter : discusses Soviet attitude, m wmcn he detects certain signs of a change towards Germany; points out economic importance to Germany of Soviet Union, in view of breakdown in German economic negotia- tions with Britain and France. The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Reports information from the Finnish M.F.A. about various Russian proposals, regarding the Finnish archi- pelago between Hogland and Leningrad, which Finland has rejected. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Refers to document No. 50 and transmits translation of official Soviet communique on Soviet proposal for a con- ference between Britain, France, Rumania, Poland, Turkey and the Soviet Union. The Charge aV Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Has learned from Hudson that latter s trade discussions in Moscow are only preliminary; if successful, economic negotiations will be conducted in London. Has ascertained nothing regarding a British invitation to Litvinov. Counsellor of Embassy Tippelskirch to Senior Counsellor Schliep . j _ ... , Extract from a letter: discusses Soviet attitude to British enquiry concerning anti-aggression declaration, Soviet foreign policy, and prospects of agreement m boviet- Japanese fisheries dispute. The Charge d' Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry , Reports and comments on Tass dementi of alleged Soviet undertaking to supply Poland with war material m the event of war, and to close raw material market to Germany. Memorandum by the State Secretary Records first official call on him by Russian Ambassador, Merekalov, who enquired about certain contracts with Skoda works; views of Ambassador on German-Russian relations. Memorandum by the State Secretary Records visit from Russian Ambassador who presented. note verbale on Russian contracts with the Skoda works. Ambassador regarded fulfilment of these contracts as touch- stone of Russo-German economic relations. Apr. 24 The Charge d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry . Reports that text of telegram from Roosevelt to ikalimn was published in Moscow press and comments on treatment of Roosevelt peace appeal in Moscow foreign language press. May 4 1 The Charge d'Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign ' Ministry Reports on method of announcing in press the replacement of Litvinov by Molotov as Foreign Commissar, and specu- lates on possible reasons for change. 51 55 60 75 81 112 161 215 217 69 98 138 196 266 267 257 320 325 419 ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS Lxxxm Date 1939 May 5 May 9 May 17 May 21 May 22 May 22 May 25 May 26 May May 26 Subject Doc JTo. Page Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart- ment Conversation with Soviet Charge d'Affaires who was informed that Soviet contracts placed with Skoda Works would be fulfilled. Charge enquired about resumption of economic negotiations, broken off in February, and further tried to learn whether dismissal of Litvinov would cause change in German attitude to U.S.S.R. Minute by an Official of the Press Department Conversation with Russian Counsellor of Embassy Astakhov on question of reserve adopted by German press towards U.S.S.R. not being reciprocated by Soviet press, and significance of Litvinov's removal for Soviet foreign policy. Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart- ment Conversation with the Soviet Charge' d'Affaires who stated that his Government desired to retain the Soviet Trade Delegation in Prague, and proceeded to discuss German- Soviet relations and prospects of improvement. The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union States that, on basis of results of Ambassador's conversa- tion with Molotov (document No. 424) a waiting policy must be pursued to see if Soviets will speak more openly. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Encloses memorandum of statements made to Italian Ambassador in Moscow by Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affaires, Potemkin, on latter's visits to Ankara, Sofia, Bucharest and Warsaw, Ambassador Schulenbitrg to State Secretary Weizsdcker Letter transmitting a memorandum on his conversation with Molotov ort May 20 about the resumption of German- Soviet economic negotiations, and commenting on attitude adopted by Molotov, who appears to want from Germany proposals of a political nature. Memorandum by the State Secretary Reviews present stage reached in Anglo-Russian negotia- tions, and possibilities of German action to prevent closer relations being formed between Britain, France and the Soviet Union. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Reports information from his Swedish colleague about refusal of Finnish Government to give Soviet Government information regarding fortification of the Aaland Islands; attitude of Soviet press. The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Cancelled draft telegram of instructions to Ambassador to seek an interview with Molotov and to submit orally -to him the German Government's views on German-Soviet relations, in response to Molotov's statement making economic relations dependent on a clarification of political relations. The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Refers to document No. 414 and sends Ambassador instructions to continue to maintain an attitude of complete reserve. 332 429 351 406 414 420 424 437 440 441 460 535 547 553 558 586 586 589 I 442 593 LXXXIV ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS Date Subject Page I 1939 ? . , , May 27 State Secretary Weizsacker to Ambassador Schulenburg Letter explaining reasons for change of plans about a German approach to the U.S.S.R., and referring to Hitler s approval for fresh plans. May 29 Editors' Note Discussions between Ribbentrop and the Italian Ambas- i sador on May 29 on possibilities of forestalling a successful outcome of the Anglo-French negotiations with the TJ.S.S.R. [May 29] Unsigned Memorandum I Makes proposals about a statement to be made to the j Soviet Charge d'Affaires by the State Secretary in response to Soviet request to maintain their Trade Delegation in Prague. | May 29 | Unsigned Memorandum I Lists points to be made on the German attitude over j Molotov's making the resumption of German-Soviet economic negotiations subject to a clarification of political I relations between Germany and the U.S.S.R. j May 30 I Memorandum by the State Secretary ' Conversation with the Soviet Charge d'Affaires on way in which Soviet request to maintain their Trade Delegation m | Prague affected German-Soviet economic relations, and the j connection between economic and political relations. May 30 I The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union i Informs Ambassador of change of tactics in Berlin on ; question of making contact with U.S.S.R- and describes con- I versation with Soviet Charge d'Affaires (document No. 451). May 30 The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Refers to document No. 452 and states that there are no objections to Hilger getting in touch with Mikoyan of his own accord, but that he must confine himself to talking in genera! terms only. June 1 The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Reviews Molotov's speech to Supreme Soviet on May 31, ( from which can be inferred that, in spite of deep mistrust, | Soviet Union still prepared to conclude a treaty with Britain and France, though only on condition that all Soviet demands are accepted. June 2 The Atnbassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry Refers to document No. 453, and reports on a conversa- tion between Hilger and Mikoyan. Hilger's attempts to dispel Soviet doubts about German sincerity in desiring resumption of economic negotiations. Enquiry by Mikoyan as to modus procedendi proposed for such a resumption. June 5 I Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsacker Letter in reply to document No. 446, correcting impres- | ! sion gained in Berlin that Molotov, during interview of | May 20, had rejected a German-Soviet arrangement. >
Believes Molotov almost invited political discussion.

Juno 7 | The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 463 and reports comment m
Pravda on views expressed in British and French press on
Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations, from which emerges
importance attached by Soviet Union to guarantee of
Estonia, Latvia and Finland.

























Unsigned Memorandum from the Embassy in the Soviet Union
Refers to statement made by Molotov to Ambassador on
May 20, that, for any economic negotiations, a "political
basis" would have to be found, and proposes measures in
domestic, foreign and economic policy whereby such a basis
might be constructed.

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart-
Schnurre recommends, on basis of recent conversation
between Hilger and Mikoyan, that he himself should proceed
to Moscow to discuss directly with Mikoyan modus proce-
dendo for resumption of economic negotiations.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 465 and states that the Soviet
Government agree to Schnurre's visit to Moscow, on certain
conditions. Considers further study required and proposes
that Hilger accompany him to Berlin for this purpose.

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Draft telegram referring to document No. 499; instruc-
tions to inform Mikoyan that German Government prepared
to send fully empowered negotiator to Moscow for economic
negotiations and to accept Soviet counter proposals of
February last.

The Charge a" Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign
Refers to document No. 486 and comments on Pravda
article dealing with the protection of Estonia, Latvia and
Finland against aggression.

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

Conversation with Bulgarian Minister, who described a
conversation with Soviet Charge d' Affaires in Berlin, during
which latter said that if Germany would declare she would
not attack the U.S.S.R., or if she would conclude non-
aggression pact, the TJ.S.S.R. would probably refrain from
concluding a treaty with Britain.

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart-
Reviews previous course of German-Soviet economic
negotiations, and concludes that, on resumption of negotia-
tions, an attempt must first be made to improve upon latest
Soviet offer of raw material deliveries. Political considera-
tions may, however, dictate acceptance of existing Soviet

The Charge d' Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign
Comments on unilateral official Soviet communique about
conversation which took place on June 15 between the Soviet
and British and French negotiators.

Memorandum by Ambassador Schulenburg

Conversation with Soviet Charge 1 d 1 Affaires in Berlin
on German-Soviet relations. Charge appeared to have
correctly understood and reported home statements recently
made to him by Weizsacker.

Doc. No.























Doc. So



June 18

June 25

June 27

June 23

June 29

June 29

June 29

June 30

June 30

The Chargt d 1 Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign
Transmits Hiiger's account of his interview with Mikoyan
on June 17, at which he presented German offer to send
fully empowered negotiator to Moscow to resume economic
negotiations on basis of last Soviet offer. Mikoyan con-
tinued to consider German answer as "not entirely favour-

The Charge d' 1 Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign
Reports conversation between Hilger and Mikoyan ; latter
stated that before going into question of a German pleni-
potentiary coming to Moscow for economic negotiations, he
required to have specified those points on which, in German
view, differences of opinion still existed.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Explains Mikoyan's tactics over resumption of economic
negotiations as based on suspicion that German offer at this
juncture dictated by political considerations. Proposes
dispelling suspicion by offering to conduct negotiations un-
obtrusively in Berlin or via Embassy in Moscow.

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart-
Minutes on document No. 570, contesting views of
German Ambassador in Moscow that economic negotiations
with the U.S.S.B. should be conducted either in Berlin or by
the Embassy in Moscow.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Reports on interview with Molotov who took note of
statements that Germany would welcome a normalization
of relations with the U.S.S.R., and had furnished proofs of
her goodwill. Requests instructions on reply to be given
to Mikoyan's questions, endorsed by Molotov, respecting
resumption of economic negotiations.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Comments on article by Zhdanov in Pravda, entitled
"British and French Governments do not want a treaty on
the basis of equality with the Soviet Union".

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal
Refers to document No. 570 and reports Hitler's decision
that the Russians are to be informed that, in view of their
attitude, Germany would not be interested in a resumption
of economic discussions at present.

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Refers to document No, 579, and states that Ribbentrop
considers sufficient has now been said in the political field;
no further action should be taken until Fresh instructions.
Decision not yet reached on question of economic negotia-
tions, so instructions should be awaited.

Minute by an Official of the Economic Policy Department

Note on directive to Embassy in Moscow contained in
document No. 62S, reviewing recent conversations with
Mikoyan and Molotov, and suggesting that this directive
should now be despatched.















588 813 ■








The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Sends further details on his conversation with Molotov to
supplement document No. 579.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Reports has been informed by Potemkin that Soviet
Government are prepared to meet German wishes respecting
release of crew of Komsomol and certain other Soviet

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Reports information from his Italian colleague about
latter s interview with Potemkin, who appeared more
optimistic regarding Anglo-Soviet negotiations. On Rosso
referring to German desire to normalize relations with
U.b.b.K., Potemkin replied that Soviet-German agreement
would represent most effective guarantee of peace.

Herr Rudolf Nadolny to Ambassador Schuhnburg

Letter discussing validity of German-Soviet Treaty of
Berlin of 1926 and its applicability to the proposed Anelo-
Rusaian agreement.

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Refers to documents Nos. 568, 570 and 579, and gives the
reply to be made to Mikoyan's question about points still
outstanding between Germany and U.S.S.R. in the economic

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No. 628 and reports action taken with

Ambassador Schulenburg to State Secretary Weizsacker

Letter expressing view that, whilst he agrees that no
further action should be taken with Molotov, a more friendly
treatment of Soviet officials in Berlin might prove German
good will.

Counsellor of Embassy Tippelskirch to Ambassador Schulen-
Letter written from Berlin describing various conversa-
tions he has had in the Foreign Ministry on the future of
German-Soviet relations.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Refers to document No, 642 and reports communication
made to Hilger by Mikoyan that Soviet Deputy Trade
Representative Babarin has been instructed to discuss
directly in Berhn points still requiring clarification before
resumption of German-Soviet economic negotiations.

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Depart-
ment r
Discussion with Soviet Trade Representatives on questions
still outstanding m German-Soviet economic negotiations
Soviet statement of views attached. Schnurre's comments
on these views.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits report published in Soviet press that German-
Soviet trade and credit negotiations have been resumed in

























July. 22


July 24

July 27



I Doc. No.


July 29

July 29

July 31


The State Secretary to the- Embassy ≫≫ the Sonet Union

Refers to document No. 677 and states that Soviet Trade
Representative Babarin has now called on Schnurre;
German policy on the economic negotiations will be to act
in a markedly forthcoming manner. In respeet of political
conversations, the Ambassador is now empowered to pick
up the threads again.

Memorandum by the. State Sectary .

Conversation with the Russian Charge d Affaires, who
wished to discover German attitude to an invitation for two
German personages to visit Agricultural Exhibition m
Russia; this to be a modest start on resumption of cultural j
relations. ]

Memorandum by the Stale Secretary _ I

Conversation with Russian Charge d' Affaires who corn- :

mented on Anglo-Japanese negotiations on Tientsin, spoke
[ of Russian relations with Japan, and enquired about
I present German-Polish relations. i

i The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
| Refers to document No. 700, and describes conversation ,
! with Potemkin, who expressed pleasure about improved
| cultural contacts. Schulenburg took opportunity of again

describing a normalization of German-Soviet relations as

j Memorandum by an Otfeial of the Economic Policy Depart-

i Describes an informal conversation held, in accordance
with instructions, with Head of Soviet Trade Delegation
and Soviet Charge d'Affaires. Discussion on advantages oi
a German-Soviet rapprochement-, and various stages m
which this might be achieved.

TM State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Refers to document No. 727 and instructs Ambassador to
await more detailed instructions before arranging further

The State Secretary to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union

Encloses copy of document No. 729, and requests that
Molotov be sounded on same lines. If Molotov abandons
his reserve, he may be told that Germany would be pre-
pared to come to an understanding with the U.S.b.K to
respect Soviet interests in Poland and m Baltic question

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Refers to document No. 736 and requests Ambassador to
report time of his next interview with Molotov. Instruc
tions in document No. 700 also apply to this interview.

Senior Counsellor Schnurre to Ambassador Schulenburg

Letter discussing difficulties in way of German business
visits to Russia, and steps taken about cultural exchanges.
Political background to latest instructions sent Ambassador ;
Ribbentrop's concern to obtain positive result m Russian





715 976

















Aug. 3





Aug. 3

Aug. 4


The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Informs Ambassador briefly of a conversation with Soviet
Charge d'Affaires on August 2. Expressed German desire
for remoulding of German-Russian relations, stated readiness
for more concrete relations and requested to know whether
Soviet Government also desire German- Russian relations to
be placed on new basis.

The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Refers to document No. 758 and informs Ambassador that,
without prejudice to his conversation with Molotov, it is
intended to continue in Berlin, in more concrete terms,
conversation on harmonizing interests. Schnurre will
therefore see Astakhov.

The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Informs Ambassador more fully of conversation described
in document No. 758. Indicated to Astakhov two condi-
tions for remoulding of German-Soviet relations; stated
that Germany in no hurry; hinted at understanding with
Russia on fate of Poland. Indicated that more concrete
conversations depended on Soviet Government officially
communicating desire for remoulding relations.

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department ■,
Conversation with Soviet Charge d'Affaires on August 3. '
Discussion of economic negotiations and interview between
Ribbentrop and Astakhov on preceding day. Schnurre
explained that, though Ribbentrop had indicated no
urgency, it would be expedient to continue conversations
within next few days.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry
Transmits and comments on Tass communique about
statements reported to have been made by British Foreign
Under-Secretary on difference of opinion in negotiations
with Moscow about infringing independence of Baltic States.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry ]
Refers to documents Nos. 736 and 744 and reports con- I
versation with Molotov, to whom he officially confirmed and
amplified statements on German policy made by Schnurre i
to Soviet representatives in Berlin. Molotov stated that i
Soviet Government also desired normalization and improve- j
ment of relations with Germany, but continued to evince |
mistrust of German intentions.

Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department I
Conversation with Soviet Charge d'Affaires, who stated :
that Soviet Government were desirous of continuing con- !
versations on improvement of Soviet-German relations, and I
regarded conclusion of a credit agreement as first stage. [

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry i
Refers to documents Nos. 760, 759 and 761 and reports I
statement by Potemkin that Astakhov has already been
given general instructions to continue conversations in
Berlin and will now receive wider instructions.

The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry

Has been informed by M.F.A. of Molotov's statements to
Finnish Minister in Moscow that Russia has no designs on
Finland but must protect herself against lightning German
attack on Leningrad. Molotov further explained Russia's >
interest in Aaland Islands.








1 05 1















Aug. 7

Aug. 7


Doc. No.


State Secretary Weizsdcker to Ambassador Schulenburg

Letter discussing possibilities of relaxing restrictions on
social relations with Soviet Embassy, in order to ease
German-Soviet relations.

Ambassador Schulenburg to Senior Counsellor Schliep

Letter giving personal impressions of Anglo -French
negotiations in Moscow, and describing experiences of
various diplomatic colleagues in conversations with

[See also under Baltic States, Europe: General, France,
Great Britain and Northern States.]








Mar. 18

Mar. 19

Mar. 27


tooc. No.

Mar. 30


Apr. 6

Apr. 10

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

German Air Attache has been informed by Berlin that
German aircraft firms have been authorized to submit
tenders to Yugoslavia under the credit ; Air Attache 1 believes
Yugoslavia is extremely interested in the speedy conclusion
of the armaments negotiations.

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Has learned that recent events have aroused extreme
anxiety, also in highest quarters, and expresses the view
that should this continue it may lead to Yugoslavia turning
towards the Western Powers.

The Ministry in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Refers to document No. 21, and proposes that, if ban on
submission of tenders to Yugoslavia by representatives of
German aircraft industry eannot be lifted at once, firms
concerned be authorized to submit tenders under the express
condition that total armaments credit is approved by the
competent Reich departments.

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Refers to document No. 105, and reports that high prices
demanded by German armaments firms are hampering
armaments negotiations.

The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation
in Yugoslavia
Refers to documents Nos. 105 and 128, and explains
reasons for delay in giving final decision about conclusion of
credit transaction.

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Reports on difficulties encountered in negotiations over
the credit offered to Yugoslavia by Italy for financing State

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Reports on orders for aircraft to be expected from Yugo-
slavia when Credit Agreement is completed.









142 178








Apr. 13

Apr. 13

Apr. 14

Apr. IS

Apr. 16

Apr. 22

Apr. 22

Apr. 25



Doc. No.

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Reports that Yugoslav M.F. A . has referred to Yugoslavia's
attitude during events in Albania as proving her loyalty to
policy of friendship towards the Axis Powers, and has asked
for authoritative statement of Germany's interest in a strong
and united Yugoslavia. * B

The. Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Reports fears expressed by Chief of the Yugoslav General
Staff to German Military Attache that agitation among
Volksdeutsche may prejudice German -Yugoslav relations.

Note by the Deputy Director of the Information and Press
Has learned from Propaganda Ministry of request made by
Cincar-Markovid to Goebbels that Yugoslavia's recent atti.
tude receive special recognition in German press. Instruc-
tions as to press treatment.

Note by the Deputy Director of the Cultural Policy Department
Refers to document No. 192 and records action taken to
keep German national group in Yugoslavia completely

Tlie Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the
Legation in Yugoslavia
States that delivery of bomber aircraft by required date
impossible. Nothing can be said about later delivery as
political prerequisites and credit conditions have not yet
been clarified.

The Legation in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Reports that War Minister raised subject of German
armament credit, referring to a promise of a 200 million RM
credit made by Goring. Minister emphasized urgency of
credit question.

Slate Secretary Weizsacker to Minister Heeren

Letter conveying Ribbentrop's annoyance at the way in
which the public announcement of Cinear-Markovic's visit
to Berlin has been made; states that the initiative came
from Yugoslavia.

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secre-
Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and the
Yugoslav M.F.A.: Ribbentrop's account of German foreign
policy; views on German- Yugoslav relations; Cinear-
Markovic's account of his country's foreign policy; policy
towards accession to Anti-Comintern Pact. Discussion of
German-Yugoslav credit negotiations. Question of Yugo-
slavia's policy towards League of Nations.

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal
Record of conversation between Hitler and Yugoslav
M.F. A. : Hitler's review of Germany's position; his friendly
policy towards Yugoslavia ; views on Hungary and Rumania ;
policy towards Slovakia; weakness of British policy;
position of Japan; progress and military strength of Italy!























Doc Ho,




Apr, 27 Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Ike Economic Policy
' Department

i Has learned from State Secretary for the Four Year Plan
of conversation between Goring and Yugoslav M.F.A. in
i which Goring confirmed that Germany was, in principle,
j prepared to grant Yugoslavia a credit.

25 j Memorandum by an Official of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop
? Confidential report on line taken by Yugoslav Legation
in Berlin as to the significance of the Prince Regent's visit
to Berlin and on German-Yugoslav relations.

Memorandum by the Foreign Minister

Conversation between Yugoslav Prince Regent, ^Hitler
and Ribbentrop on political situation; Ribbentrop's pro-
posal for Yugoslav withdrawal from League of Nations.

June 16 The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Reports has asked M.F.A. if an early decision on Yugo-
slavia withdrawing from League of Nations could be
expected. Cinear-Markovic replied that Rumania must
first be consulted, and that time was needed for preparation.

June 19 The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Refers to instructions to enquire about a Yugoslav pro-
posal to Hungary for formation of a neutral bloc of four
States and reports has so far been unable to take action,
but can confirm Yugoslav desire for Hungarian-Rumanian
| and Bulgarian-Rumanian settlement.

June 27 I Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Depart-
States agreement reached in negotiations on Protocol for
settling German credit for war materia! to Yugoslavia;
I recommends that the Protocol be now signed.

June 29 Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Polity Depart-




438 587














Considers that, in view of reports of French offers of
armaments credits to Yugoslavia, signature of the Protocol
on the German Armaments' Credit to Yugoslavia is a matter
of urgency.

July 1 The State Secretary to the Legation in Yugoslavia |

Refers to document No. 544, and sends instructions to I
approach Yugoslav Government about their plan for form-
ing a neutral four Power bloc consisting of Yugoslavia,
Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

July 3 1 The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

j Refers to document No. 598 and reports conversation
i with M.F.A., about new line in Turkish foreign policy and
I Cincar-Markovic's desire to buttress Yugoslav policy of
i neutrality by a rapprochement to similarly oriented neigh-
bouring States.

July 5 The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Announces signature of Protocol on German arms credit
to Yugoslavia (document No. 620), and reports about
position on the Yugoslav oil concession to Germany. |

July 5 German- Yugoslav Secret Protocol 620

I Terms on which Yugoslavia is to be granted a credit for
j purchase of war material in Germany; amount of credit j
[ still unspecified.









Memorandum by the State Secretary

Has told Yugoslav Minister that Yugoslavia should dis-
sociate herself from the Balkan Entente.

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

Conversation with Yugoslav Minister about views
expressed by Bibbentrop that Yugoslavia should dis-
sociate herself from Balkan Pact and League of Nations.

The Director of the Political Department to the Legation in
Refers to rumours, in connection with Prince Regent's
visit to London, about Yugoslavia breaking away to
Western Powers, accepting French and British arms credits,
and despatching gold reserves to London . Requests report.

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Depart-
Statement by Yugoslav Minister giving details about
Yugoslav request for arms. Minister's comments on the
political significance of the Yugoslav request.

The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Replies to document No. 680, that precise information on
Yugoslav gold transfers to Britain not available. Com-
ments on reasons underlying Prince Regent's visit to
London, and probable course of Yugoslav foreign policy.

Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department

Conversation with Yugoslav Minister whom ho asked, as
instructed, when Yugoslavia would leave League of Nations.
Minister unable to reply, but described steps already taken
towards gradual withdrawal from League.

The State Secretary to the Legation in Yugoslavia

Minister instructed to renew pressure on Yugoslav M.F.A.
to withdraw from League of Nations; steps so far taken iri
this direction do not meet German expectations.

The Legation in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

Refers to document No. 733 and reports action taken with
M.F.A. Latter replied that Yugoslavia had already broken
away in spirit from League of Nations, but required formal
pretext for withdrawal. This he expected to find during
September Assembly.

[See also under Italy.}

Doc. No,















S.O. Code No. 59-114-6*

MABCH. 1039 '

; No. 1

I'; Sa]/2025aO-3i

|; The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

N °' A 44? Moscow, March 13, 1939.1

Pol. V 2330.
Subject; Speech by Stalin at the Congress of the Communist Partv

Inthe first session of the eighteenth Party Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union of March 10, Stalin gave an expose of the
domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party

In that part of the speech devoted to foreign policy and in which was
mamfest unchanged adherence to the policy hitherto pursued, it was
noteworthy that Stalin's irony and criticism were directed in consider
ably sharper degree against Britain, i.e., against the reactionary forces
m power there, than against the so-called aggressor States, and in
particular Germany. Moreover this was also evident in Manuilski's*
report on the work of the Comintern.
Stalin's statements on foreign policy, as is usual here and in the
| ;; mannei ■familiar from the press, at first contrasted the prosperity of the
l/Soviet Union with the appearance of crises in the capitalist world in
border to demonstrate that the capitalist States were seeking a way out
|,tf their critical situation in "the second imperialist war" which had
| ;a lready been unleashed by the so-called "aggressor States "'from China
VM Spam. The struggle of the aggressor States was directed against the
^interests of Britain, France and the United States, who for their part
gmade concession after concession to the aggressors. The weakness of
fcifte democratic Powers, apart from their fears of a revolutionary de
Prelopment m the event of a new war, was evident in the first place
Ifrom the fact that they had abandoned the principle of collective
becurity and had turned to a policy of non-intervention and neutralitv
pnderiymg tins policy was the wish to divert the aggressor States to
"Hther victims.
j ; In this connection, Stalin also spoke of Germany and the Ukraine
ffesaid: Let us rake Germany, for example. Austria has been ceded
|q her, in spite of the obligation to protect the former's independence
|he.Sudetenland was abandoned to her, Czechoslovakia was left to her
foe, in violation of all obligations: then, however, the press began to
Kabtiah hes about the 'weakness of the Russian Army', about the

pi The date of receipt is not recorded.

^Dnutri Zakharovich Manuilski, a memb er of the Presidium of the Comintern,


'disintegration of the Russian Air Force' and about 'disturbances 1 in
the Soviet Union, thus pushing the Germans further eastwards, promis-
ing them an easy prey and saying: 'Just start a war with the Bol-
sheviks, everything else will take care of itself.' It must be admitted
that this looks very like encouragement. The fuss made by the Anglo-
French and North American press about the Soviet Ukraine is charac-
teristic. The newspapermen of this press shouted themselves hoarse
that the Germans were taking action against the Soviet Ukraine, that
they already had possession of the so-called Carpatho-Ukraine with its
population of some 700,000, and that by the spring of this year at the
latest the Germans would add the Soviet Ukraine, which has over
30 million inhabitants, to the so-called Carpatho-Ukraine. It looks
as if the purpose of this suspicious uproar was to engender the
fury of the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmo-
sphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without apparent


To these words Stalin added: "If there really are such lunatics who
would wish to unite the Soviet Union [sic ? Ukraine] with the Carpatho-
Ukraine, there need be no doubt that there will be enough strait-
jackets in the Soviet Union for such lunatics. . . Even more charac-
teristic is that some politicians and newspapermen in Europe and the
United States have lost their patience waiting for a 'campaign against
the Soviet Ukraine' and are now themselves beginning to reveal the
reasons behind the policy of non-intervention. They say frankly and
write in black and white that the Germans had bitterly disappointed
them, as, instead of advancing further to the east, against the Soviet
Union, they had turned westwards and demanded colonies. It can he
believed that the Germans were given parts of Czecho -Slovakia as a
reward for the undertaking to start a war with the Soviet Union, but
that the Germans now refuse to fulfil the bargain and send these people


On the attitude of the Soviet Union, Stalin said: "The Soviet Union
naturally cannot pass over these ominous happenings. Every war, :
even a small one, unleashed by the aggressor States in some remote ;
corner of the world constitutes a danger to the peace-loving States, j
How much greater a danger is presented by the new imperialist war, ;
which has already involved more than 500 millions in Asia, Africa and ;;
Europe. Therefore our country has continued unswervingly the policy J
of maintaining peace, but at the same time has done very serious work : ;
in the sphere of strengthening the preparedness of our Red Army and !
our Red Fleet."

As further measures towards strengthening her position, the Soviet

Union had entered the League of Nations which, "although a weak;

instrument of peace", might nevertheless restrain the unleashing of ■



Stalin presented the following points as the principles of the foreign
,■'■ ■ policy of the Soviet Union:

"1) We stand for peace and the consolidation of economic relations
?with all countries and will abide by this if these countries adopt the
■ same attitude towards the Soviet Union and will not attempt to damage
£ the interests of our country.

jT 2) We stand for peaceful, close and good-neighbourly relations with
;;' ; ; all countries having a common frontier with the Soviet Union; we take
ii. this attitude and will continue to take it if these countries adopt the
;.■;■. same attitude to the Soviet Union and do not try either directly or in-
h. directly to injure the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the
&' Soviet State.

%■, 3) We stand for support of those peoples who have been the victims
I of aggression and who are fighting for the independence of their native
!■;. land.

| i) We do not fear the threats of the aggressors and we are ready to
|;;. return in double measure every blow struck by the warmongers in their
|; attempts to violate the integrity of the Soviet frontiers."

|: : ; In conclusion Stalin formulated the guiding principles of the foreign
policy of the Communist Party as follows :

" 1) Still to continue to pursue a policy of peace and consolidation of
economic relations with all countries.

2) To exercise caution and not to let our country be drawn into con-
flict by warmongers, whose custom it is to let others pull their chestnuts
out of the fire.

3) To strengthen in every way the fighting efficiency of our Red
Army and Fleet.

;v t) To strengthen the international bonds of friendship with the
I workers in all countries who are interested in peace and in friendship
" among the peoples."

The part of Stalin's speech dealing with domestic policy presented
..little new. It was characterized by a comparatively sober account of
I the economic and internal political situation. It would take ten to
f fifteen years "to catch up economically with the advanced capitalist
|. countries", expressly renouncing all "fantasies" and adhering to the
' guiding principles and methods hitherto pursued.
| I beg to reserve a report on the full course of the Congress. 3 The
jiext of Stalin's speech will be sent when a German text is available. 4

Count von dee Schulenbubg

'.'Not printed (493/233240-47). This report, No. A/643, is dated Apr. 3.
.* Not found.


No. 2


The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry


URGENT Buchabest, March 15, 1939?4:30 p.m.

No 79 of March 15 Received March 1 6?9 :30 p.m.

Pol. IV 1714.

Foreign Minister Gafencu told me the following:

1) Rumania intends to respect the situation created by the Vienna
Award. 1 The Rumanian Government have not taken and will not take
any steps to alter this situation.

2) If circumstances demand, Rumania is prepared to participate in a
possible reorganisation of the situation with all the interested States,
in particular the Vienna arbiters. This, however, applies only to the
Carpatho-Ukraine, and not to Czechia or Slovakia, in which Rumania
is disinterested.

The Foreign Minister asks the Reich Government to inform him of
their views regarding the maintenance or the possible alteration of the
present situation in the Carpatho-Ukraine.

The Foreign Minister said that he was having similar statements
made in Berlin by the Charge d* Affaires. 2 As his newspaper Timpul
had inadvertently mentioned participation in the reorganisation of
Czechoslovakia, he asks that this should be corrected, saying that only
the Carpatho-Ukraine was meant.

A few Rumanian units are concentrated on the frontier facing
Carpatho-Ukraine, but they are not to be given marching orders until
the situation has been clarified. Rumania, however, will not look on
idly if Rumanian villages and railway lines in the Carpatho-Ukraine
are occupied by Hungary and if Hungary possibly occupies positions
facing the new frontier.

So far no military regrouping had taken place on the Hungarian
frontier but men on leave had been recalled. The Foreign Minister
again asked for our cooperation with him; Poland had also promised
him this and would take no action, even though she had concentrated
troops on the frontier for security.


i See vol. iv of this Series, document No. 99.
2 Victor Erabetzianu, Counsellor of Legation.

MARCH, 1939 5

No. 3


The Charge d' Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry


No. 47 of March 15 Ankara, March 15, 1939?6:48 p.m.

Received March 16 ? 2:00 a.m.
Pol. VII 450.
I hear from competent authority that the French are negotiating
with the Turks over uniting Hatay i to Turkey. The French are alleged
to be demanding the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance from the
Turks as a quid pro quo. The Turkish attitude to this matter has hither-
to been evasive. The French Ambassador, Massigli, stated to diplomats
here in this connection that the Reich Government had intimated to
the Turkish Government that they would support the alleged Italian
aspirations regarding Syria if Turkey deviated from her present policy
of strict neutrality towards the Great Powers.


'-^t XI '&? t^M j r !"r' W t Kh had ac 1 ull ' e d ≫ special regime of local auto-
.. nomy within the French Mandate for Syria. Various agreements between France and

Turkey concerning the Sanjak had previously been made, the most recent being in July
. 1938, when the new Franco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship was initialled. S≪ afso vol v

of this Series, document No. 539 and footnote 2 thereto.

No. 4


The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry
No. 31 of March 15 Warsaw, March 16, 1939?3:15 a.m.

Received March 16 ? 8:30 a.m.
Pol. IV 1740.
P M. Beck, who had not reacted in any way to the appointment which
1 1 had already sought yesterday, asked me to call on him this evening to
itell me, with obvious displeasure, and referring to Lipski's lack of con-
j tact with the German Foreign Ministry, that unpleasant things had
|Jbeen observed along the Polish frontier i during the surprise march-in of
liGerman troops. Machine guns had been set up at various points im-
|iuediately on the frontier and trained on Polish territory. At one point
retrench had even been dug. On the Polish side these measures, which
|sppeared like a threat, had been regarded as misunderstood instructions

1 i.e. with Caeeho-Slovakia,


by subordinate authorities, and no counter-measures had been Uken.
He asked me, however, to acquaint my Government with this matter,
fnd eSreSed a hope that these measures would be rescmded. I pro-

m Sc d k °fu S r°t h e r pointed out that, during the m arch in th demarc,
tion line originally laid down had not been adhered to. As a result, an
£EaS?S≪Lit impression had arisen. Fortunately, no incidents
had o"--d P Objectively speaking, the matter was a so -mpo^t
as the frontier established meanwhile had been accepted. However at
W communication might have been expected. I replied that*
demarcation line, of which I had no exact formation ha probab y
been regarded as settled by frontier delimitation.* In any case there
had certainly been no intention of putting Poland out of humour.

I thn presented the notification of the Hacha Agreement and in
accordance with oral instructions, explained the German Jiews on he
"erallTuation, emphasizing particularly the German .at ******
question of the Carpatho-Ukraine^ When I asked about
^Rumanian wishes, the Foreign Minister replied that the matter was
at present being negotiated with Polish mediation; he assumed that
R?E woukfreceive both the areas settled by Rumamans and the
fxTeme eastern tip with the strategically important railway He
furS mentioned that Czech troops had asked to be transported back

"ESS ^ Sk question, Beck expressed satisfaction with the
independence obtained. On receipt of last night's notification ≪ he had
immediately announced his recognition and had appointed a Charge
oVAffaires who was already on his way to Bratislava. Foreign press
reports, attributing to Poland specific designs on Slovakia were
false, and a that? dftnenfi had been ordered, ^contrast to the
Carpatho-Ukrainian frontier no troops were concentrated on the blovak

Conclusion M. Beck said he was grateful for. the detailed informa-
tion given, and expressed the hope that a settlement of he Carpatho-
Ukrainian question would also have a favourable effect on German-
Polish relations. Moltke

2 See vol. v of this Series, chapter I, Vassim.
iW^J^liriMAMiT) Moltke reported: "The Hungarian ■


MARCH, 1930

No. 5

Memorandum by the State Secretary

Berlin, March 16, 1939.

The State Secretary gave the following instructions to the German
Legation in Prague by telephone at 1 : 12 p.m.

For Ministerialdirektor Gaus, or Counsellor Dr. Kordt.

I would like to suggest that Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky instruct
the former Czech Missions abroad:

1) to notify the Government to which they were previously accredited
that they have given up their function as Czech representatives.

2) to ensure the smooth transfer of the former Czech Missions] to the
German diplomatic representative on the spot. 1


i On Mar. 16 in telegram No. 123 sent from Prague at 8:45 p.m. (2050/447285), Ritter
and Hencke reported: The Czech Missions abroad have been instructed by ChvalkovsW
by telegram today to place themselves under German Missions, to carry out our in
structions, and m particular to put all archives at our disposal. Czech Missions are
passing on similar instructions to Czech Consulates "

la telegram No. 125 of Mar 18 (not printed, 2819/548717), the Foreign Ministry in-

f ^f d i ≪? B ? y W ?>v 1S t} ? at ,' ae far as was knt "?. th * °rder had been obeyed by
.11 Czech Missions except those in W ashington, London and Paris. The Prague Govern
ment were being asked to instruct these Missions also to conform to the order.

No. 6

The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry


UKGBNT Bucharest, March 16, 1939?2 p.m.

No. 82 of March 16 Received March 16?6:35 p.m.

Pol. IV 1753.
With reference to my telegram No. 79 of March 15. 1
Poland yesterday advised Rumania to occupy Rumanian villages
: and railroads in Carpatho -Ukraine. The Minister of the Courts and the
.foreign Ministers have told me that the Rumanian Government have
'declined, because they do not wish to do anything without German
consent. They request that their just claim to these territories be not
.overlooked if, owing to the Hungarian advance, the position in
|Carpatho-Ukraine is revised in contravention of the Vienna Award.

'Document No. 2.
2 Ernst Urdarianu.
' Grigore Gafencu.


As the Rumanian Government's attitude in the matter appears loyal
in every way, please consider whether the Foreign Minister can be given
an answer which will strengthen his position in the country and will
contribute towards pacification in the eastern tip of the Carpathians.
Request answer by telegram, if necessary by telephone.


No. 7


The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry


urgent Budapest, March 16, 1939 ? 4:30 p.m.

No. 48 of March 16 Received March 16 ? 8:25 p.m.

Pol. IV 1755.

The Foreign Minister told me that Rumania was mobilizing five
army corps in all. The Hungarian Army had received orders to eject
the Rumanians, should they invade Carpatho-Ukraine. He had re-
quested the Yugoslav and Polish Governments to exert a calming in-
fluence on the Rumanian Government so that incidents would be
avoided. Hungarian relations with Yugoslavia were at present very
friendly as a result of the Yugoslav Government's complete restraint in
the Carpatho-Ukraine question. On the other hand, he had rejected in
a friendly manner the Polish Foreign Minister's 1 advice to appease
Rumania by means of territorial concessions. He would not allow
himself to be blackmailed by Rumania. The Rumanian proposal re-
ported yesterday, 2 which meant that Hungary could only have occupied
a relatively small part of Carpatho-Ukraine, was unacceptable; but he
was ready of his own accord to cede to Rumania, in return for conces-
sions elsewhere, the eastern tip of Carpatho-Ukraine (east of the Theiss)
including the railway link from Poland to Rumania, which the Polish
Foreign Minister would like to see in Rumanian possession for the
purpose of a possible Polish -Rumanian advance against the Soviet

Count Csaky requested that this communication should for the present

1 Col. Beck.

2 In telegram No. 4 2 of Mar. 1 5 from Budapest (not printed, 1929/437929-30) Erdmanns-
dorff reported information from Csaky that the Rumanian Government had presented
a Note proposing that Hungarian troops should not move east of a line running north
from Huszt (Chust). Texts of the Rumanian proposals have not bean found in the
German archives. In despatch Ho. 1775 of Mar. 24 (not printed, 1975/438346-48)
Fabricius reported that the Hungarian Minister in Bucharest had told him that Gafencu's
first proposals had been that Carpatho-Ukraine should, as welt as by Hungary, also
be occupied by Poland and Rumania; only later had Gafencu spoken of Rumania occupy-
ing four villages and the railway connecting Sighet with Poland. See also document
No. 29.

MARCH, 1939 Q

be treated as confidential and he would also be (word missing) [ ?grateful]
to us for exerting a calming influence on the Rumanian Government.
He added that the Hungarian Army, which had a start of three days
as regards mobilization, was strong enough to meet a possible Rumanian
attack with success. 3

Ebdmannsd okff

In a further telegram, No 61 of Mar. 19 (not printed, 1973/438334-35) Erdmanns-
dorff reported that Csaky had mformed him that ho had instructed his MiSTn
Bucharest to ask the Rumanian Government to explain why they were takina such
extensive military measures despite the reassuring Hungarian statements. Should he
not obtain a satisfactory answer within 48 hours, Hungary would order general

No. 8


The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania

Berlin, March 16, 1939?6 p.m.
zuPol. IV 1714.1
With reference to your telegram No. 79 of March 15. 1
Please point out to the Rumanian Government that all legal agree-
ments made at Munich and Vienna^ have been superseded by the latest
events, as these agreements were based on the concept that the entire
Czecho-Slovak territory was bounded by one common frontier. After
the centre section broke away through the Slovak declaration of in-
dependence^ an entirely new situation arose. What inferences are to
be drawn from this situation cannot as yet be assessed. We have not
seen fit to protest against the Hungarian advance.*


1 Document No. 2.

4 See vol n of this Series, document No. 675, and vol. iv, document No 99
3 See vol. iv of this Series, document No. 212. - '

* In the first draft of this telegram (1969/437928), a second paragraph read- "The
Reich Government do not intend to play an active part in the question of the future of
Carpatho-TJkraine They are rather of the opinion that it is for the States interested
in this territory to discuss the future of Carpatho-TJfkraine. " This was deleted and
the present two concluding sentences substituted in Heinburg's handwriting
i <■ A minute on this document states that copies of this telegram were sent to the Mis- sions at London Paris, Rome, Warsaw, Moscow, Ankara, Tokyo, Washington, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, The Hague, Budapest, Belgrade, Stockholm and Copenhagen, for guidance on language to be held. 10 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 9 7491/E540478 Circular of the Director of the Political Department l Telegram immediate Berlin, March 16, 1939 ? 6:10 p.m. zu PoJ. IV 1728.2 For information only. On the instructions of his Government, the British Ambassador ≫ here transmitted on March 15 a written communication, in the form of a private letter to the Foreign Minister, 2 in which it was explained that the British Government did not wish to intervene more than was necessary in a matter in which other Governments were more directly involved than they themselves were. Nevertheless, as the German Government would undoubtedly understand, they were very appre- hensive as to whether all the efforts to re-establish confidence and to bring about a detente would be successful. To these efforts the British Government, as presumably the German Government also, attached importance, in view of the commencement of the economic negotia- tions. 4 From this point of view the British Government would deplore any action in Central Europe which might cause a setback to the in- creasing general confidence upon which any improvement of the econo- mic position depended. WoERMANN i Addressees were the Missions at London, Paris, Rome, Warsaw, Moscow, Ankara, Tokyo, Washington, Buenos Aires, Bio de Janeiro, Santiago, The Hague, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Stockholm and Copenhagen. 2 Vol. IV of this Series, document No. 234. See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, document No. 247. 3 Sir Nevile Henderson. 4 Discussions were in progress at Diisseldorf between representatives of the Reichs- gruppe Industrie and of the Federation of British Industries. See vol. iv of this Series document No. 331. No. 10 2002/442276 Circular of the State Secretary Telegram (en elair) Berlin, March 16, 1939 ? 11:58 p.m. Pol. IV 1750. To all Diplomatic Missions. The Slovak Minister President, Tiso, has transmitted the following request to the Fuhrer by telegram: "With full trust in you, the Fuhrer and Chancellor of the Greater MAKCH, 193U 1 1 German Reich, the Slovak State places itself under your protection. The Slovak State asks you to take over this protection. Signed: Tiso." The Fiihrer has sent this reply: "I acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of yesterday and hereby take over the protection of the Slovak State. Signed: Adolf Hitler." Further instructions in this connection, especially regarding notifica- tion, are reserved. Weizsackek No. 11 74S2/E540403 Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department Berlin, March 16, 1939. e.o.W II 1756. Subject: Repercussions of the occupation of Czechia on the economic discussions with Britain and France. On March 15, the British Government cancelled the visit to Berlin of the Ministers Stanley and Hudson as being "inopportune in the present circumstances". 1 The conversations between German and British in- dustrial representatives in Diisseldorf are being continued until the evening of March 16, by which time they were to have been concluded in any case according to the intended programme. The British in- dustrial representatives are then returning to England from Diissel- dorf, without previously coming on to Berlin, as the dinner planned for Minister Stanley in Berlin is not taking place. 2 The industrial conversa- tions went off satisfactorily; agreements were not to be expected yet. The conversations between the various industrial groups are to be continued on dates yet to be fixed. The representatives of the two controlling organisations will meet again in June, and for this the British have issued invitations to go to London. Alphand, the chief French negotiator, returned to Paris unexpectedly this morning. The five members of his delegation are still here and are awaiting instructions, but have declined to attend the negotiations set for today. Alphand had intended to stay here until about the middle of next week in order to continue the discussions on a travel agreement and on the various plans for intensifying German-French economic cooperation. Alphand sent his apologies to me through the French 1 See vol. iv of this Series, document No. 330. 2 See ibid., document No. 331. 12 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOKEIGN POLICY Commercial Attache 3 here for having had to leave suddenly on in- structions from Gentin, the Minister for Trade, -without having the opportunity to say goodbye. The Commercial Attache gave no reason for his departure. He thought that, as the delegation had remained here, perhaps Alphand would also return in order to continue the negotiations. 4 WlEHL 3 J. Lefeuvre. * In a despatch of Mar. 20 (7482/E540405) the Foreign Ministry informed the Embassy in France: "M. Aiphand made a surprise return to Paris on Mar. 16. At first^the delega- tion remained in Berlin to await more detailed instructions from Paris. Negotiations were however not continued. The last member of the French delegation finally left Berlin during the evening of Mar. 17, so that negotiations have been broken off. More detailed information regarding the reasons for departure has not reached us from the French delegation." In telegram No. 165 of Mar. 21 (not printed, 2467/517349-50), the Embassy in France communicated the text of a statement in the French press in which the annexation of Czecho -Slovakia was given as the reason for breaking off the negotiations. The recently signed economic agreement between France and Czecho-Slovakia, which was to have come into force on Apr. 1, was regarded as having lapsed. No. 12 2002/442278 The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 36 of March 16 Warsaw, March 17, 1939 ? 4:50 a.m. Received March 17 ? 9:55 a.m. Pol. IV 1775. The Under Secretary of State, Areiszewski, asked me to call on him this evening and stated that M. Beck had unfortunately been prevented from receiving me owing to a meeting of Ministers but that he wished to tell me that he would be very grateful if information could be obtained from Berlin as to the significance of the promise given for the protection of Slovakia. 1 No clear picture could be formed here of the genesis and import of this promise ; the less so, indeed, as the Polish side had already unofficially signified their readiness for a frontier guarantee, and from Hungary, too, no danger threatened. I replied that it did not seem to me advisable to make enquiries in Berlin at this stage. If the exchange of telegrams, which had only just become known here, was confirmed, I would certainly receive instruc- tions in the near future which would put me in a position to give a more detailed explanation of the matter. Areiszewski again repeated his re- quest, referring to the great interest which M. Beck took in the matter. As was to be expected, the announcement of the exchange of tele- grams has caused considerable nervousness here which has also found 1 See document No. 10. MARCH, 1930 13 expression in renewed anti-German street demonstrations. In order to bolster up the position of M. Beck, who is apparently under strong pressure from the military element, it seems advisable that he should be supplied with information calculated to lessen as far as possible fears of a far-reaching infringement of Slovak independence and the danger of military pressure on Poland from Slovakia. Moltke No. 13 1975/43S325 The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania Telegram most urgent Berlin, March 17, 1939?3:45 p.m. No - 86 zuPol. IV 1753, ' 1755.2 With reference to your telegram No. 82 of [March] 16. 1 Budapest Legation telegraphs: [Here follows the full text of document No. 7] End of telegram from Budapest. Please conduct conversation with Foreign Minister on the following lines: s We consider the reserve hitherto maintained by Rumania to be prudent and are of the opinion that Rumanian interests would best be served by avoidance of violent measures . We continue to be interested in a final peaceful settlement of the Carpatho -Ukrainian question between Hungary and Rumania but do not intend, at any rate at the moment, to adopt the role of mediator, as we are convinced that a direct settle- ment is entirely feasible. Budapest has received the same instructions. 3 Please conduct conversation in such a way that it cannot be con- strued as an encouragement of far-reaching Rumanian wishes.* . Weizsacker 1 Document No. 6. ! Document No. 7. 3 On the same date the text of document No. G and of the instructions here printed were telegraphed to Budapest as telegram No. 70 (1975/438326) F u * In a memorandum of Mar. 17 (2050/447289), Woermann recorded: "I informed the Hungarian Minister today about the instructions sent to Bucharest and Budapest on the Carpatho-Ukrame question, and emphasized that we do not, at the moment wish to accept the role of mediators or to encourage Rumania to make far-reaching demands I mentioned that, accordmg to our information, the Hungarian Government were willing to cede to Rumania the most eastern tip of the Carpatho.TJkraine, including the railwaf line through the Valley and presumably also a few villages east of Chust in return for concessions, and I asked M. Sztojay what concessions they had in mind The Minister said Hungary had no interest in the eastern tip of the Ca^atho-Ukraine and would propose the cession of predominantly Hungarian villages along the present Hungaro-Rurnanian frontier instead. He assumed it was mainly a question of the Satmar (Szatmarnemet.) area. As there were 1,700,000 Hungarian^ living in Rumania the Hungarian Government had no cause to give up Carpatho-Ukraine territory to Rumania without compensation. Woermann further enquired about reports of Hunea rian troops crossing the Rumanian frontier, but Sztojay had no definite information J 4 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY |: No. 14 |. 6402/E474S83 | The Charge 1 cT Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry |, Telegram £,- URGENT Washington, March 17, 1939? 8:28 p.m. | No 87 of March 17 Received March 18?5:15 a.m. < W VIII a 600. With reference to your telegram No. 80 of March 17. 1 1. I have delivered to Welles the prescribed Note 2 in which the United States Government are notified of the establishment of the Pro- tectorate, and have in addition given the oral explanations as directed. Welles received these without comment. 2. However, he took the opportunity of informing me that the United States Government had determined, after a thorough examination of the case, to impose "countervailing duties " 3 on imports from Germany at the earliest possible moment, pursuant to Article 303 of the Tariff Act, 4 and he asked me to transmit this information to my Government. The American Government were in possession of proofs that German exports were heavily subsidized, and therefore felt themselves justified in imposing this measure. When I questioned him on the matter, Welles stated that "countervailing duties" would be imposed within the next 48 hours. The repercussions of the events of the last few days have thus led to removal of the State Department's opposition to the measure proposed by the Treasury (see my telegram No. 75 of March 13). 5 Thomsen i Not printed (2050/447306-07) ; this was a circular to all Missions stating that all Czechoslovak consular duties had passed to Germany; only in extremely urgent cases were reliable Czechoslovak officials to be engaged for the time being _ 2 See vol. iv of this Series, document No. 242, and also document No. 50 in this volume, footnote 5. s In English in the original. * Of 1930. Section 303 rendered liable to additional (countervailing) duties, dutiable imports into the U.S.A. if their production or export was subsidized in their country of ° r * 8 Not printed (2000/442087-88) . In this telegram Thomsen reported that a party of three experts from the Treasury and Justice Departments had left New York on Mar. 10 for Germany via France on a secret mission to investigate German currency measures, commercial barter methods and handling of blocked accounts. It was believed that a final decision as to the nature of American retaliatory measures? countervailing duties or embareo on German imports? would be based on the report of this party. The evidence gathered was allegedly to be used to overcome certain objections by the Secretary of State to the retaliatory measures favoured by the Treasury and the Justice Departments. MAECH, 1939 15 No. 15 2050/447298-SO0 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry Telegram most secret Rome, March 17, 1939?1 1 :30 p.m. urgent Received March 18? 2 '20 a m No. 100 of March 17 For the Foreign Minister. Count Ciano asked me to call on him this evening in order to inform me of the following on the instructions of the Duce, 1 with the request to report it immediately to the Reich [Foreign] Minister and also to the Fuhrer and Chancellor: He wished to confirm once again 2 that our action over the liquidation of Czecho-Slovakia had met with unreserved approval here as was also shown by the press here, even though, as he hinted for the first time, there had been no knowledge here of our latest intentions. The settle- ment was natural and logical and he, personally, was in complete agree- ment with it. Of course, it had resulted in profoundly agitating public opinion throughout the world, and public opinion here had not been unaffected, even though this was of itself insignificant as here the will of the Duce alone was authoritative. However, the Duce felt himself obliged to draw attention to certain rumours which were also to be found in the press and which, without causing him disquiet, imposed on him the duty, precisely because of his firmly established friendship towards us? indeed, the Axis formed the basis of Italy's entire foreign policy? and precisely because of the complete frankness advisable between friends, to make a plain statement now, even though he did not consider the rumours had any foundation. With a prolixity and tortuousness not usual to him, Ciano explained his long introduction by the fact that people were saying ? and these rumours also emanated from Zagreb ? that Macek intended, under the influence of the most recent events, to follow in the tracks of Hacha and Tiso, and set up Croat autonomy under a German protectorate. It was certain that the dissolution of Czechia had given the autonomy move- ment in Croatia the most powerful impetus. In such a state of affairs the Duce was anxious to allow no doubt to arise regarding the fact that, 1 For Ctano's account of this interview see Galeazzo Ciano: L'Europa verso la Catas- trofe (Milan, 1948) pp. 418-419. See also the Ciano Diaries, entry of Mar. 17, 1939. (These Diaries have been published in Italian as Galeazzo Ciano, Diario, 1939-1943 (2 vols., Milan and Rome, 1946); and Diario 1937-38 (Bologna, 1948); in French as Comte Galeazzo Ciano, Journal Politique, 1939-43 (2 vols., Neuchatel and Paris, 1946) sad Journal Politique, 1937-38 (Paris, 1949); in English as The Ciano Diaries, 1939-43, W ed. Hugh Gibson (New York, 1946) and Ciano's Diary, 1939-1943, ed. Malcolm Mugge- H ridge (London, 1947) and Ciano's^ Diary, 1937-1938 (London, 1952). As the texts of '" these four publications differ considerably in places, reference is here made to entries by dates rather than by page numbers.) 2 Sec vol. iv of this Series, document No. 4G3. JQ DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY even though Italy's desinteressement in the fate of Czechia had been, and remained complete, her attitude was completely ^different towards the Croat question which affected vital interests of the country. Italy herself had supported the Croat movement for autonomy before the settlement with Yugoslavia; that was in the past Today, on the contrary, her interest was in a strong Yugoslavia. The Croat question affected the Adriatic, and hence the Mediterranean which the Duce considered as much an Italian sea, as he regarded the Baltic as a purely German sea, in which judgement, moreover, he was at one with the Fuhrer and Chancellor who had expressed himself clearly m this sense.* Nothing had changed in his attitude. An action which did not take account of this attitude would oblige Italy to react accordingly. The Duce was far from accepting the rumours in circulation as well founded. However, he considered it right and proper-precisely because of his close friendship with the Fuhrer and Chancellor-to leave no doubt that the Croat question was for him a noli me tangere. In answer to my precise question as to his sources and their value, Ciano referred to certain unspecified reports and also to press reports. I replied that, in accordance with his wishes, I would immediately report the substance of his observations but that, for the rest, I did not see the slightest indication that any Croat aspirations to the detriment of a strong Yugoslavia which we also desired, had any prospects of success with us. Moreover, he had himself already referred to the Fuhrer and Chancellor's clear statements about the Mediterranean. Ciano thereupon repeated once again that neither he nor the Duce took it for granted that the rumours were true; the Duce, however, wished to take the precaution of stating that Italy's attitude in the Czech question did not warrant the assumption that a similar desinteressement was conceivable with regard to. the Croat question also. Ciano finally added that certain press reports regarding Italy s alleged plans in respect of Albania were quite without foundation. Piano made these statements in a markedly friendly and cordial manner. Mackensen 3 See document No. 86, footnote 7. No. 16 483/231356 Memorandum by the State Secretary St S No. 234 Berlin, March 17, 1939. The British Ambassador took leave of me today before going to London tomorrow to reports H e informed me of the feeling which i See British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, No. 308, footnote 1. MARCH, 1930 27 was developing in London as a result of the present solution of the Czecho -Slovak question, and he sounded me for arguments which he could give Chamberlain for use against the latter's political opposition at home. 1 attempted to make it clear to Henderson, with reference to develop- ments of the last six months, how we had been in a fair way towards coming to an arrangement with Prague which would have satisfied the requirements of both sides. The prerequisite for this, however the disappearance of the Benes spirit ? was lacking more and more as time went on. On the contrary, Czech hopes, obviously encouraged from outside and apparently from America in particular, of a European war and of the resurgence of their country on a larger scale had increased. This had finally created a situation in which the outward manifestation that is, Tiso's dismissal by Prague, 2 had sufficed to set the ball rolling. The present development was partly to be ascribed to the Czech people themselves, and partly to their ill-advised friends abroad. Wishes which Henderson expressed regarding certain persons who had taken refuge in the British Legation in Prague are being dealt with elsewhere. 3 Henderson could as yet make no statement regarding his return to Berlin. Weizsacker 4 2 See vol. iv of this Series, document No. 186. a On Mar. 17, Woermann telegraphed to Bitter in Prague (not printed, 350/202316-17) that the British Embassy in Berlin had semi -officially requested safe conduct for certain British and non-British subjects who were being given asylum in the British Legation in Prague. Weizsacker had suggested to Henderson that Newton, who could no longer act officially as British Minister, should discuss the matter privately with Bitter. On Mar. 18, the Legation in Prague reported, in telegram No. 132 (not printed 350/202286), that Bitter had promised Newton safe conduct for British subjects and sympathetic consideration for the cases of non-British subjects. * For an addition to this record made later by Weizsacker, see document No. 36, No. 17 S55S/E3D59iS-I>'

Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

Berlin, March 17, 1939.
W 409g.
Subject : Arms credit for Bulgaria. 1

I informed the Bulgarian Minister 2 today that the Reich Govern-
ment were prepared in principle to increase by about 20 million RM
the credit granted to Bulgaria for arms to the value of 30 million RM.3

1 See also vol. v of this Sencs, documents Nos. 314 anil 315.

2 Col. Parvan Draganov.

3 See vol. v of this Series, document No. 181.



It was not possible to increase it by 45 million as the Bulgarian Govern-
ment had requested, since our own capacity for delivery was not
sufficient for this. The increase by about 20 million RM was dependent
on two conditions:

a) the possibility of raising funds for effecting the repayment
instalments should, be clearly laid down in the Bulgarian budget,
for which we were awaiting more precise data from the Bulgarian

b) the possibility of transferring the repayment instalments by means
of the export of Bulgarian goods to Germany should be clearly laid
down, and in particular the possibility of delivering a sufficient per-
centage in goods representing [for Germany] foreign exchange, princip-
ally ores, should be guaranteed. If this is not possible from the mines
already in production, then a clause would have to be inserted to the
effect that the yield from new mines would also be used for the repay-
ment of deliveries up to an agreed percentage of the repayment instal-

The Minister described the two conditions as easy to comply
with; he thought that the Bulgarian delegation might arrive here
at the beginning of next week for the negotiations with Minister

He was very disappointed at the increase being limited to about
20 million RM. He described this as too little and strongly emphasized
that precisely in the present state of affairs it was important to bring
Bulgarian armaments up to the proposed maximum with the greatest
possible speed. He drew attention to the fact that our productive
capacity had been considerably increased by the annexation of the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and would now without doubt
be adequate for supplying also- the further 45 million RM worth re-
quested by Bulgaria in even less time than the period envisaged
hitherto. In certain circumstances even immediate delivery to Bul-
garia from Czech Army stocks could be contemplated.

I replied that I was only authorized to promise him the increase of
20 million RM. This decision had indeed been made by the Reich
Government before the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was
taken over. It was in the light of the new situation created by this that
his. fresh suggestions based thereon would be studied. The Minister
requested that this should be done as quickly as possible so that its
result would be available in time for the negotiations with the Bulgarian
delegation. 4


4 This memorandum was sent to the Legation at Sofia under cover of a despatch of
Mar. 20 (not printed, 555 S/E39 5958) signed by Moraht, Senior Counsellor in the Econo-
mic Policy Department.

MARCH, 1939 J 9

No. 18


The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland


No. 60 of March 17 Berlin, March 18, 1939?12:10 a.m.

[Received March 18 ? 3:43 a.m.]i
[zru] Pol. IV 1775.2

Instructions on language to be held. With reference to your telegram
No. 36 of March 16. 2 ■

During the few hours which have elapsed since the exchange of
telegrams between the Fiihrer and Tiso, 3 it has not been possible to
reach a settlement on the import of the promise made about the protec-
tion of Slovakia. It looks as if the status of Slovakia will be differen-
tiated from that of Czechia. The wording of the text itself indicates
that it is not intended to take such far-reaching measures as in the case of
Czechia. Further instructions follow.


i Inserted from the copy filed in the Warsaw Embassy (2892/5655691
2 Document No. 12. ''

' See document No. 10.

No. 19


Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 237 Berlin, March 18, 1939.

The British Ambassador has just rung me up (1 p.m.) to ask for an
interview with me to deliver a Note of protest. He stated that the Note
would contain the assertion that our action in Czechoslovakia was
devoid of legal basis.

I told Henderson that, in such circumstances, I could expect no
result from his visit. A conversation between him and me on the matter
would undoubtedly achieve no improvement, for I could only advise
him to propose to his Government that they should reconsider the
matter, and make no representation to us at all.

As Henderson insisted on his visit, and maintained that he had strict
instructions l from his Government regarding the presentation of a
Note, I told him that what he intended doing was up to him. In my
opinion a conversation between him and me would serve no useful
purpose because my view of the matter was quite unequivocal.

i For the text of these instructions see British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv
Do. 308, and for Sir Nevile Henderson's account of their execution see ibid., No.401. '


The Ambassador then postponed his decision as to whether he
would, after all, still see me this afternoon, or would communicate by
other means, i.e., in writing.


No. 20

F12/40 1-397

Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 238 Berlin, March 18, 1939.

At his request the French Ambassador called on me at one o'clock
this afternoon. 1 He immediately laid a Note on the table requesting
me to read it.

Without taking up the Note, I asked the Ambassador what it
concerned. M. Coulondre replied that the Note contained a protest
regarding our action against Czecho-Slovakia.

I immediately replaced the Note in its envelope and thrust it back at
the Ambassador with the remark that I categorically refused to accept
from him any protest regarding the Czecho-Slovak affair. Nor would
I take note of the communication and I would advise M. Coulondre
from the start to urge his Government to revise their draft once more.

The Ambassador immediately replied that his Government had
examined the matter most thoroughly and had decided on this step,
which had obviously been agreed upon with the British Government.
He was not in a position to urge his Government to revise their point of
view. When the Ambassador then wished to argue the matter in detail,
contesting the legal basis of our course of action, and characterizing it
as a breach of the Munich Agreement and also contrary to the Agree-
ment of December 6, I938, 2 I replied somewhat as follows:

I did not wish to enter into a discussion on this matter with the
Ambassador at all. From the legal point of view there existed a De-
claration which had come about between the Fuhrer and the President
of the Czecho-Slovak State. The Czech President had at his own wish
come to Berlin and had then immediately declared to the Reich Foreign
Minister that he wished to place the fate of his country in the Fiihrer's
hands. I could not imagine that the French Government were more
Catholic than the Pope and intended meddling in things which had been
duly settled between Berlin and Prague. Moreover, from the political
point of view, the territory in question was one regarding which M.

1 For M. Coulondre's account of the interview see Ministere des Affaires Strangles,
Documents Diplomatiques 1938-1939, Pieces relatives aux evenements et aux negotiations
qui ont pricidi Vouverture des kostilites entre V AUemagne d'une -part, la Pologne, la Grande-
Bretagne et la France d'autre part (Paris, 1 939) (hereinafter cited as the French Yellow Book),
No. 78.

* Vol. iv of this Series, document No. 369.


MARCH. 1930 21

Bonnet himself, as was well known, had stated his desinteressement to
the Reich Foreign Minister at the beginning of December. 3 But for
this step the Agreement of December 6, 1938 would not have taken
place at all. A d-marche such as the one contemplated by M. Coulondre,
would violate and render completely meaningless the Agreement of
December 6, for how could a protest based on it be delivered without
knowledge of the facts of the case. If the French Government were to
persist in the error which they apparently now intended to commit, I
must fear that the Agreement of December 6 would become null and
void. I therefore believed that the Ambassador was about to carry out
an instruction of his Government which the latter would subsequently
very much regret. To the end the Ambassador refused to take back
his Note, which was lying on my table, asking what would become of
German-French relations if we no longer accepted official Notes de-
livered by their representatives. I for my part stated that I refused to
take cognizance of this paper; if it remained lying between us I would
regard it as transmitted to us through the post.

The essential substance of the Note is :

a formal protest against our measures in Czecho-Slovakia;

the assertion that the letter and spirit of the Munich Agreement
have been flagrantly violated;

the assertion that the new state of affairs in Czecho-Slovakia has
been forced on its Government and finally,

the declaration that the French Government could not recognize the
new position in Czecho-Slovakia as legal.

a The German account of the Bonnet^Ribbentrop conversation of Dee. 6 is printed in
vol. iv of this Series, document No. 370; this Memorandum is unsigned but the word
"Minister" appears at the foot. , Since the publication of vol. IV, a letter from Brauer,
Counsellor of the Embassy in Paris (7563/E 542308-09), has been found bearing on this
document. The letter reads as follows :

Paris, December 17, 1938.

Dear Heur Woermann:

The discussions which Reich Minister von Ribbentrop had on December 6 have been
made the subject of a memorandum by Minister Schmidt, which Count Welczeck and I
were able to glance through here. However, we have not been able to keep a copy of
the memorandum here because it had not yet been approved by Herr von Ribbentrop.
What I wanted to ask you now was whether you would let the Embassy have a copy of
the final version. This is all the more important as the discussions are mentioned now
and again by the French, so that the account of the discussions must be at hand for

I thank you very much in advance for your trouble, and take this opportunity of
sending you my most cordial wishes for Christmas and the New Year.

I remain, with best wishes, and Hei! Hitler,

Yours ever, Bbauer

This letterwas entered as Pol. II 30I9gonDec. 22, 1938. It bears Weizsaeker's initials
dated Dec. 19, and also a marginal note by Woermann of the same date: ? "via St. S.
to Foreign Minister's Secretariat : this can presumably be done."

Ribbentrop agreed to Brauer's request (not printed, 7563/E542310), and a copy of
the documents printed in vol. iv of this Series as documents Nos. 370 and 372 was sent

For the account of this conversation given at the time by Bonnet to the British
Ambassador in Paris, see British Documents, Third Series, vol. in, Nos. 404, 405 and 407.


[Enclosure] 4

Berlin, March 18, 1939.

By a letter dated March 15, 1939, 5 His Excellency the German
Ambassador, acting on instructions from his Government, has handed
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic the text of
an agreement reached during the night of March 14-15 between the
Fiihrer and Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich
on the one side and the President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Czeeho-Slovak Republic on the other side.

In the same communication, it was announced that German troops
crossed the Czech frontier at 6 o'clock in the' morning and that all
measures had been taken to avoid resistance and bloodshed and to
allow the occupation and pacification of the territory to take place in a
quiet and orderly way.

The French Ambassador has the honour to convey to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Reich the formal protest made by the Govern-
ment of the Republic against the measure referred to in Count von
Welczeck's communication.

The Government of the Republic consider themselves, through the
action taken against Czecho-Slovakia by the German Government,
confronted with a flagrant violation of both the letter and the spirit of
the Agreement signed in Munich on September 29, 1938.

The circumstances in which the Treaty of March 15 was imposed on the
leaders of the Czeeho-Slovak Republic could not , in the view of the Govern-
ment of the French Republic, legalize the position laid down in this Treaty.

The French Ambassador has the honour to inform His Excellency the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich that the Government of the
Republic cannot in the circumstances recognize the legality of the new
situation brought about in Czecho-Slovakia by the action of the Reich.

* Translated from the original French, for which see the French Yellow Book, No. 76.
5 The text of this letter of Mar. 15 is given in the French Yellow Book, No. 69. See
also vol. iv of this Series, document No. 245.

No. 21


The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

No. 53 of March 18 Belgrade, March 18, 1939?1:25 p.m.

Received March 18 ? 4:35 p.m.
W 407 39 g.

With reference to your despatch W 290g of February 27. *
Regarding the present state of the negotiations concerning the big
armaments deal, von SchOnebeck, the Air Attache, who returned today,

1 See vol. v of this Series, document No . 307 .

MARCH, 1939 23

told me that, according to information telephoned to him from Berlin
by Consul-General Neuhausen, interested German aircraft firms have
now been authorized to submit tenders within the limits of the afore-
said credit to the competent Yugoslav authorities.

Herr Schonebeck has also got the definite impression that of late the
greatest importance is attached on the Yugoslav side to the speediest
possible conclusion.


No. 22


The Ambassador in France, to the Foreign Ministry


togest Paris, March 18, 1939.1

No. 154 of March 18 Received March 18?1:45 p.m.

I. The French Government have reacted to the events in the former
Czecho-Slovakia by introducing a bill to give the Government full
powers to take all necessary measures for national defence by November
30, 1939. 2

The reasons given by Daladier for the bill in yesterday's session of
the Chamber underlined the gravity of the situation without any attack
on Germany. He emphasized the necessity of countering the totali-
tarian States, whose successes are achieved by speed and secrecy, with
similar weapons.

It is expected that the bill will be passed by the Chamber today and
by the Senate tomorrow.

. II. According to the debate in the Chamber? admittedly not yet
concluded ? and to other information available here, the political
situation appears to be as follows:

1) France will, in effect, do nothing about the situation created by
German action in Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia.

2) German action has, however, caused indignation and acute

anxiety in the widest circles? even among "the men of Munich"

regarding the future development of European polities.

a) Indignation, because German measures are regarded as a
manifestation of desire for conquest. The Fiihrer is held to have
violated the right of self-determination of peoples which he re-
peatedly emphasized during the Anschluss of Austria and the

... l The hour of despatch is not recorded.

,'■' 2 A single-clause bill conferring special powers on the French Government was passed
by the Chamber of Deputies on Mar. 18 and by the Senate on Mar. 19, when it was

, promulgated as law by the President of the Republic. The terms of this law were:
"The Government are authorized, up to November 30, 1939, to take by decrees deli-
berated in the Council of Ministers the measures necessary for the defence of the country.
These decrees will be submitted for ratification to the Chambers before December 31,
1939." {See Journal Official de la Bipublique Franptise, Mar. 20, 1939, p. 3646.)


Sudetenland in justification of the German claims; he is held to have
also disregarded his former declarations, especially that of Germany
having no more territorial claims in Europe, and to be ignoring the
Munich Agreement as well as the German-French Declaration of
December 6, 1938. In these circumstances it is impossible to
retain any confidence whatsoever in German policy.

b) Acute anxiety, because German war-potential has vastly in-
creased and further coups in East and Central Europe are feared, but
chiefly because it is to be expected that Italy ? not to be always lagging
behind her German partner? will push her claims more insistently
than ever, and can reckon on German support in this connection.
3) The following demands are made for future French policy:

a) rearmament is to be promoted with the greatest energy and
by all available means,

b) Anglo-French military cooperation is to be still closer,

c) a re -examination of the Munich policy of understanding with
Germany is to be undertaken and possibly a re-assessment of the
alliances with Poland and Russia is to be aimed at,

d) but in no circumstances should resistance to the Italian claims
be abated.

III. The Government ? particularly Daladier, but above all, Bonnet,
who are held responsible for the Munich Agreement ? are exposed to
violent attacks. The Left is attacking the emergency powers, which they
regard as a threat to constitutional liberties and social achievements,
as well as a possible preliminary step towards an authoritarian regime.
A Government crisis, which in the present situation must entail extreme
danger and extensive weakening of French prestige throughout the world,
will, however, according to the view prevailing today, be avoided.

The ratio of votes by which the committee of the Chamber has
accepted the bill for emergency powers (26 votes for, 17 votes against}
probably corresponds to the attitude of the Chamber.


No. 23


The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry

urgent London, March 18, 1939 ? 1:47 p.m.

No. 75 of March 18 Received March 18 ? 4:35 p.m.

Pol. II 801.
Chamberlain's speech of yesterday l is to be traced to a double motive:

1 At Birmingham on Mar. 17. For the text of this speech see Documents Concerning
German^Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities Between Great Britain and
Germany on September 3, 19,19, Cmd. 6106, (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1939)
(hereinafter HtRtl as British Blue Bool:, Cmd. GlOfl), No. 9.

MARCH, 1939 25

1) to strengthen his own position which was being attacked on the
grounds that his policy had been shipwrecked,

2) to give expression to the very considerable exacerbation of feelings

Objectively speaking, the speech means that though Chamberlain is
keeping to his former aim of the pacification of Europe by peaceful
means, he is adopting, for the achievement of this aim, the bolder front
proposed by Halifax: a stronger attitude towards Germany as well as
an attempt to form a bloc of Powers.

It should further be stressed that Chamberlain, in contrast to the
previous British attitude, emphasizes the continuance of British
interest in eastern Europe. This is said to have come about at the
instance of France.

During the week-end most Members of Parliament will go to then-
constituencies in order to ascertain the feelings of their electorate. The
result of these impressions will have an important bearing on the future
attitude of political public opinion here.

In today's press a report, alleged to have originated from government
circles in Bucharest, is given great prominence and is being exploited
for propaganda purposes. According to this report, the German Govern-
ment have asked Rumania to cease building up her own industry, and
to direct the whole of her exports to Germany in return for a guarantee
of Rumania's independence. Please telegraph instructions.


No. 24


The Charge d. Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry


No. 90 of March IS Washington, March 18, 1939?2:45 p.m.

Received March 18 ? 1 1 :30 p.m.

W VIII a 609.

With reference to your telegram No. 84 of March 18. 1

In considering the German counter-measures to the American

"countervailing duties ", 2 it seems worthy of note that the Secretary of

Agriculture, speaking in confidence to a delegate of the Cotton Standard

Conference, characterized the cotton situation in the United States as

a threat to internal political and economic stability and admitted that

i Document No. 27. 2 In English in the original.


the Government were helpless when confronted with the problem of
disposing of the eleven million bales of cotton held as collateral.

German measures against imports of American cotton would there-
fore strike American economy at a very sensitive spot.


No. 25


Memorandum by the State Secretary

Berlin, March 18, 1939.
Telephoned instruction (3:00 p.m.)
to Ambassador von Dirksen, London.
The German Government have heard that Henderson, the British Am-
bassador here, has been summoned to London to report. According to
the speculations made about this fact by the press and among the public
generally, there obviously exists a significant connection between these
instructions to Henderson and the present German action in Czechia.
Please ask the British Government for an explanation as to their inten-
tions in announcing Henderson's summons to London in this manner.
The form of the announcement! i s felt by us to be unfriendly. 2


i On Mar. 18 the British press reported that the Ambassador in Berlin had been
called home "to report" by the British Government as a s>gn of their displeasure and

^r/^mo^dr^SMnot printed. 2050/447322) Weizsacker recorded that
Dirksen had telephoned the result of his talk with Halifax, who had informed him that
th duration of Henderson's stay in London would depend on the effect of h≫ report to
the Garnet and on the subsequent course of events (See abo BnHsh Dements, Third
Series vol IV No. 417.) In a further memorandum of Mar. IS (not printed, 2050/
447323) Weizsacker recorded that he had telephoned Dirksen agam that evening, con-
veying to him Ribbentrop's instructions to return to Berlin to report either that same
day or the day after. In a memorandum, St.S. No. 249 of Mar. 20 (not printed, 2050/
447335) Weizsacker recorded that in consequence of the recall of the French Ambassador
for consultations, he had, on Ribbentrop's instructions, telephoned requesting Welczeck
to return for consultations.

MARCH, 1939 27

No. 26


Memorandum by the- State Secretary
St.S. No. 243 Berlin, March 18, 1939.

At 4:30 this afternoon, the British Ambassador had the enclosed
Note transmitted, ' the content of which is similar to the French Note
of this morning, 2 but is formulated in terms slightly less precise. It
lacks the express statement that the British Government could not
recognize the newly created status in Czechia as legal. Rather, this
status is characterized as having no legal basis and is made the subject
of a protest.

The text of the note is appended.


i See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, No. 401.
2 See document No. 20, enclosure.

Copy British Embassy, Berlin? March 18, 1939.

Youk Excellency: I have the honour to inform Your Excellency,
under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
desire to make it plain to the German Government that they cannot
but regard the events of the past few days as a complete repudiation of
the Munich Agreement and as a denial of the spirit in which the
negotiators of that Agreement bound themselves to cooperate for a
peaceful settlement. 3

I am instructed to add that His Majesty's Government must also
take this occasion to protest against the changes effected in Czecho-
slovakia by German military actions which are in their view devoid of
any basis of legality.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the
assurance of my highest consideration.

Nevile Henderson

; Si. e . the Munich Agreement on Sept. 29, 1938 (vol. n of this Series, document No.
675), and the Anglo-German Declaration (ibid., No. 67fi) referred to by Chamberlain in
; his Birmingham speech (see British Blue. Book, Cmd. 6106, No. 9) on Mar 17 1939
';: when he said: '

? "Surely, as a, joint signatory of the Munich Agreement, I was entitled, if Heir Hitler
., thought it ought to be undone, to that consultation which is provided for in the Munich
;. Declaration. Instead of that he has taken the law into his own hands "
;; On Mar. 24, Selssam, in despatch No. A 1209 (1625/388420) from London, reported-
'" " In . £t USS ComInons sittin g ° n Mar. 23, the momber Henderson asked the Prime
':. Minister: What representations have been made by the British Ambassador in Berlin


No. 27


The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the

■Embassy in the United States

Berlin, March 18, 1939?6:15 p.m.
TOGEaT zu W VIII a 600.1

No. 84

Drafting Officer: Senior Counsellor Davidsen.

With reference to your telegram 87. l

You should energetically protest to the United States ^ernment
orally against the measure planned. It .not correct that Gennan
exports are subsidized within the meamng of Article m We Wore
request information as to what evadenee is ?^ to .^J^^
Government for their assertion to the contrary so that we, too can
See detailed proof in reply. Request them * f^^*^
the proposed measure until this issue is cleared up. Report by tele
gram on what you have done and reception there of steps t≪W ^

I Margmafnot "Text agreed with the Ministry of Economics. D[avid S en]."

on behalf of Hi. Majesty's Government to th ^^^ff^^S^ ££
failure of the German Governme^ to consuH ^^J^^V, Hitler in the Anglo-

^■SSSSftW -Secrete ≪^*££&^ *SM££

original-] tsWram No 92 (1625/388399), commented as follows:

On the same day Kordt. in ^egram jso. w ( ^ referen ce to Butler's statement

"Following upon report A 1209 of MMCtifi, ≫? ? N n ooluran U 76[≪≪ .

in the House of Commons, see Ha ^°{f^ x ^ interpreted as meaning that the

Butler's reply to Henderson's .^StoS^ act ioninTheCzeeho-Slovak question


Kordt was not in fact given to Arthur H^dCTSonsqu e^ '^ £ 6ri House of

to the Anglo-German declaration (see Parham≪≪a^^et≫^ ^ ^

MARCH, 19311 29

No. 28


The Ambassador to ike Holy See to the Foreign Ministry


No. 35 of March 17 Rome (Vatican), March 18, 1939.1

Received March 18 ? 6:25 p.m.

For the State Secretary personally.

With reference to my telegram No. 29 of March ll. 2

The Pope has intimated to me that the Fiihrer was the first Head
of State whom he notified of his election as Pope; he had also broken
with the usual protocol when he not only signed, as was customary, the
letter drawn up in Latin, but also the German draft, which was not
to be considered as a mere translation. 3 He had also wished by these
means to intimate his sympathetic attitude to Germany and his
desire for peace.

The new Cardinal Secretary of State, Maglione, to whom I paid my
first visit only today, received me with marked cordiality. Without
going into details he said, in allusion to German- Vatican relations, that
I knew his wishes, and that he only hoped they would be realized in the
not too distant future, in spite of the existing difficulties of which he was
well aware.

Osservatore Romano has again received instructions to desist from
attacks against the German Government. 4 In effect, reproduction of
anti-German press comments has recently been refrained from.

In view of the unmistakably forthcoming attitude of the Curia, I
leave it to your discretion whether the press be recommended to
continue a restrained objectivity towards Vatican affairs, the more so
as this attitude has met with appreciation here, especially in Italian
circles as well. For the time being there is no question of our taking
other measures. 5


i The hour of despatch is not recorded.
■;. s Not printed (533/239010). In this telegram, Bergen reported his views of the pos-
■. aible attitude of the newly appointed Cardinal Secretary of State, Luigi Maglione,
towards Germany.
3 See also vol. iv of this Series, document No. 475.
* See also ibid., document No. 473.
. ,5 Marginal notes: (i) "Minister Asehmann: Will this suggestion be met? Wfeiz-
. Backer]. 20 [/3]." (ii) "Herr Zeileisen: Letter to R[eich] Propaganda] Ministry],
. ATscbmann]. " (iii) "State Secretary : Bequest to this effect made to R[eiehl Prror>affanda1
fcMinlistry]. Asehmann. 21/111." L J L F^onaaj


No. 29


The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry


No. 98 of March 18 - Bucharest, March 18, 1939? [7:30 p.m.] 1

Received March 19 ? 1:15 a.m.
Pol. IV 1836.

With reference to your telegram No. 86 of March 17. 2
1 have spoken to the Foreign Minister, Gafencu, on the lines desired
by the Hungarian Foreign Minister. 3 Gafencu declared that Rumanian
troops would remain on the frontier. His earlier proposal* for occupy-
ing Carpatho-Ukraine had been due to military advice, had Poland also
marched in . . - . {group mutilated) Hungary would have occupied
two-thirds of Carpatho-Ukraine; Rumania and Poland would have
shared in the occupation of the western third.* This would not have
had the import and significance of a definite occupation, but only of a
military safeguard for her frontier. Rumania, who wanted no terri-
torial aggrandizement, had wished to withdraw subsequently to the
Rumanian villages and the railroads along the Black Theiss [Czarna

Tisza]. , , - t> -

After having duly stated that she did not wish to march in, Rumania
had abandoned this action and hoped that she would be awarded the
following places by diplomatic means: Aspa de Jos-Aspa de Mijloc,
Biserica, Alba and Slatinaocna, which all lie north of Sighet and have
almost purely Rumanian populations, as well as the railway line from
Rumania to Poland. She renounced her claim to further places bearing
Rumanian names but which had already become Ruthenianized.

Hungary should declare herself in agreement with the occupation of
this territory in the interests of improving Rumanian-Hungarian re-
lations. If Hungary did not do this voluntarily, Rumania would
abandon her claims altogether as she desired no increase of territory.
In this event, however, the spirit of Rumanian -Hungarian relations
would suffer greatly. 6

In my opinion, Hungary should quickly agree to the cession of this
strip of territory, since the railway ? whose only connecting link lies

l Inserted from the draft filed in the Bucharest Legation (7486/E540442-45).

a Document No. 13.

3 Count Csaky.

* See document No. 7, footnote 2. ,,.,,, ± ■ j

5 This passage "hadPoland . . . occupation of the western third was corrupt as received.
The text in the Bucharest draft reads at this point "... due to military advice m the
event that the Poles had also invaded. Thereupon Hungary would have occupied two
thirds of Carpatho-Ukraine; Rumania and Poland would have shared the occupation

° ≪ Th^substance of this telegram was repeated to Budapest by Weizsiicker in telegram
No. 79 of Mar. 20 (not printed, 1975/438332-33).

MARCH, 1939


across Rumania? is quite useless to her. It would be to our advantage
if Rumania, by the occupation, were to participate in the liquidation of

No. 30


The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry


No. 99 of March 18 Bucharest, March 18, 1939?9:30 p.m.

Received March 19 ? 1:15 a.m.
Pol. IV 1835!

1) At yesterday's Crown Council presided over by the King Gafen-
cu's policy was unanimously approved. The military measures are
confined to safeguarding the frontiers. There is to be no marching in
until matters are clarified with Hungary. The policy of rapprochement
with Germany was also approved, in particular the proposed Wohlthat
agreement. 1

2) Foreign Minister Gafencu today corrected a Times report 2
according to which Germany was making unilateral demands on
Rumania through Wohlthat, by stating to press representatives that
Wohlthat was only conducting normal economic negotiations which
conformed with the interests of both parties.

3) Feeling towards us here is generally favourable, though there is
no lack of rumours that German policy must lead to warlike complica-
tions. Thus Georges Bratianu 3 called on me today to state? at least on
behalf of Maniu* and Bratianu *? that they were extremely anxious
and feared that m the event of a conflict we would advance into the
Rumanian raw material area with help from Hungary. 1 reassured him
by stating that the Western Powers would not let it come to offensive
action and that it was open to the Rumanian Government to cooperate
with us on a large scale in the economic field so that such action would
be unnecessary. Foreign Minister Gafencu also expressed his anxiety
about the future, as Italian desires and our colonial demands probablv
could now hardly be realized by peaceful negotiations. I replied
that our experience had shown that only in this way could the Western
Powers be brought to the conference table. 6


1 Wohlthat had been sent to represent the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan in
d^entNo. ?8 agr6ement with R ?≫≪^, which was concluded on M? 23 See

2 Of Mar. IS.

I Georges Bratianu, leader of the dissident National Liberal Partv
\ *, ulm M a ?"' L |f d .f. of the National Peasant Party and former Minister President
s Possibly Dmu Bratianu, leader of the National Liberal Party "esraent.

e See also vol. v of this Series, documents Nos. 300 and 309.


No. 31


The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Mo 100 of March 18 ~ Bucharest, March 18, 1939-9:30 p.m.

No. 100 ol March Received March 18 [19] -1:15 p.m.

W III 2099.

The Rumanian Foreign Minister requests that 50 waggon-loads of

Jr material which had been despatched from the Czech arms and

munitions factory at Pulinovska for Rumania and held up by the

SmaS on the Polish frontier near Moravska-Ostrava be released as

Rumanian armament production [Rmungsherstellungen ≪c ! orders-
Bustungsbestellungen] in Czechia. List is to follow.
Please telegraph instructions. Fabricitjs

i The list ≪. forwarded as ^^^J^^^^^^^≪^
printed, 7487/B 540452-5 ).' ta *^ n ^^; t ^C Reich Government agree
Fabricius to Gafencu offi ≪ al, y ^^S^nia in Czechia, shall be carried out by the
that delivery of armaments, ordered by *?ST£ held back." Fabricius added that
factories and that del ?,f*Xf aWy been leased. .This action was taken at

(not printed, 2448/D515012).

No. 32

7634/15545334 .

The Charge cV Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry


? .... , 1Q Ankara, March 18, 1939J

No. .3 of March 18 ^.^ ^^ ig _ 9:25 p m

W III 2150.
During yesterday evening's reception in honour of the Bulgarian
Minister President,* Numan* drew me aside so as to expound in a
detailed conversation the Turkish Government's views on the new
Sua on. In the opinion of Turkey, Greater Germany's relations with
the Balkans had now entered upon a new phase. Turkey was ready
to cooperate actively in order that the Balkans, as an entUe geogra-
thi^eet economy might become more than ever an eeonomre

i The hour of despatch is not recorded.

t SES Secretary General of the Turkish Mm.stry.

MARCH, 193!) 33

hinterland of Germany and alao be at her disposal in times of political
crisis as a reliable and largest possible source of supplies. As a result
of this there would gradually arise a still stronger cohesion politique if
Germany were to refrain from insisting on a unilateral and manifestly
partisan attitude by the Balkan States in the ideological struggle.

As it is to be assumed that leading Turkish personalities will soon
reopen this subject in conversations with me, I should be grateful for
instructions by telegram as to the language I should hold.


No. 33


The Charge d' Affairs in the United States to the Foreign Ministry


urgent Washington, March 18, 1939. l

No. 92 of March IS Received March 18 [19]? 5:15 a.m.

W VIII a 607.
With reference to your telegram No. 84 of [March] 18. 2
The Treasury announced at midday today that it had been decided
at yesterday's Cabinet meeting to impose "countervailing duties " 3 on
all dutiable imports from Germany. The Treasury's decision is based
as regards form on the opinion given by the Attorney-General* today
who, with a reference to the normal ease of the Cotton Inland Accounts
arrangement, 5 described the German premium on cotton of 33J per
cent over the world market price, and all similar premiums, as a subsidy
within the meaning of section 303 of the Tariff Act. The fact that the
approval of the Attorney-General and the decision of the Treasury rest
on the basic principles of the Inland Accounts procedure 6 which were
specifically sanctioned by the Treasury over two years ago, and against
which no objections were raised a short time ago during the preliminary
discussions on the inclusion of lard, clearly proves that a purely political
decision, connected with the present political events, is involved which
can, therefore, no longer be met by factual arguments. I therefore
regard telegram No. 84 as superseded by events and no longer practic-
able. From what has been hitherto announced, the idea of selective
promotion of exports plays no part in the opinion. The copper arrange-
ment is merely quoted as a further case of the same nature.

1 The hour of despatch is not recorded.

2 Document No. 27.

. 3 In English in the original.

* Frank Murphy.

6 See also document No. 56, footnote 6.

? The Iiilandskontenverfakren, commonly called Inho, was a system of so-called "in-
land accounts" for compensation trade with the United States, set up under regulations



Contrary to the Under Secretary of State's announcement of yester-
day' the additional duties do not enter into force at once but on April
23 In general they are provisionally fixed at 25 per cent of the invoice
value and are to be paid by the importer in all eases of dutiable imports
with reservations as to a final computation according to the merits of
the individual case, -the fixing of higher or lower additional duties and
also their possible refund if it is established beyond doubt that no

subsidy is present.

The statements of the Treasury and Justice Departments to the press

follow in the original text en dair* Thomsen

I KwSSrl? No. 91 of Ma, . 8 (0402/E474880-S8).

No. 34


The CMrge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry
w -of. Washington, March 18, 1939.

JN0, MU Received? March 29.

P. 3326.

Subject: Attitude of the American press and public opinion to the

New Order in Czecho-Slovakia.

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 81 and 94 of March 16 and 20.1

If the American press and public opinion displayed reserve at the

beginning of this week in assessing the events in former Czecho -Slovakia,

this picture has altered substantially in the course of the last few days

after the full significance of the German measures had been recognized

and the British and French attitude had become known. The press

which first characterized the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia as a natural

^t^KS^^^^Mar.lSbutnot^tuntatatar^d that the rrfer^
{i.e., Mar. 16 and 20) were added before despatch.

1" lo'iS Z *PPl cat Irf ofcouXvailinl duties to dutiable German imports into the
t? ^T^eT These" Mand accounts" were opened in various German banks for
United s ^: Ji 6 ? \? p0 rters only, not for banks. In March 1939, the Attorney-
SeneraTo the Uni^Sta Xbmitted^o the Secretary of the Treasury an opinio^ that

raeanmgof section 303 .?^^.t? from Apr \ 2 3, countervailing duties be
D r r ted e on dXIble^ E snorted from G^rrXy if 'this had been Icquired by
°° wth tSe of other goods on a premium basis. See F ortign- Trade and ■toxto**
M G fi m≪4 Report No. 150 P Second Series 19*2, published by the United
StetefTariff Commission (Washington, Government Printing Office).

MAKCH, 1939 35

consequence of the Munich Agreement, and for the most part advocated
United States d4sinUressement as regards this development, has now
rapidly changed over to spiteful attacks on Germany. The leading
articles of the main newspapers emphasize, in the most varied forms,
that the capitulation of Czecho-Slovakia was not voluntary, but that it
had rather been systematically prepared in the various parts of the
country by German propaganda and subversive activity, and was
finally achieved at Hitler's dictation. Use is also frequently made of a
report that the Fiihrer had, during the negotiations with the Czecho-
slovak Government, threatened an aerial bombardment of Prague if
his wishes were not complied with.

The occupation of Czech territory and the setting up of the Pro-
tectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is said to be a breach of the Munich
Agreement. By this action Hitler had not only violated an inter-
national treaty but had also contravened the spirit of the Munich
Agreement which lay in the peaceful settlement of all European ques-
tions in cooperation with the Governments of the Western Powers.

From this, and in view of former declarations by the Fiihrer that
Germany had, beyond the Sudeten-German territories, no further
territorial claims in Europe, it appears to these newspaper writers that
there is clear proof of the unreliability of the German Government and
their promises. In this respect, Chamberlain's statements at Birming-
ham 2 have naturally helped to strengthen these views, and to give still
greater impetus to the campaign of hate directed against us. The
speech, which was broadcast over the North American radio, com-
manded great attention here, and has been welcomed, in conjunction
with Sumner Welles' statement, 3 as the joint expression of Anglo-
American disapproval.

In view of the attitude here, it is not surprising that the press is
shedding bitter tears over the former Czecho-Slovak State and its
Government. After the collapse of Red Spain the last true democracy
had now disappeared from Central Europe also. Descriptions abound
of the reign of terror which the Secret Police have allegedly inaugurated
for rooting out the last resistance, and to which 12,000 people in con-
centration camps are said to have already fallen victim.

The newspapers have published, under large headlines, reports of the
immediate transport of the Czech gold reserve from Prague, to the
amount of 80 million dollars; and they cannot resist seeing in this act
the true reason for the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia.

In the flood of commentaries, the question constantly comes up as to
whether, with the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and

J See document No. 23, footnote 1.

s On Mar. 17. See Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941 (U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943) (hereinafter cited as Peace and War)
No. 126.


? ?■ *h≫ Cerman hunger for expansion is sated; and the conclusion
MMa "w ^TSmK Should be entertained about it. Arthur
l^elTorkTZs) enlarges upon this question in an exposition

two possibilities with which the world , mus ^ re ^ ^ rt

Mediterranean in the very near ^'£?££2J *> him mora

*T rS££S fhetntdlttsCS development, view, ?.

the individual happens t , be mor ?^^ / Qub however) that , by
"^^jSS^S." the S S P-t of the press is advocating

There is also practical unanimity of opinion today that as a result
tf£ new lotion, America i. more than ever obhged to make the
Western Hemisphere safe against the totalitarian Powers _

i Section of correspondents' reports, commentary of the Amencan
press and cartoons is forwarded herewith.* Thomsin

* Not found.

No. 35

1625/3SS364-70 .

The Ambassador in Great Britain to the Foreu,n Mimstry
A ?. London, March 18, 1939.

No - A lo3b Received March 21.

Pol. II 827.

Political Report
Subject- The British attitude to the events in former Czechoslovakia.
The development and present state of the political crisis which has
come about in German-British relations as a result of the course of
events in former Czecho-Slovakia may be summed up as follows:

As long as the public here was merely concerned with the conflict
between Czechia and Slovakia, it showed-in- press articles m speeches.
and S private statements-a pronounced tendency to affirm w lt h a
feeling of relief, its complete aloofness from these events. The ex-
perience of the September crisis and the unpopularity enjoyed by
Secho Slovakia since that time because-accordmg to convictions

MABCH, 1930 37

here? of her completely drifting into the wake of Germany, further
tended to strengthen these feelings.

This attitude was only modified when the incorporation of Czechia
into the German Reich came about and German troops began their
advance. The first reaction to this news ? the declarations by Cham-
berlain and Halifax in the Commons and the House of Lords i ?
allowed of no doubt as to the markedly disapproving attitude of the
British Government, but it was reserved and moderate. The reasons
for this reserve were as follows: a certain slowness of the British in
taking decisions, the lack of complete information, and the desire to
preclude from the start any doubt that the British Government might
possibly intend allowing things to result in a new September crisis on
account of Czechia.

Consonant with the attitude of the Government, the press, too, was
for the most part reserved and impartial on the first day; only the
traditionally anti-German papers took up their hostile campaign.

From Wednesday, March 15, onwards, the mood stiffened per-
ceptibly : the politically-minded public awakened from the unexpected
shock they had received ; the news of the extent of the invasion and the
thorough preparations necessary for it became known. The sharper
line taken within the Cabinet, especially by Lord Halifax, who has
yielded completely to the influence of the Foreign Office, asserted itself.
False reports, for instance, that the German troops had commenced
marching in during the negotiations between the Fiihrer and President
Hacha, that misleading information was given to the British and
French Ambassadors until the last moment, and that the German-
Czech agreement had been extorted from Hacha by threats, are addi-
tional irritants.

Above all, however, it became clear both to the adherents and to the
enemies of Chamberlain that the position of the Prime Minister him-
self had also suffered seriously. He had been looked upon as the
representative of the Munich policy and as the supporter of a settlement
with Germany by means of frank discussion. He had, a few days
previously, made optimistic statements to the press regarding the
, : tranquillization of the international situation and the improvement 01
the economic outlook. Great hopes had been attached by the public
to Stanley's projected visit to Berlin. 2
.;.: This structure had now, it was thought, collapsed. Chamberlain's
fe statement in the Commons was criticized as being rather weak. His
|; : antagonists raised their heads anew. Hence the sharp tone of his
lyBirmingham speech. 3

i On Mar. 15. See Pari. Deb., B. of C, vol. 345, cols. 435-440, and House of Lords
|; (hereinafter cited as H. of L.), vol. 112, cols. 214-218.
8 See document No. 1 1 .
" s See document Jvfo. 23, footnote 1 .



It is improbable that the incorporation of Czechia into GwJJ
result in German-British relations becoming increasingly strained to .a
pit at which there is a danger of war It is Just as ^^
that the present crisis will have deep and lasting repercussions deeper
n any case, than those resulting from the Austnan Ansc^s the
September crisis and the anti-Jewish movement m November 1938
X politS circles in Britain, including the Prime ^ *£*
the picture formed of National Socialist Germany has £≪£*£?
altered. The following circumstances have contributed towards this.

1) The Fiihrer's statement that he had no further ^?f^?
to put forward in Europe had been interpreted m toe , dra. rt≪ -H-
pohtical a manner. Those who-like Chamberlain-ha d^don^J
felt that thev had been misled in their confidence m the Fuhrer a word.

2) It had^een concluded from the National Socialist ^logy and
the words of the Fuhrer that Germany was only aspiring t the an-
nexation of Germans and not to that of members of alien races. The
"cC atkm of seven million Czechs has exploded this idea espec^
as tS press had purposely minimized the significance and extent of the

TlTharWassumed that the "Munich policy" would prepare
the way for, and bring about, an arrangement and a delimitation of
spheres of interest with Germany by means of friendly discussions.
Germany s course of action in Czechia has been understood as a funda-

^ iThaTfheTaf Stance of the incorporation of Czechia been
understood. In Britain, this State had, in any case, been looked upon
smce Munich as a vassal of Germany, and one win oh m case, ^emer-
gency, was exposed to the latter'* military attack without the chance
fo relist Why therefore, the "annexation" and the military invasion
with" its atWant political risks abroad 1 Merely-so it was further
concluded-because Germany had reverted purely to power politics.

From the fulness of these disappointments and shattered hopes, there
has arisen complete uncertainty regarding the aims of Germany and
the policy to be adopted towards her. Does Germany aspire to world
dominion", or at least to the hegemony of Europe 1 Will her nex
undertaking be the overpowering of Rumania or an attack on Poland
What policj can be adopted towards so incalculable a State 1 These and
similar questions are discussed here in London today by people who
wish to be taken seriously.

It is not yet clear what practical conclusions the British Government
will draw in respect of Germany from the events in Czechia. The dis-
lussion of this matter within the Cabinet and in consultation with

MARCH, 1939 39

friendly Governments is in full swing. The differences between the
moderate and radical trends are becoming more distinct. Feelings in
the country are being investigated by Members of Parliament who are
visiting their constituencies over the week-end. Opinions are still
fluid and have not crystallized into hard and fast decisions. The
following facts and considerations may give certain pointers to the
attitude to be expected from the British Government:

Chamberlain's position has been strengthened by his speech in
Birmingham, even though the Eden-Churchill opposition, which now
makes a show of loyalty, has gained considerably in influence. As long
as Chamberlain is at the helm, a relatively moderate course is assured.

However, even if it is assumed that Chamberlain's ultimate objective
is still a peaceful settlement with Germany, the means for the attain-
ment of this objective will change. As it is believed in Britain that the
method of friendly negotiation can be regarded as having broken down,
the attempt will now be made to " bring Germany to reason" by adopt-
ing a strong line, by creating obstacles, and by refusing? perhaps in
the economic field ? to meet us in any way.

Increased international activity in this respect is already shown by
the feelers put out to France, the*United States, the Soviet Union, and
the Balkan States. It is not yet clear whether the object of these
conversations is the creation of a new, strong coalition against Germany,
or only an agreement upon measures in the event of further German
attacks on other States, for instance, Rumania or Poland. At present
the second eventuality is the more probable. The idea of contracting
new obligations towards distant countries will never be to the liking of
the British Government.

A definite objective which the British Government will have in mind
will be to prevent, as far as possible without undertaking commitments,
further unilateral actions and increases of territory on the part of
Germany by creating the greatest possible reserves of strength (in the
shape of agreements for an emergency with other States).

A settlement with Germany has, after being a primary objective of
British policy, now become a secondary one. If this question is again
to become a live issue, it must be preceded by the establishment of a
basis of confidence which is at present completely lacking. It would
be wrong to cherish any illusions that a fundamental change has taken
place in Britain's attitude to Germany.



No. 36


Meinorandum by the State, Secretary
StS No 236 Berlin, March 18, 1939.

The following is to be added to yesterday's record of my conversation
of the 17th instant with the British Ambassador: 1 ? _ _. , ,
Henderson again explained that there was no direct British interest
in the Czechoslovak territory. His-Henderson s-anxietaes were
more for the future. German policy had started a new chapter What
had now happened could no longer be brought under the beading of
"the self-determination of peoples". We were on the road to tern-
torial expansion of power. After the elimination of Czecho-Slovakia
everyone was asking: "What next?"* This anxious question was
reflected in the British attitude. In turn, the German answer to the
British attitude would not be long delayed. Germany felt hersetf to
be under pressure from a general counter-action m British policy.
This exchange would grow more intense and would finally nullify the
propitious first beginnings of a German-British understanding which
the now seventy year old Chamberlain had so sedulously and patiently
brought about. At the end of it all there would again be a German-
Britilh collision if the policy represented by Chamberlain were not

adhered to. ,.

In this connection, Henderson then asked me to give the reasons
which had in the last few days inevitably led to the dissolution of
Czecho-Slovakia. Weizsacker

1 Document No. 16.

2 In English in the original.

No. 37


Memorandum by the State Secretary
confidential Berlin, March 18, 1939.

St.S. No. 244

The Italian Ambassador told me privately, and not to go further
that he had received a telegram of information from Rome which
describes the recent mission of Prince Philip of Hesse. According to
this telegram the Prince was given the following reply :

1) The Head of the Italian Government took note of the communica-
tion regarding the events in Czecho-Slovakia.

2) In the' event of a war between Italy and France, Italy would not

MARCH, 1 931) 4J

need the assistance of German manpower, but would probably need
support in the form of war and raw materials. l

Attolico added that the Prince would, on his return, render direct the
complete and detailed report 2 on his conversation in Rome.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister. 3


1 'jjTT'r' St - S - No - 250 of Mar - 20 < not Panted, F19/453-52) Weizsacker recorded that Attolico parf him a visit before leaving for Rome and pressed for an cts^ m? Statem6nt ° n the SUbi6Ct ° f P ° int 2 above - WeizsaX^d £ an Js voCe, do P cu m e? a : %?&"*' ** ~ ^ " ° f ^ ^ d °? nt ^ ≪* ≪* * Typewritten marginal note: "Copies to the Under State Secretary and the Director loi this " " 11 ' ° l0y D6 P artment with the ≪*≫≫* to refrain fro^ making further No. 38 350/202291 Memorandum by the State Secretary St.S. No. 246 Berlin, March 18, 1939. Prompted by British press reports,' the Italian Ambassador has now again spoken to me regarding certain documents which are alleged to exist, according to which the German march into Czechoslovakia was already settled three or four weeks ago. In this connection, Attolico also remarked that this could hardly be correct as he had, in fact, only been informed at the last minute. Weizsacker ≫ The Daily Express of Mar. 16 had stated that "Long secret reports from British diploma em Europe were before the Cabinet yesterday, and Ministers were perturbed by the revelations they made of German methods in 'engineering' the situation in^eeh^ No. 39 196S/13795S Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department Berlin. March 18, 1939. Pol. IV 1964. The Hungarian Minister called on me today and informed me, in |y. reply to a question directed to him in the middle of the week by the ,: : ; State Secretary, 1 that the Hungarian Government, right up to the ■beginning of the march into the Carpatho-Ukraine, had notified neither : ' ' See vol. iv of this Series, document No. 238. 42 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY the Polish, nor the Rumanian, nor any other Government of their in- tentions Only after this entry had certain diplomats conversations Sen place. In particular, Poland, as we would certainly be aware had offered to play the part of a sort of mediator between Hungary and Rumania and had transmitted the Rumanian desire for the cession of fhe most easterly tip of the Car patho -Ukraine, including the mlwaj ^ line which crossed it, and the aforesaid villages with a Rumanian popula- tlon Hungary had replied to Poland as follows: Rumania had no fe .rounds at all for presenting Hungary with demands of any nature r Nevertheless, the Hungarian Government were prepared-in direct negotiations with Rumania-to take the tatter", local interest , m o ≫ consideration in some way or other. However, should Rumama adopt any course designed to exert pressure, this would be unsuccessful Should Rumania march in, the Hungarian Army would throw the Rumanian troops out again. ?,,.,,. a A ?? ;? In continuation of this conversation, M. bztojay expressed on in- structions from Count Csaky, the Hungarian Government s most warm and sincere thanks to the German Government and, m particular, to the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary for the interest shown m this question, and for the German attitude. This expression of thanks also applies particularly to the attitude adopted by Germany towards Rumania - Woebmasn No. 40 2871/563856-5≫;Se3-BT Treaty of Protection between Germany and Slovakia * The German Government and the Slovak Government have, since the Slovak State placed itself under the protection of the German Reich,* agreed to regulate by means of a treaty the situation resulting there- from For this purpose the undersigned plenipotentiaries of the two Governments have agreed on the following provisions: Article 1 The German Reich assumes the protection of the political indepen- dence of the Slovak State and the integrity of its territory. ££≪&?*? ^ fi de:tfrp1otrol SS The featy was published withoo* this Protocol (see Reichsgesetiblatt, 1939, Part u, p. 600). 2 See document No. 10. MARCH, 1939 43 Article 2 In order to carry out the protection assumed by the German Reich, the German Wehrmacht shall at all times have the right to set up military installations in a zone, bounded on the west by the frontier of the Slovak State and on the east by the general line of the eastern edge of the Little Carpathians, the eastern edge of the White Carpathians, and the eastern edge of the Javornik Mountains, and to man these installations with such forces as the German Wehrmacht consider necessary. The Slovak Government will arrange for the requisite land for these installations to be placed at the disposal of the German Wehrmacht. Furthermore, the Slovak Government will agree to an arrangement which is necessary for supplying the German troops and servicing the military installations from the Reich duty free. Military sovereign rights will be exercised by the German Wehrmacht in the zone specified in the foregoing paragraph 1 . Persons of German nationality who are engaged by virtue of a private contract in the setting up of military installations in the zone thus designated are to that extent subject to German jurisdiction. Article 3 [In order better to defend the Slovak State against any possible external attacks] 3 the Slovak Government will organise their own military forces in close consultation with the German Wehrmacht. Article 4 In accordance with the agreed relations of protection, the Slovak Government will always conduct their foreign policy in close con- sultation with the German Government. Article 5 This Treaty enters into force immediately upon signature and is valid for a period of 25 years. The two Governments will consult about an extension of the Treaty in good time before the expiry of this period. In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries on both sides have signed two copies of this Treaty. Vienna, March 18, 1939. Berlin, March 23, 1939. For the German Government : For the Slovak Government : V. RlBBENTROF P R , J 0Z EF TlSO VOJTECH TUKA Be. F. Dtjb.6ansk'£ s The passage in square brackets is deleted in the final text. This deletion is the sub- ject of a further protocol {not printed, 2871/563861-62) which specifies that the new, ' contracted Article 3 is the only valid one and that the necessary amendments are to be ■ made by hand before publication. 44 UOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY Con?tia L Protocol on Economic and Financ ■^o°pebation BETWEEN THE GERMAN REICH AND THE STATE OF SLOVAKIA The undersigned plenipotentiaries of the German Reich Government and the Slovak Government have today agreed that the German Reich and Se Slovak State shall cooperate in the closest possib e manner in the spheres of economy and finance according to the following pro- visions. Article I Cooperation shall extend in particular to: I) The increase and direction of Slovak agricultural production with a view to market possibilities in Germany, e.g., increasing the breedmg of pias and raising milk production. 2) Development of the Slovak timber industry and forestry by drawing up long term economic plans with a view to market, possibi- Ut ST S^yTnropemng up and exploiting Slovak mineral resource. It i a g re.ed y th£ the mineral resources, insofar as they are not required by Slovakia herself, will be made available to Germany in the first instance. The ≪ Reichsstelle fur Bodenforschung will be entrusted with the entire survey for mineral resources. As soon as possible the Slovak State Government will investigate whether the prospecting rights and titles are being used by the present owners m accordance wlh their legal obligations, and in cases where these obligations have been neglected, will terminate these prospecting rightsand titles. 4) Development and direction in industrial production with a view to German and Slovak vital interests and market conditions and co- operation in the sphere of exporting industrial and other goods. 5) Development of the means of communication and transport in Slovakia. Article II Slovakia will introduce a currency of her own and will establish a Slovak National Bank as the central bank of issue. Germany will give Slovakia her support in establishing a Slovak National Bank and in legislating for and administrating foreign exchange control. , ... , The German Reichsbank will participate in due form m the establish- ment of the Slovak National Bank and will delegate to the board of Directors of this bank an adviser who will take part in all important decisions. The Slovak Government will also consult this adviser in Sawing up and carrying out the State Budget and wul not raise any loans without his consent. The German currency taken into Slovakia ^^f^^^ tions in March 1938 will be bought back at the rate of 1 Kc= 10 pfennig. MARCH, 1939 45 It is envisaged that in order to relieve the shortage of currency in Slovakia the National Bank in Prague will be induced to transfer at once to Bratislava currency to the amount of 350 million Ke\ Article III Both Governments will in due course enter into negotiations on trade and payments agreements. These agreements will in particular be concluded on the basis that Germany will purchase Slovakia's agricultural produce, forestry products and other goods, including minerals, and will supply in return finished goods, semi-finished pro- ducts and capital goods. Slovakia will not conduct economic negotiations with other States until after the conclusion of the agreements with Germany and will keep Germany , constantly informed about these negotiations. A Customs Union between the German Reich and Slovakia is not en- visaged. During the period of transition, however, exemption from customs will be granted until further notice between Slovakia on the one hand and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the Sudeten German territories on the other. Article IV This Protocol will enter into force on the day of signature. Both parties will treat the Protocol as strictly confidential and will divulge its contents only by mutual consent. Berlin, March 23, 1939. For the German Reich Government: For the Slovak Government: V. RlBBENTROP VOJTECH TlJKA Dr. F. Dur6akskv No. 41 2050/447323 The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 55 of March 19 Belgrade, March 19, 1939 ? 1:10 p.m. Received March 19 ? 4:45 p.m. As I learn from a reliable source, the events of the last week have aroused extreme anxiety also in authoritative circles here, including the very highest quarter. Besides the fear of a recurring exacerbation of the European crisis, anxiety for their own security in the face of the dynamic force of the Axis Powers and uncertainty as to the further development of the Croat problem contribute to this. Even if, as I have been able to ascertain, the rumours circulating here that Stojadi- novic has again been received by the Prince Regent and has been asked 46 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY t ? take over the foreign Mmistry are not ≫?ct ?h a development SSrErr≪SSSS Axis. Hberen No- 42 2767/535325 The Charge 1 d> Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign M^n^stry


London, March 19, 1939?3:25 p.m.
urgent Received March 19-7 :45 p.m.

No. 79 of March 19 ^ Pol. II 798.

i Tn this morning's press, too, speculations about alleged German

il^to^r^rZni, are the most prominent features, although

Usteported t ha t Bucharest, Berlin, and also the Rumanian Legion

here deny that Germany had presented an economic ultxmatum to

R 7lTarn the following from a reliable informant on this: On March

' 17 Mea the Rumanian Minister here, on his own nntiative told the

Forekn Office i of unreasonable German economic demands on Rumania

because To ording to his information, German-Rumaman economic

I^wSe coming in of accelerated German troop movements
ZTClZS:;Zlly direction. Reports and constant action
in tVif> British press are thus explained.

^IndTp ndently of this, King Carol has apparently suggested an
exchange of views regarding a guarantee of the Rumanian fronts by
the Western Powers. KoKDT

i See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. it, No


MARCH, 1939 47

No. 43


The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry


No. 34 of March 19 Moscow, March 19, 1939?6:28 p.m.

Received March 19 ? 9:30 p.m.

Yesterday towards midnight a Note arrived signed by Litvinov, 1 the
text of which is being telegraphed by the DNB representative, and in
which the Soviet Government state that, in order to avoid conveying a
false impression of indifference, they do not consider it possible to pass
over in silence our notification regarding the Czecho-Slovak affair. The
crux of the three-page Note is the statement that the Soviet Government
cannot recognize the constitutional alterations in Czecho-Slovakia as
legal, since they were carried out without consulting the people.

Before the arrival of the Note, I met Litvinov at a reception given
by the Italian Ambassador. 2 Litvinov asked whether I had received
his Note; when I replied in the negative and asked what the Note con-
tained he answered: Since the British and French Governments had
protested about the Czecho-Slovak events and the President of the
United States had issued a "statement", 3 the Soviet Government
considered that they, too, had to clarify their position, which was that
the Soviet Government could not recognize the alterations in the
constitutional structure of Czeeho-Slovakia.

After the Note had meanwhile been delivered to me in the Italian
Embassy, I again talked with Litvinov and asked him what was the
practical import of his Note. Litvinov merely replied that the Soviet
Government had simply wished to make their point of view clear. My
impression, based on Litvinov's manner and the second paragraph of
the Soviet Note, is that the Soviet Government will also from now on
not act independently but will be guided by the attitude of Great
Britain, France, and the United States.


i Document No. 50.
B Augusto Rosso.

3 In English in the original. Presumably the statement by Sumner Welles, on Mar.
17. See document No. 34, footnote 3.

No. 44


Memorandum by the State Secretary
; St.S. No. 247 Berlin, March 19, 1939.

;.; The Italian Ambassador has again spoken to me on the subject
of Germany's deliveries of coal to Italy. He said that Ciano had


telegraphed to him that at the very moment when we were in arrears
with out deliveries to Italy we were sending such supplies to France and
Belgium. The matter had a political aspect, and exceptional measures
would have to be taken to tide over the present disastrous situation.
I answered Attolico that I had already yesterday taken an interest

in the matter myself L and would do so again.


No. 45


The, Ambassador in Italy to the, Foreign Ministry


top secret Rome (Quirinal), March 20, 1939?9:40 p.m.

No. 102 of March 20 Received March 21, 1939?1 :00 a.m.

For the State Secretary.

With reference to my telegram No. 100 of the 17th, 1 and to our tele-
phone conversation of today. 2

Today, when delivering to Ciano the Note already promised to him
orally on' March 17 (your telegram No. 11 3 of March 17) referring to his
observations of March 17 and with reference to the preliminary con-
versation between the State Secretary and Attolico on the same subject,
I told him that, according to information received today from the
State Secretary, the anxiety which he had expressed to me on the pre-
ceding Friday evening regarding our attitude to the development of
the Croat question was without foundation. What I had already told
him on March 17 was therefore confirmed.

Ciano took note of my observations and formulated the Italian view-
point by saying that Italy primarily desired the continued existence of
the present Yugoslav State; but that Italy, should those events ever
occur which today no longer seemed to him impossible in view of the
growth of the Croat autonomy movement under the influence of the
developments in the Czecho-Slovak question, expected from the Ger-
man side the same desintdressement in this area, which today directly
concerned her interests there, as she herself had shown towards us with
regard to the development of the Czecho-Slovak question. What

2 According to a memorandum by Mackensen of Mar. 20 {not prated, 2130/465304-
051 he had that morning telephoned Weizsacker with reference to document No. 15 and
asked for further information. He had been told that Weizsacker had already had a
brief preliminary conversation with Attolico and that Ribbentrop was considering a
personal letter to Ciano (see document No. 55); meantime Weizsacker could already
state definitely that the fears Ciano had expressed were entirely without foundation

3 T his number is evidently an error . From references on the Rome draft ( 2 1 30/465306-
08) of this document it would appear that the telegram under reference was the circular
of Mar. 17 cited in document No. 14, footnote 1.

MARCH, 1930 49

happened on the shores of the Adriatic was an Italian family affair just
as the new order in the area of former Czechoslovakia had been treated
by Italy as a German family affair. I replied that this view did indeed
coincide with the Fiihrer's words, which he himself had quoted re-
garding the delimitation of the living space of both parties nor did I
put any other construction on the State Secretary's observations of
today. I would, however, immediately inform Berlin of the Italian
point 01 view as formulated by him.

When I asked whether he could give me any closer details regarding
the sources of the rumours communicated to me on Friday as I still
had no concrete data about them, he talked of reports which had told
of activity of German agents in Croatia.

Ciano finally mentioned that he was expecting Attolico's visit to
morrow, and he concluded with the remark that he would report on
our conversation' immediately to the Duce, who apparently had been
more concerned about these rumours than Ciano had intimated on
Friday. 4

Mackensen 5


S. 4 i.e. Mar. 17

I -- - '

u£% C tTl le % Td n 0t th ^P°≫versation see Ciano: UEuropa verso la Catastrofe pp
419-420; see also the Ciano Diaries, entry of Mar. 20. u≫≪≫i"i/t, pp.

No. 46


The State Secretary to the Embassy in the Soviet Union
No. 43 of March 20 Berlin, March 20, 1939?10:05 p.m.

Received March 21 ? 3:35 a.m.
With reference to your telegram No. 34. l
■■ The British and French Ambassadors, who in consequence of recent
events have handed in somewhat sharp Notes here on the Czecho-Slovak
; affair, have been informed by us that we could not accept the protests
We have completely rebuffed them and their demarches here. 3 Accord-
r ingly, please decline further discussions on the matter in Moscow also.


;■;:■■ I Document No. 43.

.'■ 2 See documents Nos. 20 and 26.

I *




No. 47

The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania

XT Q , - Berlin, March 20, 1939?10:45 p.m.

iN0 - . ' zu Pol. IV 1835 and 1836.1

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 98 and 99.1 , L ,.

1 In so far as we are concerned, we still do not intend undertaking
the 'role of intermediary in Hungarian-Rumanian relations, are await-
ing rather the direct settlement about to be reached between the two

°T AlTinformation about Germany's alleged aggressive intentions in
respect of Rumania is-like the rumour, already demed,3 D f an ulti-
matum presented by us to the Rumanian Government during the
economic negotiations-pure invention and deliberate misciurf-
making * On this account please speak to Georges Bratianu again
and assure him, on the strength of your enquiries, that his fears are
completely unfounded. Weizsackee '

i Documents Nos. 29 and 30.

2 See also document No. 13.

I K nte"X° sent to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union in an. No. 42
of Mar. 20 (not printed, 215/146822} as instructions on language to be held.

No. 48


The Charge d' Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry


No 81 of March 20 London, March 20, 1939-10:46 p.m.

iN0 ' Received March 21?3:00 a.m.

Pol. II 835. ■{

Statements which Chamberlain and Halifax have just made in the
House of Commons [sic] 1 still do not clarify the intentions of the
British Government. Lord Halifax limited himself to a sometimes
bitter presentation of the events of the last few days. He spoke of the
expediency of "far-reaching mutual guarantees". According to in-
formation from reliable informants something like the followmg
picture emerges regarding the present position : The British Government ;|
now firmly hold the initiative for discussions. They hope to take the J

' ~i See Pari. Deb., H. of C, vol. 345, cols. 8S5-888 and H. of L., vol. 112, cols. 308-319.

MAKCH, 1939 51

lead in laying down the policy to be followed so as to avoid statements
of conditions being made by the other States which, in the British view,
would not achieve their object. The British manifestly think of laying
down a demarcation line which, in particular, includes Rumania, and the
infringement of which by an aggressor would constitute a casus belli.
The following States are said to have been asked to take part in the
guarantee:? Russia, Poland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. It is unques-
tionably established that Hungary has not been approached. It has
been left to Poland to make contact with Lithuania, Estonia and
Latvia; the same applies to Turkey in respect of Greece. There is
still doubt regarding Bulgaria.

It is asserted at the Turkish Embassy that Turkey would be ready to
guarantee the Rumanian frontier if Britain took the lead. Poland and
Russia have allegedly declared that the only form of assistance con-
templated was the delivery of war material and the provision of air
forces. Kennedy, the United States Ambassador here, is playing a
leading part. He is said to be in personal contact with the Missions of
all the States involved, and to be attempting to encourage them to
adopt a firm attitude by promising that the United States of America
would support them by all means ("short of war" 2 ).

The French are cooperating extremely closely with the British.

A Soviet Russian proposal for calling a Nine-Power-Conference
is said to have been rejected by Britain in order that the initiative in
the whole aSair should on no account be allowed to pass over to the
Soviets. As I learn further, there is said to have been a sharp difference
of opinion between Lord Halifax and Henderson, the British Ambas-
sador in Berlin, when Henderson reported on his Berlin impressions.


4 In English hi the original.

No. 49

| : H7I/5MS7Ji

The Charge, cT Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry


|jfo. 163 of March 20 Paris, March 20, 1939.1

Received March 20 ? 11:30 p.m.
m After the promulgation of the law regarding special powers, 2 atten-
paon is focused ? beside the unanimously emphasized desire for all-out

K, l The hour of despatch is not recorded.
1 * See document No. 22, footnote 2.


rearmament-on the question of how a protective barrier may be
erected against the German drive for expansion. First and foremost
the necessity of defending Rumania is emphasized, chiefly for military
reasons, as Rumanian petroleum and grain would make it possible for
Germany to carry on even a long war, and would thereby remove the
weakness she still suffers in this respect. In this connection the entire
press records with approval Britain's leading part in the endeavour to
bring about an association of "peaceful" Great Powers, as well as of the
States in East and South-East Europe threatened by Germany. _ A
further part is played by the fear that, as a result of Germany s action
Italy's claims will be strengthened, and that Germany's increase of
power will place her [Italy) in a position to push these claims through
As regards Italy, however, hope is gaining ground since the Czech
events that that country may be detached from the Axis. I learn
from several quarters that Laval in particular is said to be planning a
move for clearing up Franco-Italian relations, and to be employing Ins
contacts with Italian circles towards this end.

Any of Laval's endeavours will, however, for a time be running
counter to the still general rejection of Italian claims, especially those
of a territorial character, such as has also received expression in
Daladier's speech before the Senate. And in this there will probably
be no alteration as long as the circles advocating a Franco-Italian settle-
' ment are unable to produce proofs of Italian willingness to conclude a
settlement and thus loosen the solidarity of Axis policy.


No. 50


The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

A .?? Moscow, March 20, 1939.

A50b Pol. IV 1993.

Subject: Litvinov's Note on the Czecho-Slovak affair.
With reference to my telegram No. 34 of March 19. l
I beg to enclose a copy 2 and a German translation of the Note from

Foreign Commissar Litvinov of March 18, 1939, on the Czechoslovak-'

The Note was transmitted by Tass and the Moscow Radio on March |
19 and has been published today by the Soviet press.

The Note represents an expression of the views of the Soviet Govern-
ment and contains no protest. The reason underlying this step is tfaat.l

i Document No. 43.

2 Not printed (Russian text), (2002/442289-91).

MARCH, 1939 PJ3

it is not possible for the Soviet Government to pass over in silence our
Notes on the Czecho-Slovak affair,* thus creating the false impression
that the Soviet Government are indifferent to the Czecho-Slovak
events. After setting forth the Soviet point of view the Note concludes
by stating that the Soviet Government cannot recognize as legal the
incorporation of Czechia and, in one or other form, of Slovakia into the
body of the German Reich.

Supplementing my previous report i on my conversation with
Litvinov, I beg to add, that even the Head of the Press Section of the
Foreign Commissariat* could give no answer to the question put by
foreign journalists as to what practical effect the Note of the Soviet
Government would have. In response to further questions as to how
the attitude of the Soviet Government would affect the personal affairs
of the Czechs resident here, for example over passports, etc. the Head
of the Press Section said that agreement would certainly be reached on

Count von der Schulenburg

3 i.e., Notes of Mar. 16 and 17. See footnotes o and 6
* E. A, Gnedin,



Translation Moscow, March 18, 1939.

Me. Ambassador: I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your
'l Note of the 16ths and the Note of the 17th,≪ informing the Soviet
: Government of the incorporation of Czechia into the body of the German
Reich and of the establishment of a German protectorate over it.

As the Soviet Government do not deem it possible to pass over the
above Notes in silence and so give the false impression that they are
|; indifferent to Czecho-Slovak events, they consider it necessary in reply
| to these Notes to record their true position on the events in question
| 1. Political and historical considerations mentioned in the intro-
|, u uctory section of the German decree as the reasons and justification
| for it-in particular the references to the Czecho-Slovak State as a hot-
l-befl of constant unrest and a threat to European peace, the non-
liability of the Czecho-Slovak State and the consequent necessity for

£■* N≪ printed (414/215916-18); this Note repeated the text of the Declaration of Mar

S Mn tof ^vT" 1 ^°" 229> ex °' udin g enclosures) and of the stated
.MOteined in vol. iv of this Series, document No. 242. Document No. 229 had been

te?nU479≪ w^i M ? s >" Europe and the Embassies at Washington ≪S
-Jdryc (2050/447223-24); document No. 242 had, in addition to.the Missions there listed
?^circularized to the remaining Missions in Europe and to Washington, Rio de Janeiro
|Bnanoa Aires, Santiago and Geneva (2050/447229) '

|M i Not printed (414/215933-38); this Note gives the text of the Proclamation by the
ri(^" n the Protectorate of Bohemm and Moravia (see vol. iv of this Series, document

Sg JKh ZIP/.


special anxieties on the part of the German Reich? cannot be accepted
as correct or as corresponding to the facts known to the whole world.
In point of fact, of all the European countries, the Czechoslovak
Republic after the first world war was one of the few States where
internal peace and a peace-loving foreign policy were really guaranteed.
2 The Soviet Government know of no constitution in any State
which gives the right to the Head of the State to terminate the indepen-
dent existence of the State without the agreement of its people. It is
hard to admit that any people will voluntarily declare themselves in
agreement with the destruction of their independence and with their
incorporation into the body of another State, much less such a people
who for centuries have fought for their independence and already for
twenty years have preserved their independent existence. When he
signed the Berlin Declaration of the 15th, the Czechoslovak President,
Dr Hacha, had no authority whatever from his people to do so, and
was acting in obvious contradiction to Articles 64 and 65 of the Czecho-
slovak constitution and to the will of his people. Consequently, the
above-mentioned Declaration can possess no legal validity.

3. The principle of the self-determination of peoples, to which the
German Government not infrequently make appeal, stipulates a free
expression of the people's will, which cannot be replaced by the signa-
ture of one or of two persons, however high may be the positions which
they occupy. In the case under consideration, there was no expression
whatever of the will of the Czech people, not even in the form of such
plebiscites as for instance took place when the fate of Upper Silesia and
the Saar Territory was decided.

4. In the absence of any kind of expression of the will of the Czech
people, the occupation of Czechia by German troops and the subsequent
actions of the German Government must be regarded as arbitrary,
violent, and aggressive.

5. The above observations apply also in their entirety to the altera-
tion of the status of Slovakia brought about by subjecting that country
to the German Reich, an alteration which has not been justified by any
sort of expression of the will of the Slovak people.

6. The actions of the German Government served as the signal for
a rude invasion into Carpatho -Russia by Hungarian troops and the
violation of the elementary rights of its people.

7. In view of these considerations, the Soviet Government cannot
recognize the incorporation of Czechia, nor that? in one form or
another? of Slovakia, into the body of the German Reich as being legal,
consonant with the generally acknowledged standards of international
law and justice or with the principle of the self-determination of


8. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, the actions of the German
Government have not only not removed any danger there may have

MARCH, 1939 55

been to general peace but have, on the contrary, created and increased
such danger, damaged the political stability of Central Europe, increased
the elements of a state of unrest which had already previously been created
in Europe, and dealt a new blow to the feeling of security of peoples.

I have the honour to request you, Mr. Ambassador, to bring the
above to the notice of your Government, and to accept the assurance
of my highest consideration.

M. Litvinov
No. 51


Counsellor of Embassy Tippelskirch to Senior Counsellor Schliep
Copy of an Extract i from a Letter of March 20, 1939

Litvinov answered the Ambassador's Notes 2 on the 1 9th. The
Soviet Notes was broadcast yesterday by Tass and the radio, and has
only today appeared in the press. Its content is limited to an expression
of opinion to the effect that the Soviet Government cannot recognize
the Czechoslovak events. Obviously, the main reason for the Note is
that the Soviet Government wish to show that they associate them-
selves with the course of action adopted by Prance and Britain. The
Note gives the impression, moreover, that the method, more than the
result, is criticized? a criticism which the Soviets have the least reason
of all for making, if one remembers Georgia. 4

After the Austrian Anschluss, Litvinov proposed an international
conference but transmitted no Note. This time the Soviet Government
express their point of view by means of a Note, but in a manner which
relieves them of [the necessity for] further moves (for instance, the re-
call of the Soviet Ambassador to report).

The present attitude of the Soviet Government must in any case

merit our attention. It has already struck us with what reserve Stalin

' 8poke on Germany in his speech at the Party Congress. 3 I consider as

']■ still more striking certain remarks of Litvinov's to Madame Togo, the

Japanese Ambassador's wife, of which she informed me in the strictest

confidence. Litvinov told Madame Togo, to begin with, that he had

J full information that the negotiations of the Japanese Ambassador in

-£ iThe complete document has not been found. This extract bears the typewritten
m note: "Herewith to the Deputy Director of the Political Department and the Under
p. State Secretary for information. Berlin, Mar. 22, 1939 (sgd.) Schliep."
% : .' 2 Not printed. See document No. 50, footnotes 5 and 6.

K-. 3 Document No. 50, enclosure.

W. * The independent Republic of Georgia had been recognized by the Soviet Union in a

| ; Treaty signed on May 7, 1920. In February 1921, Soviet forces had invaded Georera

t- which was subsequently incorporated into the Soviet Union.
'See document No. I.


Berlin for a Gerrnan-Itaban-Japanese military alliance had broken
down owing to the attitude of Germany and Italy. In reference to this,
Litvinov said that Germany and Italy were about to set their relation-
ship with the Soviet Union in order. I assume that these remarks were
essentially intended as pressure on Japan and as a counter to threats
uttered by the Japanese during the fishery negotiations. In spite of
this I cannot pass over such observations. In view of the attitude of
Britain and France, who have broken off their economic negotiations
with us,6 the Soviet Union in particular, in addition to the countries of ■
the South-East, again assumes considerable economic importance for
Germany. I do not know whether, under these altered circumstances,
our economic negotiations with the Soviet Government will not receive

a new fillip.

Moreover, the Soviet Government appear to be giving no further
thought to the practical effects of Litvinov's Note. We have reported
on the matter in detail by telegram 7 and despatch.* Perhaps you
would also care to look at Hilger's reports on the present state of the
Japanese-Soviet fishery negotiations. My Japanese colleague told me
only the day before yesterday that the negotiations were being con-
tinued, and that there was still some hope that they might be brought
to a successful conclusion.

The British Commercial Attache 10 assured me that Hudson, the
Under Secretarv of State, would arrive in Moscow on March 23 as
previously arranged. When I asked whether there was any intention
on the British side of granting the Soviet Government another credit,
the Commercial Attache twice replied that a British credit to the
Soviet Government was not out of the question.

Furthermore, I must not forget to mention that, when the Ambas-
sador informed him of the events in Czecho-Slovakia, Litvinov openly
showed his satisfaction regarding the annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine
by Hungary.

The Poles appear to be rather annoyed over the events in Czecho-

The British here are making a particular display of ill humour, a fact
which reminds me strongly of my war-time experiences. The British have
always taken the political successes of others as a personal affront.
The Ambassador will leave for Berlin on Thursday, March 23, as he
wishes to settle various matters before he is sent to Teheran. > ! He will
arrive in Berlin on Saturday.


* See document No. 11.

' Document No. 43.

8 Document No. 50.

≫ Not found. , ? . . , _ ,

1° Frank Todd, Commercial Secretary at the British Embassy.

ii To attend the wedding of the Iranian Crown Prince; see document ko . 32S, footnote*.

MAKCH, 1930 157

No. 52


Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

Berlin, March 20, 1939.
Note on a Conversation between the Fuhrer and the Italian

Ambassador in the Presence or the German Foreign Minister

The Italian Ambassador gave a short summary of the interview
between the Duce and the Prince of Hesse, [recapitulating the various
reasons put forward by the latter to explain Germany's action in
Bohemia and Moravia, and concluding with the statement that the
German divisions which had been set free by this action "would be
available on any other front of the axis even tomorrow " The Prince
of Hesse had added, however, that if Italy contemplated any large scale
operations, it might be useful to postpone these for 18 months or
two years, because at such a time Germany would have an additional
100 divi S1 ons. The Duce had replied that he was taking cognisance of
the communication made by the Prince of Hesse, and that as regards
military assistance, Italy intended even in the case of a conflict with
France, to fight alone, expecting from Germany only supplies of
munitions and raw material but no man power.] 2

The Fiihrer replied that as regards her armed forces, Germany was
now in a position to face all eventualities. He also thought that Italy
was in a positions to carry through certain operations without France
being able to prevent her from doing so.

He, the Fiihrer, was asking himself, however, to what extent Great
Britain might intervene in any conflict. He thought that Great Britain
would almost certainly* assist France, and for these reasons he believed

. l This memorandum Is in English in the original and the conversation appears to have
ten partly held mthat language, probably because of Attolico's limitation^ airman
The id.osyncra S1 es of spelling and punctuation have been preserved. A German v^sfon
Eft≪£i? ? som l what '"drafting and sequence of topics fromThe S
£19/470-484); major differences between the two versions are footnoted below On
Mar. 21, bchmidt sent an urgent te egram. No 124 (100/fi'ifi5>7\ t n m?L? ■

, .^instructions from the Foreign Minister 1^ B^^VeW^T^IS^i
arrive in Rome at 3 p.m. tomorrow at the latest* a memorandum on the FuCr-
; Attohco conversation; after the tatter's arrival in Rome on the evening of Mar 21 he
"- SS Z^ ^^. you about th JS matter. The Foreign Minister requests that you
.0*11 on no account give Attohco a wntten memorandum, but only oral assisCe Hn
^making a comparison with the document prepared by himself and that only by mtan S of
eitracts We first promised Attohco a written copy, but, on account of theT e Uca?e
natoeof the matter its delivery was cancelled, reference being made to the tectafcaJ
■-difficulties of sufficiently early transmittal and of the availability of your help "The
,≪py sent to Mackensen was the German version of this document (1932/440187-93)
It wis marked Second Corrected Memorandum". See also document No 87
? * The passage here enclosed in square brackets has been struck out of the English ver-
; men and does not appear in the German. *j≪js"* The Polish Government
was not an authoritarian government like the Italian or the German
government, it was really a government without the support of the
people and countercurrents could at any moment come to the surface is
It must also be noted in this connection that there were almost' 4
million jews m that country, which could in these circumstances one
day influence Poland's policy in a certain direction.! 6 The Fuhrer
thought that, if Great Britain intervened in a general conflict Poland
might quite possibly be found among Germany's enemies and therefore
certain precautions must be taken." There was no danger on land
but Germany s naval forces were not great enough to attack the British
fleet either at home or on the high seas. 1 ^

The Fiihrer then emphasised that he wished by no means to appear
pretentious when he expressed the opinion that it would be a good
thmg^that larger conflicts took place only in a few years, adding

Ji The German version here reads; "that at present not only would the British N.w
be ≫ rang enough to out Germany's overseas communications, but there wouL d *?vitaWv

rnonth^to two yea"' tfme^ : ^ SItUatl ° n t0 ° WOuld be ^^ ea ^ ≫ eighteen
, ; ^The German version here adds: "for the purpose of thwarting Polish foreign

16 In place of this phrase, the German version ha≪- "wh;^ ?.=i u . j ■ ,
: permanently detrimental iAfluence on theTZh "altitude" """' * ^"^ mth M a
: ≫ In the German version this phrase is expanded into: " which not only made German
..Plenary measures necessary, but made a little more time deSeT. bS^g

■■■ > ≪ This sentence is not included in the German version.


however, that Germany would always be found at Italy's side if the
latter needed her. 19 , ,

The Italian Ambassador then referred to the possibility of obtaining
French concessions in certain circumstances. He, the Ambassador,
thought that, at the present moment France would make no concessions
at all, not even on very reasonable demands. On the other hand, he
believed that the Duce was almost 20 forced "to get something". But
when he would be confronted with an obstinate France resisting all his
demands a hundred percent he might lose patience. France's will to
resist even the most reasonable demands, was clearly reflected m M.
Daladier's full powers 21 and his observation that the situation was
"grave and might become dramatic" to-morrow. Such words clearly
indicated a stiffening of resistance also in the diplomatic field. 22

The Fiihrer replied that he thought M. Daladier's powers would not
produce a consolidation of France's internal situation. While the
parties of the Left had supported Daladier's full powers m the hope
that they might mean greater support to the Bolshevist warmongers,
the parties of the Right had given their support to the bill hoping that
the full powers would ultimately be used against the parties of the Left.
Within a few months" Daladier would be forced to use his full powers
for very unpopular measures in France, new taxes, lengthening of
the hours of work, abolition of certain social institutions, like holidays

with pay, etc.

The Italian Ambassador, who said that he was speaking only oil
his own personal account and in no way under instruction, said that
Mussolini was forced to put forward his demands to-morrow and to put
his cards on the table. He did not want to and could not wait until
France's internal position had deteriorated. He must put forward his
demands now and would thus meet with the maximum of resistance
which would put him in a very embarras[s]ing situation.

Upon a question of the Fiihrer as to the exact nature of those de-
mands, the Italian Ambassador replied that these demands were not
known to him, nor, as far as he was aware, to any other person. 2 * He
had only heard from Count Ciano that these demands were of no

i≫ In the German version this paragraph reads: "For these reasons *R ^ihrer
emphasized that in his view, it would be a good thing for larger conflicts only to occur ia
Hew years' time. He did not wish this to appear pretentious, but he was merely ex-
pressing this opinion because the Italian Ambassador had himself raised the question,
and asked for an answer."

*≫ The German version here has "now in place ol almost .

21 See document No. 22.

"This sentence is not included in the German version. ≫Tv.i≪,r? ??

" From this point onwards in the German version the sentence reads: Daladwr, m
the FUtor's opinion, would be compelled to use his full powers for so many unpopular
measures thatfnstead of achieving internal consolidation, a new domestic crisis was more

lik ≪ y in the e German version this and the first part of the next passage js condensed to
read "When asked about the Duce's demands, Attohco replied that he had heard from
Count Ciano that they were not of a territorial character.

MAHCH ; 1939 QJ

territorial character, including the neutralization but not the session
[≪c] of Corsica. As regards Tunis, Italy merely demanded the restaura-
tion [sic] of the pre-war statute of Italians residing in Tunis The de
mands connected with Suez and Djibuti were quite obvious

At this juncture both the German Foreign Minister and the Fiihrer
observed that they thought it quite possible that France accepted these
demands^ The Italian Ambassador emphasised that, if these very
reasonable Italian claims were rejected, the Duce might lose
patience. &

The Fiihrer replied that in similar cases he had laid down a very
simple rule for himself. Whenever reasonable and wellfounded claims
which he had put forward in the past, had been rejected, he had not
acted immediately, but had merely said to himself that all the normal
methods of procedure to realize these demands were exhausted and
that it was useless to handle the respective problem any longer through
the diplomatic channels. He (the Fiihrer) then awaited his moment
when, without further discussion, he could quickly carry throueh his
intentions. 6

^ ^l 11 ! i^ n 0l \ U \ ChvaIkovsk y> **en he saw him first in Novem-
ber^that the Czechoslovak Army must be demobilized and drastically
reduced m number, that German minorities must be well treated and
that all partisans of the Benesch policy must disappear. He had repeated
these same demands in January during Chvalkovsky's second visit ≫
but the Czech seemed to take no notice. So he decided to await the
moment when he could take the laws into his own hands ? If the Duce
were now to put forward very precise (concrete) demands it would be a
requirement of wisdom to await the moment when these demands
could be realized with a minimum of effort and risk, and that moment
would certainly come.

The German foreign Minister underlined the fact that Germany's
weight would go [on] increasing during all that time ^
At the end of the interview the Fiihrer explained the military im-
portance which Czechoslovakia had preserved until the end by giving
the Italian Ambassador the following figures: 30
1900000 rifles
44000 machine guns (of which 24000 had been recovered)
2400 big guns (of which 1200 had been recovered)
1000 aeroplanes.
and 120000 t of ammunition [sic].

' ," B ?hSr. " erSi ° n C ° ndenSeS tWs ■≫"≪? to - ! " ^e Fuhrer gave Czechoslovakia

■ t This paragraph is not included in the German version.

. ≫ The German vers.on here adds: " of weapons already in part confiscated ".


In a general war, owing to the strategic position, these vast arme-
ments [sic]'would have been pointed to Germany's heart. These figures
also proved that Czechoslowakia held the record of the per capita arma-
ment of its population.

Dr. Schmidt

No. 53


Memorandum by the State Secretary

St S No 251 Berlin, March 20, 1939.

Pol. IV 2040.

The Hungarian Minister 1 today handed me the enclosed letter 2 for
the Foreign Minister concerning the occupation of and assumption
of sovereignty over the Carpatho-Ukraine. The letter states that
Hungary intends to negotiate direct with Rumania and Slovakia on the
frontier question.

The letter is attached. 3


2 Notprinted (1969/437967); the substance of the letter is given in the memorandum

he 3 6 MareSai notes- (i) " U.St.S. It seems to me that an acknowledgement of receipt is
indicated. W[eizsacker] 20/[3]." (ii) "L.R. Siegfried. Is an answer necessary?
E. K[ordt] 21/3."

No. 54


Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Berlin, March 20, 1939.
zu W VI 1046.1

Submitted to Herr Dir. Wiehl through the State Secretary.

The Reich Foreign Minister asks us not to agree for the time being

to any fresh British initiative for a later visit by Oliver Stanley and

Hudson 3 and to notify the Reich Ministry of Economics as well as the

Embassy in London accordingly.

Erich Kordt

i Not printed (2791/547901-07).
2 See document No. 11.

MARCH, 1930 yg

No. 55


Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Foreign Minister Ciano i
peksonal Berlin, March 20, 1939.

My Dear Ciano: I should like to take advantage of the first moment
of leisure I have had since my return from Prague and Vienna to thank
you first of all most sincerely for the sympathetic and friendly attitude
which your Government have adopted towards recent events. I am
firmly convinced that our action, which has finally established tran
quillity and order on the South-East frontier of the Reich, constitutes
a substantial strengthening of the Rome-Berlin Axis and that this
effect will be more and more clearly revealed in the course of further
developments. I can quite understand that the rapid progress of the
action and its result came to a certain extent as a surprise to you as
you recently hinted to Herr von Mackensen.* When, to the surprise
even of ourselves, matters came to a head in recent weeks, the Fuhrer's
decisions had to be made very quickly and without the opportunity
for lengthy preparations. However, I kept Ambassador Attolico con-
stantly informed, in so far as this was possible under the pressure of
stormy events, and was also glad to be able to give detailed information
to your former Minister in Prague. 3

Furthermore, I am anxious today to give you clear and definite in-
formation as to our attitude towards the Croat question which you
mentioned to Herr von Mackensen. You are acquainted with the
Fuhrer's decision that in all Mediterranean questions the policy of the
Axis is to be determined by Rome and that therefore Germany would
never pursue a policy independent of that of Italy in the Mediterranean
countries. This decision of the Fuhrer's will always be an immutable
law of our foreign policy. Just as the Duce declared his dtsinteresse-
Mtntin Czechia, we ourselves are disinterested in the Croat question and
if we acted at all in this matter, it would only be in the closest coopera-
: tion with Italian wishes. It came therefore as a complete surprise to
me that, according to information from Herr von Mackensen, rumours

l i In a top secret and urgent telegram, No. 103 of Mar. 21 (583/242045), Mackensen

if , reported with reference to instructions transmitted by Senior Counselor Kordt hT TJl?

i( "At l:30p.m I handed Ciano the text of the letter transmitted ?to me % te Shone ti

≫ his knowledge of German , s not sufficient, I translated the letter orally sentenced v

wntence. The way m winch Ciano expressed his thanks, made his satisfaction wfth the

contents of the letter clearly apparent. In accordance with instructions AttoHcc Twill

.... receive copies on his arrival here. " Iu) wu ≫

|: ■■. "With reference to my suggestion to Senior Counsellor Kordt over the telephone I

£ wwto. teve it to your discretion to instruct the Belgrade Legation to p^SSt.

k, most restraint in dealing with the Croat question, with reference to their report forwarded

|, to me with your despatch of March 17? Pol. IV 1611." [vol. v of this Series rin^?*

J. No. 310, which was forwarded to Rome under a cover note by He £bSTof th* "£?

|: date (not printed, 2130/465309-10).] y " emDur ≪ ° J ≪"> same

'"■ s See document No. 15.

3 Francesco Fransoni.


to the contrary concerning this have reached your ears and I at once
made an investigation personally to discover what the basis for these
rumours might be. I thus ascertained that about a month ago some
Croat personalities had called at an unofficial agency here in Berlin *
and had endeavoured to obtain detailed information about Germany's
attitude. This unofficial agency left the Croat visitors in no doubt at
all that independent German activity in this matter was absolutely out
of the question and that, on the contrary, Germany would always let
her attitude be guided by Italy's intentions and wishes. I communi-
cated these and other details to Attolico orally today before his de-
parture. It may have been that, as often happens in the case of visits
by such politicians, the Croats sought contact with other non -respon-
sible agencies as well. I will investigate this and put a stop once and
for all to anything which might possibly give rise to false rumours about
Germany's intentions, or to misunderstandings.

Incidentally, I again gave Attolico detailed information about ail
topical questions today and have just been with him to the Fuhrer, 3
who in turn gave his views for the Duce and yourself on the questions
which principally concern Italy.

I should be grateful if you would bring the contents of this letter to
the notice of the Duce also and convey my most sincere greetings to him.
With best wishes I am, my dear Ciano,
Yours etc.;


4 This may refer to a Croat approach reported to the Foreign Ministry by a member of
the staff of the Fuhrer's Deputy in a letter of Feb. 14, Pol. IV 1286 (not printed, 2481/

5 See document No. 52.

6 See also Ciano: VEuropa verso la CaUmtroje, pp. 420-2-.

No. 56


The Charge $ Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry


No. 96 of March 21 Washington, March 21, 1939?3:41 p.m.

Received March 22?12:45 a.m.
W VIII a 639.

With reference to my telegram No. 92 of March 18. 1
1) From discussions with New York banks and with exporters and
importers interested in trade with Germany, no effective protests are

i Document No. 33. A further report, No. 535/W, on the same subject was sent by
Thomson on Mar. 21 (not printed, 2422/511733-34). In this he attributes the imposition
of countervailing duties to direct instructions from the President.

MARCH, 1939 gg

to be expected from these circles against the imposition of "counter-
vailing duties", 2 on account of the political nature of this measure and
anti-German public opinion. Importers will attempt to bring in as
many goods as possible before April 23 and will then if necessary turn
to other sources of supply. The National Importers' Council also
Teached a decision yesterday to this effect.

2) German counter-measures should, for reasons of expediency, be
unobtrusively applied since the American Government might possibly
retaliate with penalty duties and an embargo pursuant to section 338
It would be desirable, however, that the utmost publicity should be
given to the fact that the contraction of German exports caused by
the American measures will of necessity lead to a considerable decline
in the German import of American products, particularly of agricultural

3) The Treasury decision practically puts an end to the Inland
Account procedure 3 in any form, as it regards the payment of any
premium on American products as a subsidy and, in view of the control
of German imports and exports, no longer recognizes the German in-
ternal market price as a "current fair open market price". 2 The con-
tinuance of Inland Account is therefore useless as the additional
duty would render the German premium illusory; as, furthermore, the
present 25 per cent additional duty on all dutiable German goods' has
been imposed regardless of whether the transaction has been carried
out by means of Inland Account or provides for a purely foreign ex-
change settlement. Since two thirds of the total imports from Germany
has, to begin with, a charge of at least an additional 25 per cent imposed
upon it, I recommend complete abolition of Inland Account procedure
and cancellation of all relevant circulars (excepting in the case of those
shipments of goods which have been declared to customs authorities in
U.S. ports before April 23, and also in as far as payment is to be made
only later). The importer cannot reckon on repayment of the addi-
tional duty when making price calculations, as it is completely uncertain
when such repayment will take place and how much he will have to
expend on adducing proofs. The attempt should then be made to
bring about the removal of the present 25 per cent additional duty

p; before April 23 through import circles here on the basis of documentary

proof that Inland Account procedure had been discontinued. The

Schroder Bank's customs attorney is already negotiating on their

behalf in order to free from the present additional duty transactions

'unquestionably put through against dollars or free reiehsmarks.

.;■: 4) As the only immediate possibilities for the promotion of exports

! there remain pure barter transactions without premiums, and payment

* In English in the original.

! See document No. 33, footnote 6.


from originally owned blocked accounts (original and continuous
ownerships).* With regard to the latter, it may well be in the first place
a question of large balances accumulated from [American] deliveries of
goods and [German payment of] dividends, such as those of American
motor manufacturers (General Motors). Such transactions must be
entered into and carried out with the greatest circumspection in view
of the United States Attorney General's opimon of June 2, 1936 * now
again cited. For this purpose the employment of reliable agents well
acauainted with the relevant conditions here appears expedient (Con-
tinental).* Concrete proposals are being drafted here by customs
attorneys For final decisions I request that the commercial experts at
the Embassy should he summoned to Berlin to report and that in no
circumstances should special sanction be granted beforehand. _

5) The Embassy will for the present make no use of the authoriza-
tion in telegram No. 79. 6

6) Carpatho-Ukraine is being treated as de facto Hungarian territory
according to the Treasury order of March 18, and, with Hungary,
enjoys most-favoured-nation status including tariff concessions under
the Czech-American Trade Agreement of 1938. Th0 msen

~* m this opinion the Aperioan Attorney ^

by Germany for promoting ex ports ( s °; c ,^ s C ≫P .^position P f countervailing

m arks" and ■?, ≪≫mpm≫t on procedu* ^f**" ? printed 6416/E47S54MI).

countervailing on certam ^P^^^f^fXnment that, with effect froi

to the U.S.A. (not printed > 6^522280-8^ Economics to the Foreign

* According to a ^^^^^^^sSbSmoS-W), the Continental Export

Ministry dated Aug 27 1937 (not printed ^J*^ * m? ^ h ital of S30 0,0S3t≪≫4^ management.

% Not ^^6402^4879-80). This telegram of Mar. 17 gave detailed instructs
regarding desirable German purchases in the United States.

No. 57


The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy


No. 125 of March 21 Beblin, March 21 1939-9:10 p.m. |

Received March? 9:30 p.m. m

For the Ambassador. Secret. , ;

We have requested Colonel General Keitel to state, through an in- J

struction to the Military Attache in Rome,! tha t he is ready for the f

1 Col. Enno von Rintelen.

MAKCH, 1939 gy

immediate opening of the General Staff discussions already mentioned*
and to enqmre what date would suit the Italian General X Word
missing) an approach to the Italian General. Staff is desirable as a
moment S ** ^^ "^ ^ ^^^ ^ ^ print

Please report progress by telegram.

2 See vol. rv of this Series, documents "NTnc i≪i ??j jcn *
the German-Italian Staff taiks were selec ted f? m tT ≫ u ' A I V 1 T b Sf of d ^*?≫ts on
after editorial work on this vSC^SMS 1 ?' °- f the German Admiralty
to this volume. a started. This selection is printed as Appendix I

No. 58


Circular of the State Secretary i

UEGENT Berlin, March 21, 1939-9:30 p.m.

e.o. Pol. II 833.
According to information to hand here, the British Government have
undertaken demarches jn a number of capitals so as to bring about an
assertion of peaceful Powers " against further German expansion

KSi fl^i Goveraraent ^ -id to have approached aU
the States adjacent to Rumania and to several other Powers in order
to ascertam how far these are prepared to take measures against an
attack on Rumania.* The present reports do not indicate cleariy

S£T, Zr r P C \ d67mrclm are here ≫?lved. Chamberlain and
Hah ax stated in Parhament on March 20 3 that, on account of recent
events, Britain has entered into consultation with other Powers (among
whom Hahfax also mentioned the Dominions). Furthermore, accord
.nig to press reports, the Soviet Union has replied by proposing a con-
ference to which the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Poland. Rumania
and other Balkan States would be invited

I toConsSates^eneral^ffi^a^dnet ' *" Consu,ate at Geneva, and

K- * See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, chapter v
s See document No. 48, footnote 1.


Powers. In conversation please refer to press reports and do not allow
it to be seen that you are acting on official instructions. 4

4Th B textof this teleeram was repeated on Mar. 21 as telegram No. 90 (1625/388374)
at your end."

No. 59


The State Secretary to the Embassy in Turkey


immediate Berlin, March 21, 1939-9:45 p^

No . 50 zu PoL VI1 450 - 1

With reference to your telegram No. 47 of March 15.1
Please inform the Turkish Government: We have heard that the
conclusion of a Franco -Turkish mutual assistance pact is being dis-
cussed in connection with the question of the union of Hatay with
Turkey. This news is extremely displeasing to us, as negotiations of
that type sharply contradict the express assurances repeatedly given
to us by Turkey that she would pursue a policy of strict neutrality
towards all Great Powers.

Please refer in particular to the various unequivocal statements made
by Human, the Secretary General, to the Reich Foreign Minister {July 1
and 7 1938) ≪ and to the State Secretary {July 6, 1938 and February 10,
1939)' 3 In the conversation of July 1, 1938, Numan had, in the pre-
sence of Ambassador Hamdi, given an assurance that Turkey had always
evaded France's efforts for the conclusion of an assistance mutuelle and
would also reject it in the future. Turkey would take no part in any
combination directed against Germany. In the further conversations
referred to this assurance was renewed and confirmed.

We expect that Turkey will also in future adhere to these solemn

Report by telegram.


1 Document No. 3. , , , . , ,. .

2 See vol. v of this Series, document No. 548 and footnote 1 thereto,
a See ibid., document No. 548, footnote 2, and document No. 560.

MARCH, 1939 69

No. 60


The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Berlin, March 21, 1939.
Pol. VI 672 g.

The following is for your strictly confidential information:

Recently the Finnish Foreign Minister i told Minister von Blucher in
strict confidence that Soviet Russia was showing remarkable interest
in the Finnish archipelago between Hogland (Suursaari) and Leningrad.
Litvinov had suggested to the Finnish Minister in Moscow^ the exchange
of this archipelago for territories in East Carelia. The Finnish Govern-
ment had refused, whereupon Litvinov had further proposed that
Finland should lease the archipelago to Russia. At the same time,
Litvinov promised renewed agreement to the fortification of Hogland!
This proposal Finland also rejected. Litvinov thereupon replied that
he would not regard this answer as final.

In the meantime, the Soviet Russian Ambassador in Rome, Stein,
had arrived in Helsinki, and wanted to speak to the Finnish Foreign
Minister. The Finnish Government would not consider the Russian
offers concerning the archipelago. If Russia occupied these islands in
time of war, Finland would hardly be able to prevent this, but a
voluntary cession of Finnish territory in peace time was out of the
question. There was a possibility, however, that Finland would reach
an agreement with the Soviet Government by means of an exchange
of Notes, that in the event of a general war, Finland would remain

Herr von Blucher concluded this conversation with the remark that
if the Russians established themselves on the islands in peace time,
this would mean military control of Finland by the Soviet Union, but
that Finnish neutrality in case of war seemed to him the expedient
policy. 3

We are in agreement with the language held by Herr von Blucher.

By order:

i Eljaa Erkko.

8 Baron Aarno Yijd-Koskinen.
p a Ina farther despatch, Pol. VI 797g of Apr. 1, signed by Grundherr (429/218674), the
'.Embassy at Moscow were informed as foilows: "According to what Minister von Bliicher
..iae heard from the Finnish Foreign Minister, the reason for the recall of the Finnish
Kmde delegation from Moscow ia that the Russians tried to secure, simultaneously with
£-.'&? trade agreement, the cession of the Finnish islands between Hogland and Leningrad
'and a 20 year lease of the island of Hogland to Russia."


No. 61


Memorandum by the Foreign Minister l

rjj 17 Beelin, March 21, 1939.

I invited Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, to call on me at noon today.
I began by describing to M. Lipski the development of the Czecho-
slovak question and explained to him that, in view of the rush of
events, it had not been possible for me to keep foreign representatives
here informed as 1 would have liked to do. I had, however, given
Ambassador von Moltke, who happened to be in Berlin, detailed in-
formation and instructed him for his part to put Foreign Minister Beck
in the picture. I then described in detail the events which had induced
the Fiihrer to intervene.

It had struck us that the Benes spirit had again stirred in Rump
Czecho-Slovakia. All the Piihrer's warnings to Chvalkovsky had fallen
on deaf ears. Recently the Prague Government had tried to adopt
dictatorial methods in Carpatho -Ukraine and in Slovakia. The oppres-
sion of the Germans in the linguistic enclaves had begun again. I
assumed that the settlement which had in the meantime been achieved
in the Carpatho-Ukraine question had caused the greatest satisfaction
in Poland. The establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia meant a final pacification of this area which was compatible
with historical principles and would benefit everybody in the end.

Ambassador Lipski then expressed anxiety at the fact that Germany
had assumed the protection of Slovakia. This news had hit Poland
hard, for the man in the street could only regard such a step as being
primarily directed against Poland. The Slovaks were a people lin-
guistically related [to Poland]. History also played a part in determin-
ing Polish interests in this area and from a purely realistic political
standpoint it must be admitted that the declaration of protection could
only be regarded as a blow against Poland.

I referred Ambassador Lipski to the fact that the independent
Slovak Government had appealed to Germany for protection. The
declaration of protection was certainly not directed against Poland.
At this point I gave a slight hint that the question could perhaps at
some time be the subject of joint discussions if German-Polish relations
in general developed satisfactorily . Unfortunately , however, I could not
but note that a gradual stiffening in German-Polish relations was be-
coming apparent. This trend had already begun several months ago.
It had struck us here what a peculiar attitude Poland had adopted in

i See also the Republic of Poland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Official Documents con-
cerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939. (Published by authority
of the Polish Government, London, [1940]) hereinafter cited as the Polish WMte Book),
No. 61.

MABCH, 1930 71

the Minorities Commission. 2 The incidents in Danzig, provoked hy
Polish students, had also given us food for thought. 3 Ambassador
Lipski denied most energetically that such incidents had been caused
by Polish students. When I observed that in the Fiihrer's opinion the
banners which had led to the clashes had been displayed by Polish
students, M. Lipski disputed this most vigorously and maintained that
Polish students had. been in no way implicated.

I further drew the Polish Ambassador's attention to the continuous

press attacks, to the anti-German demonstrations on the occasion of

the Ciano visit 4 and to the open press feud which existed at present.

This press feud seemed to me entirely unwarranted. The Fuhrer had

always worked for a settlement and an understanding with Poland.

Even now the Fuhrer was still pursuing this aim. However, the

Puhrer was becoming increasingly amazed at Poland's attitude.

Hitherto I had restrained the German press on the question of Poland,

as the Polish Ambassador could ascertain for himself by glancing at the

German newspapers. However, it would not be possible for me to

continue to let such attacks pass unanswered. From such a mutual

press feud a state of affairs might soon develop in which our relations

would be reduced to nil. It seemed to me essential that a fresh attempt

should be made to bring German-Polish policy on to the right lines,

and it seemed to me right and fitting that there should be a personal

discussion between German and Polish statesmen in the near future.

I would be glad if Foreign Minister Beck would pay an early visit to

Berlin. The Fuhrer had told me that he too would warmly welcome

such a discussion. As to details of the possible subjects of discussion, I

toldM. Lipski first of all that he must admit that Germany was not with-

: out her share in the creation and the present existence of Poland. If

at Brest Litovsk, for example, Germany had pursued a different policy

with Russia, there would be no Poland, today. Under the Schleicher

.■Government 5 too, there had been the possibility that a Marxist Ger-

f- many would ally herself with the So viet Union . In that case too Poland

Jf would hardly exist today. The basis on which German-Polish under-

|| standing could rest would only be provided by German and Polish

; nationalists. Poland must realize clearly that she could not take a

^middle course. Either Poland would remain a national State, working

K; for a reasonable relationship with Germany and her Fuhrer, or one day

Sphere would arise a Marxist Polish Government, which would then be

^absorbed by Bolshevist Russia. We most honestly desired that

^■Poland should retain a strong National Government, as represented by

Marshal Pilsudski's group of Colonels.

j. - See document No. 125 and also vol. v of this Series, documents Nos. 132 and 134.

|L'S See also vol. v of this Series, document No. 131.

J- : * Gano visited Poland Feb. 25-Mar. 1, 1939. Sec vol. v of this Series, document No.
jI'lSU, and also the Ciano Diaries, entry of Feb. 25.

6 Gen. Kurt von Schleicher was Chancellor of the Reich, Dec. 5, 1932-Jan. 29, 1933.


The best chance of reaching understanding with Poland lay with this
group. For her present geographical position Poland was indebted to
the major disaster of Germany's having lost the war. The geographical
solution so favourable to Poland also derived from this fact.

The Corridor settlement was generally felt to be the heaviest burden

of the Versailles Treaty for Germany. No previous Government had

been in a position to renounce German revisionist claims without being

swept away by the Reichstag within forty-eight hours. The Fiihrer

had other ideas about the problem of the Corridor. He recognized the

justification of the Polish claim to free access to the sea. He was the

only German statesman who could pronounce a final renunciation of

the Corridor. The condition for this, however, was the return of the

purely German Danzig to the Reich as well as the establishment of

extra-territorial rail and road connections between the Reich and

East Prussia. Only this would remove the thorn in the flesh which the

existence of the Corridor represented for the German people. If Polish

statesmen would calmly take into account the real facts, a solution

could be found on the following basis:

The return of Danzig to the Reich, extra-territorial rail and road
connections between East Prussia and the Reich and, in return, a
German guarantee for the Corridor. I could well imagine that in such
circumstances it would be possible to deal with the Slovak question to
the satisfaction of all.

Ambassador Lipski had little to say in reply to this. However, he
once again expressed his anxiety over the German declaration of pro-
tection for Slovakia. I told Ambassador Lipski once again that Danzig
would certainly return to the Reich sooner or later. A common
German-Polish policy could also prove very fruitful in- future. The
treatment which we had accorded to the Ukraine question showed how
loyal Germany's attitude was. From the disappointment expressed by
the Ukrainians he could see how straightforward was our policy. As
I had once assured Foreign Minister Beck in Warsaw 6 we were prepared
to regard the Ukrainian question from a purely Polish angle.

Ambassador Lipski promised to inform Foreign Minister Beck and
to report immediately.

I suggested that Ambassador Lipski should go to Warsaw and make
a personal report. I again repeated how advantageous a final settle-
ment between Germany and Poland seemed to me, particularly at the
present juncture. This was also important because hitherto the Fiihrer
had felt nothing but amazement over Poland's strange attitude on a
number of questions; it was important that he should not form the
impression that Poland simply was not willing.


6 See vol. v of this Series, document No. 126.

MARCH, 1039 73

No. 62


Memorandum by the. State Secretary
St.S. No. 254 Berlin, March 21, 1939.

I have today again urgently pointed out to Reich Minister Funk
by telephone the political importance of a friendly gesture to Italy as
regards delivery of coke and coal.i Herr Funk complained vehemently
of our own deficit and of the expected drop in steel supplies? particu-
larly of such steel as we required for Italy-^ince the delivery of coke
to Lorraine had been reduced. However, he promised to review the
matter and will do his best. 2

. Weizsacker

1 See document No. 44.

5 A marginal note reads: "Cf. [St.S.] No. 201 [vol. iv of this Series No 4^71 ar ,A
I8t8 J^W 6 [n M VT 'T$ lf*p/*SI0e2]". In tU latter melrlndu^ WeS c Zr
recorded that on Mar. 22 he had explained to Magistral the reasons for the defieitto
dafc and declared that both the Foreign Minister tnd the Minister^? Economics were
determined to make every effort to meet the Italian needs. In a teleeram to RmlZ!
≪^, 2058/447913-14) on the same day, the following deiiv^rylgu^XX,?-
January? 415,000 tons of coal, February? 535,000 tons, March (up to 21atl? *ffi ftnfi
tons The Coal Syndicate expected to deliver a total of 590,000 to 000 000 tons in
13&££££^££ Apr " l ,o. 3- of Maich 2. Received March 22-1:15 p.m. ?

For confidential information. I learn from a well-informed source J
that urgent attempts have been made, especially on the French side, .1
to prevfil upon tta Pope to associate himself with the protests ofthe
democratic States against the annexation of Bohemia and Morav a .*
the Reich The Pope has declined these requests very firmly. He ha*
Sen those around him to understand that he sees no reason to in-
Sere in historic processes in which, from the political point of v.ew,
the Church is not interested. ■ Bergen

MARCH, 1930 75

No. 66


The Charge d' Affaires in the U?iiied States to the Foreign Ministry


No. 98 of March 22 Washington, March 22, 1939?12:59 p.m.

Eeceived March 22 ? 9:25 p.m.
Mr. Suma, the Japanese Counsellor of Embassy, told me in confidence
that he had been reliably informed that the British have sounded the
"State" and "Navy Departments" 1 as to whether they could reckon
on American support, and if so, as to what extent in the event of an
acute conflict developing between Britain and Japan over Hongkong.
The British had stated in this connection that they were determined
not to give up Hongkong without a struggle. The American answer
had been completely negative.

This coincides with my own observations, according to which the

American Government will avoid everything which would bring them

: into open conflict with Japan. The extent and importance of any

military activity by America centred on Europe will be determined by

: - the latent threat to her western flank by Japan, in other words, the

clanger that while engaged in a European conflict, she might behind

;: her back be cut off by Japan from supplies of the most important raw

materials and have her Pacific possessions overrun.


1 In English in the original.

No. 67

;.. : S771/53687S

The Charge d' Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry

|No. 56 of March 22 Ankaea, March 22, 1939?2:30 p.m.

Received March 22 ? 6:05 p.m.
The Bulgarian Minister President 1 received me yesterday before his
|journey home in order to acquaint me with the results of the conversa-
|tions held during his visit here. The salient points may be summarized
j follows:

1. The Minister President had informed the Turks in unambiguous
as that Bulgaria was ready to guarantee the existing Turco-
garian, and Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontiers, but not Bulgaria's present

I&i! Gheorghi Kiosseivanov.


frontiers with Rumania and Greece. Bulgaria declined now as before
to enter the Balkan Pact 2 without previous frontier revision. He had,
moreover, frankly informed Ismet, the Turkish President, that ui his
view the Balkan Pact would break up at the first test.

2. Bulgaria regarded the Dobruja question 3 as urgent and admitting
of little further delay. K[iosseivanov] had asked the Turks what they
would do if Bulgaria took steps against Rumania; whether, in particular,
obligations under the Balkan Pact (defence obligations) had priority
over obligations under the Turco -Bulgarian Friendship Pact* (non-
aggression obligations). The Turks had on the first day acknowledged
these obligations under the Balkan Pact; on the following day, obviously
after consultation with the British Ambassador," this view had been
modified to the extent that the question of Turkey's attitude remained
open The Turkish Governmentrequested.however.that, shouldBulga-
ria intend to intervene in Rumania, she should previously consult them.
3. The Minister President told me that he had received news that
Germany had offered Rumania a guarantee of her present frontiers in
return for the fulfilment of her [Germany's] petroleum demands. He
could not believe this news was correct. For Bulgaria well knew that
without German help she must abandon her national aspirations.
Bulgaria, on the other hand, was ready to cooperate with Germany in
political and economic fields still more closely that heretofore, if that
were possible. The Minister President requested me with emotion to
transmit to the Reich Government the Bulgarian plea for support in

their national demands.


? : .:

2 The Pact between Greece, Kumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia constituting a, Balkan
Entente, signed at Athens, Feb. 9. 1934. For the text ≫^;? i /≪ff?≫
Tap?s (London, H.M. Stationery Office, in progress) (hereinafter cited as B.F.S.P.), vol. .

"^JSiSkSd claim to the Southern Dobruja ceded to Rumania after the Second
Balkan War by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, re-ceded to Bulgaria when Ruman*
included a separate peac£ in 1918, and re-ceded to Bumania by the Treaty of Neudly

m * The Treaty of Friendship between Bulgaria and Turkey, signed at Ankara, Oct. 18,
1925. For the text see B.F.S.P., vol. 122, pp. 213-217.
& Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen.

No. 68


The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania


^ n , n , Berlin, March 22, 1939?10:25 p.mJ:

JN ° 1 e.o.Pol. IV696g.v

Reports constantly coming in convey the impression here that?
Rumanian military measures have more than a purely security character ■

MARCH, 1939 77

and appear to amount to a total mobilization of the Rumanian Army.
The reason for this is not apparent. We therefore request that the
Rumanian Government be asked, without any particularly urgent
interest being displayed, about the cause and significance of these
measures. 1


i Marginal note: ' : N.B. this telegram is based on information received from Political
Department] I Military Questions]."

No. 69


The Charge' d' Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry

confidential Paris, March 22, 1939.

A 1197 Received March 23.

Pol. II 875.
I have the honour to submit herewith a German confidential agent's
memorandum on a conversation which he had on March 20 with
flandin, the former Minister President. Flandin's statements cor-
respond by and large with the views, heard elsewhere also, of those
French circles which have hitherto championed a settlement with Ger-
many and which, especially during the Czech crisis of September 1938,
intervened energetically for the maintenance of peace.

There definitely exists a desire in these circles to overcome the
crisis in German-French relations ? as is also expressed in Flandin's
■ statements ? even though at present the hope of doing so is small.





Flandin, the former Minister President, displayed considerable

|: pessimism regarding German-French future prospects during our conver-

psation which lasted about an hour. He said, by way of introduction,

pthat he did not understand the action against former Czecho -Slovakia.

M"Hy political friends and I have sought in vain to find a logical ex-

Eplanation for Hitler's motives. I find this political action the less

Incomprehensible since it was carried out just at a moment when the

^efforts of the advocates of a German-French understanding began to

Ishow concrete results. In my opinion the German authority over

Jthe Czech State was so strong and undisputed that the protec-

ittorate of Slovakia appears to be as superfluous as the annexation of

^Czechia. In any case the gain is in no wise proportionate to the


loss which Germany has suffered through the interruption of the
economic negotiations, 1 and through the complete abandonment of all
projects of international cooperation."

Flandin then quoted the general moral arguments which were being
brought forward by most Frenchmen at the present time. The new-
crisis through loss- of -confidence was, in his opinion, no temporary
manifestation, but was decidedly serious, deep-seated and lasting.
Flandin received with considerable scepticism my plea that, after a
few months, public opinion would calm down, and the plans for
German-French cooperation could surely be resumed . " I do not believe
that we are faced with a mere setback which, after some months, as you
say, may be overcome. I have rather the impression that something
is broken which can hardly be repaired. And this is particularly dis-
tressing to me. Certainly I am no prophet. Perhaps something will
happen in the future which will give us new points of contact, but it
will have to be something 'big'. For the moment the bridges are
broken and our public opinion will have nothing to do with Germany.
Even if the Reich Chancellor, Hitler, were to give an assurance to-
morrow that he had no intentions of annexing, or of taking under his
protection, other eastern or southeastern States of Europe, there
would be hardly anyone among us who would believe these words.
The seizure of former Czecho-Slovakia has produced the conviction in
France ? as it has in British public opinion ? that the Germans are
just a people striving for the hegemony of Europe, and that the brutal
urge of conquest is in their blood. Believe me, the blow against
Czecho-Slovakia has simply reduced twenty years' work for under-
standing to absurdity."

If the newly created situation were looked at soberly and objectively,
and all those trends were considered which, at the moment, were
agitating Europe anew, then in the last analysis, there was no way out
to be seen except war ? even though it is not fitting to describe war as a
' ' way out ' ' . Certainly there could at the present time be no thought of
becoming involved in war; but were not the crisis through loss of con-
fidence, the shock to public opinion and the measures which the
Governments felt obliged to take, calculated to hasten a "recourse to

I here objected that Germany's strategic position in respect of France
and Great Britain was very favourable. I referred to Britain's man-
power and war material, her limited possibilities, etc., and made no
secret of the fact that, in the view of my German acquaintances, all
measures against the German Reich, such as the recall of Ambassadors, 2
etc., were regarded as wasted efforts, and that in general it was ob-

1 See document No. 1 1 .

2 See document No. 25.

MAKCH, 1939 79

served with regret that France, and. Britain as well, would achieve
nothing by these methods, and merely ran the danger of suffering a loss
of prestige.

Fiandin replied to this as follows: "I fear that Germany is indulging
in an illusion in this respect. The democracies, especially the British
democracy, react very slowly, but if once the British have decided to
act, then nothing can hold them back. I do not regard the British
plan of calling something like a reduced League of Nations into being
as a qmntite negligeable. I also believe that economic warfare directed
against Germany may inflict very considerable damage on the Reich, "
Fiandin pointed out to me, in a lengthy exposition, the psychological
repercussions of the annexation in London and in Paris, and he re-
peatedly laid particular stress on the positive work done by the advo-
cates of a rapprochement during recent months. If people in France ?
as also in Britain ? had been prepared to forget the past, the pre-war
period and the war years, this had resulted from the conviction that in
Germany a new generation with a new and healthier mentality had
grown up. The blow against Czecho-Slovakia had destroyed this good
will with lightning rapidity. All the things which had outraged the
British sense of justice such as, for instance, the violation of Belgian
neutrality, etc., re-emerged from the past, and were used as proofs
that the mentality of the Germans had in no wise changed; that, in
attaining their aims of hegemony, they had no scruples, and that the
assurances of Germans must not be believed because they do not keep
their word: the new generation no more than their fathers did.

I expressed the view to M. Fiandin that it would appear to me more
rational if the newly-created situation, which was after all unalterable,
were regarded less from the psychological angle than from that of
political realism. Fundamentally, Munich had been a division of
spheres of interest; hence it was hardly comprehensible to a German
that su°h a clamour should be raised in Britain and France over the
German action.

Fiandin: "Pardon me, that is a great mistake. There is not one

word in the Munich Agreement to the effect that a division of spheres

of interest was intended, Germany has never declared herself ready

to renounce her colonial demands in Africa. On the contrary: Herr

|: Hitler is still vigorously supporting Italy's African claims! And the

annexation of Czecho-Slovakia has, in my opinion, by no means

secured for the Reich that economic equilibrium which could enable

her to base herself successfully on autarky in the future. Perhaps I

am wrong, but I hardly think so. The former Czecho-Slovakia has a

highly developed industry which depends upon sources of raw materials.

Germany will have to hunt for markets with increased energy, and the

| food problem may well involve the Reich in new difficulties. I am

^therefore ? as I have said ? convinced that Herr Hitler cannot think of


renouncing his colonial claims; rather it can be assumed that they will
continue to be urged even more vigorously. In view of this, therefore,
the opinion expressed by some journalists and politicians without re-
sponsibility that Munich was intended to give the Germans a free hand
in the East, while France was left to concentrate on her Empire, cannot
be maintained. " -Flandin emphasized in this connection that it had
always appeared to him normal and supportable that a Germany, re-
newed in strength, should turn economically towards the East and
South-East. He had always been in favour of this tendency although
he was conscious of the fact that this economic advance must naturally
displace the non-German Powers, and injure French and British in-
dustry . ' ' Today, however, we are confronted with a changed situation.
It is no longer a problem of economic penetration but manifestly of
political hegemony also. The British will attempt to save what they
can in the economic field; this will damage Germany and will, over and
above it, nurture fresh political tension. For this reason, and also for
otheT considerations, the success of the annexation seems to me to be
more than problematic for the German Reich. "

Once more the former Minister President began to speak of psycho-
logical matters: In his view the situation would not have been so grave
by far if the German Reich Chancellor had notified the French and
British Governments two days before the annexation; if he had at
least attempted to explain his motives and to give expression to the
fact that he had found himself obliged to take action. Certainly,
objections would have been raised and there would have been no lack
of protests, but the psychological shock would not have been so great.
One would not have had the impression of having been struck in the
face. Flandin countered my remark that there was, in the German-
French Declaration, 3 no provision for consultation in such an eventu-
ality, by saying that the Reich would indubitably have intervened
immediately if France had, in answer to the wishes of Catalonia,
assumed a protectorate over this Spanish province. If Paris had
presented the Reich with a fait accompli, on the plea that this matter
did not concern Germany, Berlin would not only have felt injured,
but would have replied with an intervention of its own.

Only something really "big " could overcome the present crisis.

. 3 Of Dec. 6, 193S. See vol. IV of this Series, document No. 369.

[Editors' Note. On March 23, Hitler landed in Memel. Docu-
ments dealing with the events which led to the German-Lithuanian
Treaty of March 22, 1939, and the cession of Memel will be found in
volume V of this Series, chapter III.]

MAKCH, 1939 81

No. 70

1 74/135900

The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry

secret Tokyo, March 23, 1939?7:00 p.m.

No. 121 of March 23 Received March 23?6:10 p.m.

For the State Secretary.

I hear from a well-informed Japanese press source that, after de-
liberating for several hours, the Japanese Five Minister Conference, 1
under the chairmanship of the Minister President, decided at two
o'clock this morning to open diplomatic negotiations with Germany for
the purpose of concluding a military alliance directed against Russia.
Sections of the Army had recommended a more far-reaching military
pact also against third Powers. The Italian Government have demanded
the same. The Navy advised limiting it to Russia. Ambassador
Oshima is said to have forwarded an enquiry from the German Govern-
ment whether Japan wished to conclude a military alliance. 2 Al-
legedly, Germany had also heen agreeable to a purely anti-Russian
pact and had requested a reply by April 3. 3 Despite the alliance, the
Government here do not intend to destroy the bridge with America
and Britain, and are said to be considering concessions in China to this
end. The morning edition of the newspaper Asahi today also mentions
a secret conference of Ministers and announces that "an important
question of Japanese foreign policy will he decided in a few days' time ".


i Consisting of the Minister President, Baron Hiranuma, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Arita, the Minister of War, General Itagaki, the Minister of Marine, Admiral
Yonai, and the Minister of Finance, Ishiwata.

i See Editors' Note below.

* No record of such a request has been found.

[Editors' Note. No evidence as to the precise nature of the
German-Japanese negotiations at this time has been found in the Ger-
man Foreign Ministry archives. The Foreign Ministry film of the
Buro RAM files on Japan contains none of the drafts listed below and
§ it is clear from volume IV of this Series, document No. 548, and from
document No. 270 in this volume, that special secrecy was observed in
their case. References to the negotiations will be found in volume IV
?of this Series, documents Nos. 400, 421, 422, 426, 542, 543 and 546. Some
(judication as to the nature of the proposals under discussion can be
s found in the Italian diplomatic documents, as quoted textually in
jjMario Toscano, Le Origini del Patto d'Acciaio (Florence, 1948).
The following drafts are there quoted verbatim:
(a) German draft of Tripartite Pact (original text in English, but


quoted by Toscano in Italian) given to Ciano by Ribbentrop at Munich
on September 29-30, 1938 (Toscano, op. cit., pp. 19-20). An English
translation from the Italian is printed in: Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, Documents on International Affairs 1939-46, vol. I
(London 1951) pp. 145-146.

(6) German draft of Tripartite Treaty. Text m French, submitted
to Oshima, Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, late October 1938 (Toscano,
op cit pp. 24-26). This is not identical with draft (a) above. Ciano .
saw this draft on October 27, 1938 ; see The Ciano Diaries, entry of
October 27, 1938, and also volume IV of this Series, document No. 400
and Galeazzo Ciano: L'Europa verso la Catastrofe (Milan, 1948) pp.
373-378 (English translation in Ciano's Diplomatic Papers (London,
1948) pp 242-246). See also volume IV of this Series, document
No 421, for the letter of January 2, 1939, from Ciano to Ribbentrop
announcing Mussolini's withdrawal of his reservation on Ribbentrop's ■
plan to transform the Anti-Comintern Pact into a pact of military aid.
(c) Draft of Tripartite Pact of Alliance agreed to between Ribbentrop
and Oshima, and transmitted by Attolico to Ciano in a personal letter
on January 6, 1939 (Toscano, op. cit., pp. 52-56; an English translation
of the letter and Secret Protocol is printed in Documents on Inter-
national Affairs, op. cit., pp. 152-155).

The Japanese reply to this draft arrived in Berlin on February 1,
1939, accepting in principle but requesting that modification of details
of the draft should be discussed in Berlin, after the arrival of a special
commission composed of members of the Japanese Foreign and Navy ;
Ministries (Attolico telegram No. 53 of February 2, 1939, cited in .
Toscano, op. cit., p. 60). _ :

This commission, consisting of Consul General Ito, ot the foreign

Ministry, Lt. Col. Tatsumi, of the General Staff, and Rear Admiral Abe, ;

of the Navy Ministry, arrived in Berlin, via Rome, at the end of ;

February 1939. (See document No. 254, also volume IV of this Series, ;

document No. 547.) For the activities of this commission the following ■:

sources in the documents of the International Military Tribunal, Far

East (hereinafter cited as IMT FE) may be consulted. Evidence of^

General Kawabe, Japanese Military Attache, Berlin, October 1938- ;:

February 1940 (IMT FE Transcript of Proceedings on November 21, a

1947 pp. 33760 ff.), interrogation record on Hiroshi Oshima, Japanese )

Military Attache, Berlin, 1934-38, Japanese Ambassador, Bering

October 1938-October 1939 (IMT FE document 2156 D, pp. 7-11),

Affidavit of Oshima (IMT FE Defence document 2862, Exhibit No.

3508), Affidavit of Uzuhiko Usami, Counsellor to Japanese Embassy,

Berlin, November 1938-May 1940 (IMT FE Defence document 2630-

Exhibit No. 3494). According to the Affidavit by Usami, the Ito'|

commission brought with them a fourth draft, of which he gives a|

paraphrase. The purpose of the commission was, according to Oshima^

MAKCH, 1939 83

(IMT FE document 2156 D, Interrogation of Oshima, pp. 10-11), to
instruct Oshima and Shiratori, Japanese Ambassador in Rome, in the
views of the Japanese Government, and not to negotiate directly (see
also volume IV of this Series, document No. 547). Lt. Col. Tatsumi
however, seems to have had contact with Ribbentrop (Attolico report
No. 1864 of April 4, 1939, cited in Toscano, op. tit., p. 72), but no
evidence of this has been found in the. German Foreign Ministry

No. 71


The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy

in the United States


No. 94 of March 23 Berlin, March 23, 1939?9:30 p.m.

W Villa 601 II.
With reference to your telegrams Nos. 89 l and 95.2
I. In accordance with the ordinance of the Minister of the Interior
of March 21 , 2 based on article 13 of the Fiihrer's decree of March 16,3
the existing Czecho -Slovak customs duties in the Protectorate of Bohe-
mia and Moravia, and the existing customs frontier between the Reich
and the Protectorate, will remain in operation until further notice.
; The date on which the incorporation of the Protectorate in the German
customs area will take place, as envisaged in article 9 of the decree, will
- be determined later.

Under this ordinance the principles and agreements by which econo-
mic relations have been carried on up to the present between Czecho-
; Slovakia and thu-d States will, for the time being, continue to be
.applied accordingly to economic relations between the Protectorate
I and third countries, not only in respect of customs duties but in
| general, in as far as such countries are prepared to reciprocate. 4
| Thus the American Treasury order of March 18, suspending most-
| favoured treatment for products from Bohemia and Moravia, does not
" take account of actual conditions.

?,V l Not printed (350/202306). On Mar. 17, Thomsen telegraphed that the Treasury had
|.≫Bnounced that, as from Mar. 18, most-favoured-nation treatment would be withdrawn

J&om Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia.

|v s Sot printed (350/202259); in this telegram of Mar.. 20, Thomson sent the text of the

fiStete Department s .Note in answer to the German Note of Mar. 17. See also docu-

EfflBBt No. 14.
Si', s See vol. iv of this Series, document No. 246.

I'* Telegrams of instructions on a similar declaration to be made by German Missions
|≫ccredited to Governments having trade relations with Czecho-Slovakia, were despatched
loaMar. 22 (not printed, 8467/E595885-86 and 8S8-905); excluding Washington and
KMoscow where special circumstances prevailed, according to information supplied by
Ipaodius on Mar. 23 to certain Reich Ministries (not printed, 8467/E59588'7). The
jpocument here printed is the telegram sent to Washington, but no record of any similar
BiCoBimunication to Moscow has been found.


Please inform the [American] Government of ^e above eit her
orally or in writing, without requesting a reply, so that we shall not
be exposed to another refusal, especially after what occurred at the
tune of the reunion with Austria.a Should the American Government
themselves declare their readiness to rescind the order of ^March
American imports will be dealt with as heretofore, until the Protec-
torate is finally incorporated in the German customs territory or other
agreements concluded with the American Government.

Please report by telegram on the execution of your ddmarche and,
if pertinent, how it is received.
II. For information only.

(a) We shall wait for about another week for a possible declaration
of such readiness, and then, if nothing happens, we shall ourselves put
new arrangements into effect and, in particular, shall no longer provide
foreign exchange for American imports to the Protectorate, winch
WO uld practically amount to a complete stoppage of imports.

(61 Suspension of most-favoured nation treatment for Slovak goods
is completely unjustified, as Slovakia is an independent State which has
not even a customs or currency union with Germany We leave it to
the Slovak Government to make representations on this matter. Un
the other hand, there are no objections to drawing attention to the
facts of the case in conversation.

6 On Apr. 6, 1938, in a letter to the Secret at y ^^^^^^ZSyt

No. 72


The Charge d' Affaires in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry


No. 63 of March 23 Ankara, March 23, 1939-10:38 p.m.

Received March 24?5:00 a,m.g
Pol. VII 503. |

With reference to your telegram No. 50 of March 21. 1 M

Saracoglu, the Foreign Minister, has confirmed to me that the *rencfc|
Ambassador here had initially proposed, in the form of a personal|

l Document No. 09. '.'

MARCH, 1939 85

suggestion, conversations concerning the union of Hatay with Turkey,
and that such conversations had even begun. In this connection, the
French had suggested as advantageous the conclusion, in place of the
Turco-French agreement signed at the time of the Hatay settlement
guaranteeing territorial inviolability in the Hatay area, of a similar
treaty of assistance guaranteeing the new Tureo -Syrian frontier as
constituted heretofore by Hatay. Conversations had not yet progressed
very far and their outcome was uncertain. In accordance with de-
clarations repeatedly made to us, Turkey continued to decline the
conclusion of a general treaty of assistance with any Great Power
whatsoever. I have expressed in all seriousness to the Foreign Minister
the confident expectation of the Reich Government that Turkey will
■ continue to pursue also in the future a policy of the strictest neutrality
towards the Great Powers and will outwardly avoid even the semblance
of a different attitude.


No. 73


The Foreign Minister to the. Embassy in Poland
Draft Telegram 1

No. Berlin, March. . ., 1939.

Tor Ambassador personally.

Now that M. Lipski, in accordance with my proposal, has left last
night for Warsaw to report orally, please request an interview with M.
Beck at once, to put before him again for your part also, in earnest and
emphatic terms, our attitude to the present state and future develop-
ment of German-Polish relations, and to do this in my name and on the
lines of my conversation of March 21 with M. Lipski 2 with which you
: are abeady acquainted. In doing so please lay particular emphasis on
the following points:

1) The Fiihrer considers it of decisive importance that the Danzig

H question should be solved soon. The development of the general

B political situation as well as the development of conditions in Danzig

! itself demand a speedy settlement. We are convinced that a further

l Marginal note: "Draft. Cancelled, by order of the Fiihrer." This draft is undated,
forat evidently relates to Mar. 23 as appears from a note by Weizsacker of Mar. 24
BJ97/108S11) which reads as follows! "On the evening of March 23 I asked Ambassador
bvod Moltke by telephone provisionally to request an interview with Minister Beck.
pfairvonMoltke would probably receive detailed instructions in the course of the follow,
ffigday (March 24). These would be along the lines of the conversation held on March 21,
Sletween the Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassador Lipski, and in consequence of
jptluch Lipski is at present in Warsaw."

* See document No. 61.


postponement of the question might very easily lead to a situation
which -would render at least difficult if not impossible a friendly settle-
ment on the lines of the far-reaching development and intensification of
German-Polish relations desired by us.

2) The basic principles of a settlement of the Danzig question en-
visaged by us have .been repeatedly stated to the Polish Government
by the Fiihrer as well as by me: Return of Danzig to the Reich, extra-
territorial rail and road communications between East Prussia and the
Reich, also linking up Danzig; in return, a binding recognition for
25 years, to be laid down by treaty, of the Polish Corridor and the whole
of Poland's western frontier. In addition, insofar as the reincorpora-
tion of Danzig into the Reich causes economic or technical transport
difficulties for Poland, in spite of the development of Gdynia, we are
prepared to treat these with consideration.

3) Our quid pro quo for Danzig, however, would not be limited to these
concrete promises but beyond this, after the removal of this obstacle,
it would lie in the really great possibilities of a common German-Polish
policy. The strengthening of Germany would then react in full measure
in favour of Poland's international position, as there would no longer
be any rivalry or conflicting interests between the two countries. Above
all Germany could then pursue a common Eastern policy with Poland
in which the identical interests of both countries in warding off Bol-
shevism could also effectively be realized. We are also prepared, as we
have already proved in the treatment of Carpatho -Ukraine, to concede
to Poland the leading role in the future development of the whole
Ukraine problem.

4) Our future attitude to Slovakia is also to be judged from the same
standpoint. After the proclamation of the Protectorate of Bohemia
and Moravia, the Fiihrer could not simply ignore the appeal for protec-
tion addressed to him by Slovakia. Following the assurance of German
protection we had now also concluded a concrete Treaty with Slovakia, 3
as it would have been impossible just to leave in suspense Germany's
relationship with this remaining element of the former Czecho -Slovakia.
Such a vacuum on the eastern frontier of the Reich would have been
intolerable for us. It is obvious, however, that the treaty concluded
with Slovakia allows of extremely wide scope 'in the extent to which
it takes effect. The measure of this effectiveness will naturally be
governed primarily by the future development of Germany's relation-
ship to Poland. If this development is in accordance with our wishes,
the possibility of a common treatment of the Slovak problem by
Germany, Poland and Hungary would also be opened up.

5) In weighing up correctly all these points of view it would be com-
pletely erroneous to say that by the reincorporation of Danzig into the

3 See document No. 40.

MARCH, 1930 87

Reich, Poland was exchanging something really concrete for merely-
abstract or vague assurances. The Polish. Government could certainly
be in no doubt that, however the separate policies of both Govern-
ments developed, Danzig could in no case be permanently prevented
from reunion with the Reich. Poland should therefore not commit the
serious mistake of clinging obstinately to a position which in the long
run must prove untenable. Now that we had already repeatedly
offered the Polish Government a solution on the above-mentioned basis,
without receiving any positive response, we naturally could not repeat
this offer ad infinitum. Indeed, if the Polish Government still adopt
a purely passive or evasive attitude, the Fiihrer is resolved to withdraw
his offer once and for all, as we could only interpret such an attitude on
the part of Poland as a direct rejection of our intentions and as an
attitude directed in principle against the Third Reich.

6) I therefore once again urgently request M. Beck through you to pay
a visit to Berlin in the near future to discuss very thoroughly and frankly,
first with me and then also with the Fiihrer himself, all these political
questions. The Fiihrer, as well as I personally, would greatly welcome
it if in this way we might succeed in bringing German-Polish relations
out of the now clearly increasing stagnation into a fruitful course.
This would be quite in keeping with the broad lines of the Fuhrer's
policy and he would only allow himself to be dissuaded from such a
positive formulation of the relationship to Poland, if, to his own regret,
he became convinced that Poland did not wish to heed his intentions
but to follow other paths.

Please report at once in detail by telegram on the result of your
conversation witn M. Beck. I may then decide to summon you to
Berlin to give an oral report.


No. 74

The Consul General at Danzig to the Foreign Ministry

No. 454 Danzig, March 23, 1939.

Received March 25.
Pol. V 2704.
Subject: Danzig Diet.

ha the course of a recent conversation between Greiser, the President
|; of the Senate, and Minister Chodacki, the Polish diplomatic representa-
tive, the question of the new elections for the Danzig Diet was also raised.

In this connection, and following consultation with Foreign Minister
: !Beck, Minister Chodacki gave the view of the Polish Government,
1; which was that the Polish Government were not interested in whether


an election for the Diet took place or whether and in what way the
term of office of the present Diet was extended. On the basis of this
statement, Greiser, the President of the Senate, informed Minister
Chodacki that, by virtue of the Enabling Act, the Senate proposed to
prolong the present term of the Diet by a Senate ordinance until

further notice. 1 -

1 have the honour to transmit in the annex 2 a minute ot the con-
versation which was placed at my disposal.


i On Mar 24 Janson reported that the Senate had, on Mar. 21, issued an ordinance for
the prolongation of the existing Diet's term of office for a further period of four years
(not printed, 2389/499882). , vr.i-

2 Not printed (2389/499881). The conversation took place on Mar. 1 1.

No. 75


The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

No A538 Moscow, March 23, 1939.

Pol. II 917.

Subject: Official Soviet communique on the Soviet proposal for a

With reference to my report No. A506 of March 20 l and telegram
No. 37 of March 22.2

1 enclose a translation of the communique by the Soviet Government
published on March 22 concerning the Soviet proposal for a conference
of representatives of Great Britain, France, Rumania, Poland, Turkey

and the Soviet Union. 3

Count von der Schulenburg

i Document No. 50. , .

2 Not printed (258/169445). This telegram replied to the enquiry contained m docu-
ment No 58 by referring briefly to the Soviet communique transmitted in full in the
document here printed on the subject of the British enquiry and the Soviet reply.

a See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, Nos. 461 and 462.


Tass Communique Published in the Moscow Press on
March 22, 1939

Pol. II 917.

The foreign press is circulating rumours to the effect that the Soviet
Government recently offered Poland and Rumania their assistance in
the event of their becoming the victims of aggression. Tass is autho-
rized to state that this does not correspond to the facts. Neither
Poland nor Rumania has approached the Soviet Government for assis-

MARCH, 193A 39

tance or informed the Soviet Government of any danger threatening
them. Correct is only that the British Government notified the Soviet
Government on the 18th of this month that there were serious reasons
for fearing an act of aggression against Rumania, and enquired as to
the possible attitude of the Soviet Government to such an eventuality.
In reply to this enquiry, the Soviet Government proposed that a con-
ference be called of representatives from the States most interested,
that is, Great Britain, France, Rumania, Poland, Turkey and the Soviet
Union. Such a conference would, in the opinion of the Soviet Govern-
ment, offer the greatest possibility of clarifying the actual situation and
the attitude of all participants of the conference. The British Govern-
ment, however, considered this proposal premature.

No. 76


Minute by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

Berlin, March 23, 1939.

The Foreign Minister, in the course of a telephone conversation today,
drew the attention of the Hungarian Minister to reports that the
Hungarians had advanced from Kosice to Presov and had already
encircled Michalovce in eastern Slovakia. The Reich Foreign Minister
further pointed out to the Hungarian Minister that such action could
in no way be approved. The Hungarian Minister emphatically denied
that any action had been undertaken from Kosice and stated that,
according to his information, Hungarian troops had merely occupied
such territory which they claimed ? as discussed with us l ? as a frontier
rectification against Slovakia.

The Hungarian Minister promised to obtain information in Budapest.


l In a memorandum of Mar. 17 (not printed, 350/202329), Woermann recorded that

Gen. von Tippelskireh had told Weizsacker that the boundary line west of Ungvar as

drawn on the map by the Hungarians went further than was justified by military re-

■ quirementa. Woermann had telephoned to the Hungarian Minister, Sztoiay askins

that military operations should not extend further west.

No. 77


fl Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 261 Berlin, March 23, 1939.

The Hungarian Minister 1 today mentioned to me a request made to
|^him by the Reich Foreign Minister about sparing the somewhat

1 DSme Sztujay,


radically minded Sitzleute [sic] 2 . The Hungarian Government should
not deny transit rights through the Carpatho-Ukraine to the people of
this category who had connections with Admiral Canaris.

The Minister added that he had taken the necessary steps in this
matter in Budapest.


2 Evidently the Sic, the armed and uniformed Ukrainian nationalist organization in
Ruthenia. See also vol. iv of this Series, documents Kos. 210 and 215. In telegram
No. 40 from Chust of Mar. 14 (not printed, 2381/499056-57), Hofmann, who was in
charge of the German Consulate there, had reported clashes between the Czech gendar-
merie and the Sid, and transmitted a further appeal to the Reich from Volosin for pro-
tection against the invading Hungarians. In a subsequent telegram, No. 48 of Mar. 16
(not printed, 1969/437937), Hofmann reported that the Hungarians had suffered con-
siderable losses in fighting against the Sid. See also Editors' Note below.

[Editors' Note. Evidence in the German Foreign Ministry archives
indicates that the official German attitude towards the Sic and towards
the Carpatho-Ukraine question generally had been extremely reserved.
In response to enquiries from the Czecho -Slovak Government in
February, 1939, as to German views on the Carpatho-Ukraine, reported
by the Prague Legation under A III 2.h.5 of February 16 (not printed,
2381/499099-100), Altenburg had recommended in a minute of Feb-
ruary 22 (not printed, 2381/499105) that the Carpatho-Ukraine question
be not discussed with Prague, at least for the present. In a minute of
March 7 (not printed, 2381/499115-16), on a conversation on that date
with Oldofredi, leader of the Volksdeutsche, who referred to statements
by State Secretary Keppler that Germany would not tolerate injustice
towards the Carpatho-Ukraine by Prague, Altenburg recorded that he
had made it clear that the Reich was not to be committed to active
support. Following reports, in telegram No. 28 of March 7 from Chust
(not printed, 2381/4991 10), of disagreements between the central
Government in Prague and the Volosin Government in Chust, Weiz-
sacker had instructed the German Consulate there (in telegram No. 13
of March 8, not printed, 2381/499111) to avoid any political conversa-
tions with Volosin or other personages. On receipt of the message from
the Carpatho-Ukraine Government declaring their independence under
German protection, transmitted in Chust telegram No. 37 of March 14
(printed in volume IV of this Series, document No. 210), Altenburg
minuted on March 14 (7587/E543255): "Herr Hewel, obtaining in-
structions from the Reich Foreign Minister, telephoned that no action
is to be taken [on this telegram], " Hungarian forces began marching
into the Carpatho-Ukraine on March 15 (see volume IV of this Series,
documents Nos. 236 jf.) On March 22 Ribbentrop sent Csaky a tele-
gram of congratulation on the reunion of the Carpatho-Ukraine with
Hungary (not printed, 1969/437963}.]

MARCH, 1939 Q\

No. 78

2104/455770-75; 764-69

German- Rumanian Economic Treaty

for the Promotion op Economic Relations Between
the German Reich and the Kingdom of Rumania i
The German Reich and the Kingdom of Rumania, desirous of in-
tensifying the constantly expanding economic relations between the
two countries and of cooperating in their mutual interests on a broad
and planned basis in the economic field, have in pursuance of their
peaceful aims agreed to conclude a treaty to this effect.

For this purpose there have been nominated as their plenipoten-
by the Chancellor of the German Reich :

the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in
Bucharest, Dr. Wilhelm Fabricius,

and the Ministerialdirektor to the Commissioner for the Four
Year Plan, Herr Helmuth Wohlthat,
by His Majesty the King of Rumania:

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Grigore Gafencu,
and the Minister of Economics, M. loan E. Bujoiu,
who having examined their powers and found them in good and proper
form have agreed on the following:

Article I
An economic plan providing for cooperation for several years between
: the contracting parties will be drawn up to supplement the existing
German-Rumanian economic relations under which the balance of
mutual trade shall be maintained in principle.

The economic plan shall take into account on the one hand German

import requirements and on the other hand development possibilities

, for Rumanian production and Rumanian domestic requirements as

well as the necessity for Rumania to maintain economic relations with

other countries.

| The economic plan shall include in particular:

la. The development and direction of Rumanian agricultural pro-
duction. After a previous exchange of information by the depart-
ments concerned on both sides a start will be made both on the
cultivation of new agricultural products and an increase in those

. l The text of this Treaty, but not the confidential Protocol of Signature, was published
|vm BiutegutlzUatt, 1939, Part II, pp. 779-781. For Wohlthat's account of the negotia-
| tons which led to the conclusion of the Treaty, see vol. v of this Series, document No
W>- 306, and this volume, document No. 131.


already cultivated, in particular, feeding stuffs, oil seeds and fibrous
6. The development of existing and the starting of fresh agricultural
industries and processing concerns.

2a. The development of the Rumanian timber trade and forestry.
b. The establishment of timber trade concerns and industries in so
far as this appears necessary in view of 2a.

3a. The delivery of machinery and installations for mining in
b. The formation of mixed German-Rumanian companies for pros-
pecting and exploiting copper pyrites in the Dobruja, chromium in
the Banat, manganese ores in the neighbourhood of Vatra Dornei-
Brosteni. Likewise, the possibility will be studied of utilizing
bauxite deposits and, if need be, of developing an aluminium

4. The formation of a mixed German-Rumanian company, the object
of which shall be to prospect for petroleum and carry out a programme
of boring and refining.

5. Cooperation in the industrial field.

6. The establishment of free zones in which industrial and com-
mercial undertakings may be formed, and the provision of storage and
transshipment facilities for German shipping in these free zones.

7. The delivery of war material and equipment for the Rumanian
Army, Navy and Air Force and the armaments industry.

8. The development of the communications and transport systems,
the network of roads and waterways.

9. The setting-up of publicly owned undertakings.

10. Collaboration between German and Rumanian banks in the
interest of both countries and especially with a view to financing
individual projects.

Article II
The Government Committees, set up under Article 32 of the Treaty of
March 23, 1935 2 between the German Reich and the Kingdom of
Rumania, relating to Establishment, Commerce and Navigation, will
be entrusted with the execution of this Treaty.

Article III
The Government Committees will as occasion arises inform one
another of their intentions which come within the meaning of this
Treaty. They will decide regarding the execution of individual projects.
The two Governments will afford the necessary assistance to economic
organizations and firms engaged in the preparatory work on and the
carrying out of the projects specified in Article I and will, by granting

2 For the text of this treaty see Reicksgesetzblatt, 1935, Part II, pp. 311-338.

MARCH, 1939 93

such licences as are required by law, facilitate the execution of the
projects approved by the Government Committees.

Article IV
The payments to be made by Germany to Rumania and vice versa
consequent on the implementation of this Treaty will be effected in
accordance with the regulations generally in force for German-Rumanian
payments. The Government Committees may agree that a percentage
of the proceeds of those deliveries of goods provided for in Article I
Nos. 7-9, or other such deliveries be used for capital investment and
financing the projects specified in Article I.

Article V

This Treaty shall be ratified. It will come into force one month after
the instruments of ratification have been exchanged, which shall be
done in Berlin as soon as possible. The contracting parties will apply
the treaty provisionally as from the day of signature.

This Treaty shall remain in force until March 31,1944. Should it not
be denounced a year before this date, it shall be regarded as having
been extended for an unspecified period. It may then be denounced
at any time subject to one year's notice at the end of any calendar

Done in duplicate at Bucharest in the German and Rumanian lan-
guages, both texts having equal authenticity, on March 23, 1939.


Helmuth Wohlthat I. e. Bujoiu


Protocol of Signature
to the Treaty for the Promotion of Economic Relations


■ On signature of the Treaty for the Promotion of Economic Relations
I between the German Reich and the Kingdom of Rumania of March
1 23rd, 1939, the concurrence of the Contracting Parties on the inter-
| pretation and implementation of the agreements reached has been
i. placed on record in respect of the following points:

I With reference to Article I, Section 1.

|; Desirous of developing Rumania's agriculture, the German Govern-
|ment are agreeable to the necessary experts being placed at the disposal
|pf the Rumanian authorities. They will, furthermore, promote the

reapply of the necessary machinery and plant by German firms.

j}; The Royal Rumanian Government will set up suitable organizations


for promoting the production and processing of agricultural produce
and, as far as may appear necessary, will facilitate the establishment of
mixed German-Rumanian companies to deal with the conclusion of
cultivation contracts, to engage in trading in, and the processing of,
agricultural produce and to arrange for the financing thereof.

With reference to Article I, Section 2.

The German-Rumanian timber and forestry committee will, over a
period of years, make a survey of the quantities of coniferous and
beech sawn timber, coniferous logs and coniferous wood pulp available
in Rumania for export to Germany and will agree upon the grading of
each type. They will submit to the Government Committees proposals
for the exploitation of forests and for reafforestation. The Government .
Committees will, as and when necessary, decide upon the despatch of
timber and forestry experts.

With reference to Article I, Section 4.

As soon as data are available, the projected German-Rumanian
company will draw up a minimum programme of boring and, where
advisable, of refining, to be approved by the Royal Rumanian Govern-
ment. The Royal Rumanian Government will take the necessary
steps to facilitate the execution of a large scale petroleum pro-

With reference to Article I, Section 5.

In order to facilitate cooperation between German and Rumanian
industry, a mixed industrial sub-committee of the Government Com-
mittees will be formed which will submit the requisite proposals to the
Government Committees.

With reference to Article I, Section 6.

The Royal Rumanian Government agree to the formation in the '
Tree Zone, of mixed German-Rumanian companies which will engage
in manufacture and export. The Government Committees will take
decisions from case to case on the setting up and the details of the
technical organizations, the equipping, financing and so on.

With reference to Article I, Sections 7-9.

The total commercial credit will be in the order of about 200-250
million RM.

With reference to Article I, Section 8.

German supplies are contemplated inter alia for the Rumanian tele-
communications network, the Rumanian railways, merchant shipping.
and civil aviation in as far as Rumanian requirements cannot be met;
by Rumanian industry.

MAECH, 1939 95

With reference to Article, I, Section 9.

Orders for public monopolies also come under this provision. The
construction of electrical, gas and water works, of hospitals, fire stations,
abattoirs and cold storage is contemplated inter alia.

With reference to Article I, Section 10.

The Royal Rumanian Government will permit German banks to
have an interest in Rumanian banking institutions.

In order to promote the development of Rumanian production as
envisaged by the agreements reached, the German Government will
encourage German banks to afford German suppliers adequate support
to enable them to grant commercial credits for investments, economic-
ally sound or approved by the Government Committees.

With reference to Article II.

The terms of reference of the Government Committees shall be to
achieve the uniform, orderly and central implementation of the Treaty.

The Government Committees are to ensure that the programme of
deliveries and purchases contemplated under this Treaty does not
disturb the balance of payments and that any considerable fluctuations
which may occur may be rectified by measures in the field of commodity
exchange or, should this provide no relief, by suitable financial

The Rumanian Government Committee will submit proposals for the
representation of German firms in Rumania to the German Govern-
ment Committee from case to case.

With reference to Article III.

With regard to the grant of residence permits, express reference is
made to Article I, paragraph 3, of the Treaty of Establishment, Com-
merce and Navigation of March 23, 1935, between the German' Reich
and the Kingdom of Rumania. 2

Wtih reference to Article I V.

The present rule that goods paid for under the German -Rumanian
Gearing Agreement are for consumption within the Customs Territory
of either country and not for export to third countries also holds good
for transactions effected under the present Treaty.

In the execution of the projects to be approved under the present
; Treaty, care must be taken to ensure that financial measures (invest-
j;ments, credits) are kept within limits which do not disturb the course
|f of commodity exchange.

H TPiiA reference to Article V.

||;., Both Governments will treat the Protocol of Signature as confidential

ijand will, without prior consultation, neither publish details therefrom

For the text of this Treaty see Seic}isgesUzblatt, 1935 Part II, pp. 311-338.


nor bring them to the knowledge of third Governments or persons or
firms whom they do not concern.

Done in duplicate at Bucharest in the German and Rumanian
languages, both texts having equal authenticity, on March 23, 1939.


Helmuts; Wohlthat I. E. Bujonx

No. 79


The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry


No. 44 of March 23 Warsaw, March 24, 1939 ? 3:30 a.m.

Received March 24 ? 8:10 a.m.
Pol. II 905.

With reference to your telegram No. 65 of March 21. x

Upon investigation here it has been established that in regard to the
British demarches two separate moves were involved.

Concerning the Polish attitude towards the demarche about the
threat to Rumania, a remark passed by Under State Secretary Arci-
szewski to some diplomats here is of interest. Coupled with disparaging
remarks about Britain and France, who always want to misuse Poland
for extraneous ends without incurring any risk to themselves, he de-
clared that Poland would at all times take up arms in her own interests
and would wage even a hopeless struggle, but never would she fight
merely in the interests of other Powers. One would probably not go
far wrong in assuming that the reply to the British demarche on the
Rumanian question was given somewhat along these lines.

It has not been possible so far to learn anything definite regarding
the other British suggestions, in connection with which the British
Ambassador 2 has paid repeated visits to the Polish Foreign Ministry.
From the general trend of Beck's policy it is, however, safe to assume
that Poland ? emulating her attitude in the question of the Comintern
Pact ? would be prepared only with reluctance to join any combination,
or allow herself to become involved in moves which would force her to
declare her position prematurely and openly. That of course does not
imply that Poland would not act if, in the course of these negotiations,
the opportunity were to occur of obtaining definite British assurances
which would increase her security in the event of a German attack.
Beck, however, would decide to associate himself with an overt move,
only if he were forced to do so by the increasingly noticeable wave of

i Document No. 5S, which was sent to Warsaw as telegram No. C5.
2 Sir Howard Kennard.

MARCH, 1930 97

nationalism which threatens his position. Meanwhile, the arrest of the
prominent editor, Mackiewicz.s who although an adherent of Pilsudski
is a bitter opponent of Beck, might be an indication that the Foreign
Minister's position is still strong. e

Agitation among the Polish population has increased considerably
since the return of Memel to the Reich.* The main reason for this is
that it is generally feared that now it will be the turn of Danzig and the
Corridor. The Government appear to assess the Memel question with
considerably greater calm. Under State Secretary Arciszewski it is
true, spoke to me of a "very unpleasant surprise", but remarked in
passing that it was essentially a concern of the signatory Powers Still
the call-up of reservists, which has been observed in isolated cases for
some days, but which has been intensified since yesterday, shows that
the Government consider it advisable to make it known abroad but
particularly at home, that Poland will not submit to any interference
with her vital interests. 5


3 Editor of Stovoo.

* See Editors' Note on p. 80.

6 Marginal note: "Settled by Pol. II 906 [see document No. 83]. R[intelen]. 25/3."

No. 80


The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram (by courier)

No. 122 of March 24 Bucharest, March 24, 1939.1

Received March 27 ? 2:35 p.m.
Pol. II 944.
With reference to your telegram No. 95 of March 21 (Pol. II 798) 2
I. Foreign Minister Gafencu had already informed me of Minister
Tilea's attitude as described by telegram from London. It seemed to
me unbelievable, as up to now Tilea has always been loyal to us here
and, although President of the Anglo -Rumanian Cultural Association,'
he was considered to be pro -German from conviction.

The Foreign Minister explains his attitude as due to excessive zeal
in following his own economic policy. But this should not have de-
viated from the economic policy of the Government. For this reason

. . 1 The hour of despatch is not recorded

■f *Not p^ted (5453/E366628). This telegram repeated to Bucharest the text of

' &SST& N -°' 4 t a £ d ^ teIegra j n 2°- 60 of Mar " 19 from Budapest (not printed, 2767/
S f 5826-27) in which Erdmannsdorff reported that he had been told in strict confidence
w - bjr CsAky that the Hungarian Minister in London had been asked by Sir Orme Sargent
y (Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office) what would be the Him-
>v ganan attitude m the event of a German attack on Rumania
* 7



Tilea had been recalled. It would be decided here whether he would
return to London at all.

II. The Foreign Minister re -affirmed to me that he had requested
the British not to come here for the discussion of concrete business until
the German-Rumanian negotiations were concluded. He complained
of the enormous pressure which up to the last moment had been exerted
on the Government from abroad, in order to prevent the conclusion of
the Wohlthat Treaty. 3 For example, the British Minister* had called
on him concerning an alleged German economic ultimatum which he
had denied. The Minister again called because his denial was not
believed in London. Gafencu without further ado then took the
Minister to the King, who repeated this to him and explained to him
what was being negotiated with Germany.

III. Gafencu also complained of the incredible rumours which had
been circulated in order to overthrow him.

IV. There is nothing to report regarding the alleged suggestion by
King Carol for an exchange of views on the guarantee of Rumania's

frontiers by the Western Powers.


s i.e., the Treaty printed as document No. 78.

* Sir Reginald See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, No. 443.

No. 81


The Charge d' Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry


No. 39 of March 24 Moscow, March 24, 1939?8:24 p.m.

Received March 24 ? 9:5 p.m.
Pol. II 922.

With reference to your telegram No. 44 (Pol. II 825) of March 21.i
Hudson arrived yesterday. In the afternoon he visited Litvinov and
Potemkin and also had a discussion with Mikoyan. I had an oppor-
tunity of speaking to Hudson and Ashton-Gwatkin afterwards at a I
reception by the British Commercial Attache 2 here, and learned that
Hudson only intends to conduct preliminary trade discussions here.
If the results are favourable the negotiations proper would take place . |

i Not printed (2770/536808). This telegram contained an enquiry, based on a report
from Helsinki, and addressed to the Embassies at Moscow and London, as to whether it
was true that Hudson was empowered to invito Litvinov to London, In telegram ;
No. 86 of Mar. 23 from London (not printed, 2770/536809), Kordt replied that nothing ,|
was known of this. It was, however, thought that Litvinov had himself offered to come. |
to London in connection with the Russian proposal for a conference.

2 Frank Todd, Commercial Secretary at the British Embassy.

MAEOH, 1939 Qg

in London with a Soviet delegation, preferably led by Mikoyan. Mean-
while, nothing can be ascertained regarding the alleged invitation for
Litvinov to go to London. I leave it to you to inform Helsinki in
accordance with telegram quoted.


No. 82


The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

No. 79 of March 24 Budapest, March 24, 1939?1 1 : 10 p.m.

Received March 25?4:10 a.m.
Pol. IV 2109.
The Foreign Minister informed me that he would receive the Ru-
manian Minister i tomorrow and make the following statement to him:
In the event of the Minister being able to declare officially that Rumania
would commence demobilization within 24 hours, the Hungarian
Government would immediately rescind the measures adopted for the
defence of Budapest and would reduce the 6th Army Corps in Debreczen
to peace strength.


i Raoul Bossy.

No. 83


Circular of the State Secretary i
immediate Berlin, March 24, 1939.

zu Pol. II 906. 2

Reports so far to hand here on progress and results of diplomatic

faction by the British Government towards the formation of a united

% faint against Germany 3 give the following picture:

f On March 18 the British Government approached a large number of

!■ foreign Governments to find out their attitude towards the German

|| action, as well as to the? according to Britain? supposedly imminent

g .'.: 1 Addressees were all Missions in. Europe (excepting those at San Sebastian Tallinn

|Riga,Kovno and Luxembourg), the Embassy at Washington and the Consulates General

g'at Ottawa and oydney.

It: ■' Not printed (7492/E540482). In this telegram, No. 16 of Mar. 23 from Oslo, Sahm

Ereported that no British or French approach had been made to Norway.

W- .' See document No. 58.


German attack on Rumania. This enquiry was made by Britain,
partly as a mere ballon d'essai, partly in more precise form, apart from
Paris, in Warsaw, Moscow, the Balkans, Hungary, and also Portugal.
In Europe, the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands,
Belgium and Switzerland were not asked. Furthermore, Britain had
circulated this enquiry to the Dominions. The result of this move was
obviously only moderately satisfactory, as the majority of the Govern-
ments asked apparently replied in the negative or evasively, and even
the Dominions did not show any inclination to be drawn into a
European conflict so long as Britain herself was not attacked. Moscow
replied with the counter proposal to call a conference. 4

In view of this result, London turned to closer consideration of the
idea of a joint declaration by Britain, France, Russia and Poland, 6
whereby these Powers were to enter into consultation regarding
joint resistance in the event of a renewed threat by Germany.
This proposal, however, encountered strong suspicion in Warsaw,
whilst Moscow, according to an unconfirmed Reuter report, is said to
have assented. Poland obviously fears to appear openly in an anti-
German combination by associating herself with the declaration, the
consequences of which she would be the first to have to take in any
given case, without having thereby obtained reliable guarantees for her
security. Moreover, Poland would look on Russia as a dubious

These difficulties appear then to have led London to consider falling
back on the Russian proposal for a conference. Furthermore, according
to information as yet not fully confirmed, a dual declaration is now
contemplated in London: first, a guarantee to Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and Switzerland by France and Britain, and secondly, a declara-
tion for the protection of the eastern European countries against
German attack. This much, however, may be taken for certain, that
in comparison with the initial announcement in the London and Paris
press, the final result of the British action will prove to be very meagre.
Moreover, this action mainly denotes a wooing of Moscow by Britain,
through which she makes herself less attractive to other countries and
repeats the French mistake of 1935. 7 This aspect of the matter is
especially to be emphasized in conversations.

Should essential additions or corrections to this picture be established
by you, please report by telegram. 8


1 See document No. 75.

6 See British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, No. 446.

6 In telegrams No. 85 of Mar. 22 {not printed, 1625/388387) and No. 90 of Mar, 23 (not
printed, 1625/388389-90), Kordt had sent similar information from London.

7 i.e., the Franco-Bussian Pact of Mutual Assistance, which ■was signed on May 2,

8 Marginal note: "Supplement for Berne, Brussels, The Hague: Further instructions
reserved. Weizsacker."

MARCH, 1939 101

No. 84


The Charge, d' Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry


No. 186 of March 24 Paris, March 24, 1939. 1

Received March 25 ? 12:30 a.m.
Pol. II 920.
A considerable section of the Paris press publishes reports which in
the main agree that on the occasion of the French President's visit to
London, Chamberlain, Halifax and Bonnet had signed a protocol or
exchanged aide-mimoires in which France and Britain undertook, in
the event of an attack on Holland or Switzerland, automatically to
render armed assistance to these countries and to defend their frontiers. 2
The agreement thus concluded confirmed the oral arrangement said to
have been reached on January 29 in Paris between Bonnet and the
British Ambassador here. 3 The obligations thus assumed are the same
or similar to those existing vis-a-vis Belgium. As regards the January
agreements, V Europe Nouvelle reports in its issue of March 18
(p. 301) that Britain had desired commitments over Holland, and
France over Switzerland.


1 The hour of despatch is not recorded.

2 The French President and Mme. Lebrun, accompanied by the Foreign Minister, M,
Bonnet, paid a state visit to Britain on Mar. 21?24, during which time a series of informal
talks took place. For an account of these conversations, see British Documents, Third
Series, vol. iv, Nos. 458, 484 and 507.

3 Sir Eric Phipps. See also ibid,, Nos. 40, 50, 51 and 52.

No. 85


Memorandum by an Official of Political Division V

immediate Berlin, March 24, 1939.

Pol. V 2677.
Consul General von Janson, Danzig, has just telephoned the following

According to reliable reports reaching the Consulate-General at

'Danzig, measures of a purely defensive nature have for some days past

heen taken by Poland in the northern part of the Corridor. The details

of the measures involved are as follows:

V 1) Empty rolling stock was being withdrawn from Gdynia as during

; ; the crisis of September 1938.

2) The bridge over the Vistula at Dirschau had not, contrary to
|!,:' custom, been illuminated during the previous night. Machine guns
I'.-: protected by sandbags had been mounted on the bridge.


3) In Toruri reservists of the 1912-16 age groups had been called up
and transferred to Bromberg.

4) In widely different districts of the Corridor, horses and taxicabs
had been requisitioned by the military authorities.

5) General cancellation of leave had been ordered in the garrisons.

6) 300 goods waggons, 120 passenger coaches and 16 locomotives
had been despatched to Poland from the Free City of Danzig (where
the railway belongs to the Poles) on March 23, 1939.

Submitted to the State Secretary for information through Senior
Counsellor Schliep, the Deputy Director of the Political Department
and the Under State Secretary.

Political Department] 1 Military Questions] has received a copy direct.


No. 86

100/64127; 422-26; 429

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

Rome, March 24, 1939.

I gave Attache Freiherr von Schroeder, who came here as special
courier, two copies of the enclosed memorandum l today to take with
him to Berlin and submit direct to the Foreign Minister and the State
Secretary respectively.

1 added the remark that, from information reaching me from the
same source, during the day on the evening of which the Fascist Grand
Council was held, the Duce still intended to add to his unequivocal
statement concerning the Axis the words between blue brackets in the
enclosure marked in green. 2 I had the impression that if, as can be seen
from the memorandum on the course of the meeting, he abandoned
this intention, that might well be due to the fact that in the meantime
he had seen the Reich Foreign Minister's letter to Count Ciano. 3

v. Mackensek

* Enclosure 1.

2 Enclosure 2, passage between asterisks.

3 Document No. 55.

[Enclosure 1]'

Rome, March 22, 1939.

At the Fascist Grand Council on March 21, the Foreign Minister, |
Ciano , first gave a brief description of the international situation based on ■'; |
the diplomatic reports received, without presenting any unusual details. :?i

* The State Secretary's copy of this memorandum (1848/421063-67) bears the follow-,
ing marginal note: "State Secretary: Brought from Rome today by the Courier Attach*
von Schroeder. Si[egfried] 24/3."

MARCH, 1039


Mussolini, on the other hand, spoke for -well over an hour, and gave
a historical sketch of the irresistible process of revision, which, with
compelling logic, had led to the unequivocal continuance of the policy of
the Rome-Berlin Axis. He took as his starting point the tremendous
mistakes made by France and Britain under Clemenceau's influence
during and after Versailles. Clemenceau had always been the greatest
and most violent hater not only of Germany but of Italy too, and had
never forgiven Napoleon III for favouring the unification of Italy, and
still less for not having prevented and made impossible the unification
of the German Empire while there was still time. Imbued with this
fanatical attitude, Clemenceau at Versailles forcibly carved up Germany
and robbed her beyond all reason, and at the same time he also refused
Italy the colonial compensation which had been promised, and in
addition tried to build up, by every available means and by offers of
assistance, a barrier of anti-German States to the east of Germany.
The whole post-war period was dominated by the ruinous consequences
of these blunders and injustices at Versailles, which as time went on
had only been made worse still at Geneva. Italy, resurrected under
the Lictors' Fasces, renewed by Fascism, and led on to a new position
of power, had from the beginning tried to give a new direction to
European policy, and as far as possible to set it free from Clemenceau's
mistakes. She had therefore opposed the territorial occupation of the
Ruhr, requested cancellation of war debts, and made efforts to bring
-Germany back, with equal rights, into the concert of the great European
,. Powers. The policy of Fascist Italy had aimed at producing at least
, some understanding and cooperation among the Great Powers, and that
had also been the intention behind his proposal to conclude a Four-
Power Pact, 5 which was to have initiated a peaceful revision of Ver-
sailles. This attempt had failed, chiefly because of France's intran-
sigence and lack of understanding of politics and history. Nevertheless,
in the end the Peace Treaties were revised from necessity. Had the
revision, of course, been carried out at the right time, and in the way
suggested by Mussolini, it would have gradually brought about an
.easing of the international tension and have put Europe in a position
to resume the role of leadership in the world which is her due. Instead,
.revision took place in a series of severe eruptions which progressively
! ; : exacerbated the international situation.

The Versailles injustices, however, had become especially harsh
lichen Italy was preparing her expedition to Ethiopia. Britain and
llrance at that time allowed themselves to be guided by their old feelings
lof jealousy and hegemony, and considered that the moment had come
par dealing the decisive blow against Italy who had become trouble-
iBome. During that phase, agreement between the interests of Germany

!!; 8 In March, 1933.


and Italy in opposition to the intolerable imperialism of the two
Western Powers began clearly to show itself. Germany refused to take
part in sanctions against Italy, and immediately seized the opportunity
to reassert her right to defend herself, and fortified the Rhineland. It
was consonant with the logical sequence of events that in the future
also Italy and Germany should march side by side to an increasing
degree, and that neither of the two Powers should oppose the just
demands of the other partner. Therefore, Italy had not opposed the
Anschluss of Austria with Germany. As regards Czecho-Slovakia, a
country made up of several national groups and artificially invented
at Versailles as a tool for war against Germany, the wish of the Sudeten
Germans to follow the Austrians into the Reich could not be rejected
or combated. After the Peace of Munich, Czecho-Slovakia could have
achieved new life, under two conditions : complete loyalty to the Reich,
and thus also the full guarantee of the rights of her minorities. But
Prague was not equal to the situation or the task, and did not free
herself from the influence of Jews, Freemasons, Democrats and Bol-
shevists. Instead of this she relied on the false hope of getting her
own back on Germany once the great democracies had carried out their
mighty rearmament programme. Looking at the situation from that
point of view, Germany could not have acted differently from the way
she did, for reasons of geography, history and politics. Italy would
have done just the same under similar circumstances, and thus Italy
remained " perfettamente solidale" [in complete solidarity] with the
Reich, especially now, when the Western Powers were threatening her
with a new policy of encirclement.

As regards Italy's natural aspirations, it was true that she had no
Mgr. Tiso to make her a present of her demands. "Ma anche la nostra
ora verra" [But our time will come too]. The events of the last few
days had created some disturbances here and there in Italian public
opinion, which by and large was not in a position to assess the reasons
of the Reich. But enlightenment would follow.

Mussolini concluded by referring to the tremendous increase of power
achieved in the last few weeks by Germany, and thus also by the Rome-
Berlin Axis, through the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, particu-
larly in view of the munition factories and industrial plant, and de-
clared with great emphasis that Italian policy "andra tlno in fondo,
basandosi sull'asse e sulle amieizie che vanno consolidandosi intorno
aH'asse" [would go to the limit, basing itself on the Axis and on the
friendships being consolidated around the Axis].

Of the members of the Grand Council who spoke, only Grandi's and
Balbo's 6 statements are of interest. Grandi said that the Duee's policy

Count Gvandi, Italian Ambassador in Groat Britain, and Marshal Balbo, Governor.
General of Libvn.

MABCH, 1939 105

was the policy dictated to Italy by history, and that absolute loyalty
to this policy gave to Italy great moral strength as regards Britain.
Balbo dealt briefly with the military situation in Libya and Tunis.
The forces gathered in Libya were sufficient for present needs and for
defence. The French had only weak advance posts near the frontier.
The real defence positions lay 100 kilometres behind the frontier,
beyond the desert area. At present there were no signs of immediate
danger. In any case Libya was prepared, and in case of emergency
could at once take further necessary measures.

Summing up, it can be stated that no differences of opinion emerged
in the Fascist Grand Council, and that the statements and views of the
Duee were unanimously accepted. Upon special enquiry, it was empha-
sized that the discontent expressed in the Palazzo Chigi about Berlin's
delay in keeping Rome informed was not mentioned at all . Neither was
anything said about Spain in yesterday's meeting of the Grand Council.
This discontent concerns the practice? observed again and again ?
of presenting Italy with a fait accompli, though it is sometimes admitted
that events follow each other extremely fast. But then people are
wondering, with some anxiety, where and how far Germany really in-
tends to go. As Austria, the Sudetenland, Bohemia, Moravia and
Slovakia are in German hands, and as Germany also has a dominating
influence in Hungary, while Hungary now holds Buthenia and is per-
haps counting sooner or later on Croatia, to which of course Dalmatia
also belongs, people are saying that in the end the old Hapsburg
Empire, this time under the swastika flag, will reappear on the Adriatic,
"una cosa che l'ltalia difficilmente potrebbe tollerare" [something
which Italy would find difficult to tolerate]. Moreover, Mussolini could
not expose himself to the reproach from his own country that he was
.rebuilding the old Hapsburg Empire, or at least restoring the status quo
, of power which existed before the war and before the destruction of the
Hapsburg Monarchy. Mussolini and Ciano do not share these appre-
; hensions, basing themselves, as they stressed, on secret agreements
^ made in October, 1936 7 , in Berlin, by which the Adriatic zone is expressly
.reserved to the Italian sphere of influence, while Italy at that time
allowed Germany to expand in the east and south east.

iv 'The confidential Protocol signed in Berlin by JNeurath and Ciano on Oct. 23, 1936

*t,(not printed, 2871/563579-88) does not refer to the Adriatic zone or to the Mediterranean

On Sept. 23, 1936, Dr. Hans Frank, then Minister without portfolio, had a conversa-

!'; tion with Mussolmi, his notes of which (not printed, 1231/335829-35) record that

W Mussolini, with reference to the British, said: "The Mediterranean is ours." The

K;; Italian version of this conversation given in Ciano : UEuropa verso la Catastrofe,

'f; : PP- '4^76 (English translation in Giano's Diplomatic Papers, pp. 43-4-8), under

g. the date Sept. 23, 1936, records Frank as saying that Hitler regarded the Mediterranean

r; as an Italian sphere; there is an Italian record of a conversation between Hitler and

feGano on Oct. 24, 1936, (loc. cit., pp. 93-99 ; English edition, pp. 56-60) in which Hitler

g. repeated this declaration. No German record of this latter conversation has been

j|.found. The official communique issued after the meeting contains no mention of the

] Mediterranean.


[Enclosure 2]

March 21, 1939.
Bergmann 8 has just told me, at 9.40 p.m., that Ciano and Mussolini
will speak in detail on the international situation in today's meeting of
the Fascist Grand Council. The gist of their statements wiU be that
"anche dopo gli ultimi avvenimenti rimarra al franco della Germama
*sebbene si avrebbe preferito di essere stato preavvertito* " [even after
recent events, Italy will remain at Germany's side *although she would
have preferred to be informed in advance*]. This addition, however,
will not be included in the official communique of the meeting, though
this reservation is generally very strongly emphasized in the Palazzo
Chigi It is stressed that even without an alliance, Italy remains loyal
to Germany, even should war threaten (which is not expected in the
present case), and for that very reason can expect to be prepared and
informed in good time. . ,

B[ergmann] declares that his information is absolutely certain, buu
emphasizes that, in a possible communication by telephone to Berlin,
it could only be very guardedly reported that Italy, as was always
assumed, still "rimane in linea" [keeps in line]. B[ergmann] em-
phasizes that for special reasons it is extremely important for him that
we should only speak very cautiously of "good news" which would
come during the night concerning Italy's attitude to Germany.

a The reference is uncertain.

No. 87


Ambassador Mackensen to Counsellor Erich Kordt

Rome, March 24, 1939.
Dear Herr Kordt: As you will know, the Reich Foreign Minister
telephoned to me again yesterday at midday on the matter of the
memorandum of the Fiihrer-Attolico conversation, 1 of which you are
aware, and instructed me to give Attolico, should he so desire, more .
detailed information from this memorandum. I have written the en-
closed memorandum of my conversation today with Attolico, which I
request you to submit to the Reich Foreign Minister. I hope to hear
more from Attolico after his report to the Duce. Incidentally, he
appeared to be much impressed by the mood he found prevailing here
in Rome The Duce seems to have been much annoyed by the fact
that in the final phases of the Czechoslovak dissolution we just con-

J See document No. 52.

MAKCH, 1939 107

fronted him with a fait accompli. Attolico explained this by the
circumstance that, in contrast with the course of events which came to
a conclusion in Vienna, the Duce had this time had no opportunity
whatever to prepare public opinion. He felt this all the more as, in his
view, our present procedure ran counter to the policy hitherto adhered
to by us in principle, not to incorporate non-Germans, a policy which
he had defended in a personal letter to Runciman 2 and in his speech
at Verona. 3 Attolico added that the Duce was, however, not the man
to brood for long over the past, and so, this time ? and this must be
regarded as an immense service on his part ? he had, without a moment's
hesitation, accepted the course of events, and had most energetically
supported the decision of which we are aware, in the Fascist Grand
Council ? as indeed Ciano did also, a point on which Attolico laid
particular stress. Here Attolico hinted that at the Fascist Grand
Council, where complete frankness of expression was allowed, keen
criticism had been voiced.
With cordial greetings and Heil Hitler !


2 Vol. H of this Series, document No. 488.
, ≫ On Sept. 26, 1938. See ibid., document No. 611 .



Rome, March 24, 1939.
In accordance with yesterday's telephoned instructions from the
\ Reich Foreign Minister,* I took immediate steps to get into touch with
: Attolico, but it was only towards 11 o'clock at night that I received a
| telephone call from him. He thanked me for suggesting seeing him
'>again about the substance of his conversation with the Fiihrer in the
slight of the fresh material which had reached me in the interval. He
Iregretted that he had not been able to reply to my telephone message
||go6ner, but the sudden serious illness of his brother-in-law had claimed
Sail his attention. He would, however, call on me in the course of the

He arrived shortly after 12 o'clock today and I told him that I had

anwhile received further instructions from the Reich Foreign

ster and, in a "cipher telegram", a memorandum 5 on our version

* A memorandum by Mackensen dated Mar. 23 (not printed, 100/65621-22) notes
bese instructions which Ribbentrop telephoned himself.

■ 'As is evident from document No. 52 and footnote 1 thereto, and as emerges from a
jdegram from Mackensen, No. 106 of Mar. 22 (not printed, 100/65625-26), the memo-
Siandum was sent by special courier and not in a "cipher telegram".


of the conversation. I placed myself at his disposal to compare this
memorandum with his own and to answer any questions he might put.
Attolieo thanked me and asked that, in making this comparison, we
should proceed as follows. I would mention each individual point of
the conversation in turn, he would then say first what he remembered
about it, and I would then complete this. This method of comparison
showed that his version tallied almost completely, in parts nearly
word for word, with the text of the so-called second amended memo-
randum before me. A deviation, in itself perhaps not negligible, was
detected only at one point. In the passage on page 3 6 of -the memo-
randum in question, that concerning the significance of the British
Navy in relation to the maintenance of German sea-routes and German
trade, Attolieo was somewhat fuller than the memorandum, in that lie
expatiated on the objectives of possible German measures for securing
supplies through more extensive military operations.

Referring to page 5 of the memorandum, I asked him on what
he based the view that the Duce "must now get something";"
Attolieo replied that this opinion was based on the view, widely
shared here, that the time had come for Italy also, with her well-
known claims against France, to get some advantage out of the Axis.
At this point it transpired that the impression I gathered yesterday,
that Attolieo had already made a report to the Duce personally yester-
day morning, was incorrect. On the contrary, he is not seeing him
until this afternoon. I told Attolieo that I did not share his view on
this point, but that on the contrary I had observed a whole series of
things which led to the conclusion that Mussolini had no intention of
letting himself be carried away by the current of public opinion, or of
forcing the pace. I then pointed out to him also that, from all I had ;|
heard here about Mussolini's intentions, the actual programme (not a "
programme which he expected to materialize overnight, but one for the
realization of which he had? if I were correctly informed? even re-
served the right of fixing the date himself) was confined to Suez,
Jibuti and Tunis. Corsica, as far as I knew, together with Nice and ;ji
Savoy, came under what Mussolini described as Italy's so-called
"historic" claims, the attainment of which was only to be expected J
within the framework of major general events. Attolieo replied?
according to the memorandum ? that when he mentioned Corsica it was|
not a demand for cession that was meant, but for neutralization. I
replied that, to my mind, that did not greatly alter the matter.

Attolieo promised to call here again before his return journey, which
would probably take place the day after tomorrow.

v. Mackensek 3


≪ See document No. 52, passage quoted in footnote 11.
" See ibid., sentence following footnote 20.

MARCH, 1039 J 09

No. 88


State Secretary Weizsacker to Ambassador Molike
steictly personal Berlin, March 24, 1939.

Dear Moltke; I owe you a word in addition to the telephone con-
versation we have just had, in which you were asked to cancel your
conversation arranged with M. Beck to supplement the Lipski-
v. Ribbentrop conversation of March 21. i
| The Reich Foreign Minister instructed me to do this after he had
| submitted the draft of the instructions to you to the Fuhrer. 2 I realize
! : - that the procedure now adopted is somewhat embarrassing for you
and might even give rise to certain political conjectures. However
that cannot be helped.

In actual fact the substance of the instructions to be addressed to you
did not differ greatly from the conversation of March 21, only it
was more sharply worded and, as it were, presented the Poles with the
option: friend or foe. They would have had to pay for our friendship
in the way of which you are aware, but at the same time would also
have received the gift of which you know, frontier recognition lasting
for twenty -five years. B

As it is late I refrain from further explanations, but I assume that
M. Beck will try to evade as far as he can the option mentioned. On the
| results of such an evasion I can only draw conclusions of which Herr
|v von SchelihaS w ill inform you orally.
Best wishes and Heil Hitler !

Yours ever, Weizsacker

i Document No. 61.
* Document No. 73.
! Counsellor at the Warsaw Embassy. No indication of his report has been found.

No. 89

?M0!/E474 900-01

TU Charge d' 'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Minister


jjfo. 103 of March 25 Washington, March 25, 1939?5:48 a.m.

Received March 26 ? 3:35 a.m.
W Villa 686.
With reference to my telegram No. 96 of March 21. 1
|l) Accompanied by delegates of the German-American Chamber of
*" anmerce, Customs Attorney Pickerel, who fully agrees with the views

H Document No. 56,


of the Embassy as set forth in paragraph 3 of telegram Ho. 96, today
negotiated with the Customs Bureau (Johnson) to secure the release
from the provisional additional 25 per cent customs duty of imports
undertaken against dollars or free Reichsmarks. Johnson asked for
proposals in writing, which he will examine with the Customs autho-
rities in New York_at the end of next week. Pickerel's proposal pro-
vided for a sworn declaration by American importers, and perhaps also
German exporters, on the method of payment and also proof of pay-
ment in cash or time draft at the time of the customs declaration. The
prospects of the proposal are uncertain. At the same time Pickerel
considers the cancellation of the Inland Account Procedure [Inkover-
fahreri] before April 23 as essential, especially as the application of
arbitrary penalty duties under section 338 is to be feared if the pro-
cedure is continued. Pickerel thinks that the Treasury must cancel the
imposition of the additional duties if the Inland Account Procedure is
abolished, as the opinion of the Attorney-General on which they were
based relates exclusively to the Inland Account Procedure. In reply
to representations to that effect by Pickerel in his talk with Johnson
today, the latter said without committing himself in any way that the
Treasury would in that case abolish the additional duties.

2) Customs Attorney Laylin, Schroder Bank, Chase Bank and cotton
exporters are conducting negotiations with the Treasury along the same
lines with the object of securing the gradual release from the provisional
25 per cent additional duty also for transactions in blocked marks
[Sperrmark] as well (paragraph 4 of telegram No. 96). On the other
hand, they recommend the retention for the time being of the Inland
Account Procedure, in order if necessary to give importers the oppor-
tunity after April 23 of settling the additional duty by payment from
Inland Accounts. _

3) I am more than ever convinced , especially on the basis of P[ickerel]'s
report, that the Inland Account Procedure should be abolished and I
recommend that all necessary measures for this should be prepared but
that we delay putting them into effect until more details of the
Treasury's attitude are ascertained in further negotiations next week.

I will report on this by telegram.


No. 90


Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Political Department
immediate Berlin, March 25, 1939.

Admiral Canaris telephoned me today at 11 o'clock and told me the
following about Polish mobilization measures:

MARCH, 1930 HI

1) Some 4,000 Polish troops are concentrated at Gdynia.

2) The troops of a garrison previously stationed in the southern part
of the Corridor have been transferred to the immediate vicinity of the
Danzig frontier.

3) Poland has mobilized three age-groups.

All these measures concern only the northern part of Poland; in the
other districts of the country there is nothing to report militarily.
_ General Keitel does not believe in any aggressive intentions on the
part of the Poles, neither, therefore, does he believe that Poland wishes
rather to forestall us by a military occupation of Danzig, but attributes
these measures to the generally noticeable nervousness of the Poles.
In the General Staff, on the other hand, the tendency is to take a some-
what more serious view of the situation. 1


i Marginal note: "To the Foreign Minister: A warning to the Poles not to let matters
come to a ' 21st May ' with a. subsequent ' 28th May' might be advisable. Wfeizsacker],
25/111." Reference is here made to the Czechoslovak crisis of May J938. See vol. n of
this Series, chapter III.

No. 91


The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

No. 124 of March 24 Bucharest, March 25, 1939 ? 12:30 p.m.

Received March 25 ? 5 : 30 p.m .
Pol. IV 2125.
The Rumanian Minister in Budapest 1 was to speak to Csaky on
: behalf of his Government in order to make proposals for reciprocal de-
mobilization. 2 Csaky refused to receive the Minister personally on the
grounds that he did not negotiate at the point of the bayonet. Rumania
■wishes to make the following proposal; that the Hungarian troops be
withdrawn 20 to 30 kilometres from the frontier, as had already been
done with the Rumanian troops. Rumania would then at once start
to demobilize, and Hungary would immediately follow suit, which was
: possible since the military action in Carpatho-Ukraine had in any case
; come to an end.

While Hungary remained fully armed on the frontier there could be

no tranquillization in the South-East, especially as the incursion of

^Hungarian troops into Slovak territory, reported in the press today,

I had shown her neighbours the danger which threatened from Hungary.


.' l Raoul Bossy.
2 See also document No. 82.


No. 92


The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram 1

No. 125 of March 2.4 Bucharest, March 25, 1939 ? 12:30 p.m.

Received March 25 ? 4:00 p.m.
Pol. II 926.

With reference to your telegram No. 97 of March 21 (Pol. II 833). 2

Gafencu, the Foreign Minister, asserts that no demarche has been
made to him by the British Government for an association of "peaceful
Powers". He has forestalled an enquiry by Britain, such as had been
circulated to other States, by declaring from the outset to London and
Paris that Rumania would in no circumstances join any group of
powers which was directed against another. He had jettisoned all
collective security plans. On the other hand, he had explained quite
clearly to London and Paris why a rapprochement with Germany was
necessary for Rumania and, despite warnings from many quarters, he
had adhered firmly to this, as was proved by the Economic Treaty. 3

He did not know whether an enquiry had been circulated by Britain
regarding the protection of Rumania, this probably referred to the
above-mentioned action.

All press reports about a conference to which Russia had also invited
Rumania were pure invention. Similarly, he could assure me that
neither had the King suggested any exchange of views about a guarantee
of Rumania's frontiers by the Western Powers.


i This telegram was circulated to Missions in Europe for information on Mar. 27 '}
(1625/388415). ' ?

2 Document No. 58.

3 Document No. 78.

No. 93


The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry


No. 17 of March 25 The Hague, March 25, 1939?2:12 p.m.

Received March- 25 ? 4:00 p.m.
Pol. II 925.

I spoke to the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry l today re-
garding a report in the Paris newspapers that France and Britain have

1 Jonkheer A. M. Sinouck Hurgronjp.

MARCH, 1939 113

pledged themselves in London to defend the Netherlands frontier in
the event of a German attack. The Secretary-General said he had
knowledge of the matter only through the Netherlands press. If the
Western Great Powers made such agreements, the Netherlands could
not prevent them from doing so. True to their policy of independence,
the Netherlands themselves, however, would never in any circum-
stances accede to such agreements. Should war break out, the Nether-
lands would defend their neutrality to the utmost and, if necessary,
resist by all possible means any armed invasion irrespective of whence
it came. 2


2 A draft telegram (not printed, 1625/388408-11) addressed to the Legations in
Brussels, The Hague and Berne, dated Mar. 25 and marked by Ribbentrop; "not to be
sent", stated that reports to hand indicated that the British and French Governments
had concluded an agreement for mutual and unconditional support should Germany
attack Belgium, the Netherlands or Switzerland. All press reports that Germany in-
tended to attack these countries were malicious calumny. Appropriate demarches were
to be made in Brussels, Berne and The Hague, in milder form in the last in view of the
assurances contained in the document here printed.

No. 94


Circular of the Foreign Minister l
Express Letter

I confidential Berlin, March 25, 1939.

Kult. A 1368 g.
Germany's relationship with Italy in the Berlin-Rome Axis requires
that, in political questions in the Mediterranean countries and particu-
larly in the case of national community and minority problems in these
countries, Italy's intentions should exert a decisive influence on
Germany's attitude. Only in the Foreign Ministry is it possible to make
a complete survey and decide in what instances relations with the
aforementioned national and minority groups are appropriate and, if so,
how these are to be developed. I would therefore request you to observe
the following principles in future :

1) Our attitude regarding all national community and minority
I problems in the Mediterranean countries must be adjusted to meet the
1 wishes of the Italian Government.

2) Any relations with national community and minority organiza-
tions in these countries may only be maintained if the assent of the

i Typewritten marginal note : "The departments are requested to specify those bodies
i-yrhe should be acquainted with this letter or its contents by this office (the Auslands-
^'iastitut in Stuttgart, the V.D.A., etc.}." The letter was, in fact, circulated to all Minis-
: tries, and the Cultural Policy Department communicated the instructions contained
■ therein to eighteen bodies (2446/514898-908).




Foreign Ministry thereto has been obtained in writing. In this event
permission will be granted and the necessary guiding principles for
developing relations of this kind will then be laid down by the Foreign
Ministry or alternatively by the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle.

3) In the interests of German-Italian relations, connections with |
Croat organizations- 2 must on no account be maintained in the future.

I would request you to bring the above at once to the notice of those
of your subordinate authorities, official departments, organizations,
etc., which are concerned, and make it incumbent on them to con-
form unconditionally to the same.


2 See also document No. 55.

No. 95


The Consul General and Charge d' Affaires in Slovakia to
the Foreign Ministry

Report No. 132 Bratislava, March 25, 1939.

Received March 26.
Pol. IV 2134.

I transmit herewith a note verbale from the Slovak Foreign Ministry!
which reached me today.

I am not making any alteration to the wording and would beg to
suggest that no great offence be taken at it. The Slovak Foreign
Ministry is composed of a few young people with little experience who,
however, do their best to write to us in German. The Ministry functions
in three modest rooms of the Government building.

If I may comment on the note verbale, it aims at determining more
closely the probable duration and character in international law of the
German occupation of Slovak territory.

I can imagine that we, on our part, do not think it worth while to
commit ourselves further.

Irrespective, however, of what decision is taken, I may perhaps
be permitted to point out the prejudicial effect produced when our
troops in the occupied area exercise sovereign rights beyond those of
military necessity, and beyond the provisions of article 6 [sic % 2] of the
Treaty of Protection 2 and remove material. The material we need
will not be lost to us, and there is therefore no necessity for simply
carrying it off.

i Not printed (2002/442300-QS). The contents were as indicated above.
2 Document No. 40.

MARCH, 1939 JJg

The second question which the Note apparently aims at clearing up
is that of examining questions of legal succession relating to State
property arising from the secession of Slovakia.

In this respect, too, we could, in my humble opinion, get our way and
achieve our objective otherwise than by simply removing disputed
State property.

I am assuming that it is our intention to create, in respect of Slovakia
a classic example of our conception of a protective relationship with a
South-Eastern European Slav State. 3

v. Drtjstel

?Marginal note: "Settled in oral discussion with Consul General von Druffel at

Colonel Wagner s. Alltenburg] 28/3." See document No. 117.

No. 96


Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 262 Berlin, March 25, 1939.

The Hungarian Minister today handed me the enclosed letter from
the Hungarian Regent to the Eiihrer.

For submission to the Reich Foreign Minister. 1

■:. i Marginal notes: (i) "Herr Siegfried: Please ascertain that the letter has reached the

Foreign Minister and consequently the Fuhrer. W[eizsacker] 27/r3] " (ii) "llHerr

' g^J b ^ a * e " *≫≫£≪≪ ?≪> Mm to Munich. 2) Bring up in 3 days' time. Siegfried]

, 27/3." (.u) Herr Hewel states that the Fuhrer has had the letter, which dois not

■ S^gfricdfae/f" ' ° reign Ministr T> where i4 h ^ been filed (Biiro


Budapest, March 24, 1939.
Pol. IV 2281.
J: Yora Excellency: I have with genuine pleasure and heartfelt
.thanks taken cognizance of the statement relating to Slovakia, which
J, Your Excellency caused to be transmitted to me by my Minister in
: Berlin.^ i waa particularly gratified that Your Excellency appro-
priated so exactly the interests both of the Hungarian people and of
f those peoples who have lived with us on common soil for a thousand
Ijesxs. At the same time it is beyond doubt that the proposed solution
|best covers Germany's interests.

≪, '.This statement has not been found, but in St.S. No. 258 of Mar. 23 (7488/E540465)
feTVeizsicker recorded: The Hungarian Minister, who was received by the Fuhrer a few
fe days ago and who was in Budapest for a day with a message to the Regent, returned
|; bringing an expression of very great gratitude from the latter. The Fiihrer's attitude
iv to the problems at issue, which was m accord with Hungary's historical ideas had made
I a decisive impression on the Regent and had given him very great satisfaction "



In order to ensure completely harmonious cooperation between our
Governments, I would ask Your Excellency to allow my Minister in
Berlin to submit the reasons necessitating a new frontier demarcation-
in place of the frontier determined by Benes? between the so-called
Ruthenian [russinischen] territory and Slovakia.

As the Ruthenian territory has been united with Hungary, we desire
to accord this area appropriate territorial autonomy and? in order at
once to provide work for the population? to proceed immediately with
the construction of dams for the exploitation of the water-power. My
Government have begun preparatory work on this.

In expressing once more my warmest and most heartfelt thanks tor
the friendship and understanding shown towards Hungary,


I remain etc.,

* This letter is stamped, "Seen by the Fuhrer March 25, 1939 ".f R i^ r t ^ r 1 ",^
ginalnote; "The Fuhrer wishes this Setter to be filed .n the Foreign Muustry. H[e]w[el].


No. 97

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St S Ho. 264 Berlin, March 25, 1939.

The Hungarian Minister asked me today, obviously on instructions |
from Budapest, about rumours that the German economic Treaty
with Rumania i had been linked with some political concession or other ■
to Rumania. Rumanian sources indicated, in fact, that we had given
the Rumanians a frontier guarantee against Hungary.

I flatly denied this rumour, to the Hungarian Minister.


i- See document No. 78.


No. 98

Minute by an Official of Political Division I

Berlin, March 25, 1939.

zuPol. IMllOlg 1 Ang.IH!

In accordance with instructions, I have informed OKW that thai

Foreign Ministry attaches great importance to the speediest possible?;

evacuation of occupied Slovak territory extending beyond the de-|

marcation line laid down by Treaty. Should the completion of the|

i Not found.

MARCH, 1989 117

evacuation not be possible forthwith, the Foreign Ministry considers it
desirable that a beginning at least be made as soon as possible by-
measures which will also be obvious to the Slovak Government.
OKW undertook to transmit this request to the competent authorities.

v. Nostitz

No. 99

Harembere document 100-E.
Eihibit USA? 121

Directive from the Fuhrer to the Commander in Chief of the Army
on March 25, 1939 *

Danzig question

L[ipski] is returning from Warsaw on Sunday, March 26. His mission
was to enquire there whether Poland was ready to make an arrange-
ment about Danzig. The Fuhrer left Berlin on the evening of March 25
and does not wish to be here when L[ipski] returns. For the present
R[ibbentrop] is to conduct the negotiations. The Fuhrer does not
wish to solve the Danzig question by force however. He does not wish
to drive Poland into the arms of Britain by this.

A possible military occupation of Danzig could be contemplated
; only if L[ipski] gave an indication that the Polish Government could
not justify voluntary cession of Danzig to their own people and that a
fait accompli would make a solution easier to them.

; Polish question

' For the present the Fuhrer does not intend to solve the Polish ques-

n tion. However, it should now be worked upon. A solution in the near
future would have to be based on especially favourable political pre-
conditions. In such a case Poland would have to be so beaten down
that, during the next few decades, she need not be taken into account
as a political factor. In a solution of this kind the Fuhrer envisaged
am advanced frontier, extending from the eastern border of East

i 'Prussia to the eastern tip of Silesia. The questions of evacuation and
resettlement still remain open. The Fuhrer does not wish to enter the
■ Ukraine. Possibly a Ukrainian State might be established. But these

K questions too still remain open.

fcSJwofc question

li How long the Fuhrer will adhere to the Treaty concluded with

fSlovakia 2 is doubtful. The High Command of the Army has the

pi The German text of this document is printed in Trial of the Major War Criminals
PWere tht, International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg, 1947-49) (hereinafter cited as
%:prial of the Major War Criminals), vol. xxxvm, pp. 274-276.
''■'■? See document No. 40.

■ I


impression that when the time comes the Fiihrer will rid himself of this,
and. will use Slovakia as a political bargaining counter between himself,
Poland and Hungary. For the time being, however, Hungary is to be
kept in check.

The Fiihrer agrees with the proposed frontier delimitation (line of the
Waag). Should Slovakia be partitioned, the eastern frontier (Nitra
line) is to become the frontier and Bratislava is to be included. There
may be a plebiscite in Bratislava, but the Fiihrer believes there will be
no difficulties, as the town has no leanings towards Hungary.

Engerau is intended to become a permanent Garrison

Col. General Keitel is to notify the Slovak Government, through the
Foreign Ministry, that no armed Slovak units (Hlinka guards) may be
maintained or garrisoned this side of the Waag frontier. They are to be
sent to the new Slovak territory. The Hlinka guards are to be disarmed.

A demand shall be addressed to the Slovaks through the Foreign
Ministry that all weapons we want and which are still in Slovakia shall
be surrendered to us against payment on the basis of the agreement
between our Army and the Czech troops. The millions which we intend
to sink in Slovakia in any case are to be used for this purpose.

Czech Protectorate

The Army Groups are to be asked again if the demand for the sur-
render of all arms within a limited time and under threat of severe
penalties should be repeated once more.

We shall take on all the war material of the former Czechia without
payment. On the other hand, the guns bought by contract before
February 15 will be paid for.

Officers of the Czech Army will be provided for in accordance with
the discussions between General Reinecke, Colonel Wagner and Burgs-
dorf of the High Command of the Army. Their pensions shall assure
them a good standard of living in order to prevent discontent. We may
take over payment of the pensions or a part thereof ? as it were in
payment of the captured war material. Pensions ? no lump sums ? to
keep a hold on these people. That is how we should negotiate.

Questions should be settled in principle before executive power is
handed over. Supreme Headquarters of the Army has suggested
April 6 as the final date for handing over executive power. The
Fiihrer agrees,

H[acha] shall be directed to change his residence to some place where
he can do no harm. The request, however, must come from Hacha.

Should the Czechs wish to set up a labour service, the matter is to
be dealt with in a dilatory manner. The Czechs must not be consoli-
dated by concentrations of this kind. The settlement of this question
falls within Germany's competence.

MARCH, 1989 119

Czechia is to be granted a certain measure of sovereignty in financial
matters: somewhat on the lines of that formerly accorded to Bavaria.
On the debt settlement, the Fiihrer is not yet clear. The change over
to the mark will be made at a suitable opportunity.

Bohemia and Moravia are to make annual contributions to the
German exchequer. The extent of these shall be determined on the
basis of the sums formerly budgeted for the Czech Army.

The Fiihrer has no objection to the withdrawal of troops once dis-
armament has been carried out. However, he does not wish to preju-
dice the Polish situation, which has not yet been cleared up.

He is to be asked again about this on Monday.

When Neurath takes over there will be rather more troops in the
Protectorate than will remain permanently. Movements are therefore
agreed to.

Before Neurath takes over, the Fiihrer wishes to have another talk
with the High Command of the Army, Friderici ?, etc.

Britain ? France

Relations have apparently slightly cooled, because France realizes
that Britain is trying to harness her to her waggon.

Britain is said to have told France that she must satisfy Italy's
wishes in the Mediterranean.


The Fiihrer wants to have armaments deals with the Balkan coun-
tries. But only against payment in foreign currency or goods represent-
ing foreign currency. Becker is to report orally on standardization of
calibres and Skoda.

(Original written by hand by Lt. Col. Siewirt,

1st Officer of the General Staff.)

Certified correct.

[signature illegible]

Colonel of the General Staff

No. 100


Tke Fiihrer and Chancellor to the Bead of the Italian Government 1

Berlin, March 25, 1939.

I" Duce: You have lived to see the 20th anniversary 2 of the day on
§which the foundation stone of Fascism was laid. Since 1920 the new

i:i Translated from the Italian. No German text of this letter or indication of the
1 of delivery has been found in the German Foreign Ministry archives. For the

i text see Mario Toscano, Le Oriffini del Potto d'Acciaio, p. 95, note 110.

SI*' Mussolini founded his first Fascia di combattimento in Milan on Mar. 2G, 1919,



history of your people and of your country, which found ite j crowning
success in the rebuilding of the Roman Empire, is inseparably associ-
ated with your name and the name of your movement. But apart
from that, I am aware of this: that from that day the evolution of
Europe and, with it, the evolution of mankind, has been directed into a
new channel. One cannot imagine what consequences for the Wert
would have followed in the train of a bolshevization of Italy. There is
no doubt that, but for your historic action in founding Fascism Italy
would have been wedded to this bolshevization. Even if in the life
of a nation it is for the most part difficult to decide what component
parts make up the knowledge of the individual or what contributions
are made by and large by the national attitude and actions, neverthe-
less Duce, your own contribution and the example of Fascism can be
established on the basis of many positive results. The regeneration in
the 20th century not only of Italy but also of Europe wJl be linked for
ever with your name. I have pondered deeply on these prob ems.
But I think I can assure you in all sincerity, Duce, that, apart from those
of your own people, you can receive from no one more heartfelt good-
wishes for your work, now twenty years old, than those of us Germans
and of myself. There is, moreover, so much similarity m the develop-
ment of our two ideologies and in our two revolutions, that one a
tempted to believe in a single decision on the part of Providence Yet
in my eyes, nothing can link the destinies of the German and Italian
peoples more than the hellish hatred which is poured out on them by
the rest of the world, although we have done it no harm. You, .Duce,
had knowledge and experience of the attitude of these adversaries
when you were creating your Empire. We Germans have experienced
it during the past twelve months, when we were putting an end to a
situation unbearable from the national and military point of view.

By means of this letter, I wish to assure you once more that during
the last twelve months the German people, my movement and above
all myself have experienced not only the enmity of these foreign
countries-if indeed we did not already know of it? but we have also,
all of us, taken an unalterable decision: whatever may be the path you
tread, Duce, you shall see in me and in us Germans your unchanging
friends. And you shall see in this friendship not only a symbol of an
attachment which is purely platonic, but you may regard it as the
immutable decision to bear, if necessary, even at the most difficult
times, the direst consequences of this solidarity.

Let me therefore express once more to you and to the Italian people,
in my name and especially in the name of my movement, my good:
wishes for the return of a day to which not only Italy but also Germany
owes so much.

With undying friendship, ? mmi

Yours, Adolf Hitob

MARCH, 1939 121

No. 101


Memorandum by the Foreign Minister x

RM 20 Berlin, March 26, 1939.

I received Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, at 12:30 today.

Ambassador Lipski handed me the attached memorandum by the
Polish Government, which I read through in his presence.

After I had taken note of the contents, I replied to Ambassador
Lipski that in my personal opinion the Polish viewpoint could not
form the basis for a German-Polish solution. The sole possible solution
of the problem could only be the reincorporation of Danzig in the
German Reich and the creation of an extraterritorial road and rail
link between the Reich and East Prussia.

In this connection, I referred Ambassador Lipski to the reports 2
to hand on Polish troop concentrations and warned him of possible
consequences. The events seemed to me to be a strange answer to my
recent offer of a final settlement of the German-Polish relationship. If
things went on in this way a serious situation might soon arise. I
could inform Ambassador Lipski that for example a violation of the
sovereignty of Danzig territory by Polish troops would be regarded by
Germany in the same way as a violation of the Reich frontiers.

Ambassador Lipski energetically denied that Poland had any military
intentions towards Danzig. The troop movements undertaken by
Poland merely represented precautionary measures.

I then put the question to- Ambassador Lipski whether, as soon as

; the situation had calmed down somewhat, the Polish Government

■ would not again consider the German proposal so that a solution might

be arrived at on the basis proposed by us of the reunion of Danzig and

V the extraterritorial rail and Autobahn link.

Ambassador Lipski answered that Poland would certainly study the
I'., 1 question further and was willing to do everything to reach agreement.

I told Ambassador Lipski that I would report to the Fiihrer at once.
In my view the main thing was that the Fiihrer should not get the im-
| pression that Poland was simply unwilling.

Ambassador Lipski asked me to have the questions studied again
|Cby Germany from every point of view and he wondered if there was not
■a prospect of perhaps reaching an acceptable solution on the basis of
■ Polish ideas.

When I put the definite question whether in his view the Polish
'.Government might state that they disagreed with the solution proposed
I" by Germany, Ambassador Lipski gave an evasive answer.

i See also document No. 103,
b See document No. 90.


Ambassador Lipski stated that Foreign Minister Beck would
gladly come to Berlin in accordance with our suggestion,* but it
seemed to him advisable that the questions should have been suitably
prepared from the diplomatic angle beforehand.

At the close of our conversation, I left Ambassador Lipski in no
doubt that in my view the Polish proposals could not be regarded by
the Fiihrer as satisfactory; only the definite re-incorporation of Danzig,
an extraterritorial link with East Prussia, and a 25 year non-aggression
treaty with frontier guarantees, and cooperation in the Slovak question
could, in the German view, lead to a final settlement.

I have the impression : .

1) that the military measures taken by Poland are of a defensive
nature. Intentions to intervene in Danzig by force of arms probably

do not exist at present. .,,.,,

2) Poland would like to get off as cheaply as possible in the present

discussions. , ^ ,. ,

3) Poland's compromise proposal might not represent the Polish

Government's last word.

On the basis of these impressions I should like to propose the follow-
ing procedure to the Fiihrer: .

1) The Polish press attacks should be answered gradually in the
German press, without, however, bringing things to a head

2) In a short time the Polish Ambassador should be told by me that
the Polish proposals do not represent a basis for negotiations. Only an
acceptance of the basis for negotiations proposed by Germany could

lead to a solution.

3) If after allowing an interval to watch developments, the Polish
military measures were not gradually reduced, M. Lipski's attention
would again have to be drawn to the difficult situation arising there-
from and it would have to be' pointed out that, if things went on in
this way, they would end badly.* RlBBENTRW

a See document No. 61.

* I" S~acco°unt of this conversation see the Polish WkUe Boole, No. 63.



As in the past, so today, the Polish Government ascribe full im-
portance to the maintenance of good-neighbourly relations with tne :
German Reich to the utmost extent.

The Polish Government have given clear proof of this attitude by being ;
one of the first foreign Governments to initiate friendly relations with;|
the German Reich already in 1933 and to enter into negotiations which, J

MARCH, 1939 J 23

led to the conclusion of the Polish-German Declaration of January 26
1934. 3 J '

Here may also be mentioned the friendly attitude adopted by Poland
to the National Socialist Senate in Danzig.

During the following five years, the Polish Government in their
political activity in the international sphere have always avoided
participating in actions directed against the German Reich.

Finally, it is well known that in the autumn of 1938, Poland's
resolute attitude contributed in considerable degree to the avoidance
of an armed conflict in connection with the accomplishment of the
German demands. 6

[n the question of transit traffic between the German Reich and
East Prussia as well as in the question of the Free City of Danzig,
questions where hitherto understanding between the two Governments
has always been achieved, and on which the German Government have
now put forward new suggestions, the Polish Government take the
following view:

a) The Polish Government have no interest in creating any diffi-
culties in traffic between East Prussia and the rest of the Reich. For
that reason, despite many changes which have occurred in the last
few years by comparison with previous times (e.g., in the question of
transfer of payments), the Polish Government have not only not raised
any difficulties in the privileged rail transit traffic but have undertaken
the financial clearing for this transit traffic with due consideration for
German interests.

This being their attitude, the Polish Government are prepared
jointly with the German Government to study means of further
; amplifying and facilitating rail and road traffic between East Prussia
!≪nd the rest of the Reich so that German travellers may be saved in-
|convenience when using these ways of communication. Technical
jpxperts could begin working out proposals for realizing this aim.
P But all concessions could, however, only be granted on the Polish side
Imthinthe limits of Polish sovereignty? therefore there can be no ques-
tion of extraterritorial status for the ways of communication. While
pairing this reservation, the Polish Government intend to meet
jjjGerman wishes very liberally.

m b) As far as the Free City of Danzig is concerned, it may be recalled
"at for some time now the Polish Government, recognizing the need

|.≪ By this Declaration of Non- Aggression and Understanding, signed at Berlin, which
Ftae to be valid for ten years, both Governments decided to base their mutual relations on
^tePact of Pans (Kellogg-Bmnd Pact), of Aug. 27, 1928. For the text of the Declara-
iouase B.F.S.P., vol. 137, pp. 495-496.

f ? In the instructions by Beck to Lipski, printed as No. 62 in the Polish White Book
Hub paragraph is not meluded. '


for a settlement of this question by way of an understanding between
Wars w and Berlin, have put forward correspond*^ -ggest.o-
This seemed to them particularly approbate given the g-^^
League of Nations, which is no longer fully able to fulfil the obligations
it has undertaken towards the Free City of Danzxg.

As appeared from the previous Polish-German ≪f?^ <* T existed no difference of opinion on the basic approach, namely ^ that the Polish Government do not aim at hindering the German population of the Free City in their own way of life, that on the other hand the GimaTGo/ernment respect Polish rights as well as the economic, m the Tree City. As these two questions are both fundamental the Ponsh Government believe that it should be possible to find a solution J dona joint Polish-German guarantee for the Free City of Danzig S guarantee would, on the one hand, satisfy the free development of the German national community and its political way of hfe, and on Jhe other hand, would safeguard Polish rights and ***^?* interests, moreover, coincide with the economic mtere sU ? * ^WPJ* tion of the Free City, as for centuries the prosperity of the latter has deoended on Polish overseas trade. In contrast to the above-mentioned problem of facilitating com- munications which, in the view of the Polish Government, ≫ primarily £ a technical nature and a matter for experts, the political^ pnnciple in the question of the Free City must first be discussed between the Polish and German Governments, and to the end that in tins organism, fn accordance with the words used by the Reich Chancellor m February 1938, Poland should respect the national character of the Free City and the Free City and Germany should respect the rights and interests of P0 The d Polish Government would consider it desirable, in order to stabilize conditions in this part of Europe, that an exchange of? on both the problems referred to above, which should be dealt w*h iointly. should take place as soon as possible, in order thereby to find a basis for the future consolidation of mutual good-nexghbourly relations. 7 ' 'Words written across the ^-^^.^'^^^^^S^tXpS 1 of this document in Ribbentrop's handing appear to tead. n^ ^ J on which we can negofcate 1. [^ f^ib^ 2. ^ov[ak J^o ^ .. and British. Future ? whether to Poland s advantage, p? zosen Engldnder. Zukunft ob zum Heti Polens.]' MARCg, 1939 125 No. 102 2050/447350-61 The State Secretary to the Legation in the Protectorate Telegram No. 128 Beblih, March 26, 1939? [2:20 p.m.] 1 [Received March 26 ? 4:00 p.m.] 1 For Ambassador Ritter. In the former Czecho-Slovak diplomatic and consular Missions abroad, especially in so far as they are under British, French, American and Soviet influence, there is an increasingly stubborn resistance to the instructions issued by the former Foreign Ministry in Prague relating to the smooth transfer of their affairs to the German representatives. 2 The relevant reports on this are being and will continue to be sent to you regularly. The motive power behind this resistance is to be found partly in an attachment to the former Benes system, but mostly in those Governments to which these missions were accredited. These former Czecho-Slovak Missions which are behaving so mistakenly or are being misused by foreign countries, are rendering an ill service to themselves and to the interests of the Protectorate. Hence we are ourselves not disposed to continue to tolerate these manoeuvres and propose taking counter measures against the refractory heads of Missions, the personnel they are misleading, and their home interests. However, we intend to make the Prague Government themselves primarily responsible. Please call on the former Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, during the course of Monday, March 27, and inform him of the general measures which the Prague Government must now take without delay, so as to set matters in order. The measures to be specified remain to be confirmed in detail by telephone with the Foreign Ministry in the course of Monday morning. They will include with- \ : drawal of protection, expatriation, freezing of all salaries, sequestration of property and income of the persons themselves and their dependents, etc. It will also be expedient, in one or other particularly crass case, to take immediate measures, to which publicity can be given, which may serve as an example and produce a salutary effect. You are requested to get in touch with the Foreign Ministry on the subject by telephone during the morning of the 27th. Wisizsacker i Taken from the Prague copy (28/19481-82) s See document No. 5. [Editors' Note. On March 26, the twentieth anniversary of the jjffoundation of the Fascist Formations, Mussolini made a speech at the 126 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY Mussolini Forum in Rome. He formulated that part of his speech which dealt with international questions under the following five heads: ? 1. Although he would consider perpetual peace as a catastrophe for civilization, he thought a long period of peace was necessary to safe- guard European civilization in its development. But, although recently solicited [see document No. 114 below], Italy would not take the initiative until her sacrosanct rights had been recognized. 2. The period of the tours de valse [i.e., taking turns with different partners] was over. The Axis, invulnerable to any attempts to cause rifts in it, was a meeting between two revolutions "in absolute antithesis to any other conception of modern civilization ". What had happened in Central Europe was bound to happen. If the great democracies wept over the premature and somewhat dishonourable end of their dearest creation, that was an excellent reason for Italians not to associate themselves with them. When a people possessed of large numbers of men and immense stores of arms was not capable of a gesture, that showed it to be overripe for its new destiny. But, if the desired coalition against the authoritarian regimes were to come into being, these last would counter-attack in every corner of the globe. 3. The barricades between France and Italy raised by the Spanish war [spoken of in his speech of May 14, 1938, at Genoa] could be re- garded as almost entirely demolished. The impending collapse of Madrid would strike the last blow. The Italian problems in relation to France were of a colonial character ? Tunis, Jibuti, the Suez Canal. Although the French Government were free to refuse to enter even a simple discussion, in that case .they would have no cause to lament if the furrow [solco] between the two countries became too wide to be filled. Relations between States were relations of force only. 4. Geographically, historically, politically, militarily, the Mediter- ranean was a vital area for Italy. Italian interests were "preeminent but not exclusive in relation to the Slavs" in the Adriatic. 5. Italy had to arm at whatever cost, even if the Italians had to make a clean sheet of everything that was called civil life. The full text in Italian of this speech will be found in Benito Mus- solini: Scritti e Discorsi, Edizione Definitive^ XII (Milan, 1939), pp. 154-160.] MABCH, 1939 127 No. 103 I813/41517S-70 The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland Telegram No. 76 Berlin, March 27, 1939?12:00 noon. e.o. Pol. V2727. For the Ambassador. For your preliminary and personal information : The Foreign Minister received the Polish Ambassador on Sunday at midday. 1 The latter announced that Minister Beck was ready for a discussion in Berlin, but only after tangible results of present talks had been achieved through diplomatic channels. Lipski left a memoran- dum which, in effect, offers a bilateral German-Polish guarantee for the Free City of Danzig instead of the moribund guarantee of the League of Nations. Instead of an extraterritorial strip through the corridor for Autobahn and railway, the Polish Government offer far-reaching traffic concessions to and from East Prussia, -while still maintaining Polish sovereignty. Lipski characterized the present military measures by Poland as purely defensive. The Foreign Minister told the Ambassador that the Polish offer was very unsatisfactory, and reserved his answer until after consultation with the Fiihrer. (At present it is not to be expected that this answer will be forthcoming very quickly.) The Foreign Minister urgently recommended that the military measures should be rescinded, pointing to the example of Czechoslovakia in May last year. The Foreign Minister described any advance of Polish soldiers into Danzig as constituting a casus belli for us. Details to follow later. . Weizsackek 1 Mar. 26. See document No. 101. No. 104 ;■"■■ 7485/E54043S . The Charge d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Telegram ;.'No. 105 of March 27 Washington, March 27, 1939 ? 12:36 p.m. ; Pveceived March 27 ? 8:55 p.m. W Villa 705. 1) With reference to your telegram No. 94 of March 23. l I have today sent a Note to the Secretary of State in the sense of r.part 1, para. 1, without requesting a reply. In view of the additional $■. i Document No. 71. 128 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY customs duties now imposed, and the completely negative attitude of the American Government in the same matter on the occasion of the reunion of Austria and of the Sudetenland, it is certain that the Treasury will not lift or modify the order of March 18. Therefore, I did not consider even oral representations to be advisable in view of the tension prevailing here at present. 2) Note in accordance with instructions in your communication of March 7, W Villa 416, 2 handed over today. Thomsen 2 Not printed (7485/E540429-35). This despatch instructed Thomsen to present a Note stating Germany's intention to incorporate Austria and the budetenland into the German customs area in the near future. No. 105 5570/E30SS22 The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Fweign Ministry No. 74 of March 27 Telegram Belgrade, March 27, 1939?8:00 p.m. Received March 27 ? 10:50 p.m. W 449 g. With reference to my telegram No. 53 of March IS. 1 The representatives of the aircraft industry (Reiehsverband- Dornier-Messerschmitt) who have arrived here, state that on in- structions from the Reich Ministry for Air, issued at the instigation of the Foreign Ministry, they have been forbidden until further notice to submit tenders for the supply of aircraft which have been announced here and are awaited by the Yugoslav War Ministry. The representatives of these firms and the Air Attache, too, are afraid that, despite previous assurances, a fresh delay in submitting the tenders may cause grave resentment here and give rival French and British firms an opportunity for disruptive manoeuvres. If the lifting of the ban on the tenders cannot be expected in the | next few days, I propose that the representatives of the firms be authorized to submit their tenders on the express condition that the total armaments credit is approved by the competent Reich depart- -J ments. Heeeen i Document No. 21. MARCH, 1939 J 29 No. 106 2050/447383 The Legation in the Protectorate to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 151 of March 27 Prague, March 27, 1939?8:25 p.m. Received March 27?10:50 p.m. With reference to your telegram No. 128 of March 26. i 1) Salaries of refractory Foreign Ministry officials have been stopped since Thursday of last week. 2) Last Saturday I had the bank accounts here stopped of the Ministers or Charges d'Affaires in Paris, London, Washington, Warsaw Moscow and Santiago. After the inspection of the tax-returns, which is taking place today, I will also have any remaining property con- fiscated. 3) Legislative measures requisite for expatriation and expropriation will be decided upon at today's Cabinet meeting. 4) I suggest postponing publication until measures under paragraph 3 are decided upon. I should then prefer publication to be effected by the Prague Government. RlTTER Hencke i Document No. 102. No. 107 SI22/5I1 705-13 The Charge' a" Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry ■■No. 556 Washington-, March 27, 1939. Received April 5, Pol. IX 602. :■ Subject: American foreign policy; its aims and limitations. . The American Government's pronouncements and measures of the last few weeks show ever more clearly that President Roosevelt's bid ? for leadership in matters of world politics is aimed at annihilating iNational Socialist Germany with all means available, and hence at 1 nullifying the New Order in Europe. K; In order to save appearances the President has, of course, announced || in his message to Congress l that America, in her struggle against "law- llwsness and blackmail ", will not use war measures, but only "measures ifo Congressional Xecord, vol 84 pp. 76-79. Tho relevant passages f rom this easage are printed in Peace and War, No. 124. DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 130 fermmy. Amenca^own fer^y has l**n partly Fra nce and Britain, ine delivery of war materials at by a ll -ans -aiUble and not £** ^ ^ ^ , d °% ^rAmtSrthe sole purpose o£ combating Germany's exports. One must start from the ^g^^^w world war, and sufficiently a ^f "y^^^acoorded to the De- ^ h irZTi:^'^ to the totalitarian Powers - mocracies, and his aeUDer ftvT > critically democratic principles

not merely to be traced to the hypocn ^ y convinced

which he voices on every °≪^ a ^^d because she has bo
that Germany is the enemy ^ "^?£* America also will
upset the balance of P^J."^^* ^first. K the totahtarian
feel the consequences should sh e fail to get n hrst ^^

Powers establish and consolidate ****&*£* later int * a sitmt ion
w il U nKoosevelt'sview ^e manoeuvred ^^^^.^ is glad

wh ich can only end m t^^^f^^SoBCKy now. He does
of ^f^^^^^SS^ and reckons on a
not believe in the posaiauicy u Powers and the democracies,

trialof strength be ween the totahtananPo ^.^

These are America's &st ^"tS, view, be finished. Roose-
role as a great Power would, ?a*?"?£ ^ is not t o be traced

veit ? r f as rt th° c^i^^ fau to A ?'

to the desire that the ^Sf 11011 ' T ? addition to being indicative :

by virtue of her might and g£*≫~ r " t her a Sgn of innfr weakness
of an overdose of arroga-e it i much ra h e ^ gn ^ ^

and perplexity m face of ? ?>Vf t tion in ^ Far East, a fact|
late if she were not already prepared jww. ^

MAKCH, 1939 13 J

"war-potential" is now being gradually reorganized for a state of
emergency. The armament industry is receiving "trial orders"; war
material, particularly aircraft, is being delivered to Britain and France
in order to speed up production; raw materials of military importance
which are not available in the United States are being imported and
stock-piled by way of precaution; the establishment of an armament
industry m Canada is being promoted; and manoeuvres of the armed
forces on land, sea and in the air are based on objectives far transcend-
ing the requirements of national defence. At this stage of the prepara-
tions nothing is said of sending troops to theatres of war outside
America because public opinion is, at present, not prepared for this.
Eoosevelt and his advisers are also probably of the opinion that, under
present conditions, the despatch of troops to Europe after the out-
break of war would be less decisive for its outcome than if the whole
of America's economic might were made available in good time.

In order to further this policy, Roosevelt is having recourse' to the
most ruthless propaganda, and he is being assisted by those forces
which see their triumph, and their business, in the annihilation of
Germany. The propaganda of Britain, Jewry and the Communists in
brotherly association has succeeded with the means at its disposal for
influencing public opinion in press, radio and cinema, in stirring up the
American people to a degree which is not even comparable with the
psychosis of the World War years, but far transcends it. The credu-
lous and easily led majority of the mentally dull American people has
completely succumbed to the insidious propaganda that Germany is
America's "Enemy No. I ",2 that Germany intends to attack America,
to impose its system upon her, has for this purpose covered the country
. with a network of spies and agents, is preparing for acts of sabotage in
■case of war and is, in short, that "Aggressor Nation" against which
j the whole world, including Russia, must defend itself. Even com-
^paratively reasonable people believe in the propaganda arguments that
^Germany's aspirations for colonies are merely to be traced to the
/desire to be in a position to attack America from the west coast of
^Africa with squadrons of aircraft, and that Germany's struggle for the
I'Latin American markets has only been entered upon in order to
^'liberate the German minorities" there by annexation of their areas
|of colonization, and thereby, at the same time, to obtain air bases from
Iffhich to attack the Panama Canal. Propaganda flourishes in such
Ifertile soil. In general, the average American understands nothing of
iBuropean history and European politics. He has an opinion on every,
: " ' g, however, if it is only suggested to him often enough. In addition,
e is the proneness to wild enthusiasm and the emotionalism for
jirhich the American is well known; instruments upon which every
ptator and every world reformer can play. After the American
ople have been persuaded that their most sacrosanct possessions are


threatened, it only needs, in certain circumstances, outside provocation
to bring public opinion to boiling point. As things are today the vas
majority of the American people agree with the Present's policy, that
is with intimidation of the totalitarian Powers by means short of
war"'* but the notion of having to go to France for this pohcy is un-
acceptable to them, and even propaganda cannot be expected to change
them immediately in this respect, even after the outbreak of a war in
Europe The picture would in all likelihood, however, immediately
change with the arrival of the first news of the effect of air attacks on
British or French cities and on the civilian population (they would not
he so sensitive in respect of German cities) or indeed when the first
American victims of this air war came to be lamented. It would then
need comparatively little effort to get the American people into a state
of war fever similar to that which existed after the torpedoing of the

"Lusitania". ? T . , . ,

Other circles, too, are utilizing the heat of tins propaganda against
Germany to cook their own soup; circles which would be glad to take
the war psychosis into their calculations, because it would serve their
political and other business ends if America were to participate most
actively in a war; circles which, however, are themselves icy cold and
sober m their calculations while engaging in this business. Among
them are the politicians who are rendered uneasy by the chaotic state
of domestic policy throughout the country, and who would like to
overcome, at one blow, unemployment and all its attendant dangers.
There are, moreover, the armament industrialists who scent big
business And, above all, there are the Communists, who see themselves
getting nearer their goal of making a Soviet State of America if the
whole world? with the exception of Russia? is embroiled in a life and
death struggle. It is these circles, too, which are striving to reinforce
America's willingness to participate by arguing that Germany is not
economically in a position to wage a protracted war, but would collapse
within a few months from lack of raw materials, and that therefore the
time to strike is now or never. _

If this one-sided picture of American public opinion under Roosevelt s

leadership were regarded as the only one, a false impression would be

gained of the forces and counter-forces in American politics, and their

possibilities and prospects. Roosevelt's "bold" foreign policy is popular

with the broad masses on whom he relies; but he is acutely aware that

it is not supported by many leading and authoritative circles^ The

bitterest enemies of his foreign policy are in the ranks of his own Party;

but they do not oppose him in the field of foreign pohcy because of their

resentment to his domestic policy. No, they are of the opinion that

Roosevelt's pohcy will sooner or later plunge the country into war,

and they consider it their duty, as patriots, to oppose this policy with-

out regard to Party political ties. Like the Republicans, who are m

MARCH, 1939 133

principle opposed to Roosevelt's adventurous foreign policy, these men,
leaders in the Senate and House of Representatives, express themselves
as wholly in favour of America's being suitably prepared for defence;
they have, however, important reasons for not wishing America to
become involved in European conflicts, and they express these reasons
in Congress, as well as over the radio and in the press ? in so far as these
are available to them. In this connection, the Presidential election of
1940 is already casting its shadow before and, seen in the light of
American foreign policy, it assumes especial significance. It would be
wrong to suppose that, in general, Roosevelt's critics adopt, or will
adopt, a substantially different attitude towards Germany and the
totalitarian Powers. They have a different perspective, and approach
matters from the purely American point of view, needs and national
interests. For them, as American isolationists, it is an axiom wholly
compatible with American national dignity that America is 3,000 sea-
miles distant from the nearest continent, and is therefore unassailable.
It does not fill them with satisfaction to act as the world's schoolmaster,
for they realize America's limited possibilities with regard to both
foreign and domestic policy, and the everlasting dependence upon
British policy is a thorn in their flesh.

Whether or not America is prepared and in a position to take an
active part in a world war cannot irrefutably be affirmed or denied.
However, on sober consideration, the reasons against participation in
war are self-evident, and they can hardly be countered with factual
arguments even by Americans unless Roosevelt's uneasiness regarding
the threat to America's position as a World Power and to her world
prestige is regarded as justifiable.

The experiences of the World War are still all too fresh in the
memories of the American generation of today to allow them to con-
template, as desirable or without danger, a repetition of the abortive
experiment of "making the world safe for democracy". 2 The war
debts have not been paid, but their own war loans must be redeemed
and interest paid on them. The country is groaning under the heavy
burden of taxation and unbridled expenditure. In spite of the influx
of gold from all over the world, the budget deficit is becoming ever
greater, and the unemployment figure remains constant. The critics
ask: How can one, under such circumstances, lead the American people
into a war? And what are the foreseeable consequences of a war?
Nothing less than the establishment of a dictatorship, the very thing
which we supposedly wish to combat; and indeed, a dictatorship which
will, in all likelihood, never again give place to an old, sound democracy.
Before America ventures upon experiments in foreign policy, she should
first set her own house in order; diversionary manoeuvres cannot dis-
; guise the gravity of the domestic situation. More and more frequently
: ; one hears voices warning against interfering in European affairs which



do not concern America. Over there, it is much less a q≫^ion of
ideological differences, as is always maintained here, than of the de-
cision of imperialist and geopolitical points of controversy which had
already existed for centuries when America developed into independent
nationhood. In face of the unbridled attacks by the American press
and public opinion on the policies of Germany, Italy and Japan, voices
are happily not lacking which reproach the <>ace-lovmg Demo-
cracies with their own sins, past and present. The history of he
origins of the British and French World Empires is examined under the
microscope, and the hypocrisy of the arguments which the sated
nations utilize in the struggle against the "have nots * is pulled to
pieces. Even the Communist danger is recognized to an increasing
decree Whenever this problem is brought up, the idea of entering into
a war/with Russia as a possible ally, folds little approval, and many
Americans are also conscious of the danger threatening civilization if
Russia should manage to keep out of a conflict. The Cassandra cries
which conjure up the danger of a German attack on America are
countered by the retort that Germany? as well as Italy and Japan-
will probably be so busy with the consolidation of their possessions
that even after a war victorious for them, they themselves mil be by
no means in a position to consider an American adventure And even
if it be admitted that the danger exists, the American defence forces
would be perfectly able to beat off any attack on American territory.
These predominant considerations of domestic policy must be
supplemented by an examination of America's position in foreign
policy, a position which robs the American magnetic field ot much of
the power of attraction ascribed to it by Roosevelt. Japan, even
though fully occupied with China, is not America's ally today as m
1917. America's western flank would be exposed if American armed
forces should become involved in a European conflict. Even if America
does not take an active part in a war at the outset, her capacity for
action will be hampered by the incalculable factor of Japan. For
America, too, a war on two fronts is no longer a mere chimera. In any
case, forces are being pinned down which might be needed m other
sectors. America cannot under any circumstances consider an offensive
war against Japan; nor would she come to Britain's assistance if
Britain's Ear Eastern possessions were attacked by Japan. As the
case of Guam* has shown, the signs indicate that America is not only
not seeking a war with Japan but will studiously avoid it. The reasons
for this are, on the one hand, her desire to maintain and, where possible,
to increase her trade with Japan and, on the other hand, her fear of
being denied access by Japan to raw materials in the Malayan islands.

* The proposal to spend *5,0Q0,0G0 on harbour implements on ≪to H"* <* G?≪ % was defeated in the House of Representatives on Feb. 23, by 205 votes to 168. MARCH, 1939 135 This fear also partly explains the United States' penetration of Latin America. It is hoped to obtain there, with United States capital, sub- stitutes for raw materials which may perhaps be lost. In spite of all the optimism, externally displayed, regarding South America's loyal friendship under the "Good-Neighbour Policy", 2 there are no illusions here as to the reliability of the new friends. So much the more un- scrupulous in its manifestations is United States policy, which does not hesitate to connive with any Latin American Battista [sic], Trujillo or Vargas, 5 but which cannot heap sufficient invective upon true national leaders. There is complete awareness here that Latin America inclines towards Europe from tradition and economic advantage and there is, by this token, fear of the repercussions on Latin America of Nationalist Spain's victory. Finally, into the considerations of American policy there creeps the anxiety as to whether the European democracies, for whose ideals America is ready to sacrifice much, will always remain what they at present appear to be, that is, democracies. The conferment of dicta- torial powers on Daladier 6 has had an extremely sobering effect here, ' although the attempt is made to justify the need of these powers by reference to the danger threatening from Germany and Italy. Koosevelt believes that he is serving peace by piling up as much in- flammable material as possible; no one will glorify him, least of all the American people if, in the judgement of history, he appears as a Herostratus. Thomsen 5 Col. Fulgeneio Batista, Chief of the General Staff of the Constitutional Army of Cuba, 1933-39; Gen. Rafael Trujillo Molina, President of the Dominican Republic, 193 i.e., Pari. Deb., H. ofV., lot. cit,



No. 117


Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IV b

Berlin, March 28, 1939.

zu Pol. IV 2114. 1 i

A conversation took place this afternoon in section VI of the General
Staff (Colonel Wagner), at which the Foreign Ministry was represented
by the following: Consul General von Druffel from Bratis ava, Senior
Counsellor Altenburg and Secretary of Legation von Nostitz.

Herr von Druffel brought forward for discussion the various com-
plaints of the Slovak Government* against actions of the military
authorities inside and outside the occupied zone of Slovakia. At the
close of the deliberations the following points were established:

1) From March 27 inclusive, the German Customs Frontier Protection
Force in Slovakia has been withdrawn to the Moravian-Slovak frontier.

2) The line of the Waag* continues to be the line of military occupa-
tion It is proposed that at a later date its exact course will be
determined by a mixed German-Slovak military commission.

3) A staff officer will be seconded to the Consulate General by the ^
end of this week, who will establish direct liaison between the Slovak |
Armed Forces and the OKW. _ |

4) The troops to the east of the military occupation line (only single ,;
detachments are involved) are to be recalled today by urgent order, i

5) The Wehrmacht lay claim to the entire war material of the former 3
Czechoslovak Army in the occupied zone of Slovakia. The removal J
must, however, be carried out in an orderly manner (documents to be j
handed over). Any disputes and legal claims are to be dealt with later |
and to be cleared up. Paw materials and machinery to remain vhmf
they are in the armament factories of the occupied zone. -

6) There will be no more requisitioning or removal of war materia^
east of the occupied zone. When necessary, special contact will bep
made with the Slovak Government. _:

7) The question is under consideration of conceding to the Slovaks
■ State an armed force of about four divisions, of which two will be mo^

tain divisions The Fiihrer's decision on this has still to be obtained.^

8) The Volksdentsche in Slovakia are, should the case arise, to bej
concentrated in their own formations under their own command. This,
would involve the formation of about 3 mountain battalions. . . j


iw^ minted (2002/442296-98); a Slovak note verbale dated Mar. 17, which set forth,^
^1^"^ complaints referred to in the document here prmted. ? , ,|

i See document No 95 mihrer > s decision as conveyed to us by OKW. According
J£:Z S Z Waag hne 6 S to Mma" 'provision^' [≪,≪≪*,] (or was it ?≪≪
^tX^oei^MsT^eiteZl}). W[≪rm≫a]." See also document No. 99. . ;.|

MABCH, 1939 j^y

No. 118


The. Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

most tjegent Wabsaw, March 29, 1939?3-43 p m

No. 54 of March 29 Received March 29?6:35 p.m!

For the Foreign Minister.

Foreign Minister Beck summoned me yesterday evening to tell me
the following: In the conversation of March 26, i the Reich Foreign
Minister told Ambassador Lipski that a Polish coup against Danzig
would signify a casus belli. This communication forced him to state in
turn, that if an attempt should be made by Germany to alter the status
of the Free City unilaterally, Poland would regard this as a casus belli
The same applied if such a breach of the Treaty a were to be made by
the Danzig Senate. M. Beck added that the Polish Government re-
gretted the exacerbation in relations caused by the German declaration
and that, far from having any aggressive intentions towards Danzig'
they still hoped to find through friendly negotiations a solution to
the Danzig problem satisfactory to both sides. He asked me to con-
!. vey this information to the Foreign Minister.

I answered Beck that this exacerbation had been caused, not by us,
.but solely by the Polish mobilization measures, which were entirely un-
justified, and furthermore, given their effects, they were a very dubious
■ step to take. Even now, as a result of the warlike atmosphere thereby
J created, and aggravated in an irresponsible fashion by press and
| propaganda, a situation had arisen holding very dangerous possibilities.
|'The serious incidents in Pomerellen were clear proof of this. I drew
^; special attention to the scandalous outrages in Liniewo 3 and reserved
|the right to refer to this matter again when I had more precise informa-
nt: tion.

^ Beck tried to justify the mobilization measures by saying that the
I'daim made precisely at this moment about Danzig, after the events
fin Czechoslovakia and Memel, had had to be interpreted by Poland
gas a danger signal. There was no cause for anxiety that difficulties
tjnight arise in consequence of the measures taken. So far he knew

i' 1 See document No. 101.

kl The words "breach of the Treaty" are an error in deciphering. The draft of this
tfegram m the files of the \\ arsaw Embassy (7804/E566358-60) has the word "attempt ' '
h place of them . r

!<* According to a despatch of Mar. 28 from the German Consul in Torun (not printed (821/5*8761-63), a meeting of the local National Socialist Party in Liniewo on Mar 25 ^forcibly broken up by a group of Poles who also destroyed all the furnishines of the mmbly rooms and tore up a portrait of the Fiihrer and the German flag: on thf follow- misrtit windows in the house of a German subject were smashed. 148 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 2 which the Fiihrer had given preeminence to maintammg the P ok y Polish side. Moltke No. 119 6783/E513480 . . TAe Jtfimrfer ≫≫ *Ae Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry Telegram ■ the hague, March 29, 1939? 19:15 p.m.^ CONFIDENTIAL THB : ^^ ^ , No. 18 of March 29 ** w 472 g __* With reference to my report A667 of February 10. 1 '.jj SfcSntmSe^inJhiS of the Netherlands Field Army* uta.3 me that Krupp have refused delivery to the Netherlands Army rf * S s t^eSed light field howitzers, 10.5 cm latest model, togrite 5£ the requisite gunlimbers and ammunition, although Krupp m laaYa tender and demonstrated the guns here in Holland m the nuddle ^£t S ? I need not stress the overall importance of tins order *£> ^1 probably go to France in the event of German refusal, ≫*

g ^Lt.-Gen. Baron van Voorst tot Voorst.

MARCH, 1989 149

request that Krupp be prevailed upon to fulfil it. I also request that I
be placed in a position to make an explanation to the General of the
Field Army who secured the order for Krupp against the pro-French
tendencies of the War Ministry. 3


3 A copy of this telegram was forwarded to the Reiehsgruppe Industrie, which in a
letter of Apr. 1 (not printed, 6783/E513503-04) expressed the view that the C.-in-C. of
the Netherlands Field Army had been misinformed since Krupp were still interested in
and endeavouring to obtain the Netherlands order. See also Addendum to this volume.

No. 120


The Director of the Political Department to the, Legation
in Hungary


No. 100 Berlin, March 29, 1939?9:20 p.m.

e.o. Pol. IV 2203.

With reference to your telegram 87 of March 27. l

As already orally discussed in Berlin, we do not at present propose
to intervene as mediator in the negotiations between the Hungarian
and Slovak Governments on the frontier questions. You should evade
further discussion of the allegation that the Hungarian invasion of
Slovakia occurred with German approval, and contradict it if necessary
in conversation by drawing attention to the Hungarian dimenti already
f given.

I refer you also to the telephone conversation with the State Secretary
on March 28. a


> Not printed (2006/442956). In this telegram, Erdmannsdorff reported that he had
' been asked by the State Secretary of the Slovak Foreign Ministry whether the statements
of some Hungarian Commanders, that the Hungarian invasion of Slovakia had taken
;■ place with German approval, were true.
' * No record of this has been found.

≫Ia a memorandum of Mar. 31 (2313/484529) Altenburg recorded: "Minister von
.^Erdmannsdorff telephoned at 5:45 p.m. that Count Cs&ky had informed him that, with
Uncertain lega! reservations, the Slovak Delegation accepted this morning the Hungarian
I demands for establishing the frontier in Eastern Slovakia. The Hungarians are prepared
? to make certain economic concessions. Technical commissions are to be set up for this
jpas also for delimitation of the new frontier. The latter commission has already started
: 'i,mrk this afternoon."


No. 121


The, Charge f C, vol. 345, cols. 1883-1885; ;i
for Lord Plymouth's speech see Pari. Deb., H. of L., vol. 112, coU. 474-478,

3 See also document No. 83.

MARCH, 1989 jg I

being made to embody any results in secret agreements, which is how-
ever hardly practicable.

7) Introduction of conscription is improbable; instead there will be
intensified recruiting for the three branches of the Armed Forces on a
voluntary basis and, in particular, expansion of the Territorial Army.

II. The present state of the negotiations seems to rest on the follow-
ing considerations: The originally planned methods for security against
territorial changes through attack or threat of force have found but
scant welcome in all the countries concerned. Obviously the countries
consulted wish to avoid anything which could be interpreted as an
encirclement of Germany. Now Great Britain has adopted this stand-
point also. Hence the renunciation of direct Soviet Eussian coopera-
tion. It is not considered desirable to drive Germany to desperate

Poland and Rumania are not to be put in a position which must im-
pose a strain on their relations with Germany. This is the reason for
the proposed acknowledgement and development of the already
existing Polish-Rumanian defensive alliance. The proposed support
of Poland by Great Britain and France, in the event of a German attack,
is not to be given the character of a real treaty in favour of a third
party with a direct Polish claim for assistance, but will rather be in the
form of a declaration of willingness by Britain and France without the
need for acceptance. The circumstances are similar in the case of

III. Two systems of treaties are therefore apparently planned:

1) The French-British system for safeguarding the frontier in the

2) An eastern system of treaties, the nucleus of which would be
formed by the Polish-Rumanian alliance.


No. 122


Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 279 Berlin, March 29, 1939.

;, The Hungarian Minister told me today that it is thought in Budapest

that the satisfactory and rapid conclusion of our economic Treaty with

: Rumania appears to be also due to the Hungarian military measures,

I" .under the influence of which Bucharest showed itself accommodating

V' towards us, Budapest rejoiced with us over our success.

h, I laughed at Minister Sztojay, and told him that the Rumanian offers

i to us in the economic field had been made a good deal earlier than the


Hungarian military measures. I also said that I noted with pleasure
that Budapest also welcomed our economic agreement with Rumania
in the common interest.

In this conversation it also came to light that Hungary no longer
adheres to her intention to make over a few villages in Carpatho-
TJkraine to Rumania if Rumania gives her compensation tor them

elsewhere - Weizsacker

No. 123


Memorandum by the State Secretary
St S. No. 280 Berlin, March 29, 1939.

Referring to his last audience with the Fiihrer.i the Hungarian
Minister asked me today about our conversations with Poland regarding
■Danzig. He also hinted that Count Csaky would be prepared for his
part to counsel a conciliatory, attitude in Warsaw, should we so

W1 I ignored the latter idea as being futile. For the rest, I merely told

Sztojay that our conversations with the Poles were still continuing.

Certainly Warsaw had so far shown very little understanding. There

was still a great deal they must learn. 2


i See document No. 96, footnote 2. i miv,?.!" ≫?j. "Thanki"

a Marginal notes in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[uhrer] , and. Inank.

a S≫ note?" Resubmit for next conversation with the Hungarian Minister or ≪

4/IV VvfeizsackerV' A memorandum by Weiasacker, St.S. No. 309 of Apr. 3 (not

printed; 7488^640466), records that he expressed the Foreign Minister's thanks to the

Hungarian Minister.

No. 124


Memora-ndum by the State Secretary
St S No 282 Beklin, March 29, 1939. ;|

The President of the Danzig Senate, Greiser, and Staatsrat Br. |
Battcher, head of the Foreign Department of the Danzig Senate, called ;?
on me today to enquire about the state of the German-Polish discus- >j
sions on the solution of the Danzig question. - j

I acquainted the gentlemen?insofar as they were not already in-,;
forme d? with the treatment of this question during the last few months, j
and in particular with the essential substance of the conversations^

MABCH, 1930 153

of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ambassador Lipski on March 21
and 26. 1

On being asked by President Greiser what attitude Danzig should
adopt in future, I replied that in my opinion Danzig had no cause to
show the Polish Government a particularly accommodating attitude in
the treatment of Danzig-Polish questions (e.g., students' conflict 2 ),
but that, on the other hand, I did not consider it advisable to provoke
Poland in any way through Danzig. I thought it now possible to con-
duct a kind of policy of attrition towards Poland in order to make the
Polish Government more disposed to the solution we aimed at for certain
German-Polish questions, including also the Danzig question. Danzig
should continue to behave just as during the last few weeks and months.

President Greiser further asked what attitude Danzig should adopt
in future towards Professor Burckhardt ; the League of Nations Com-
missioner in Danzig. I replied that I considered it advisable for
Burckhardt not to return to Danzig for the time being as he only ran
the danger of being misused by the Polish Diplomatic Representative
there for Polish ends and to further the intentions of the Committee of
Three. 3 When Greiser asked if he, Greiser, should accept an invitation,
if it were issued, from the Committee of Three to go to London, I
answered that it would be better if he declined such an invitation, as
it was to be feared that he would merely be interrogated by the Com-
mittee of Three, treated disrespectfully and then dismissed.


1 See documents Nos. 61 and 101.

* See vol. v of this Series, document No. 131.

* The Committee of Three, composed of representatives of Great Britain, France and
Sweden, was an organ of the League Council set up on July 4, 1936. Its purpose was to

■ give preliminary consideration to, and thus relieve the Council's agenda of, the numerous
;■■ Danzig issues referred to the League by the High Commissioner, See also vol. v of this
Series, chapter I.

No. 125


The Ministry of the Interior to the Head of the Reich Chancellery

VI b 701 X/39 Berlin, March 29, 1939.


r'Subjeet: German-Polish Governmental negotiations on questions con-
""'' cerning national groups.

ly I enclose copies of the memorandum on the German-Polish negotia-
1 tions 1 for your information.

i Not printed (1522/373337-59). The minutes of the discussions held Feb. 27-Mar. 3,
H'1939. There are seven appendices containing the agenda, German and Polish proposals
W\ on specific items and draft press communiques.



I would like to make a few general remarks on the negotiations con-
ducted with the representatives of the Polish Government:
The negotiations have given the following clear picture:
The Poles have no intention of making any change in their policy
towards the German national group. In less important spheres they
may be prepared to- make small concessions, but in matters affecting
the life of the German national group they are determined to pursue
with vigour their present de-Germanizing policy. The following two
fundamental considerations on the part of the Polish delegation ran
like a scarlet thread through the discussions: ?

a) During the one and a half centuries of Prussian administration, a
definite percentage of the former Polish population has been Ger-
manized. The Polish Government regard it as their duty to bring this
section of the population back into the Polish national community.

b) The German national group, though it still only amounts to two
per cent of the total Polish population, nevertheless possesses such a
strong economic and cultural structure that it is able to exert a not in-
considerable influence on sections of the Polish national community
which lack stability. Therefore the German community must be re-
duced to a degree of insignificance commensurate with its numerical

Regarding (a) I replied to the Polish delegation as follows: The .
Germans did not first come into the country during the period of
Prussian rule. On the contrary, there had for centuries been a con-
siderable proportion of German settlers in the districts which fell to
Prussia in 1772 and 1793. Thus the Germans did not come to Poland
as conquerors, but were invited into the country by the Polish kings
and nobles. In all spheres of. cultural and economic life they have ?
worked constructively in every way, so that they have acquired a
number of privileges. This, I explained, is perhaps the underlying reason
for the strong, centuries-old antipathy shown towards the German
community by the Polish people, to whom the Germans were held up
as examples by the Polish ruling classes of the time. Today the
Germans demand no privileges, but only that their most elementary.:
right to live should be respected.

Concerning the fundamental idea in (6), I asked the Polish delega-
tion how the Polish Government, in view of this consideration, en-
visaged the carrying out of the Minorities Declaration of November 5,
1937, 2 according to which any discrimination against the German
national group was to be ruled out.

In reply to this the Polish delegation could only state that all-
measures are kept strictly within the laws made by the democracy of

2 See vol. v of this Series, document No. 18.

MARCH, 1939 155

Poland, and are applicable to everyone. This basic view, in my opinion,
provides the key to the Polish attitude towards the German community!
that is, a frantic endeavour to appear as a great Power united in a single
national State, combined with an inferiority complex.

Concerning the position of the Polish national community in Ger-
many, the Polish delegation pointed out that the National Socialist
ideology is unfavourable soil for the prospects of a foreign minority
in Germany. The object of all laws, as indeed the laws themselves
openly declared, was the welfare of the German people. The dynamic
force of National Socialism, permeating as it did the entire German
nation, was so strong that no room was left for individual life to the
Polish national group.
The following conclusion can accordingly be drawn:
The Polish Government, on the basis of their "democratic" laws,
arrogate to themselves the right to torment and persecute the German
community, and deprive them of their rights, while at the same time
demanding privileges for the Polish national group in Germany. In
view of this basic attitude no constructive results could be achieved in
the discussions. By order;

Dr. Vollert

|: No. 126

}' 2908/566066-67

I Senior Counsellor Schliep to Ambassador Moltke

Berlin, March 29, 1939.

My Dear Ambassador: I beg to submit herewith Prince Bismarck's
memorandum 1 on his conversation today with Prince Lubomirski. 2

Herr Greiser was received this evening by the State Secretary 3 and
the Foreign Minister.* On being asked by the President of the Senate
what attitude Danzig should adopt, Herr von Weizsacker answered
that in his opinion Danzig had no cause to show Poland a particularly
accommodating attitude in the treatment of Danzig-Polish affairs; nor
did he, on the other hand, consider it advisable to provoke Poland from
Danzig in any way. In his opinion Germany would now adopt a kind
of attrition tactics towards Poland in order to make the Polish Govern-
ment more disposed to the settlement aimed at by us for certain German -
Polish problems. During this period of attrition Danzig should con-
tinue to behave as in the last few weeks and months.

\ i Not printed (52/34603-04). Bismarck had protested about the incidents in Liniewo
,. wA elsewhere, which had been reported from Torun (see document No. 118 footnote 3)
:; and the appeal to boycott the German element launched by several Polish organizations
;:;.* Counsellor of the Polish Embassy in Berlin.
'■ J See document No. 124.

* No material on this interview has been found.


The Foreign Minister also spoke on the same lines: Danzig should
adopt a Sphinx-like attitude towards Poland. Germany would stick
to her demands on Poland and continue to assert them emphatically.
Moreover, the Foreign Minister was of the opinion that the climax of
the present crisis had already been reached.

Heartiest greetings. and Heil Hitler!

Yours sincerely, ' Schliep

No. 127


Minister Blucher to State Secretary Weizs&cker

Helsinki, March 29, 1939.

Dear Baron von Weizsackbr: Knowing how fully occupied your

time is, I do not usually trouble you with private letters. Today I

would like to make an exception in connection with the Aaland

question. 1

You know that, with the exception of Germany and Italy, all the
signatory Powers have replied to the Finnish-Swedish Note 2 weeks ago.
Now the non-arrival of our reply is extremely awkward for the Finnish
Government, and especially for the Finnish Foreign Minister, because
the elections are due to take place on July 1, and by then the matter
must have passed through the tedious parliamentary channels common
to every democratic country. At every meeting with me the Foreign
Minister refers to the non-arrival of the German reply, and anything
that I can say in reply is but poor consolation.

At the same time the Foreign Minister is fully prepared for Germany
to make a reservation regarding the special Swedish rights and
about bringing in the League of Nations. I have the impression that
this reservation is not so awkward for him as the fact that we have
been keeping him waiting for weeks, especially as there are circles in-
side and outside the Government who regard the non-arrival of the
German reply as a slight to a small State, or who even suspect Mac-
chiavellian designs behind it.

In these days when Britain is courting Poland and Russia, and when
Mr. Hudson is expected here, 3 the Finnish attitude is not without
significance in the process of a possible regrouping of the Powers, at
least in Northern Europe. In this respect too, it would serve our
interests not to keep the Finns waiting any longer.

i See document No. 145 and also vol. v of this Series, chapter iv.

2 See the League of Nations, Official Journal, May-June, 1939, pp. 279-282, and vol.v
of this Series, document No. 464.

a R S Hudson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Department of Overseas Trade,
arrived at Helsinki for trade talks on Mar. 29. This visit was part of a tour which had
already taken him to Warsaw and Moscow,

MARCH, 1939 J 57

In particular, I would like the Foreign Minister, for his own sake,
to be able soon to present his Cabinet with the German reply In
these critical days, M. Erkko has clearly dissociated himself from
Russia and, in a certain sense, from Britain also, and because of this
has had to overcome much opposition among his Cabinet colleagues'
Continued non-arrival of the German reply is bound to weaken his
position in the Cabinet, and that runs counter to our interests.

In conclusion, therefore, I would like to urge that the reply to the
Aaland note be speeded up as much as possible. 4

I kiss the Baroness's hand and send kind regards to yourself
Heil Hitler! J

Yours sincerely, Blucher

* Margmal note: 1. Foreign Muuster has been informed. 2. Today I promised the
Swedish Mm.ster an early opportunity for a discussion. 3. Blucher has to be put off
for another brief penod. Herewith to the Under State Secretary, Wfeizsaclcer] 4. [4] "

No. 128


The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry


No. 78 of March 30 Belgrade, March 30, 1939?8 :50 p.m.

Received March 31?1:50 a.m.
W 474 g.
With reference to my telegram No. 74 relating to the arms transac-
tion, 1

I. On instructions from the Ministry of War, Colonel Bosanovic in-
formed Military Attache von Faber officially yesterday that the progress
of the negotiations for the armaments transaction was causing grave
concern. The tender for anti-aircraft guns submitted by the firm of
Krupp could just not be discussed in view of the prices quoted. The
prices were several times higher than those asked by competitors
The Ministry of War still wishes to conclude a deal with Germany as
soon as possible. However, a prior condition was of course the quota-
tion of prices which were in some degree acceptable. He was urgently
requesting the Military Attache also himself to bring influence to bear
in order that the conclusion of a big armaments deal should not be
endangered by private firms demanding impossible prices.

n. Simovic, the Chief of the General Staff, who had asked Air
Attache von Schonebeck to call on him this morning, expressed on
behalf of the Ministry of War similar concern regarding the progress of
negotiations for the delivery of aircraft. The submission of tenders

1 Document No. 105.



from the aircraft firms, urgently requested and long promised, was
repeatedly being delayed for some obscure reason. These tenders
formed, however, the indispensable basis for any negotiations, since it
could only be seen from them whether the prices quoted came at all
within the range of what was feasible for Yugoslavia. Since the Field
Marshal had approved in principle the conclusion of big arms transac-
tions on a credit basis, the difficulties which were suddenly cropping
up were not understood here. On the other hand, the smooth con-
clusion of the transaction would greatly enhance Germany's prestige
with the army and the public.

III. Consul General Neuhausen has been advised of the foregoing.
As he has just informed me he has, in consultation with Ministerial-
direktor Wiehl by telephone, cleared up the question of the ban on
tenders from aircraft firms to the effect that the tender may be sub-
mitted subject to a proviso regarding agreement being reached on the
question of credit.

IV. Like the Military and Air Attaches, I too have the impression
that the Yugoslav Ministry of War attaches the greatest importance to
speedy rearmament and urgently needs our assistance for this, with the
result that the exploitation of this difficult situation by the quoting of
exorbitant prices may cause serious and lasting resentment to the detri-
ment of the good name of German industry.



No. 129

Memorandum by th& State Secretary

St.S. No. 292

Beblin, March 30, 1939.
e.o. Pol. II 1049.

The Swiss Minister 1 told me today, in continuation of our recent
conversation, 2 that the Swiss Government were not involved either
officially or semi-officially in the discussions which were taking place
now between Britain and France with a view to cooperating for the
protection of Switzerland, Belgium and Holland. Switzerland knew no
more of these matters than what she had learnt from the press. She
regarded what was going on between London and Paris as res inter alios



1 Hans Frolicher.

2 See document No. 109.

MARCH, 1989 J 59

No. 130


Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department

Berlin, March 30, 1939.

Economic Tension with the United States of Amebica

Caused by the Incoefobation of the Peotectoeate of

Bohemia and Moravia

1) American measures. l

The American Government immediately withdrew most-favoured
treatment from goods from the Protectorate and placed them on a par
with goods from the Reich proper [Altreich]. They have further directed
that, as from April 22, an additional duty of 25 per cent is to be im-
posed on all dutiable goods from the Reich proper, the Protectorate
and Memel. These measures against the Reich proper have long been
recommended by certain circles in America and also by some govern-
ment offices. Their introduction at the present moment may be con-
sidered merely as a political gesture of disapproval.

2) Effects of the measures.

Through the withdrawal of most-favoured treatment, the sale of
goods from the Protectorate in the USA is rendered very difficult.
As a result of the additional duty, the Greater Reich's export to the
USA, hitherto worth 200 million RM, will probably be cut by approxi-
mately 85 million RM. With this export of 85 million RM, we have
hitherto paid for the import of important raw materials (cotton and
copper) for which, if we must still obtain them from the United States,
foreign exchange will have to be expended.

3) Possible counter-measures.

The following might be considered:

(a) Immediate and complete cessation of purchases of cotton in
order to strike the United States at this sensitive spot in its economic
and domestic policy. 2 However, German economy would also be
harmed by this action, as long as we did not succeed in transferring our
orders for cotton to other countries, a transfer which would probably
be difficult. The desired effect on the USA is lessened by the fact that
the American Government have already introduced measures to ease
the political pressure at home by subsidizing their exports of cotton.
A decrease in our supplies of cotton from the USA will result from the

i See documents Noe. 14, 33, 56, 71 and 104.
2 See document No. 24.


actual situation, even though it is ordered and announced as a counter-

(b) Imposition of the maximum German tariff on imports from


(c) Complete cessation of payments to USA on German debts.

All these measures, especially those specified under (b) and (c),
■would certainly provoke further American measures. First of all,
penalty duties would be imposed, as a result of which there would be
a complete cessation of German exports to the USA; further, also,
measures [would be taken] against German property and German
balances in the USA as well as against German shipping, as a result of
which trade between Germany and other countries would be seriously
affected (cf. previous memorandum of December 19, 1938). 3

4) The freezing of Czech credit balances (State and private) in
American banks, originally ordered, has meanwhile been rescinded.
American creditors with balances in the Protectorate are, through the
German foreign currency control introduced there, restricted in their
use of these credits without the need having arisen to institute special
freezing measures. The Protectorate's public and private debts to the
USA amount to approximately 28 million dollars, and the gold and
foreign currency credit of the former Czech Government with the
Federal Reserve Bank in New York amounts to approximately the
same, so that for this reason, too, a special order blocking American
claims against the Protectorate cannot be recommended.

5) Further procedure.

Definite German counter measures are not contemplated. Where
restrictions are possible (cotton) they will be made "unobtrusively"
[auf kaltem Wege]. The attempt will be made to obtain as much as
possible from the German- American exchange of commodities. It is
hoped to induce the United States Government to cancel the addi-
tional duties by dropping the German measures for promotion of ex-
ports which were the reason given for these additional duties.


3 Vol. iv of this Series, document No. 514.

No. 131


Ministerialdirektor Wohlthat to State Secretary Weizsacker
W VI/373 Berlin, March 30, 1939.

Dear State Secretary: I transmit herewith for your confidential
information a copy of my report to the Field Marshal on the negotia-
tions in Bucharest. 1

1 i.u,, for tlio Ucmnm-ltLiiiiiuiitui Economic Tiyaty (document No. 7S).

MARCH, 1939 JgJ

I have submitted the matter to the Foreign Minister. Ministerial-

direktor Wiehl has also been informed. 3 I promised [Under] State

Secretary Woermann that I would forward this report, and I would be

grateful if you would acquaint him with it.

Heil Hitler!

Yours faithfully, 5 Wohxthat

2 Wohlthat also submitted a memorandum (not printed, 2104/455751-59), entitled
"Survey of the first economic effects of the German-Rumanian Economic Treaty" to
Wiehl on the same date. ' ' u


w VI / 313 Berlin, March 27, 1939.

Report on my Negotiations in Bucharest of
Maech 10-23, 1939
Submitted to Field Marshal Goring for his information.

My departure from Berlin was delayed several days as the Foreign
Minister's report, in which recommendations were to have been made
for the treatment of the Antarctic discoveries 3 and for instructions for
negotiations with Rumania, was only made on March 9. State Secretary
Weizsacker being agreeable, I set off on March 8. On my arrival in
Bucharest on March 10, I could see how important it was that my
journey had not been further delayed. Political circles in Bucharest
had reckoned with a Cabinet reshuffle if the German Government had
not empowered me to conclude a treaty, or had put off the negotiations.
The Ministers who would have been replaced because their pro-German
policy, which had been sanctioned by the King, had proved unsuccess-
ful, were: Gafencu, the Foreign Minister; Bujoiu, the Minister of
Economics and Slavescu, the Minister for Armaments.

Gafencu had informed the British that, as long as Rumania was
negotiating with Germany, they should make their proposals in writing,
and for the time being send no economic delegation to Bucharest. I
had agreed on this with Gafencu when I left at the end of February.
Bujoiu had been charged with the direction of the negotiations by the
King after he had obtained His Majesty's approval for his economic
policy after arguments with Constantinescu, the Finance Minister and
Governor of the National Bank, in two ministerial conferences under
the King's chairmanship, Slavescu had, as Minister for Armaments,
energetically advocated a policy of cooperation with Germany; I had
also convinced him of the better prospects of supplies from Germany
under the collective plan, compared with supplies from France and

J This may possibly be a reference to the German Antarctic expedition, 1938-39


Gafencu asked me immediately on my arrival what political news I
had for the King as he needed the support of the King vis-a-vis the
other Ministers in order to push the treaty through the Cabinet. In
addition to bringing the actual terms of the treaty to his notice, I
endeavoured to bring home to him the immense political value of the
German proposal which was that, instead of a secret agreement, an
official State treaty should be concluded, for which the German Reich
Chancellor on the one side and the King of Rumania on the other side
would appoint their plenipotentiaries. As instructed, I did not go into
the matter of the decoration,* the personnel questions and Gafencu's

visit to Berlin. . .

The King had given instructions that the conversations were only to
be conducted by his Ministers. This led to loss of time as, after I had
convinced Bujoiu, the Minister for Economics, he had to keep reporting
to the Cabinet, which was meeting under the chairmanship of the King.
After the first news of the events in Slovakia and Prague, political
tension developed and continued to mount daily until the signature of
the treaty on March 23. On March 15 and 16, 1 was able to report that
Gafencu the Foreign Minister, was in agreement with the form of the
treaty and that the King agreed in principle to the draft treaty drawn
up with Bujoiu, the Minister of Economics.

A three hour meeting of the Cabinet and Privy Councillors took place
under the chairmanship of the King during the late afternoon of March
17 At this meeting Rumanian policy was laid down in respect of the
events in Czechoslovakia and the Hungarian invasion of Carpatho-
Ukraine the attuning of Rumania's policy with that of her allies,
Poland and Yugoslavia, the attitude to be taken in the Balkan Entente
and the Little Entente and the economic treaty with Germany. The
Cabinet clearly saw that far more than a commercial treaty in the usual
sense was involved. '

Since my arrival, British and French journalists had appeared in
steadily increasing numbers. The foreign diplomats, particularly the
British daily pressed the Rumanian Ministers for information on the

i See vol. v of this Series, document No. 261 , footnote 2 . The Wiehl telegram of Dec. 6
(2104/455845), there quoted, also includes the following passage: In view -of recent
Sittcal events in Rumania, it has been decided to drop the plan to confer a decoration
^Zrrnwn Prince " In a letter of Mar. 16 to Wiehl not printed, 2104/4o5796-97)
Gramsch aToS of the Four Year Plan, quoted the following passage from a letter
ftonVWohUnat- "I have learned from the Minister here that the prospects in the matter
of Sedecorations, which the King feels as a personal insult to hunself, are ex twmely
doubtful, ≪ the suggestion for this" action is supposed to have been made t° the Pub?

Tretty You may act on this should any importance still be attached [by the Rumanians]
to a settlement of the matter."

MABCHj 1939 163

state of the negotiations with Germany. On Saturday, March 18, The
Times and the BBC London reported a German economic ultimatum
to Rumania. When the news reached Bucharest, I was holding a dis-
cussion with Bujoiu, the Minister for Economics, on the text of the
treaty, the signature of which I wished to effect on Monday, March 20,
if possible, in view of the threatening situation. Titeanu, the Rumanian
State Secretary for Propaganda, called on us at once at the Ministry
for Economic Affairs, and loyally discussed an official dementi which the
Rumanian Government proposed of their own accord and in which the
friendly character of our negotiations was to he emphasized. For his
part, Gafencu immediately telephoned Ambassador Tatarescu in Paris
and instructed him to make public Bucharest's ddmenti. Gafencu
similarly telephoned Tilea, Minister in London, who, it is true, did not
communicate the dementi officially to the British press. At that time
the Rumanians considered Reuter's Bucharest representative to be the
guilty person. It transpired during the course of the day that the
Western Powers were bringing unusual pressure to bear on Rumania in
order to prevent the conclusion of a treaty with Germany.

I was forced to infer from these events that the conclusion of a
secret treaty was no longer possible, and I changed the texts into that
of a State treaty which could, if necessary, be published, and a Secret
Protocol of Signature incorporating the objects and reciprocal promises
of the two Governments, which were not suitable for publication. In
spite of the fact that I completed the new texts with M. Bujoiu during
the night from Saturday to Sunday, signature could not take place on
Monday, as M. Bujoiu could, in the tense political situation, no longer
obtain the approval of the other Ministers. On Tuesday, March 21,1
negotiated for nine consecutive hours with M. Bujoiu and thought that I
had reached agreement with him by one o'clock in the morning. As it
further transpired at midday, Wednesday, March 22, that the Cabinet,
?with the King as chairman, was still discussing the treaty, I called on
Foreign Minister Gafencu together with Minister Fabrieius at five in
the afternoon, and pointed out to him the risk Rumania was running
by a further delay in signature. I stated that I would leave for Berlin
during the evening of Thursday, March 23, and I requested direct
negotiations in which the Foreign Minister himself should take part, or
immediate audience of the King. I was obliged to take this decisive
step as a critical situation had developed in the excitable southern
atmosphere, under the influence of world publicity and the mobilization
in Bucharest. The rural population called to the colours appeared in
masses in Bucharest and other towns. There was a partial breakdown
in transport. Milliards of Lei were withdrawn from the banks. The
population listened in to the radio announcements from London and
Paris. The leading political circles were convinced that an invasion
from Himgary threatened Transylvania, and that one from Bulgaria


threatened the Dobruja. It was said that the Russians were con-
centrating forces on the Bessarabian frontier The ? ? *£££
either Germany must restrain Hungary and Bulgaria, or that Britain
and France must guarantee the Rumanian frontiers. _

The question of whether the German-Rumanian treaty was signed or
not had, as a result of Britain's policy, become of decisive ^P<*tance for Germany's position in South East Europe. Quite apart from the fundamentally new trade policy adopted by us Germans under the treaty, I was able to bring about the following political consequences by concluding it: 1 The Rumanian people would be released by Germany from the nightmare of mobilization and the threat to their frontiers. 2 The mobilization led to the entire people becoming conscious that their future depended on the treaty and on cooperation with Germany. 3. Germany successfully asserted herself in Rumanian eyes in an open trial of strength with Britain. 4 AH South East European countries" were compelled to see who possessed the ascendancy on the Danube, supported by economic realities: Germany with her modem forms of treaty, or Britam and France with old claims and propaganda. 5 It was possible to inflict a decisive defeat in the European political sphere on the British and French during Lebrun's State visit to London* when Rumania, the greatest and richest country of South East Europe, voluntarily concluded with Germany, in spite of all attacks, the most important economic treaty in all her history. The decisive negotiations began at seven o'clock in the evening at Minister Bujoiu's home. Gafencu was present. Shortly before, Minister Fabricius had received. a communication by telephone from the Foreign Ministry in Berlin that they would attach the greatest importance to signature during that very night. When it transpired that the Rumanians were not agreed on three important points because they feared for their sovereignty, I took such a strong line that Caknescu, the Minister President, was brought in. Gafencu wished to have ex- pression given in the text of the treaty to a peace policy. I declared that a grand economic policy could only be effected in peacetime. He insisted on his wish and then accepted my proposal to insert mthe preamble the words' "in pursuance of their peaceful aims". Calinescu proved to be an outstanding jurist, but one who could not reply to economic and anancial arguments. From the King's appearance, I concluded that he too regarded the prompt conclusion of the treaty as necessary. As he' only put forward political arguments, I saw an opportunity to push through all the German demands, made no further concessions m the 6 See document No. 84, footnote 2. MARCH, 1988 1(J5 matter and only altered the wording. Calinescu resisted industrial cooperation on a mixed industrial committee as the Rumanians feared Germany would deny them self-determination in their industrialization. The Rumanians further asked for a State credit of 200-250 million RM and quoted to me as example the German credit loans granted to Yugoslavia, .Poland and Turkey. I declined, and it remained a matter of private credit. Finally, Bujoiu, who certainly did not speak from his own conviction but was urged on by Constantineseu, the Finance Minister, advocated various restrictive provisions in the matter of financing and capital investments. Calinescu then left the meeting for a time in order to obtain the consent of the other Ministers and the King. The texts were completed by 4 a.m., after adoption of the Ger- man wishes. Signature was, indeed, no longer possible during that night but, at the earliest, at midday on Thursday, March 23, after a fair copy had been completed and the Rumanian texts had been trans- lated. Even though there was a certain risk in the delay of signature, this was offset by the material advantages obtained under the treaty. If there was no alteration in the political situation, the effect of the signature on Britain and France would still be the same on Thursday, at the end of Lebrun's State visit. Incidentally, the Rumanians con- sidered Italian opposition to the German policy to be particularly disturbing. At midday on Thursday, Minister Bujoiu asked me to call on him, as the Rumanians wished to have four points amended before signature. It transpired that, in particular, the question of how Yugoslavia was to receive the State credits had been raised. I refused orally to reopen negotiations, and only agreed to one point where the Rumanians had erred in favour of Germany, the phrase "as well as" being replaced by the word "or". The signature took place in the Foreign Ministry at 5:30 in the afternoon. Gafencu concluded his address with the hope that Germany would, as a result of the treaty, gain a similar position to the one she had enjoyed in Rumania before 1914. From the Foreign Ministry I drove straight to the audience in the palace. The King was very satisfied with the terms of the treaty and with its signature at this moment. He expected a general feeling of relief from the news of the signature which, in fact, was spreading like wildfire among the population, who were in a state of extreme tension as a result of the mobilization. The King mentioned that relations between the two countries were, however, not yet satisfactory on all counts. On the basis of communications from the Foreign Ministry, I could now hold out the prospect of Gafencu, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, being invited to Berlin. In general terms, I also spoke somewhat optimistically of the further questions, as Minister Fabricius had received a communication by telephone from the Foreign Ministry 166 DOCUMENTS ON" GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY from which it appeared that the matter of the decorations would also be settled. When the King asked what repercussions the linking of Rumania's national economy with that of Germany would produce in the sphere of foreign exchange policy, I explained to him the possible, solution for a future settlement of inter-State liabilities in Europe. The King believed that, with the present trend of British policy, these questions could not be broached. The conversation took a markedly polite course. When the audience ended, the square before the palace was filled with an excited crowd of people. American and British journalists asked me as I left the palace whether signature had taken place. The Americans had wagered with the British that I would succeed in concluding the treaty. Rightly or wrongly, it was felt among the Rumanian people that peace had been assured by the conclusion of the treaty. At my de- parture from the station, which was surrounded by thousands of peasants called to the colours, uniformed police officials were standing in readiness to accompany the sleeping-car to the frontier, so as to prevent its being stormed by troops or peasants, or even attacked by Jews, who made no secret of their rage. The following concomitants of the negotiations should also be em- phasized. Tilea, the Rumanian Minister in London, was immediately summoned home in spite of the fact that he is a friend of Gafencu and Tatarescu. He was not allowed to take part in the ceremonies of the State visit, and is said to have been recalled. Ausnit, 6 the Jewish in- dustrial magnate, with his offers of large credits for an Anglo-French syndicate, met with a refusal from the Rumanians, as I convinced the latter that Ausnit and his friends wished to take their capital out of Rumania in this way. Kaufmann, the leading Jewish banker, and owner of the Banque de Credit, .with whom negotiations had already been conducted for some weeks, sold the shares needed for a 51 per cent majority to a Rumanian syndicate of which, among other people, the Queen of Greece is a member, and gave the syndicate's brokers a firm option on the rest of his holdings. By this means, Jewish influence was successfully eliminated from this bank. The Deutsche Bank of Berlin is to be a member of the pool which will control the bank. On my return I gave State Secretary Korner 7 a brief account, and will report to the Foreign Minister this afternoon. Wohxthat * General manager of the Eejita iron-works and director of many large Rumanian industrial undertakings. ' Permanent Deputy to Goring as Commissioner for the Four Year flan. MABCH, 1939 167 No. 132 1975/488349-50 The State Secretary to the Legation in Hungary Telegram No. 103 Berlin, March 30, 1939. Sent March 31?2:15 a.m. zu Pol. IV 2206 Ang. I.i zu Pol. IV 2213. 2 With reference to your telegram No. 90 of March 29. 1 Bucharest Legation reported on March 29 : 2 "Hungary demands recognition of her new frontiers with Rumania and proposes the issue of a declaration along the lines of the as yet un- signed declaration of Bled^ between Hungary, Yugoslavia and Rumania. Yugoslavia has already agreed. Rumania desires more precise details as only a pledge of non-aggression is provided for, and no frontier guarantee (such as was promised in the semi-official article in the Pester Lloyd). Rumania thus renounces the villages and railways of Carpatho-Ukraine, and Gafencu therefore expects to receive today, or at the latest tomorrow, an answer which will make it possible to order demobilization." End of report. For our attitude to the Bled Agreement I refer you to telegram No. 136 of August 26* f i ast year an 097

Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 306 _ Berlin, April 1, 1939.

Today Attolico again broached the Croat question. 1 I gave him the
most formal assurance that everything had been done to allay his
anxiety about contact between the Croats and German authorities.


1 See also documents Nos. 55 and 94.

No. 145


Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department l

The Aaland Islands Question 2

1) After the Crimean War in 1856 Russia had to give an undertaking
to Trance and Britain not to fortify the Aaland Islands or to station
any military forces therein. In 1917, after her separation from Russia,
Finland, without more ado, claimed the Aaland Islands for herself.
However, a plebiscite in the Islands in 1919 resulted in a large majority
for union with Sweden. To remove the resulting tension between the
two countries, the Council of the League of Nations decided in 1921
that the Archipelago should remain under Finnish rule but should be
demilitarized and neutralized by an agreement between the interested
Powers. Thereupon the Convention on the non-fortification and neutra-
lization of the Aaland Islands was concluded in Geneva on October 20,
1921, under the auspices of the League of Nations. 3 The Signatory
Powers are Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Great
Britain, Italy, Latvia, Poland and Sweden, but not, however, Soviet
Russia. The provisions for demilitarization of the islands are very
thorough: "no fortifications or other military constructions, no garrison-
ing of armed forces, no landing of warships, etc." In the event of war,
the area of the islands is to be regarded as a neutral zone which may
not be used either directly or indirectly as a base for military operations.
On the application of one or more Signatory Powers, the Council of the
League of Nations must decide on measures necessary for securing the

1 The document is unsigned and undated. It bears the following marginal note:
"Memorandum by Ministerialdirektor Gaus for the Reich Foreign Minister."

2 See vol. v of this Series, chapter iv, and this volume, document No. 127.
* See League of Nations Treaty Series (Geneva, 1922), vol. ix, pp. 212-221.

APRIL, 1939 281

carrying out of the Convention or for preventing a violation of its
provisions. (Art. 7, I). Only in the case of a surprise attack upon the
islands may Finland herself take the necessary defence measures
{Art. 7 II).

2) On January 26 of this year the Finnish and Swedish Ministers
delivered Notes* with identical texts at the Foreign Ministry stating
that Finland and Sweden had agreed to a number of amendments to
the 1921 Convention and asking for the concurrence of the German
Government. With the assent of all Signatories, the matter was to be
submitted to the Council of the League of Nations. The main points
of the Fmno-Swedish agreement are as follows: the neutral character
of the island zone is to be maintained. Demilitarization, on the other
hand, is to be considerably curtailed. In the southern part of the zone
Finland is to have a completely free hand for military protective
measures. In the northern part she is to have the right to certain
defence measures for ten years: military training of the population
stationing of troops also from other parts of the country, mobile coastal
artillery, etc. In the event of danger of war Sweden shall, at the re-
quest of Finland, also be able to take part in the defence measures
Further, it is to be laid down that no belligerent Power shall have the
right to intervene on its own initiative by armed force to protect the
neutrality of the islands.

3) According to the 1921 Convention the decision on all measures
which prove necessary for the protection of the neutrality and demili-
tarization of the islands rests with the Council of the League of Nations
In principle this will remain unchanged under the n&w Finno-Swedish
proposals. By accepting these proposals therefore, which in substance
replace the old agreement by a new one, we would again be recognizing
the competence of the Council of the League of Nations. It is also a
contradiction in terms that the two Northern States themselves should
primarily base their proposals on the failure of the security system of the
League of Nations, that they should deduce therefrom the necessity for
direct Finnish and Swedish military measures, but that all other Signa-
tory Powers are to continue to be subject to the jurisdiction of the
Council of the League of Nations regarding measures permitted to them.
We could therefore for good reasons reject such a system and demand
the complete exclusion of the Council of the League of Nations. As a
result tedious negotiations for another settlement would then probably
be necessary and, if such a settlement proved possible at all, the parti-
cipation of the Soviet Union could probably not be avoided, though,
however, as a permanent Council Power, they also have a voice under
the present system.

4) In the opinion of our military authorities, Germany is interested in

* See vol. v of this Series, document No. 464.


the Aaland Islands remaining neutral in the event of war, as provided
in the 1921 Convention. In the present situation this no longer appears
assured if the islands are unfortified, as the Russians today have forces
sufficient to take possession of the unfortified islands even against the
resistance by Sweden and Finland. With the further growth of the
Russian Navy, Russian intentions will go beyond the defensive task
of securing the Gulf of Finland and will aim at political and military
supremacy in the northern Baltic Sea. On that account it must be
expected that the military leaders of the Soviet Union will strive for
the possession of the Aaland Islands, first in order to be in a better
position to interrupt German commercial sea-communications and
secondly to outflank German military approach routes to the Gulf of
Finland. The fortifications planned will obviously be regarded by
Finland as being also primarily directed against Russia. The Swedes
on the other hand, even though they have now expressed, at the insis-
tence of the Finnish Government, their agreement to the fortification of
the islands, have probably given more thought to the possibility that,
in a German-Russian conflict, Germany might occupy the islands as a
preventive measure in order to forestall the Russians. But, as our
military interests are primarily directed to the maintenance and pro-
tection of the neutrality of the islands, we need take no offence at
Sweden's proposed participation. 5 Should the case arise that in a
war Russia, Finland and Sweden were aligned against us, they would in
any case try to use the Aaland Islands as a base against us.

5) The High Command of the Navy wishes the opportunity to be
taken to discuss with the Swedish Government the maintenance of
deliveries of ore to Germany in the event of war and safeguarding
its transport. As the settlement of the Aaland Islands question is
an integral part of the Finnish and Swedish policy of neutrality, it
would in fact present a natural starting point for such a conversation
with the Swedes. The conversation would probably have to be conduc-
ted in such a way as not to make the discussion of the question of
deliveries of ore a direct condition of our assent to an amendment of the
1921 Convention. Nor can it be expected that it will be possible to arrive
at a precise and binding agreement with Sweden on deliveries of ore . We
can merely try to induce the Swedish Government to make a general
statement somewhat to the effect that, in the event of war, they do not
intend to take measures which might have an unfavourable effect on
the normal export of ore to Germany.

6) Taking all factors into account it would probably be advisable
not to make our agreement to the Finno-Swedish proposals dependent on
the conclusion of a differently worded new convention completely exclud-
ing the League of Nations. It would suffice for us to state that we could

6 Marginal note: "Only as long as Sweden is not a belligerent Power."

APRIL, 1939 183

no longer recognize as binding upon Germany any resolutions taken by
the Council of the League on the basis of the Convention. We can then
leave it to the other Powers to decide what conclusions to draw from
such a statement. It would also be advisable when answering the
Swedish Note to initiate the conversation on ore deliveries orally in the
way mentioned above. Before it is decided to treat the Finno-Swedish
proposals in this way, however, it will be necessary first to come to an
understanding with the Italian Government regarding the question of
the League of Nations.

[Editors' Note. On April 1 Hitler made a speech at Wilhelmshaven
dealing mainly with subjects of his own foreign policy, British "en-
circlement" and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. For an English
translation of relevant extracts from this speech see Norman H.
Baynes: The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922 to August 1939
(London, 1942) (hereinafter cited as Baynes: Hitler's Speeches), vol. ir,
pp. 1590-1602.]

No. 146


The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry


No. 96 of April 2 Budapest, April 2, 1939?2:45 p.m.

Received April 2 ? 6:00 p.m.
Pol. IV 2301.

With reference to your telegram No. 103. l

The Foreign Minister told me that the Bucharest report, that he had
demanded recognition by the Rumanian Government of the new
frontiers with Rumania, was incorrect. He would not do this, so as
to avoid Rumanian counter-claims. The Rumanian Government would,
in effect, be obliged to give recognition in the near future when they
claimed toll-rights on the connecting line of railway to Poland, which
ran through the eastern tip of Carpatho-Ukraine. He had pointed out
to the Rumanian Minister 2 that only specifically designated articles in
the Pester Lloyd were to be considered as semi-official. Consequently
Hungary had not promised Rumania any frontier guarantee. He had
declared his readiness to negotiate to the Rumanian Minister, but not
under the threat of Rumanian bayonets, therefore only after the com-
pletion of Rumanian demobilization.

With reference to the conversation between the Hungarian Minister

i Document No. 132.
s Raoul Bossy.


in Berlin and the State Secretary, 3 Csaky gave the assurance that the
Hungarian Government would not consent to the Agreement of Bled
coming into force now, even in an altered form, as was being suggested
by Rumania, supported by Yugoslavia. He had told the Rumanian
Minister that the world would laugh if recognition of Hungarian
military sovereignty were proclaimed now.

The Rumanian Minister had asked him, with a view to strengthening
Gafencu's political position in the country, to send a written com-
munication, designed for publication later, merely saying that the
Hungarian Government would respect the Rumanian frontier as scru-
pulously as hitherto. As to problems arising from the new frontier
delimitation, Hungary was ready to negotiate with the Rumanian
Government through diplomatic channels in the most conciliatory
spirit, in the hope of achieving complete understanding between the
two nations. This proposal contains in its first and last paragraphs
the substance of the Hungarian Foreign Minister's written communica-
tion of March 25 to the Rumanian Minister, telegram No. 85 of March
25 4 but omits the passage relating to Bled and mobilization, as
this, in the view of the Rumanian Foreign Minister, does not seem
suitable for publication. In the face of the new general political de-
velopment (London efforts) Csaky wants to give Rumania as little as
possible to go on and is not, for the present, considering negotiations
with Yugoslavia, in order to avoid even the semblance of a linking up
with the Little Entente. Erdmannsdokff

3 The reference is evidently to a conversation between the Hungarian Minister and
the Under State Secretary, Woermann, on Mar. 31. In a memorandum (169/82532) on
it Woermann wrote: "The Hungarian Minister called on me today and stated, on in-
structions from his Government, that Hungary now intends to enter into negotiations
with Rumania for a convention to include an agreement on no resort to force, and a
settlement on minorities. A little later.'corresponding negotiations would be entered
into with Yugoslavia.

"I told M. Szt6jay that we had had somewhat different information from Budapest and
Bucharest, namely that what was involved was putting into force the Bled Agreement
between Rumania, Hungary and Yugoslavia. I informed him of the instructions sent to
our Minister in Budapest [see document No. 132] adding that these were instructions on
language and not for his intervention in the negotiations. M. Sztojay referred to the
memorandum of February 10 handed to the State Secretary (memorandum by the State
Secretary No. 143 of February 17 [see vol. v of this Series, document No. 292 and foot-
note 1 thereto]). Hungary had already then stated that she would only negotiate bi-
laterally, in no circumstances on the basis of the Bled Agreement, and in slow tempo.
He added that there was no longer any question of agreements over Hungarian military
sovereignty with Rumania and Yugoslavia." The substance of this conversation was
sent, on Apr. 1, to Budapest in telegram No. 106 (not printed, 1973/438359).

* In this telegram (1975/438345) Erdmannsdorff gave the gist of a Note just handed
by Csaky to the Rumanian Minister as follows: ' ' The Hungarian Government will respect
the new frontier with Rumania as scrupulously as the old . This coincides with the former
Czech-Rumanian frontier. The Declaration of Bled of August 23, 1938 relates also to
this part of the common frontier. The Hungarian Government declare that they are
prepared to withdraw all defensive measures undertaken on account of the Rumanian
military measures, on the one condition that the Rumanian Government declare that
they have begun to withdraw the military measures undertaken since March 1 5. Twenty-
four hours later the Hungarian Government will act accordingly. The _ Hungarian
Government are prepared to negotiate in a conciliatory spirit with the Rumanian Govern-
ment through diplomatic channels on any question about the new frontiers."

APRIL, 1939 joe

No. 147


Circular of the State Secretary *


Berlin, April 3, 1939?10:00 p.m.

The British Government's declaration of assistance to Poland
announced by Chamberlain in the House of Commons on March 3] 7?
according to its text, only of a provisional nature. It is delned to
clanfy the Bntish attitude during the intervening period which "sit 11

727 MeVe T Cl T e reSUltS in the B " itish eon ulion
with other Governments. As the British Government have found

SZJ ITh ° g 1° de 7 rumours of an iIKminent G ? ^ on

Po and as being without foundation, the prematurely issued statement
of the declaration of assistance to Poland was in no way justified bTthe
foreign political situation, but was, rather, caused by the British Govern
ment s need to give the world and public opinion at home, which hTd
aheadv become impatient, a first result of the assiduous diplomat
actmty begun by the Foreign Office on March 18.3 [In these cSum


? ° Ur ] !T Tv. ^l BritiS ? att6mpt at enci ^lement, and on the dangers
incurred by the States who are a party to it, has already been expreSed
m the Fuhrer s speech at Wilhelmshaven on Saturday.* I n any con
venations please display a dispassionate and completely reser Ve d
attitude [and rebuff all conjectures on the probable German^ttituJ *
(From here onwards not for Warsaw.) In particular you are requested

^onte CU8S m ^ ^ "^^ ^ *""≫* ^te of Gerni^pS


^S^mSS^^S^ " E " rope ' the Consulate at - Ge ?' ? th.

* See document No. 136.
3 See document No. 58.

:Ltirri≫^ r Xttp we ii 3 deieted from the ^ ?? **■**?

8 See also document No. 159.

No. 148


Memorandum by an Official of the Protocol Department

Berlin, April 3, 1939.

zu Prot. 3770 IV 101 >

f * 8:4 ? t m ^° n , April 2 ' ° n the ins *?tions of the Foreign Minister I

wekomed M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, in his saborfcoaclat

1 Not found.


the Schlesischer Station as he was passing through Berlin and asked
him if wished for anything during his stop in Berlin and for his journey
through Germany. 2

Foreign Minister Beck expressed no wishes. In cautiously and care-
fully chosen phrases and keeping his eyes all the time on Ambassador
Lipski, who was also present, Foreign Minister Beck again expressed
his pleasure and satisfaction at the Reich Foreign Minister's recent
visit to Warsaw. 3 He hoped that the Reich Foreign Minister had re-
turned with pleasant impressions and that he felt that his increased
knowledge of people and the impressions he gained from what he had
seen in Warsaw would be valuable and useful for his further work on
German-Polish relations.

I remained entirely receptive and left the Polish Foreign Minister's
compartment as soon as was compatible with the requirements of

Submitted to the Foreign Minister.

Von Halem

2 Beck arrived in London for conversations on Apr. 3 and left on Apr. 7. See also
British Documents, Third Series, vol. v, chapter I.

3 Pvibbentrop had had a conversation with Beck at Warsaw on Jan. 26, 1939, see vol. v
of this Series, document No. 126.

No. 149

Nuremberg document 120-C
Exhibit GB-41

Directive by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht


Officer Only 5 copies.

WFA. No. 37/39 g Kdos. Chefs. L. la 2nd copy

Subject: Directive for the Wehrmacht, 1939-40.

The "Directive for the Uniform Preparation for War by the Wehr-
macht" for 1939-40 is being issued afresh. 1

Part I ("Frontier Security") and Part III ("Danzig") will be issued
in the middle of April. 2 They remain basically unchanged.

Part II ("Operation White " 3 ) is attached herewith. 4 The signature
of the Fiihrer will be appended later.

For "Operation White" the Fiihrer has issued the following addi-
tional directives:

1 See also vol. iv of this Series, document No. 81.

B Handwritten marginal note : "Attached". These parts of the directive were issued
on Apr, 1 1 . See document No. 185.

3 Literally "Case White" [Fall Weiss]. The German code name for the attack on

4 On the copy here printed Part II is not attached; it appears as Enclosure II to the
document printed below as No. 185.

APEIL, 1939 187

1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can
be carried out at any time as from September 1, 1939.

2) OKW is charged with drawing up a precise time table 5 for
"Operation White" and is to arrange for synchronized timing between
the three branches of the Wehrmaoht through discussions.

3) The plans of the branches of the Wehrmacht and the details for
the time table must be submitted to OKW by May 1, 1939,

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht,


Distribution List

High Command of the Army . .1 Copy No. 1

High Command of the Navy . .1 ); 2
Reich Air Minister and C-in-C of the

Luftwaffe . , 1 ??

High Command of the Wehrmacht .2 ? 4 and 5

≪ A provisional time table was drawn up and submitted to Hitler on June 22 For
the text see Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. xxxlv, document 126? C, Exhibit
Go ? 4o, pp. 443-445.

No. 150


The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry

S1CEET Rome, April 4, 1939?2:00 a.m.

No. 117 of April 3 Received April 4?4:40 a.m.

Reports reaching me today from a reliable source to the effect that
Italian-Albanian negotiations with the object of establishing a Pro-
tectorate were in progress and were expected to be concluded before
the end of this week, induced me to call on Ciano this evening. He
received me with the remark that he had been about to ask me to come
and see him for the same reason, as he considered it important to in-
form us as quickly as possible and, he added, the Hungarians too, as
to what was really happening.

According to his account, the King of Albania,! under the impact
of the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia, requested Italy just over a fort-
night ago to make the present treaty relations closer. On the
23rd the King, alleging imminent anti-Axis activity by Yugoslavia
and Greece, had asked for the despatch of Italian troops. This Rome
had categorically refused when it became evident that the King, who
has always been a "voyou" and who had been deprived by the Italian-

1 Ahmed Bey Zogu, King Zog I of the Albanians.


Yugoslav settlement of a card which he had frequently and readily
played, wished to involve the troops in "anti-Yugoslav machinations."
Thereupon the King's attitude had radically changed and had become
definitely hostile, with the result that not only had the negotiations
suggested by himself failed to make progress but threats and outrages
against Italians had -occurred, which, increasing daily, had now led
to a flood of telegrams to the Duce requesting protection, not only from
Italians but also from Albanians, by whom, with the exception of those
in his own circle, the King is hated. The Duce was now contemplating
sending an Italian battleship, as the troops, although they have been
concentrated at Bari for a few days, are not yet ready for embarkation.
Moreover, Mussolini had today instructed his Minister in Tirana 2 to
give the King a warning, amounting to an ultimatum, against acts pre-
judicial to the lives and rights of Italian subjects, and to state that,
even if these acts were the work of alleged gangs, he would be held
personally responsible. An attempt will also be made to continue the
negotiations, which are not being conducted here but in Tirana, in
order to achieve a closer Anschluss of Albania to Italy, which would,
however, leave intact the sovereignty and territorial independence of
Albania, and would, in any case, take a lesser form than a Protectorate,
such as is the case in Bohemia and Moravia. If the King is sufficiently
compliant, which Ciano did not appear necessarily to expect, negotiations
will take place with him, otherwise Italy will act independently. In any
ease, the Duce had no intention of putting up with further Albanian
attacks on the persons, lives and property of Italians resident there.

Ciano expects that matters will clarify themselves in a day or two.
In my presence he gave instructions for denials, through Radio Bari in
the Italian and Albanian languages, of rumours of more far-reaching
Italian intentions.

From his account it appeared that the whole question had developed
more quickly than was expected here.


2 Francesco Jacomoni di San Savjno.

No. 151


Memorcmdum by the Foreign Minister

RM 22 Berlin, April 4, 1939.

Pol. II 1098.

The Turkish Ambassador 1 called on me today at 12:30 p.m. at his
own request. He informed me that he could repeat on behalf of his

i Mehmet Hamdi Arpag.

APBIL, 1939 jgg

Government the assurances that all rumours to tW *fw ,u * iL


! See also document No. 134.

No. 152


The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry


No. 153 of April 4 Bhchaesst, April 4, 1939-8:30 p.m.

Received April 4?10:45 p.m.

The Rumanian Air Ministry today ordered 30 Ju 112 nghter^raft
audio spare engmes to a total of 5.1 mmion RM . The a r mS/v
wishes to appoint commissions as soon as possible ?Hpr ? str ^
Economic Treaty to handle the total ^S^^^ **"


No. 153


Tke Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry


I No. 156 of April 4 Bttchaeest, April 4, 1939-1 1 :45 p.m.

Received April 5?2:00 a.m.

t a tt - Pol. IV 2370.

:■ I. As Hungary refuses to make a declaration to Rumania relating

, to the fronts or to progression and also refuses to make ar^ terrf

tona concessions m the Carpatho -Ukraine, Rumania, who regards th e

■ direct cause for tens 10 n as being ehminated, will, neverthS TeS

I ^obihza ion tomorrow and complete it by Easter. Foreign IS'

|Gafencu toH me tins with the remark that he had suffered a ^Se

|Ee regretted this as he had needed support at present for his San

If ° y T?l ^T 1 ' 7 at h ° me and abroad " H?W, howevTSd
Ishown that she did not want a rapprochement with Rumania


II. On general policy Gafencu said that he would in no way allow
himself to be drawn into the encirclement policy against Germany. He
was the most decided opponent of the policy of collective security. If
Britain and France wanted to make a one-sided declaration that, in
the event of an attack on Rumania, they would regard themselves as
Rumania's allies, he could hardly fail to take note of this. It would be
a different matter, however ; if Soviet Russia were to participate in a
declaration of this kind, because that could be interpreted as an anti-
German attitude. He was sincere in his intention further to extend
relations with Germany, particularly in the economic political sphere,
and he was glad that he would be able to state this again in Berlin
soon. For the rest, he had so far no definite programme for the Berlin
conversations. 1


1 See document No. 135.

No. 154


The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

Warsaw, April 4, 1939.
Received April 5.
Pol. V 3006.
Subject: Poland's attitude after Chamberlain's declaration.

Chamberlain's statement on Britain's readiness to render assistance
to Poland 1 has been received with satisfaction by public opinion in
Poland. The nervousness which last week amounted to a war-psychosis
has noticeably decreased, even if a certain patriotic excitement remains,
which is being exploited by war propaganda in the interests of the loan
for air raid precautions, towards which 140 million zloty have already
been subscribed. The press, however, was instructed to observe a
certain reserve as regards the attitude to the international situation as
created by the British guarantee, probably in order not to irritate
Germany unnecessarily, and not to arouse too great illusions here.

The following points of view are put forward in statements on the
political situation by leading officials of the Foreign Ministry: Poland
could feel a special satisfaction that there were no longer ? particularly
as in the Treaty of Locarno ? two different standards for security in the
west and in the east. As for relations with Germany, Poland for her
part was not aiming at any changes of the good relations created in

1 See document No. 136.

APRIL, 193≫ ]OJ

1934 As a result of alterations which had taken place in her immediate
neighbourhood and xn the sphere of Polish foreign interests, the "equi-
librium which had been one of the prerequisites of the German-Polish
Declaration of 1934 had been disturbed. In the constellation at that
time, Po and had had the French alliance, which had presented no
obstacle to the German-Polish tetente. If at present, after Germany's
great increase in power, Poland received in addition a British guarantee
this really only meant the restoration of the "equilibrium" and thu!'
in a certain sense, a return to the position of 1934

With regard to the Danzig question, the Foreign Ministry continues
to emphasize that Poland will not submit to force. On the other hand
the possibility and necessity of removing certain differences by negotia^
ton is admitted So far it is not clear whether, over and above this
Poland expects that, as a result of the final British guarantee, she will
be obliged to adopt an accommodating attitude in the Danzig question
It is nevertheless interesting that such rumours are circulating here and
he statement by the British Ambassador* to the same effect on which
I reported in telegram No. 56 of March 30,3 per h aps justifies the assump-
tion that, in connection with the frontier guarantee, London is aiming
at a settlement of the most important German-Polish differences

So far there are no signs that the intransigent Polish attitude in the
Danzig question has yet been in any way relaxed. Nevertheless there
seems to be a readiness for certain concessions in the minorities question
I hear from a reliable source that in the last few days the Polish Ministry
of the Interior has issued very emphatic instructions for the protection
of the German minority, and even the Western League * has received
orders to exercise greater moderation. The accommodating attitude to
the German minority is also interpreted by many as meaning that the
Polish Government want to avoid anything which might make the
western part of Poland appear as a source of constant unrest in the
eyes or the British.

According to reports here, the decisions in London seem, incidentally
to have been made very hurriedly. I learn from circles in close contact
with the British Embassy here that the news of such far-reaching British
assurances to Poland came as a complete surprise even to Kennard the
Ambassador. '

v. Moltke

a Sir Howard Kennard.

implications as a disturbance to peace told me tnrlatr th=+ ;? """''S 'fuesuon and its
have to take into account the Germ? character o dL^W V ' 6W th f Po1 ? would

onee the wave of chauvimsm now sweeping the country which w7 s undm hJS^ ≫ '
dangering Beck's position, had subsided again " y undoubtedly en-

* See document No. 108.


No. 155


The Consul in Gdynia to the Foreign Ministry

Gdynia, April 4, 1939.

Received April 11.

Pol. V 3112.

Whenever Volksdeutsche have called at the Consulate here recently
about their own affairs, I have always noticed that they assume that a
solution of the" Corridor question is imminent. When I question them
I am constantly told that some Polish newspapers had discussed the
question of the reincorporation of Danzig, and also that at the same
time speculations were being made in the Polish press on the possible
intentions of the German Reich regarding the return of the Corridor.
These questions raised by the Volksdeutsche are partly based on the
knowledge that the Polish armed forces are being mobilized.

On these questions by Volksdeutsche, which I have left unanswered,
I have heard the opinion, expressed that a large part of the Polish
population views the reincorporation of the Corridor very sympathetic-
ally on social grounds. It could be assumed that an average of two-
thirds of the population would in no way oppose the German troops if
they marched in, and this would apply especially to the rural population.

Among the people in the smaller towns in my consular district the
attitude of the Polish population would have to be assessed variously.
In places where much unemployment prevails, hopes of building up a
livelihood are based solely on the actions of our Puhrer.

It is thought that in certain places the entry of German troops could
not he carried out entirely without friction. The Polish coastal villages,
from the Pomeranian coast to Grossendorff, are said to be very pro-
Polish, especially as the Poles who live there have built themselves
houses for summer visitors so as to have a large source of income from
seaside tourists.

In Gdynia the population is largely made up of immigrant Galicians
and Congress Poles 1 with very few native Pommerellians and Cassu-
bians. Among these Cassubians are a number who have made large
profits from speculation in land and from housing when the city of
Gdynia developed, and they often possess large dwelling-houses out of
which they have made for themselves a very comfortable livelihood.
They come mostly from Cassubian peasant and fishing families, who
are now very anxious about their property and firmly opposed to every-
thing German.

1 From Poland as constituted after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, i.e. from the areas
formerly under Russian suzerainty.

AFEXL, 1930 193

Nevertheless it can be said generally that the indigenous Poles and
Cassubians who formerly lived under German rule in West Prussia
have been bitterly disappointed by the actions and attitude of the
Polish Government. They nourish a stubborn hatred towards the
immigrant Galicians and Congress Poles and would, generally speaking,
be glad if this area were again to come under German order and dis-

Especially those Poles who have served in the German forces and
who on discharge had often been granted fairly large war disablement
pensions, which, however, have for the most part been cancelled by
the Polish authorities, are consistently accorded unfavourable treat-
ment in obtaining employment and are special sufferers from unemploy-
ment, which has naturally given rise to great bitterness against the
Polish authorities.

The mood of the Poles living in Gdynia is very serious and to some
extent depressed.

In the smaller towns, on the other hand, and in the country the Poles
are at the moment feeling very expectant and partially hopeful, especi-
ally as the economic conditions everywhere are in a parlous state under
the Polish administration.

A copy of my report is being sent to the Consulate General at


No. 156


Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 313 Berlin, April 4, 1939.

At his visit today the British Counsellor of Embassy asked me about
the Fiihrer's intentions regarding the German-British Naval Agree-
ment. He wanted to know whether the Puhrer's statement in his
speech at Wilhelmshaven 1 was to be taken as a denunciation of the
Naval Agreement.

In reply I told Forbes that, as he knew, the denunciation of an
Agreement took place by notification through diplomatic channels.


i See Editors' Note, p._ 183. The passage in Hitler's speech ran: "I once concluded
an agreement with Britain ? the Naval Agreement. It is based on the ardent desiro
shared by us a!l never to be forced to fight a war against Britain. This desire can, how-
ever, only be a reciprocal one. If it no longer exists in Britain, then the practical
premises for the agreement have been removed. Germany would accept even a situation
of this kind with calm composure."



No. 157


The Charge" d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry


No. 113 of April 5 Washington, April 5, 1939 ? 6:56 p.m.

Received April 6 ? 4:00 a.m.
W Villa 810.
With reference to my telegram No. 103 of [March] 25. l
Negotiations with interested parties on amending the Treasury de-
cision have so far been without result. The Customs Bureau inclines
to free from provisional additional duty, import transactions effected in
dollars, free Reichsmarks, and dividend mark credit balances, provided
such payment is satisfactorily proved at the time of the customs de-
claration; on the other hand, it is uncertain whether the Treasury will
approve of such amendments. In spite of urgent representations our
customs attorneys do not expect a decision within a week. In these cir-
cumstances, I request authority by telegram to hold informal talks with
the Customs Bureau and to promise the abolition of the Inland
Account Procedure 2 if removal of the additional duties can thereby be
attained by April 23. 3

1 Document No. 89.

2 See document No. 56.

* In telegram No. 119 of Apr. 15 (not printed, 4992/E281733) Clodins replied that the
Ministry of Economics intended to cancel the Inland Account procedure in respect of new
transactions, provided the U.S. Government would refrain from levying countervailing
duties except in cases of Inland Account transactions now being effected . The Embassy
was instructed to negotiate along these lines with the Treasury.

No. 158


The Foreign Minister to the Einbassy in Italy


No. 162 of April 5 Berlin, April 5, 1939 ? 7:15 p.m.

Received April 5 ? 7:25 p.m.

For the Ambassador personally.

With regard to the Albanian question, 1 please inform Ciano from me
at the first opportunity that Germany in principle welcomes whole-
heartedly any strengthening of Italy and of Italian influence. 2

1 See document No. 150.

2 Marginal note: "Informed Ciano this evening, Cf. mytelegvam to Berlin [document
No. 171]. M[ackensen] 6/4."

APRIL, 1939 J 95

No. 159


The State Secretary to the Embassy in Poland


Berlin, April 5, 1939.
Pol. V 3050.

For the Ambassador personally.

Lipski will probably be received here again before Easter At this
interview he will be told the following with reference to his last con-
versation with the Foreign Minister: 1

Our offer to Poland will not be repeated. The Polish Government
had apparently not fully understood the significance of this offer. We
could not help that. The future would show whether Poland had been
well advised. The counter proposal put forward by Lipski had, as was
known, already been rejected by the Foreign Minister as a basis for

End of the statement to Lipski.

Please do not enter into any further material discussions on the
German offer and the Polish counter offer. We must prevent Poland
from throwing the ball back to us and then manoeuvring us into the
position of appearing to have let a Polish offer go unheeded. Other
principal Missions have likewise been instructed not to enter into serious
discussions on the Polish question but rather to evade the subject
calmly and not to give any indication of further German intentions.2
, Weizsacker

i On Mar. 27, see document No. 108.
2 See also document No. 147.

No. X60


Circular of the Foreign Ministry 1

strictly confidential Berlin, April 5, 1939.

Pol. II 10252 Ang. I.

According to reports and confidential information reaching us here, 3

the British encirclement action was inaugurated uniformly on March IS

by demarches by the British representatives in a number of capitals.

We are particularly well informed about the course of this d-marche in

1 Addressees were the Embassies at London, Paris, Brussels, Rome, Moscow, Warsaw
and Legations at The Hague, Berne, Belgrade, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia and Athens
* Document No. 134.
3 See also documents Nos. 58 and 83.


Ankara. There, on that date, the British Ambassador, Sir Hughe
Knatchbull-Hugessen, handed the Turkish Foreign Minister a copy of
his instructions from Lord Halifax, 4 the contents of which were roughly
as follows:

The Bumanian Minister in London, Tilea, had informed Lord
Halifax that Germany Jhad made a proposal to Rumania which had the
character of an ultimatum. This was that Rumania was to grant
Germany a monopoly of her foreign trade and control of her industry,
in return for which Germany would give assurances concerning the
frontiers of Rumania. M. Tilea asked what Britain's attitude would be
if Rumania were to reject this German proposal. Tilea also asked if it
would be easier for Britain to give an answer if an understanding were
reached on this question between Poland and Rumania and if the States
of the Balkan Entente undertook obligations over their external
frontiers also. Lord Halifax reserved his reply and asked to be informed
of the attitude Turkey would adopt in view of this situation. The
Turkish Foreign Minister replied in writing to the British Ambassador
that Rumania had not approached Turkey in this matter. Should
such an enquiry be addressed to them, the Turkish Government would
examine the matter closely and in the friendly spirit which charac-
terized relations between the two countries. They would not hesitate
to fulfil the obligations incumbent upon them within the limits of the
Balkan Entente.

This course of the British demarche clearly shows on how little
it was based and how surprising the British action was even to the
States of the Balkan Entente.

By order:


* See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, Nos. 390 and 407.

No. 161


The Charge" d' Affaires in the Soviet Union to the Foreign Ministry

No. A 652 Moscow, April 5, 1939.

Pol. V 3124.

Political Report

Subject: Ddmenti regarding Soviet promises to deliver war material to

The Soviet press of April 4, 1939, publishes the following Tass
communique 1 :

"The newspapers Temps and Oeuvre (of April 1, 1939) have repro-
duced a Havas report from Moscow which states that the Soviet Union

APRIL, 1939 jgy

has allegedly undertaken, or promised to undertake, to supply Poland
with war material in the event of war and to close its raw materials
market to Germany. Tass is authorized to state that this report is not
m accordance with the facts, as the Soviet Union has given no one
such promises and has undertaken no such obligations "

00 T ?^ eP ° rt iS Str ° ngly reminisc ent of the Tass communique of March
22 1939, concerning the denial of a promise by the Soviet Union to
render assistance to Poland and Rumania, i The present Tass com-
munique reflects the same attitude as was taken by the Soviet Govern-
ment in that case.

The Soviet intention in the Tass communique may be to counter
before Beck s arrival in London,* reports which have clearly been
spread for the purpose of prejudicing the Soviet Government's atti-
tude In view of the doubts expressed by Poland and Rumania
regarding military assistance by the Bolshevists, the Soviet Govern-
ment obviously attach importance to making it clear that they have
not promised military assistance to anyone. The Kremlin's distrust
of the policy of Britain and Prance, which can constantly be observed
here finds expression in the endeavour not to allow the power factor
which the Soviet Union represents, to be used as a counter in other
people s games, and to maintain freedom of action as long as possible
However, the Soviet Government's attitude does not by any means
indicate that they would not be prepared to give Poland military
assistance if the need arose, but merely that they wish first to see
fulfilled the conditions which they have laid down.


1 See document No. 75.

2 On Apr. 3.

No. 162


The Minister in the Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry

A I375 The Hague, April 5, 1939.

Received April 11.

Pol. II 1121.

Subject: Alleged Anglo-French promise of assistance to the Netherlands.

With reference to your despatch of March 31? Pol II 1009 l

During a conversation which I had with him a few days ago, the

foreign M inister s told me that he did not believe that an Anglo-

; l Not printed (5453/E366631-33). This despatch circulated a DNB report of Mar 28
on Anglo-French promises of ass^tance to the Netherlands, Belgium X S^Wland
:£S nS m L0,ldon ' Paris ' B ?^ ls > Berne, and The Hagu/an^uested fuXr
2 J. A. N. Patijn.


French agreement on mutual assistance in the event of an attack on
Holland had been concluded. In any case, not even a hint had ever
been given to him here in The Hague by the Trench and British
Ministers. Even the Netherlands Ministers in Paris and London,
when asked to report, because of French, newspaper announcements at
that time, had also replied that they had been unable to ascertain
anything authentic regarding an agreement of this kind. 3


3 Marginal notes: (i) "[For] F[iihrer]. R[ibbentrop]. " (ii) "To Counsellor Hewel
with instructions from the Reich Foreign Minister to inform the Fuhrer. Schmidt 13/4."
(iii) "Transmitted by telephone to Counsellor Hewel at Berchtesgaden. [Signature
illegible] 14/4."

4 The following reply (1625/388462-64) was sent to The Hague on Apr. 18, and was
circulated to the principal Missions in Europe : ' ' The doubts expressed by the Netherlands
Foreign Minister regarding the existence of an Anglo-French agreement on mutual
assistance, in case of an attack on the Netherlands, are not easy to understand as,
judging from reports in our hands and from statements in the British and French press,
there can be no doubt at all of the existence of Anglo-French agreements for the event of
an attack on the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland. It is known that these agree-
ments formed part of the subject matter of Bonnet's conversations with British Ministers
on the occasion of the state visit to London of the President of the French Republic.
By order. W[oermann]."

No. 163


Memorandum by the Head of Political Division IVa

Berlin, April 5, 1939.

e.o. Pol. IV 2419.

submitted on 8.4.39.

Minister Count Magistrati called on me today in order to discuss
with me questions concerning the South Tyrol, as had already been
announced by Ambassador Attolico during his conversation with the
State Secretary on April l. 1 He began by bringing up the following
particular requests and complaints.

1. The Austrians living in the South Tyrol who had acquired German
nationality through the reunion of Austria with the Reich were, owing
to their close links with the South Tyrolese and their numerous ties
with former Austria, a disturbing element and a source of anxiety for
the Italian Government. It would therefore be desirable if, under the
recently started resettlement scheme for German Volksgenossen and
Reich, nationals from the South Tyrol, consideration were given above
all to former Austrians.

2. Count Magistrati expressed his thanks for the information that the
music firm of Hieber in Munich had been forbidden to sell the gramophone

1 See document No. 143.

APRIL, 1930 J 99

record of South Tyrolese songs (Pol. IV 464}.* Nevertheless, he requested
that steps should be taken to forbid the sale of the record altogether

3. Count Magistrati brought the conversation back again to the
leaflets which had been distributed in the South Tyrol for some time
He drew particular attention to a leaflet that had recently been dis-
tributed in the South Tyrol (this is the matter of the leaflet forwarded
m the report of the Consulate General at Milan of February 3 of this
year-Pol IV .297 g),3 ^hich attacks the methods of administration
apphed in South Tyrol. I explained to him that, according to what we
have established by thorough enquiries, the leaflets had certainly not
been prmted m Germany, and that Reich German agencies and organiza-
tions had had nothing to do with the production and distribution of the
leaflets, and parfacularly not the Deutsche Auslandsinstitut in Stuttgart
According to the information we have obtained these leaflets had
also not been printed in Basle. The names of the firm found on the
leaflets, namely "Kiefer-Basel" and "Tip-Kia Basel" were unknown
m Basle and had obviously been chosen for the purpose of deception

4. Count Magistrati further alleged that, according to information
reaching him, there exists in Munich a National Socialist Students'
Society called "Innerkofler",* which publishes its information for
students by putting it up on the notice-board of the university. Italian
students studying in Munich, who had made enquiries about the
student society, had been astonished to be told that "Innerkofler"
was South Tyrolese. Count Magistrati contented himself with drawing
attention to this, and did not make a request for the name to be changed

5. With reference to Dr. Friedrich Lange's language maps Count
Magistrati repeated the request, already submitted in writing (Pol. IV
2182), s that the number of German-speaking inhabitants of the South
Tyrol printed on the maps be changed. On the language map he had
placed before us, the number of German-speaking persons in South
Tyrol is given as 270,000, whereas Magistrati himself estimates the
number at about 200,000. I explained to him that we had got into
touch with the competent home authorities ≪ about this, and, as soon as
we had a statement from them, we would communicate with him further.

* ^\^i"^ (788 + 4/ fi 708 f >■ .° n ^ 20 ' 1939 the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle re-
quested the Gestapo to take steps to stop the sale of the gramophone record about which
Magistrati had complained to the Foreign Ministry. On Feb. 20 Heinburc wrote to
Magistrati (not printed, 78S4/ES70853) stating that this had been done g

3 Not printed (7886/E570876-79). The leaflet attacked ^£&rtS£ methods in the
South Tyrol and emphasized that the oppression of the German element was £t in
Lnd elsewhere S demandS f ° r the a PP^^tion of the principle of nationality in Tunis

* The name of a Tyrolese preacher and author
5 Not printed (7884/E570856).

/i^!."? !^?- 1 (l J 0t P r ? ted ' 7884/E570S57-58) Hemburg drew the attention
of the Vo ksdeutsche Mittelstelle to the fact that the figures for the German-speaking
inhabitants m the former South Tyrol given on Dr. Friedrich Lange's linguistic map!
were not in accordance with the actual facts of the case and he therefore suggested that
the figures be omitted. es


After these particular requests and complaints Count Magistrate
turned to the fundamental aspect of the South Tyrol question. The
natural geographical frontier on the Brenner unfortunately did not
coincide with the ethnographical frontier. The South Tyrolese looked
upon themselves as German and could not be pacified as long as they
belonged to Italy. Although at the moment the situation in South
Tyrol was not disquieting, nevertheless at any time incidents might
occur which would place the heaviest burden on the Axis. Above all
friction might occur between the old-established South Tyrolese and
the newly settled Italians, the more so as the Italian Government were
still intending to bring into the South Tyrol as large a number of
Italians as possible. Therefore a radical solution of the South Tyrol
problem must be considered. In his view the only solution would be
the resettlement of all the South Tyrolese in Germany. He thought
the present time was particularly favourable for this. At the head of
Germany and Italy stood two men, bound by the closest ties of friend-
ship and whose authority was so great that such a resettlement could
be effected without difficulty. Besides, since the reunion of Austria
with the Reich there were now in Germany supplies of frozen Lire
amounting to several thousand millions out of which, on a clearing
basis, sums could be placed at the disposal of the South Tyrolese to be
resettled in Germany as compensation for property left behind by
them. It would be difficult for the Duce to submit such a plan to the
Eiihrer, as the South Tyrolese were Italian nationals, but Mussolini
would gladly agree to such a plan were the Fiihrer to propose it to him.
I maintained a completely receptive attitude to these general observa-
tions of Count Magistrate's. 7

Heinburg 8

7 Marginal note here in Weizsacker's handwriting: "Rightly so".
s A marginal note on the cover sheet (not printed, 7794/E566003} to this document
indicates that Ribbentrop saw it on Apr. 18.

No. 164


The Minister in Albania to ike. Foreign Ministry


urgent Tibana, April 6, 1939 ? 2:50 a.m.

No. 14 of April 5 Received April 6 ? 8:40 a.m.

Pol. IV 2395.

The Foreign Minister 1 described the situation as follows: The Italians
had often expressed doubts as to whether Albania on her side would

1 Ekrem Bey Libohova.

APBIL, 1930 201

fulfil her alliance obligations. From the Albanian side everything had
been done to dispel suspicion. Finally the Italians had proposed to
make the alliance closer, which Albania was in principle ready to do.
The Italian oral proposals had, however, been unacceptable because
they violated the independence of Albania. Thereupon the Italians
had formulated rather less far-reaching proposals ' in writing but
these too were unacceptable. Mussolini was suddenly pursuing the
matter with great urgency and had requested a reply by tomorrow.
This would be given in the course of the night to the Italian Minister 2
who would take it personally to Rome tomorrow. In the meantime
the Italian Consul in Valona had spread the rumour that Italian war-
ships with troops were on the way to Albania. A rumour had reached
here from Bari that troops were concentrated there destined for
Albania, These reports caused great excitement among the people and
there had been demonstrations but no Italian had been harmed. The
Minister expressed the hope that the Albanian reply would satisfy the
Italians. The Albanians had gone to the utmost limits of what was
tolerable for their independence. The Albanians would meet with
armed resistance any violent invasion by the Italians. The Italian
Minister maintained that Italians had been murdered, wounded,
threatened and insulted. Therefore all Italians were being evacuated
from Albania today and tomorrow. The Albanians furthermore had
mobilized. When I asked what Italy would do if Albania replied to
the Italian terms with counter proposals, he answered that Rome would
probably regard this as a rejection. With regard to the attitude of
other Powers in the event of a possible invasion by Italy, he referred to
the Croatian difficulties of the Yugoslavs and to the "understanding"
article in The Times "Italy and Albania ".3

It is my impression that the Italians have deliberately brought about
the existing conflict in order to establish a protectorate over Albania.
They have obviously not been successful in precipitating incidents.
So far I have not been able to ascertain that one Italian has been
murdered or wounded anywhere. The Albanians are said to have
15,000 men under arms instead of the normal 5,000 to 6,000. Mobiliza-
tion began on the occasion of the Giro affair 4 after which the Italians
ofiered the King help which he refused. Public feeling against the
Italians has turned to hatred. Valona and Durazzo are said to have

2 Francesco Jacomoni di San Savino.

*The Times on Apr. 4 had printed a despatch from their Rome correspondent review-
ing possible Italian intentions towards Albania.

* According to a previous report by Pannwitz, No. 181 of Feb. 28 (2184/472051-54)
Giro, an influential member of the Fascist Party, had been sent to Albania, at the request
of the Albanian authorities, as adviser on the training of youth. He had formed youth
organizations on the Italian Fascist pattern and also meddled in local politics. This had
culminated in his expulsion from the country.


been evacuated by Albanian troops and these to have taken up better

positions further inland. s


5 In a memorandum of Apr. 5 (not printed, 116/66204) Woermann recorded that the
Albanian Minister enquired on behalf of his Government how Germany would react if
Italy were to land troops in Albania. Woermann replied that, as he must be aware,
Germany had no interest in the Adriatic and that a German intervention against Italy
was out of the question.

No. 165

1 975/43S36 3

The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry

No. 103 of April 6 Budapest, April 6, 1939 ? 6:14 p.m.

Received April 6 ? 10:55 p.m.
Pol. IV 2416.

The Foreign Minister invited me to call on him to inform me he had
just told the Rumanian Minister 1 that reports in the British press that
parts of Rumanian territory were to be returned to Hungary owing to
pressure from Britain were nonsense, as were British press reports of
an imminent attack on Rumania by Hungary. When the Rumanian
Minister again referred to the putting into effect of the Bled Agreement 2
he replied that this was out of the question. He was, however, willing
to negotiate a completely fresh agreement, which must, above all,
include provisions for the protection of minorities.

Csaky then handed the Rumanian Minister a Note, the second para-
graph of which is identical with the second paragraph of the text
reported in my telegram No. 101. 3

First paragraph, however, now reads: 4
"Mr. Minister,

I have the honour to state to you that the Hungarian Government,
from the start of the military operations in Karpatalja (former Sub-
Carpathian Russia) have ordered their troops to respect the whole
Rumanian frontier as scrupulously as has been done in the past." 6


1 Raoul Bossy.

2 See document No. 135.

3 Of Apr. 5 (not printed, 1975/438363-64). The second paragraph reads: "With
regard to questions which might arise as a result of tho new frontier line, the Hungarian
Government are ready to negotiate with the Rumanian Government, through diplomatic
channels, in the most conciliatory spirit with the hope of achieving a more perfect un-
derstanding between the two nations."

4 As previously reported, this passage had read: "That the Hungarian Government
would respect the Rumanian frontier as scrupulously as by [sic] the past." The full
text of the Note was sent by Erdmannsdorff in report A 144 of Apr. '6 (not printed,

5 This passage is in French in the original.

APKIL, 1939 203

No. 166


The State Secretary to the Legation in Albania


urgent Berlin, April 6, 1939? 9:45 p.m.

No. 19 [ ZU ] poi. iv 2402.1

With reference to your telegram No. 15. 1

Should the occasion arise we agree to take over the Italian interests
on the request of the Italian representative.

Beyond this, please observe complete reticence. You will not under-
take any action, or make any gesture whatsoever which might cast
doubts upon our unqualified approval of the Italian action.

i This telegram of Apr. 6 (2184/472059) reads: "The Italian Minister told me that the
Albanian counter proposals did not satisfy Borne and that he would receive a final
answer at 6 p.m. today,

"He asked me whether, if diplomatic relations were broken off, I would be prepared
to take over Italian interests in Albania. I stated my willingness to do so. Pannwitz."

No. 167


The Ambassador in Poland to the Foreign Ministry

p - 34 Warsaw, April 6, 1939.

Received April 7.
Pol. V 3084.

Political Report

Subject: Observations by Chef de Cabinet Count Lubienski regarding

Count Lubienski, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister, invited a
member of the Embassy to call on him today in order to communicate
the views of the Polish Government regarding the resumption of the
discussions on minorities. 1 I am reporting on this separately. 3

This communication was clearly only a pretext for further observa-
tions, which were probably based on instructions from Foreign Minister
Beck. Count Lubienski spoke somewhat as follows: the campaign
against Poland, which has been waged by the DNB in the foreign press,
and which was carried out by means of partly true, but also partly

1 See document No. 125.

s This report of Apr. 8 (not printed, 1836/419041) stated that Lubienski had declared
the Polish Government to be agreeable to a resumption of the negotiations at the end
of May or beginning of June.


distorted and tendentiously collected facts, was the real reason why-
foreign countries had feared that a direct attack on Poland was imminent.
This anxiety had then led to the attempts to make pacts which were to
protect Poland from an attack. Despite the pressure being simultane-
ously exerted by Germany in the Danzig question, Foreign Minister
Beck had rejected these British and French proposals for a pact and had
adhered strictly to the bilateral principle. If M. Beck had acquiesced
at all in the British guarantee declaration 3 it was as a direct result of
Germany's attempt to create in Poland a state of anxiety by means of
pressure ? in any case a method which could never be successfully used
against Poland and especially not in the present circumstances. By
his intransigent stand on the Danzig question Foreign Minister Beck
had saved German-Polish relations, for if he had accepted the German
proposal he would have been forced to resign. Such a development
would without doubt have started a definite anti-German policy in
Poland, which might even have led in the end to an alliance with the
(Soviet Union. It was difficult to pursue a policy against the general
current of opinion, and Marshal Pilsudski had also encountered this
difficulty at the time when he had worked for an understanding with
Germany. A great deal of patience was required to bring such a policy
to fruition. But if one allowed oneself to be drawn away from broad
principles there was the risk that the supreme objective would be called
in question. The Polish Government still had a genuine desire for a
sincere policy of understanding with Germany, but without the use of
pressure and by maintaining the independence of both countries. In
speaking today of an encirclement directed against Germany, it should
surely also be remembered how much Poland had been encircled by
Germany through recent political events.

v. Moltke

3 See document No. 136.

No. 168


The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry

secret Belgrade, April 6, 1939.

G 110 W529g.

With reference to your despatch of March 21, 1939 W 421 g. 1
According to reports here the negotiations on the credit of half a

l Not printed (2130/465333). In this despatch Moraht asked for a report on the Italian
offer of a credit of half a milliard Lire to finance Yugoslav State contracts. Italy was said
to have received orders for 2 cm anti-aircraft guns and a small number of aircraft, A copy
of this despatch -was forwarded to Rome with a cover note of Mar. 25 (not printed,

APRIL, 1939 205

milliard Lire previously offered by Italy for financing Yugoslav State
contracts have not yet been concluded.

The difficulty is said to lie in the question of the period of repayment
The Italians are said to have agreed to extend the repayment period of
four years, originally envisaged by them, to five years, but the Yugo-
slavs continue to demand a ten-year period. About two-thirds of the
credit would be used for war material and about one-third for
other purchases, including signals equipment for the Yugoslav rail-

The result of the present negotiations on the granting of the credit
cannot yet be gauged, but opinion tends to be that the agreement will
be concluded.

A further enquiry to Consul General Neuhausen shows that his in-
formation tallies in the main with that of the Legation. 2

von Heeeen

2 A copy of this report was forwarded to Rome by Moraht with a cover notn nt A nr u
(2130/465334). Moraht added : << It has meanwhue t^red t£a w ^XJwK with the Italians for part of the total of 200 bomber a£craft and for the 7 5 cm an?," aircraft guns. _ But wo w.1 , on our side, ensure that the competition is kept within the Lmito prescribed by relationswithltaly." A handwritten marginal n£e on this cover note reads: "Neuhausen has told me about this in detail Mfackensen] 18/4 " No. 169 52/31632-34 Memorandum by the State Secretary! St.S. No. 316 Beklik-, April 6, 1939. I invited the Polish Ambassador to call upon me today and in the course of our conversation he of his own accord introduced the subject of Beck's conversations in London.^ Lipski' maintained that, though he had no detailed information, he could make certain basic principles clear to me: 1) Poland wished to abide by the 1934 Agreement. 2) The Polish-British Agreements were bilateral and purely de- fensive; there was no question of Poland joining a bloc. I received these remarks of Lipski's with a smile and answered some- what as follows: the most recent trend of Polish policy was now alto- gether incomprehensible to me. Lipski knew as well as I did how strained had been our relations before the seizure of power. ?' N one in Germany, except the Fiihrer, could have had the great conception of 1934 and have realized it vis-&-vis Poland. From that time our ,i i For Lipski's account of this conversation, see the Polisli White Book No 70 a Beck visited London Apr. 3-7, 1939. ' a i.e., by Hitler in 1933. 206 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY relations had undergone a constant and gratifying improvement. On the basis of these good-neighbourly relations the Fuhrer had, as he knew, initiated conversations with Poland at the beginning of 1939 and had tried not only to settle the remaining points of difference between us, but also to give Poland a generous guarantee for the Corridor frontier. Poland had obviously not understood this offer. Instead of its being gladly taken, and the work of 1934 completed, we had sud- denly heard strange sabre-rattling in Poland. Though this had not disturbed us, it was in strange contrast to the response which we were entitled to expect from Warsaw. The Fuhrer's offer to Poland was one which would not be repeated. The kind of answer to the offer which the Polish Government had wished to give us had, as we knew, been characterized to him ? Lipski ? by the Reich Foreign Minister, on March 27*, as representing no basis for the settlement of the question at issue. (Later in the course of the conversation I repeated that the Polish answer was for us no basis for discussion.) The future would, of course, show whether Poland had been well advised in her attitude. I went on to say that 1 had not yet read the statement which it was announced Chamberlain would make in the House of Commons this afternoon. 5 But if what was already appearing in the press about Beck's conversations was true, then I did not know how the Polish attitude could still be reconciled with the spirit of the 1934 Agree- ment. Lipski tried to argue on this last point that the Polish-French Treaty relationship had after all been compatible with the 1934 Agreement (!) Lipski at the same time represented Polish troop concentrations in the neighbourhood of Danzig as an understandable action, parallel with troop movements taking place in other countries ? such as Hungary, Rumania and even Norway. Above all, however, Lipski maintained that, at the time of the German entry into Czecho-Slovakia, we had remained entirely out of touch with him, as a result of which, in con- trast to last September, an understandable Polish nervousness had de- veloped. Polish fears had been correspondingly increased by the German ultimatum addressed to Lithuania. 6 I cut Lipski short immediately he mentioned an "ultimatum" to Lithuania, ridiculed his observations on troop movements of other countries ? which were never directed against Poland ? and told him I would have understood if he, Lipski, had now thanked us for having put no obstacle in the way of Warsaw's ardent desire for a common * See document No. 108. s For the text of this statement see Pari. Deb., H. ofC, vol. 34S, cols. 2996-7. In it, the Prime Minister gave the terms of the Anglo-Polish communique of Apr. 6, whereby the unilateral British assurance to Poland (see document No. 136) was supple- mented by a corresponding Polish assurance to Britain and provision made for the con- clusion of a permanent and reciprocal agreement. ≪ See Editors' Note on p. SO. APRIL, 1939 207 Hungarian-Polish frontier. In short, I loftily and indifferently refuted Lipski's statements with the relevant arguments, whereupon we parted. 7 Wbizsackeb * A further memorandum by Weizsaeker, St.S. No. 320 of Apr. 7 (52/34635) reads- For the sake of completeness it should be added, to memorandum No. 316 of Apr 6 (conversation with Ambassador Lipski) that Lipski characterized our action in Czecho- Slovakia, as a threat to Poland. I replied that, as he knew, the Polish Government had been told that Slovakia might also be discussed within the framework of the neneral settlement [Gesamtberemigung] envisaged." No. 170 023/250388 Memorandum by the State Secretary St.S. No. 317 Beblin, April 6, 1939. The Italian Ambassador telephoned me this evening to inform me that developments between Rome and Tirana had reached a stage which made military intervention necessary. Count Ciano had in- structed him to inform the Reich Foreign Minister that Italian troops would land on the Albanian coast on Friday, April 7, at 4:30 a.m. The country was to be occupied; Attolico could give no further details of Albania's future political status. Attolico thought that he could give an assurance on behalf of Rome that any objections on the part of Yugoslavia would be dispelled by direct approach in Belgrade. This would be all the easier to achieve the more unrestrictedly the German press supported Italy's action. On the last point I promised Attolico our full support. Weizsacker No. 171 2184/472083-84 The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry Telegram most ukgent Rome, April 7, 1939?1:15 a.m. No. 127 of April 6 Received April 7?3:00 a.m. Pol. IV 2472. In accordance with your instructions by telegram No. 162 of April 5, 1 I made a statement to Count Ciano, who had asked me to come and see him this evening at 9 p.m., which obviously pleased him and which he acknowledged by asking me to convey his most heartfelt thanks to the 1 Document No. 158. 208 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY Reieh Foreign Minister. He valued this statement all the more because he had asked me to come and see him to inform me that the situation in Albania had been so exacerbated that Italy would land large bodies of troops at 4:30 a.m. tomorrow morning, at San Giovanni di Medua in the northern part of the country, which in any case was hostile to the King, as well as at Durazzo, Valona and Santi Quaranta. 300 aircraft would accompany the landing manoeuvre, a further 200 were standing ready. All Italians had already been evacuated but, in view of the latest reports, there was the gravest anxiety about the Legation staff, which had of course remained there. Another despairing telegram had just been received saying that the Legation was completely surrounded by gangs. He, Ciano, would himself go to Albania tomorrow morning at 5 a.m. in his own aircraft, but would probably return here in the course of the day. The King had completely lost his senses and was pushing things to extremes. Outwardly the military occupation would be represented as having a time limit, while, naturally, leaving open the question of how the situation would actually develop later, and what decision Italy would have to take. Outwardly sovereignty was to be maintained, it had not yet been decided in what way. The word "personal union" was mentioned, and ? in contrast to recent conversa- tions 2 ? the word "protectorate". During his visit to Belgrade in January, 3 he had already pointed out the possibility of the development which would take place today and had informed the [Yugoslav] Minister here during the last few days. He said, however, that he would this evening show the Minister a re- port from the Italian Minister in Tirana, about twelve days old, in which the latter stated that, in demanding Italian troops, as men- tioned in my previous telegram No. 117,* the King was planning a joint action against Yugoslavia by invading as far as Nish, giving as the reason for this his mission as the "Hitler of the Balkans", who was called upon to organize the Balkans on the model of the order created by the Fuhrer in Central Europe ? ideas which Ciano characterized as a touch of megalomania. This report would certainly make an im- pression in Belgrade and help to create understanding for Italy's action. Furthermore the Hungarians had very loyally stated their readiness to demonstrate with six mobilized divisions in the event of any more serious unrest in Yugoslavia. Ciano, however, did not seem to expect any unfriendly acts of provocation on the part of Belgrade, if only be- cause of the present internal weakness of the Yugoslav State. A very great deal, he said, of course depended on German public opinion, in particular the press, ranging itself quite clearly on Italy's side from the first moment, and fully representing the justification, and indeed 2 See document No. 150. a Jan. 18-23. See the Ciano Diaries, entries on these days. i Document No. 150. APRIL, 1939 209 the necessity, for Italy's action. He would ask me to lay very special emphasis on this. In reply I said that my initial statement made to him on behalf of the Foreign Minister, in conjunction with the Fuhrer's latest speeches, left me in no doubt that in this hour Italy could unreservedly rely on us. Immediately after me, Ciano received the Hungarian Minister. Mackensen No. 172 2134/472065-66 Circular of the State Secretary l Telegram urgent Berlin, April 7, 1939?1:25 p.m. e.o. Pol. IV 2409. For confidential information. The Italian military action which began this morning against Albania is the result of serious differences between Rome and Tirana. Its immediate aim is the occupation of the country for a limited time; further action has presumably not yet been determined. This action has our complete approval and will be wholeheartedly supported by us in the press, on the radio, etc. The Italian Government are endeavouring to spare Yugoslavia's understandably sensitive feelings and, indeed, as a result of an ex- change of ideas with Belgrade, they feel that they have good prospects of success, so that no difficulties of any importance are to be expected from that quarter. Weizsacker ' Addressees were the principal Missions in Europe, except Rome, and those at Tokyo and Washington. No. 173 162Sj'3SS465-&S The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry No. 167 of April 7 Bucharest, April 7, 1939?4:00 p.m. Received April 7 ? 9:30 p.m. Pol. II 1126. Foreign Minister Gafencu told me he had received the following information from M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, explaining his new attitude in the matter of the mutual assistance pact between Poland and Britain: 14 210 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 1) Poland was a Great Power and therefore could not place herself under the protection of other Powers. For that reason Britain's uni- lateral promise of protection must be replaced by a reciprocal agree- ment. 2) A reciprocal agreement would avoid the system of collective security, which Germany might consider as directed against herself. 3) Poland wished to take no action in association with Soviet Russia. She therefore stood for a system of bilateral agreements. When G[afencu] wanted to know my opinion, I evaded the question by re- ferring to the Fiihrer's speech at Wilhelmshaven 1 against the encircle- ment policy and observed that in my opinion Beck had nevertheless succumbed to the enticements of British statesmen, but that it was impossible to say anything until the final text of the agreement was known. G[afencu] said he also had noticed this sudden change of . attitude on the part of Beck. Rumania's attitude remained unchanged, namely: No reciprocal agreements; should Britain and France, however, want to give Rumania a unilateral guarantee, he could not evade it. When he asked my opinion I replied that Rumania must avoid any- thing which might give support to British propaganda directed against Germany; there was probably nothing more behind the Anglo-French declaration. G[afencu] remarked: "Yes, a German declaration of that kind would be of more use to me." In conclusion he again emphasized that he was not participating in any kind of encirclement policy and would not attach himself to any grouping of States directed against one another. Fabricius 1 On Api'. 1. See Editors' Note on p. 183. No. 174 B209/E30S0G4 Memorandum by the State Secretary urgent Berlin, April 7, 1939. St.S. No. 318 This morning the Italian Ambassador addressed an urgent appeal to me, asserting that Italy was no longer receiving any coal from Germany. He then modified this remark by saying that we were falling short of our promises. In a further conversation he said that deliveries were showing a tendency to fall off. I told Attolico that, as he knew, I was doing my utmost in this matter and had recently spoken about it to Reich Minister Funk on the telephone. 1 However, in order to lend 1 See document No. 62, APKIL, 1939 211 weight to his request, I would like to have figures; these Attolico was not in a position to give. He will accordingly procure them At the same time I contacted the Economic Policy Department in order to ascertain our figures. Without these a mere general reminder however urgent, would of course fizzle out at the Ministry of Economics! Weizsacker No. 175 5209/E30S030-3I The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Italy Telegram ? G *? Beblik, April 8, 1939-4:40 p.m. zu Will 2737.1 With reference to your telegram No. 126. 1 The steady increase, of which you are aware, of coal exports from January to March will be maintained in April also, as the Italians have already been promised. In April we hope to reach a total of 700 000 tons The temporary fall in loading figures during the first few days of April is due to the fact that, during the first few days of every month obligations for regular orders with fixed delivery dates must be met' In additaon indispensable supplies to German blast-furnaces for the Easter holidays caused an unusual strain, particularly over coking coal In order to satisfy Italy's urgent demand for an immediate increase in deuvenes, a special increase in. consignments on account of later deliveries wiU be made as from April 11. Already today, Saturday bv ruthlessly ignoring other demands, 17,500 tons, instead of the usual daily load of 3,500, have been consigned by rail, despite the particularly difficult conditions of half a working day between two holidays We would even have loaded 20,500 if the Italian Monopoly* itself had not preferred to have 3,000 tons sent by sea. Attolico who made a similar request, has been informed accordingly and showed his satisfaction. But please also inform Ciano direct em phasmng that a five-fold load today, improvised in 24 hours, really represents a special feat of organization. Clodius i In this telegram of Apr. 6 (5209/E308029), Maokensen reported- "On ;??+ ?? from . Cianc , Gia^ini urgently requested me Juse mTlXenT^h th P^h GoveT ment in order that the consignment of coal, especially of cokinz coal wtXv/wi !f ovem : rtill further, should be stepped up immediate!^. t£$^£M^£?£ dsquietmg Industrial establishments and gas works £ere on the point of closing do? For political and economic reasons prompt German measures and the despatcTof ^ & ?S7 m f! asea ^ ^quested." [The rest of the telegram is corrupt.] 2 The State-owned company Azienda Carboni Italiani. 212 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 176 5570/B3988S8 The Minister in Yxvgoslavia to the, Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 101 of April 10 Belgrade, April 10, 1939 ? 5:10 p.m. Received April 10 ? 9:45 p.m. W 528 g. For the Reich Ministry for Air. When the Credit Agreement 1 is completed, the orders to be expected for the Air Force consist, for the time being, apart from ground equipment, of 50 Me. 109's and 50 Do. 215's, plus spare parts. On April 8, 1 had a conversation with General Jankovic, who told me that an order for 100 bomber aircraft was only possible if 50 could be delivered in June, July and August. 2 Jankovic suggested that these 50 should be drawn from new stocks intended for the German Luftwaffe. The Air Force here is prepared to buy these bombers with the same equipment and so to commit themselves to using German weapons and bombs. Only Dornier type, perhaps with Bramo 3 , will do. The reasons for this early requirement are said to lie in domestic policy. This demand gives us the chance of strengthening and exploiting our military influence here. 4 Heeken i See document No. 142. ?,??,?? j ,,~ 2 A marginal note in Clodius' handwriting on another copy (3053/60 1 259) reads : Out of the question." 3 Aero engines produced by the Brandenburgische Motorenwerke. *A marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting on another copy (3053/601259) indicates that this telegram was referred to Wiehl. No. 177 625/250760-61 The Charge d' Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry A 1471 Paris, April 10, 1939. Received April 12 Pol. II 1137. Subject: Statements on the political situation by the French Minister of Marine, Campinchi. A few days ago the French Minister of Marine, Campinchi, expressed his views on the political situation very frankly, to a source which I know to be reliable. They were reported to me as follows : APRIL, 1939 213 "Germany's treatment of Czecho-Slovakia," Campinchi had said, "proves that the Fuhrer is committed to a policy from which he can no longer turn back." Further ultimata and further acts of occupation would therefore doubtless he attempted. But even if one admitted that the Fuhrer intended to rest satisfied with the present situation, that would be no argument in favour of the maintenance of peace . As a result of Germany's policy, especially the elimination of Czecho- slovakia, Europe had been thrown so much out of balance that German hegemony had come threateningly near. For Europe, therefore, there was now only the alternative of accepting such German hegemony without demur or resisting it. Britain and France were ready and determined to do the latter. These were the reasons why he, Campinchi, had for some weeks considered war to be inevitable. He knew that Germany was not afraid of war, especially because she thought she could bring it to a victorious end in a very short time with her superior Luftwaffe. This view was a dangerous illusion. Germany today was weaker than on the eve of the World War and she would have as her opponents, not only the nations of Europe, but the whole world with the sole exception of Italy and Japan. The result of the war would therefore undoubtedly be the defeat of Germany. In that case a peace would he imposed upon her, in comparison with which the Peace of Versailles would be as nothing. The peace treaty which ended the next war must be on the pattern of the Peace of Westphalia, i.e. it must completely dismember the Reich and split it up into its component parts. Only then could there be any hope of peace for a relatively long period. It was often imagined that leading military circles in France shrank from war. This view was false. During the September crisis he, Campinchi, had been in constant touch with General Gamelin and he could give an assurance that the latter had pronounced himself in the strongest terms against the surrender of Czecho-Slovakia. Only recently there had been another conference between the Defence Ministers and representatives of the General Staff, at which General Gamelin had again made no secret of his views. Gamelin was of the opinion that France's strategic and military position, whatever the losses it had suffered recently, left no doubt as to a successful outcome of a war. It is well known that from the first M. Campinchi has been one of those who adopted a sharp tone in the French Cabinet, but who have not been able to carry their point at the decisive moment, or who have fallen from power. In spite of this, his remarks seem to me to be of interest, all the more so as I have reason to assume that he was counting on their being passed on to me. They typify the fact that the atmo- sphere here is largely dominated by the thought of war, which is held to be inevitable. The Government programme, as also revealed in the 214 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY emergency regulations, 1 subordinates everything to national defence and the increase of armaments, and, both in Parliament and among the people, no objection has been raised to this since the events of March in Czeeho-Slovakia, as was the case during the September crisis. A sign of weakness, however ? a point which Campinchi did not mention ? is the wide-spread view that, before a clash of arms with the authori- tarian States, France must be more strongly armed and must therefore increase her efforts in that direction. Brauer 1 See document No. 22, footnote 2. No. 178 100/64455-50 The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy Telegram most urgent Berlin, April 11, 1939?4:40 a.m. No. .176 of April 11 Received April 11?8:00 a.m. For the Ambassador personally. For Field Marshal Goring. 1 I learn that you are going to Rome on an official visit lasting several days from April 15. 2 As I only learned indirectly of your departure for Italy at the time, I was under the impression that it only involved a private visit. I also gathered from a recent conversation with General Bodenschatz that you would be seeing Mussolini and Count Ciano in Rome, but I did not understand that this was an official State visit. I have therefore so far issued no. official notification from the Foreign Ministry to the Italian Government and have not given any special instructions to the Embassy in Rome. The Embassy in Rome has now informed me, on my enquiry, that an official programme for your Rome visit is apparently being arranged with the Italian Government direct, but since you have said nothing to the Foreign Ministry or to Ambassador von Mackensen, the latter was therefore unable to give any authoritative information in answer to enquiries about your visit from the Italian side. The Embassy in Rome is thus placed in a somewhat awkward position vis-a-vis the Italians. This is not right and I do not consider that the arranging of an official programme for your visit without the participation of the official Reich Mission, which is re- sponsible for this, is proper. I should be grateful if you would inform 1 This telegram was forwarded to Tripoli (see enclosure to document No. 252) where GOring had gone from his holiday in San Rsmo. 2 Goring visited Rome Apr. 14-16 and had conversations there with Mussolini and Ciano. See documents Nos. 205 and 211. APBIL, 1939 215 Ambassador von Mackensen as soon as possible and communicate your wishes for the Rome visit direct. Ambassador von Mackensen has been instructed by me to contact you at once and then make final arrangements for your Rome programme with the Italian Govern- ment. RlBEENTBOP No. 179 2422/311714 The Chargi d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 115 of April 10 Washington, April 11, 1939?11:31 a.m. Received April 11 ? 7:30 p.m. Pol. IX 632. I. Italian action against Albania has clarified two points here: 1) The attempts hitherto repeatedly made to detach Italy from the Axis were futile. There is therefore no point in repeating them. America has been forced to recognize the fact that the Axis is unshake- able. 2) The British attempt at encirclement has been thwarted. All endeavours to force a unilateral British guarantee of independence on the Balkan States, which are disunited among themselves, come too late; British assistance is of problematic value. Britain's readiness to associate herself with the Polish, the Russian, and the other smaller dictatorships merely to hold Germany in check is not having any effects favourable for Britain on the mood of political circles here. However, the Government and a large part of the press let it be understood that they approve of any means of combating Ger- many and Italy. II. After Spain's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact 1 and the further improvement in Europe of the political and strategic position of the totalitarian Powers, it is to be expected that America will transfer to Japan the favours hitherto accorded to Italy, and will attempt, by rousing Japanese distrust of her treaty partners, to weaken the totali- tarian ring. Thomsjbn i On Mar. 27, 1939. See vol. m of this Series, documents Nos. 767 and 768. 216 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 180 1975/438372-7* The Minister in Rumania to ike Foreign Ministry Telegram 1 most urgent BUCHAREST, April 11, 1939 ? 6:35 p.nv No. 173 of April 11 Eeceived April 11?8:20 p.m. Pol. IV 2506. With reference to my telegram No. 171 of April ll. 2 Foreign Minister Gafencu sent for me and said that Csaky's state- ment, obtained through our mediation, was welcomed with gratitude. In contradiction to this, however, were : i) The daily attacks by Hungarian radio and press aimed at foment- ing the aspirations of the minorities. ii) The peculiar attitude of the Hungarian Foreign Minister who had [passage corrupt] 3 in the spirit of Bled, had then supplemented the Rumanian counter proposal by amending it, i and who now would not make any statement at all beyond that regarding the immediate coup . . . (group missing). 5 In view of the present tension in Europe, it was therefore not easy for the Rumanian Government to demobilize, although the Govern- 1 This telegram, as received in Berlin, was corrupt. Corrections taken from the draft in the Bucharest Legation file (7063/E524158-60) are indicated in footnotes. 2 Not printed (5453/E366635). In this telegram Fabricius briefly reported having carried out his instructions with Gafencu. These instructions related to a telegram Fabricius had sent on Apr. 7, "So. 169 (1975/438369), in which he reported: " The King has reversed the previous decision to demobilize, because the Hungarians have stopped demob- ilizing and are provoking frontier incidents. Also, amongst the Hungarian and German minorities in Transylvania and the Banat, the idea is obtaining increasing currency that Hitler is coming , . , (group missing}, which gives rise amongst the Rumanians, in both town and country districts, to anti-German feelings, which are visibly growing. Feelings are running so high that incidents have been of frequent occurrence. "The Minister of the Court, Urdareanu, who spoke of this most emphatically, drew my attention to the dangers inherent in the widespread belief amongst the population, though not the Government, that Germany was behind Hungary. The Government them- selves again had the feeling that Hungary was planning a coup, against which Rumania must defend herself. In the present situation, mobilization entailed heavy expense daily for both sides, and, as the fields remained untilled, economic losses, which would weigh heavily against the loyal fulfilment of our economic Treaty which Rumania intended." The Foreign Ministry acted on this report by telephoning enquiries to the Legation in Budapest, who replied in telegram No. 106 on Apr. 8 (not printed, 1975/438370) that Csaky had disclaimed all knowledge of frontier incidents, described the Rumanian assertion about a Hungarian coup as "complete nonBense", and stated that Hungarian troops on the Rumanian frontier had been demobilized; further he attributed Rumanian tardiness in demobilization to a desire to exert pressure on Hungary to ratify the Bled Agreement, and was proposing to take counter measures. This reply was repeated to Bucharest by the Foreign Ministry on Apr. 9 in telegram No. 152 (not printed, 7635/ E545389? 90), with instructions to Fabricius to convey Csaky's dementi to the Rumanian Government (an intention of which Csaky was being informed) and to express the German desire to see a speedy ditente in Rumanian-Hungarian relations, which was likewise being expressed in Budapest. 3 The Bucharest draft reads: "who had at first proposed making a statement". * See documents Nos. 132 and 165. * The Bucharest draft reads: "which he had made to us". APBIL, 1939 217 ment wished to do so, as they desired to continue the policy of rapproche- ment with Germany. He, Gafencu, needed some kind of declaration from Budapest, even though he had told the Hungarian Minister here only yesterday that he did not want one, because he had seen that nothing could be achieved through him. He was now, therefore, con- fidently appealing to the Reich Foreign Minister and asking him to pre- vail upon Budapest to make the following declaration, for which Csaky had from time to time indicated his willingness: "I have the honour to inform you that the Hungarian Government will respect the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier as conscientiously as they have done in the past. "The Hungarian Government are prepared to negotiate with the Rumanian Government, through diplomatic channels, on any issues arising from the correct frontier demarcation, in the hope of a better understanding between the two countries." If necessary the first paragraph could also be made reciprocal. Gafencu told me that he was doing everything possible to prevent Rumania from being involved in the British encirclement policy. For that reason he had even sent Secretary General Cretzianu to London" to make his views clear there, as he did not trust Tilea. But he asked us also to support him and strengthen his position so that he could carry through the big economic agreement with us. I told Gafencu that I thought it would be extremely difficult to obtain a new declaration from the Hungarian Foreign Minister. We had mediated on Saturday when we recognized that, in view of the anti-German feeling among the population, Rumania's ≪ demobiliza- tion was in our interests. Nevertheless, I would pass on his request for further intervention by the Reich Foreign Minister. I would like to support this request, as its fulfilment, followed by Rumanian demobilization, would contribute to a considerable easing of the tension in South Eastern Europe, and would strengthen Gafencu's position in the Cabinet and with public opinion. My colleagues, who utilized the Easter holidays to make a tour of Transylvania, ' have affirmed how difficult the position of the German minority there would become if mobilization continued any longer. Finally, the attitude of Csaky in first making proposals for declarations himself and then com- pletely withdrawing them seems incomprehensible. Fabeicius 6 The Bucharest draft reads "new". ? See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. v, Noa. 37 and 65 ≪ The Bucharest draft here reads "rapid" in place of "Rumanian."' 218 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 181 1625/388470-71 The Minister in Switzerland to ike Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 43 of April II Bebne, April 11, 1939?9:23 p.m. Received April 12 ? 1:30 a.m. Pol. II 1139. Federal Councillor Motta, who has been ill for weeks with high blood pressure and is still in need of rest, was unable to receive me again until today. He is going on about six weeks' convalescent leave soon. As to the reasons for the call-up of troops and frontier defence measures under the authorization of the Federal Council of March 24, he assured me that this had not been due to the report put out by the Agence Fournier 1 that 700,000 troops had been deployed by us on the Swiss frontier, nor to the attempted Putsch in Liechtenstein, 2 nor to Polish partial mobilization, nor to a warning by France or any other Power. The Federal Council had only undertaken such measures as were necessary to restore calm at home, although, as he admitted to me, they had had exactly the opposite effect on the population. Part of the troops called up had been released again and other frontier measures which, he assured me, had been taken uniformly on all frontiers, had for the most part been rescinded. Concerning the Anglo-French guarantee agreements, Motta told me that, on the day that Bonnet and Lebrun left for London, 3 the Director of the Political Department of the French Foreign Ministry* had summoned the Swiss Minister in Paris, Stucki, and had informed him that Britain and France intended jointly to give a promise of guarantee to Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium. Stucki had answered, with perfect correctness, that he took note of the information with thanks but would like at the same time to state that this declaration was not of Switzerland's seeking and that it remained for her to decide the moment at which she might consider it necessary to make use of the guarantee. Motta went on to say that, in the event of a violation of Swiss neutrality, it was indeed a foregone conclusion that the other Powers interested in Swiss neutrality would come to Switzerland's aid and that thus the promise of a guarantee need not have been given. Only today has he informed Minister FrOlicher, who is here, of the French Foreign Ministry's statement to Stucki. Proceedings had been instituted on account of the inflammatory report by the Agence Fournier i A French News Agency, with headquarters in Paris, and a sub-office in Geneva. 2 See document No. 141. 3 On Mar. 21. * fenile CharvtSriat. APRIL, 19S9 219 (cf. my despatch No. 867 of March 29) ;S he himself moat strongly dis- approved of the report. 6 Kochee * In this report (not printed, 2025/443988-90), KScher analysed the reasons which had prompted the measures of the Federal Council and the rumours which had suddenly appeared on Mat. 25 and 26 : an article in the Geneva Suisse, of Mar. 28, pointed out that the Zurich correspondent of the Agence Foumier had originated the report that 700 000 German troops were stationed in Vorarlberg, a report which had at once found its wav into the Pans edition of the Daily Mail and was repeated on Strasbourg radio on Mar 28 A copy of this telegram was sent for information to the Missions in Europe in a circular of Apr. 26 {not printed, 1625/388472-73), with the addition of the comment that Stucki s statement, that it was for Switzerland to decide the moment at which she thought she mast make use of this guarantee, could not be regarded as correct. No. 182 1025/388*92-93 The Charge d' Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry Airgram No. 114 of April 11 Londok, April 11, 1939. Received April 12 ? 11:30 a.m. Pol. IV 2521. The conversation with the Italian Charge d'Affaires, 1 on which I am sending a detailed memorandum, 2 yielded the following facts for assessing the situation created by Italy's occupation of Albania: Already last week the Italian Government had initiated their action by a statement to Britain that they regarded Albania as an exclusively Italian sphere of interest. 3 The British Government replied that they recognized Italy's predominant influence in accordance with the 1921 resolutions,* but must protest against the claim to exclusive interest. Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons that Britain had no direct interests in Albania, but was only interested in Albania inso- far as a threat to peace was concerned, 5 induced Mussolini to send a personal message to Chamberlain.^ In this message Mussolini refers to Chamberlain's statements and says: 1) that Italy's action in Albania does not affect the Anglo-Italian Agreement, 7 and 2) that there is no factor in this action which justifies Britain's anxiety about the maintenance of peace. i G. Crolla. 2 Not printed (2184/472093-98). 3 See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. v, No. 88. * The Declaration by Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan regarding the integrity of thefrontiers of Albania, signed at Paris, Nov. 9, 1921. See B. F.S P vol 117 vv iV-53 5 See Pari. Deb., B. of 0\, vol. 345, col. 2995. ≪ For the text of this message see British Documents, Third Series, vol. v, No. 83. 7 Of Apr. 16, 1938, brought into force on Nov, 16, 1938. See B. F.S P vol 142 pp. 147-156, see also British Documents, Third Series, vol. ni, chapter vi 220 DOCUMENTS' ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY In the course of the exchanges Italy made two statements to the British Government: 8 1) that the withdrawal of volunteers from Spain would- take place in accordance with the Anglo-Italian Agreement immediately after the big Madrid parade, 9 and 2) thatltalyhadnointentionofoccupyingCorfuorofattackingGreece. The Italian Charge d' Affaires added that it had been all the easier for his Government to make these statements because, in any case, they had previously agreed with Franco that the Italian volunteers would leave Spain after the big parade and because, even before the occupation of Albania, they had told the Greek Government of their own accord that they would respect the territorial status of Greece including the islands [statut territorial et insviaire). Lord Halifax had been very pleased about both statements and had asked the Italian Government's consent to his making use of them in Thursday's session of the House of Commons. 10 Mussolini had agreed to this. Halifax told the Italian Charge d'Affaires that in the forthcoming session of the House of Commons the British Government would try to subdue the excitement of British public opinion, which is undoubtedly considerable. They would of course be obliged to use sharp words against Italy's action; but Italy must have patience, Britain wanted to maintain the relations based on the Anglo-Italian Agreement "in the in- terests of European peace " . In conclusion Halifax had used the simile : "although the window panes are shattered, the bridge is still intact ". Th. Koedt 8 See also British Documents, Third Series, vol. V, No. 110. 9 The Victory Parade, which took place on Way ]9, 1939. 10 i.e., on Apr. 13. No. 183 051 9/E43 7200-64 The Embassy in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry B 1171 London, April 11, 1939. Beceived April 12. W VI 1352. Subject: Results of the visit of the Secretary to the Department of Overseas Trade to Warsaw, Moscow, Helsinki and Stockholm. With reference to my report B 1086 of April 3, 1939. 1 Mr. R. S. Hudson, Secretary to the Department of Overseas Trade, returned to London on April 4 from his round trip to Warsaw, Moscow, Helsinki and Stockholm. ■ Not printed (540I/E366678). APRIL, 1939 221 The Embassy learns in strict confidence from a member of Hudson's party that the talks which he had in the various capitals produced no concrete results. Nevertheless it was agreed that Russian, Finnish and Swedish trade delegations would come to London in the near future. With the exception of the Russian delegation these will be composed of economic and industrial representatives from the countries in ques- tion, so that probably only in the case of Russia can talks on a new trade agreement be expected. In the case of the Swedish and Finnish delegations every effort will naturally be made by the British Govern- ment and by British industry to represent Great Britain both as a potential buyer and seller, in order at least in this informal way to place trade relations with these countries on a better foundation, in the hope that the relations initiated by Mr. Hudson may thereby be permanently strengthened and developed. Even if, in order to achieve this aim, the British Government are prepared to put the state credit machinery of the Export Credit Guarantee Department into action to a large extent, the lack of understanding so far shown by British manu- facturers for the requirements of these countries and the high price of British goods, together with a sales organization to some extent badly neglected in the countries mentioned, might prove a considerable obstacle to the comprehensive development of mutual economic re- lations which is earnestly desired. There is therefore no need to attach too much significance to the Finnish and Swedish trade visits, although it is probably worth while following their course and their results, in order to recognize in time the starting points for possible counter action. Worthy of more serious consideration are the negotiations for the conclusion of a new trade agreement, which are to take place here soon, between the Russian Governmental Delegation and the British Govern- ment. In spite of the scanty information given by the British press on Hudson's conversations on the subject in Moscow, it seems certain, according to statements by my informant, that during Hudson's stay in Moscow all disputed points in Anglo-Russian economic relations were discussed in very great detail and that, at that time, agreement in principle was already reached on the more important questions at issue. 2 This is all the more likely because the desire for a change in political relations with the Soviet Union provided an opportunity of showing the goodwill of the British Government in the economic field, while on the other hand Russia was also afforded more scope for making concessions in view of the existing state of Anglo-Russian economic relations. According to my informant, all authoritative circles in Russia regard Britain's attempts at rapprochement with the greatest scepticism, which Britain hopes to surmount, at least in part, by suitable treatment in the economic field. The resistance formerly 2 See British Documents, Third Series, vol. iv, .Nos. 505, 519, 531, 533 for Hudson's reports on his talks in Moscow. 222 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN TOKBIGW POLICY put up by British public opinion to far-reaching cooperation -with Russia can be considered as having been almost overcome as a result of the latest trend of feeling here. The previous report under reference* already gave in detail the questions to be dealt with at the Anglo- Russian economic negotiations. It is beyond doubt that over and above this the British Government are prepared not only to pass over completely the question of Russia's pre-war debts, but also to invest new funds in Russian trade and industry by means of credits. In this connection it may be mentioned that rumours have been circulating here for some time that Britain is anxious to link up the Russian rail- way system in Turkestan with the railway system in British India (Peshawar), a project which assumes additional significance in the present circumstances. It has so far not been possible to establish how far negotiations about this are actually pending. Comparatively little had. been made public about the Anglo-Polish economic negotiations in connection with Hudson's visit to Warsaw, and Beck's visit to London. 4 It is certain that Beck's staff did not in- clude an economic expert and that his stay in London did not lead to the transaction of a credit or a loan. Both in the Government and in the City Poland was expected to receive a considerable loan, as this question had already been one of the subjects of Hudson's talks in Warsaw. The sum mentioned then varied between 20 and 25 million pounds. It is also a fact that, in view of the political situation, British banks, which so far have mainly financed Polish trade and industry (as for example Kleinwort) refuse to allow Poland further credits without a guarantee from the Treasury. Beck is therefore said not to have attempted to make contact with City circles. I also hear in con- fidence that the Polish Government intend to set up a new industrial centre in south-eastern Poland, which is later to form the backbone of the Polish armaments industry. The Polish Government are seeking loans and delivery credits mainly for the financing of this enterprise. The British Government are keenly interested in this project and want British industry to take a share in developing the enterprise. It seems that Hudson's moderate optimism with regard to his talks in Warsaw is primarily based on this. However, it will probably depend, in the main, on the further development of political relations between Poland and Great Britain, which are not [sic ? now] under discussion here, whether and to what extent British participation in this project has any prospect of success. jjy or( i er: Weber 3 The report cited in footnote 1 is not relevant here; it does, however, refer to report B 693 of Mar. 6 (not printed, 584iyE425700-03) which is presumably meant. In it Kordt reported "from a reliable official source" that Hudson's instructions were to test Russian readiness to revise the existing trade treaty. * Hudson arrived in Warsaw on Mar. 19, 1939, and left for Moscow on Mar. 23. Beck visited London from Apr. 3-7. AntlL, 1939 223 No. 184 52/341355 Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I Berlin, April 11, 1039. On April 10 the Intelligence Department [Abt. Abwehr] of the High Command of the Wehrmacht gave the following general assessment of the present military situation in Poland: "Poland is safeguarding the crucial area of the Corridor against any surprise attacks by maintaining troops on the frontier in a continuous state of alert." VON NOSTITZ No. 185 Nuremberg document 120-C ExhiMt OB- 41 Directive by the Fuhrer TOP SECRET MILITARY BERLIN, April 11, 1939. BY OFFICER ONLY 5 Copies 2nd copy OKW No. 37/39 g. Kdos. Chefs. WFA/L I Subject: Directive for the uniform preparation of war by the Wehr- macht for 1939/40. I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the Wehr- macht and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for the conduct of war. Until that directive comes into force the Wehr- macht must be prepared for the following eventualities: I) Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich and protection against surprise air attacks. (See Enclosure I). II) "Operation White." (See Enclosure II). III) Taking possession of Danzig. (See Enclosure III). Enclosure IV lays down the regulations for the exercise of military authority in East Prussia in the event of hostilities, Adolf Hitler Distribution List High Command of the Army 1 Copy No. 1 High Command of the Navy 1 Copy ? 2 Reich Air Minister and C-in-C of the Luftwaffe 1 Copy ? 3 High Command of the Wehrmacht (Operations Office/National Defence Office) 2 Copies Nos. 4 and 5 224 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY [Enclosure IJ SAFEGUARDING THE FRONTIERS OF THE GERMAN REICH AND PROTEC- TION AGAINST SURPRISE AIR ATTACKS. 1 [Enclosure II] OPERATION WHITE The present attitude of Poland requires, over and above the plan "Frontier Security East" the initiation of military preparations, to remove if necessary any threat from this direction for ever. 1.) Political Requirements and Aims German relations with Poland continue to be based on the principles of avoiding any disturbances. Should Poland, however, change her policy towards Germany, which so far has been based on the same principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement might become necessary in spite of the Treaty in force with Poland. The aim then will be to destroy Polish military strength, and create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of national defence. The Free State of Danzig will be proclaimed a part of the Reich territory at the outbreak of hostilities, at the latest. The political leaders consider it their task in this case to isolate Poland if possible, that is to say, to limit the war to Poland only. The development of increasing internal crises in France and resulting British restraint might produce such a situation in the not too distant future. Intervention by Russia, if she were in a position to intervene, cannot be expected to be of any use to Poland, because this would mean Poland's destruction by Bolshevism. The attitude of the Baltic States will be determined wholly by German military superiority. 2 [In the course of further developments it may 1 Not printed. For the full text see Tried of the Major War Criminals, vol. xxxrv, pp. 382-387. This directive required the provisions for safeguarding the frontiers of the Reich to be so organized that frontier arid air defence could be put into effect if the situation required without general mobilization. The following points in this directive bear on foreign policy: 1 , The focal point of the preparations for frontier security is in the West. 2. First priority must be given to extending the Western fortifications as a permanent installation, so that they may be held against an opponent three or four times superior in strength. In the second place the Eastern fortifications must be completed and advanced to the Polish frontier south of the Oder-Warthe bend. The "Special Orders" attached to this directive (for the full text see Joe. cit.) state, under section 2 ("Legal Bases"), that: "it is to be assumed that a state of defence or state of war as defined in the Reich Defence Law of September 4, 1938, will not be declared. All actions and requirements connected with the implementation of mobiliza- tion are to be based on peace-time legislation". For the Reich Defence Law, which was kept secret on Hitler's instructions, see loo. cit., document 2194-PS, exhibit TT8A-36, vol. xxix, pp. 316-327. 2 The word "superiority" is crossed out by hand in the original and "demands" inserted. APRIL, 1939 225 become necessary to occupy the Baltic states up to the border of the former Courland and to incorporate them in the Reich.] 3 Germany cannot count on Hungary as a certain ally. Italy's attitude is determined by the Rome-Berlin Axis. 2.) Military Conclusions The great objectives in the reconstruction of the German Wehrmacht will continue to be determined by the antagonism of the Western Democracies. "Operation White" constitutes only a precautionary complement to these preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military conflict with the Western opponents. The isolation of Poland will be all the more easily maintained, even after the outbreak of hostilities, if we succeed in starting the war with sudden, heavy blows and in gaining rapid successes. The overall situation will require, however, that in all cases pre- cautions be taken to safeguard the western frontier and the German North Sea coast, as well as the air above them. Against the Baltic States ? Lithuania in particular ? securitymeasures are to be carried out in case of a Polish march through this country. 3.) Tasks of the Wehrmacht The task of the Wehrmacht is to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. To this end a surprise attack is to be aimed at and prepared. Camou- flaged or open general* mobilization will not be ordered earlier than the day before the attack and at the latest possible moment. The forces provided for "Frontier Security West" (section I, "Frontier Security") must not be employed for the time being for any other purpose. All other frontiers are to be kept under observation only; the Lithuanian frontier is to be covered. 4.) Tasks for the Branches of the Wehrmacht a) Army The operational objective in the East is the annihilation of the Polish Army. For this purpose the German Wehrmacht, on the southern flank, may enter Slovak territory. On the northern flank, communication between Pomerania and East Prussia must be established quickly. The preparations for the opening of operations are to be made in such a way that, even without waiting for the planned deployment of mobilized units, positions can be taken up by the troops immediately available. A camouflaged assembly of these units just before the day of attack may be provided. I reserve for myself the decision in this matter. 3 The sentence in square brackets has been deleted in the original and a marginal note added: "deleted according to OKW 37/39 II Ang. of April 13". * This word is inserted by hand in the original. IS 226 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY Whether the forces provided for "Frontier Security West" will be deployed there in their entirety, or whether part of them will be avail- able for some other employment, will depend upon the political situa- tion. 6) Navy The tasks of the Navy in the Baltic Sea are as follows: 1) Destruction and/or elimination of the Polish Naval Forces. 2) Blockade of all sea-lanes to the Polish naval bases, especially Gdynia. The neutral shipping in Polish harbours and in Danzig is to be given a time limit for sailing at the beginning of the invasion of Poland. After its expiry, the Navy will be free to take blockade measures. The disadvantages for the conduct of naval warfare caused by this time limit must be accepted. 3) Suppression of Polish maritime trade. 4) Securing of the sea-route between the Reich and East Prussia. 5) Protection of German sea-communications to Sweden and the Baltic States. 6) Reconnaissance and protection, as far as possible in an incon- spicuous manner, against intervention by the Soviet Navy from the Gulf of Finland. Suitable naval forces are to be provided for defence of the North Sea coast and its approaches. In the southern part of the North Sea and in the Skagerrak such measures are to be taken as are deemed advisable as precautions against surprise intervention in the conflict by the Western Powers. These measures are to be restricted to the absolute minimum. Their incon- spicuousness must be assured. It is of decisive importance to avoid here any sort of action which might aggravate the political attitude of the Western Powers. c) Luftwaffe The Luftwaffe, except for necessary forces left in the West, is to be used for a surprise attack on Poland. Besides destruction of the Polish Air Force in the shortest time pos- sible, the tasks of the German Luftwaffe are principally as follows: 1) Interference with Polish mobilization and prevention of planned strategic concentrations by the Polish Army. 2) Direct support of the Army, especially support of the spearheads starting immediately after the crossing of the frontier. A possible transfer of air units to East Prussia, before the beginning of operations, must not endanger the element of surprise. The first crossing of the frontier by air is to be synchronized with the operations of the Army. Attacks against the harbour of Gdynia may be undertaken only after expiry of the sailing period for neutral ships (see number 46). Strong points of air defence are to be set up above Stettin, Berlin and the Upper Silesian industrial district including Mor. Ostrava and [Enclosure III] . TAKING POSSESSION OF DANZIG Surprise occupation of the Free State of Danzig may become possible independently of "Operation White" by exploiting a favourable political situation. The preparations are to be made on the following basis- , The "Division of Power of Command in East Prussia in case of hostilities {see Enclosure IV) will be put into effect according to Occupation by the Army will be carried out from East Prussia The Navy will support the action of the Army by intervention from the sea, according to detailed orders by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy The naval forces involved are to be instructed to cooperate with the Army. r The extent to which Luftwaffe units can participate in the occupation will be decided by the Reich Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe. Details on cooperation are to be settled directly between the branches of the Wehrmacht. 6 s In the "Special Orders" attached to "Operation White" ffor th* fi,ii *=?* #.. pp. 392-396) the following points bear on forei^poUcy -lectin Irloeat^hl ' K ° itel ^sued a directive on "Operation White ≫ in which he ordered
the OKH to prepare measures to capture intact the bridges over theLower vS?
and, m view of the importance of the bridge at Dirschau to consult wftl t£Tw Vlstula '
whether in the event of a coup de main against th£ bridge the l^S eWn7min°t
be endangered by previous naval measures in the Bay of Danzig (2X ri?T 3^61

≪ In the "Special Orders" attached to "Taking Possession of rWrt?≫ it P '^ J\,

*$%£?■& PP " > "ff^ ^ f °?J OWil * ^ beToTfore^oSfy. <** ^ *" Section I General" states that "it is to be assumed that hv t≫k;? the Free State of Danzig a purely German territory^ wXbe restored to fc ?f °- "T °t the German Reich after a long period of separation 7 '. restore <* *° the sovereignty of Section 3 ("Mobilization") states that "the operation involving fh n +<,n?~ of Danzig will be carried out by units of the peLe-tinie wTh?fcht o^ivT.S 0ss ^ slon mobilized reinforcements so th/t no civilian nSbflitaS met^e, are £l ^Ed?* A draft order received by the Commander-in-Chief of the Naw from tVSn ,' Officer commanding the Naval Air Force on July 27, 1939 concern^ *?* 6 Gen 5 al of the German Free State of Danzig on (Y-Davl " ItoZT g ^-iT he ° ocupatton the reunion of the German Free S fate of D^n^h ^ %££ G^^Sa^ the innate occupation of Danzig by the Wehrmacht for the protect^? f"heG e ?? populate. No hostile intentions are entertained towards Poland, w Irog a7the K sns p; s to*2 e oo) mp lon y ? nMd force (see foc - cit - doou ? ent AmS 228 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY [Enclosure IV] ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND IN EAST PRUSSIA IN CASE OF HOSTILITIES 7 ' Not printed ( for full text see he. eit., pp. 400-402) . Attached to this document are two further directives. The first (enclosure v) contains "Boundaries of the Zones of Opera- tions of the Army ", signed by Hitler. The second (enclosure vi) contains "Directives for the War against Enemy Economy (Economic Warfare) and Measures for the Protection of our own Economy ". It is prefaced by an order, dated May 10, and signed by Hitler that the Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Wehrmacht are to report by August 1, 1939, on measures taken in accordance with this directive (for the full text see foe. tit., pp. 402-408). No. 186 J 625/388496-97 Circular of the Foreign Minister l Telegram Berlin, April 12, 1939?9:05 p.m. zu Pol. II U422 [Aug.] I. As is known to you, the British Government, in agreement with the French Government, are continuing their efforts at encirclement directed against Germany and Italy. You are requested not to make any d-marche in this matter. In conversations which may occur you should express yourself on the following lines : We do not expect any further States to be hoodwinked by the British. Should further Governments nevertheless fall a prey to the enticements of the British, we should deplore this in the interests of the States themselves. We would regard any participation in, or connection with, such a combination as being directed against us and would react accordingly. In this connection you could recall the words of the Fiihrer in his speech at Wilhelmshaven on April 1, when he said, "Whoever declares himself ready to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the Great Powers must expect to get his fingers burnt in doing so.' 1 For the rest you should, in conversations, handle the whole affair with great composure and ridicule the nervous zeal with which the British are trying to harness other States to serve their own ends. Ribbentrop 1 Addressees were the Missions at Brussels, The Hague, Berne, Luxembourg, Copen- hagen, Oslo, Stockholm, Helsinki, Tallinn, Riga, Kovno, Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade, Athens, Ankara. The copy here printed is as despatched and incorporates amendments by Ribbentrop telephoned from Sonnenburg (not printed, 1625/588502), Under Angabe II (not printed, 1 625/388501) this telegram was repeated on the same day for information to Paris, London, Rome, Washington, Moscow, Tokyo, Warsaw, Budapest and San Sebastian. i Not printed (1625/388494-95). This is the original draft of the telegram showing Ribbentrop's amendments. APRIL, 1989 229 No. 187 2043/570O02-O1 Memorandum by the Stale Secretary St.8. No. 332 ^ Berlin, April 12, 1939. Pol. VI 992. Today I invited the Swedish Minister! to call and spoke to him in the following terms about the Aaland question: In consequence of well-known occurrences in the sphere of general politics, and against our own wishes, in dealing with the Finno-Swedish proposals in connection with the Aaland question we had been unduly delayed. 2 The Minister must not, however, thereby conclude that our attitude towards the question of the neutrality of the Aaland Islands and their fortifica- tion was in any way negative. Given this as a general premise, he would the more clearly understand what I now wished to communicate to him. In dealing with the problem, we had come upon two points which caused us some difficulty. One concerned our understandable reserve over the function of the League of Nations in the Aaland Conven- tion, as we are not members of the League. I did not wish to speak further on this question at present. On the other hand I did wish to discuss the fact that, according to the Swedo-Finnish proposals, the Swedish Government were to occupy a position apart from the other signatory Powers, which would materi- ally alter the whole system of the Convention. We had, therefore, reached the view that the right to take military defence measures should be accorded solely to Finland, under whose sovereignty the islands lay. Notwithstanding the historical antecedents, with which I was familiar, I believed the German view to be well founded. There naturally existed a certain relation between the position we had adopted towards the special rights claimed by Sweden and the attitude of Sweden in the event of war. I was fully cognizant of the views upon this question officially announced by the Swedish Government. We must, however, also reckon with influence being exercised by other States with which Germany might possibly clash. This was an allusion to certain utterances by the Swedish Minister, Westman. 3 Our anxiety at the prospect of Sweden slipping over to the other side might perhaps be removed by a Swedish declaration to be made direct to us. With such a statement in our hands, the task of formulating our note of reply in 1 Arvid Richert. 2 See documents Nos. 127 and 1+5. 3 In a report from Stockholm, A 556 of Apr. 4 (not printed, 2902/565809-08), Wied stated that on Apr. 1, Westman, the Minister of Justice, had said in a speech atNorrkBp- ing that in the September crisis of 1938, Britain had begun to make preparations for an economic blockade even against States which she knew would remain neutral in the event of war. 230 DOCUMENTS ON GEKMAN FOREIGN POLICY the matter of the Aalands might be considerably simplified. I sug- gested to M. Richert the possible phrasing of a statement to be handed to us somewhat as follows: "The Swedish Government declare that they will, wherever it is the concern of the Government, ensure that the normal Swedish exports to Germany suffer no prejudice in the event of war." Actually what I was proposing here was a matter of course; but as an official declaration to us it would none the less have a certain value. In conclusion, I again mentioned our positive attitude towards the whole question of neutralizing and fortifying the Aalands, and told the Minister that my conversation with him was the first since he had called on me with his Finnish colleague. 4 In the interests of a smooth settlement of the matter, it was certainly not necessary to make any communication to the Finnish Minister about our conversations. I would, however, like to ask for a Swedish statement in reply. The Minister will report upon our conversation and will call on me again. Weizsacker 4 See vol. v of this Series, document No. 464. No. 188 1625/388514-15 The Charge" a" Affaires in France to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 215 of April 13 Paris, April 13, 1939?4:00 a.m. Received April 14 ? 1:10 a.m. Pol. II 1177. With reference to my telegram No. 211 of April 13. 1 The declaration made on behalf of the French Government by Daladier on the promise of support to Rumania and Greece gives rise to the following observations: 1) The declaration means the temporary abandonment of the policy France embarked on at Munich of assuring the peace of Europe by coming to a direct understanding with the authoritarian States. In the place of this policy comes the creation of a cordon of States, in part bound by treaty to the Western Powers. France is thus returning to i Not printed (5453/E366636-38). This telegram communicated the text of a state- ment by Daladier to the press on Apr. 13 which contained a "declaration to the nation" announcing, in terms similar to those employed by Chamberlain in the British Parlia- ment (see document No. 189), the French Government's guarantees to Rumania and Greece. In addition Daladier announced that the French and Polish Governments reaffirmed their alliance: "France and Poland guarantee each other immediately and directly against any threat, direct or indirect, which menaces their vital interests." APRIL, 1933 231 the system of collective security, in a new form, and is participating in the attempt, probably mainly inaugurated by Great Britain, to en- circle the totalitarian States. 2) The Franco-Polish Alliance is severed from its connection with the League of Nations, as it existed in the Treaties of 1921 and 1925 a and reshaped on the lines of the British guarantee. That Russia is not mentioned might be due to consideration for Poland and Rumania although this would not necessarily mean that Russia is to be omitted as a factor m the new system. The long and frequent visits of the Soviet Ambassador to Bonnet during the last few days and the clearly visible decline of opposition to the Franco-Soviet Pact seem to me significant. 3) The French declaration obviously proceeds from the assumption that certain acts already planned by Germany or Italy may be expected m the near future; its intention is to set a limit to further expansion by the authoritarian States. The text of the declaration is designed to strengthen the resistance of smaller States in the event of threats to them. + 4) Besides this, France is trying to save her prestige with the smaller fatates, which has recently been severely shaken. She also desires, however, to bind herself by this declaration and to bar the way to further concessions in the face of expansion by the authoritarian States. 5} On the other hand, France shows no tendency to take military or diplomatic action against the previous advance of the authoritarian States. The reason for this is that now, as ever, she does not want war. 6) The reason for the sharp and precise tone of the declaration may also be that, after the events of March in Czecho-Slovakia and again after the occupation of Albania, the Government took very extensive military measures, and the resultant nervousness of the French people with the rumour-mongering, which the Government did little about have engendered an idtefixe that French interests were threatened The French Government therefore need the declaration to justify themselves and are probably also trying to avoid giving the impression that their tar-reaching measures were so wide of the mark. 7) The fact that the Daladier Government have made far-reaching declarations, decisive for war and peace, and have adopted them without consulting or even informing Parliament, shows that Daladier feels extremely strong and is not afraid of any repercussions at home. Difficulties will probably only arise when he is obliged to cancel his extensive and over-hasty measures. ■ Brauer a The Political Agreement between France and Poland agreed in Paris, Feb. 1 9 1 92 1 (for the text eee BF.S.P., vol. 118, pp. 342-343) and the Treaty between France and lroW a c g ^ d r 8 o , LO0a ^° , , 0Ct - 16 vio 9 ^ (f ° rth6 t6xt See British Whi^Pap^S Protocol ofths Locarno Conference, 1925 {and Annexes) together with the Treaties between France and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia, Cmd. 2525 of 1925). 232 DOCUMENTS ON GEBMAN FOREIGN POLICY No. 189 T8S:/ES71141 The Charge d' Affaires in Great Britain to the Foreign Ministry Airgram No. 120 of Anril 13 London, April 13, 1939. Received April 14 ? 10:50 a.m. Pol. II 1180. According to Reuter the text of the guarantee declaration in favour of Greece and Rumania in the Prime Minister's speech today in the House of Commons is as follows: 1 "His Majesty's Government feel that they have both a duty and a service to perform by leaving no doubt in the mind of anybody as to their position. I therefore take this opportunity of saying on their behalf that His Majesty's Government attach the greatest importance to the avoidance of disturbance by force or threat of force of the status quo in the Mediterranean and the Balkan peninsula. Consequently they have come to the conclusion that in the event of any action being taken which clearly threatens the independence of Greece or Rumania and which the Greek or Rumanian Government respectively considered it vital to resist with their national forces His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Greek or Rumanian Government as the case might be all the support in their power. We are communicating this declaration to the Governments directly concerned and to others, especially Turkey, whose close relations with the Greek Government are known. I understand that the French Government are making a similar declaration this afternoon." 2 KOKDT 1 The text of the statement is quoted in English in the original. See also Pari. Deb., H.ofC, vol. 346, col. 13. 2 See document No. 188, footnote 1. No. 190 1625/388517 The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 36 of April 13 Sofia, April 13, 1939?5:45 p.m. Received April 13 ? 9:00 p.m. Pol. II 1178. With reference to your telegram No. 49 of April 12. 1 When I took leave today of King Boris at a private interview, we i Document No. 186, which was sent as telegram No. 49 to Sofia. APRIL, 1989 233 spoke at length about British policy. The King assured me that up to the present no attempt had been made here to involve Bulgaria in the British policy of encirclement. King Boris took a very unfavour- able view of the situation and thought that Britain was growing "old". KCMELIlir No. 191 511/235509-10 The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 105 of April 13 Belgrade, April 13, 1939?7 :00 p.m. Received April 14 ? 1:10 a.m. Pol. IV 2559. The Foreign Minister asked me to call on him today, in order, as he said, to discuss the general situation. He then passed at once to Yugoslavia's attitude during the events in Albania. He thought that during the last few days Yugoslavia had given clear proof of her loyalty to the policy of friendship towards the Axis. Although events had taken place on her very frontier, she had, with full confidence in the political aims of the Axis, refrained from all military measures such as were now being taken in many countries and had contented herself with reinforcing her frontier defences for the purpose of apprehending Albanian refugees. This attitude was in keeping with the firm resolve of the Yugoslav Government to maintain to the full and in all circum- stances their friendly relationship to the Axis Powers. He asked me to convey to the Reich Foreign Minister the categorical assurance that he, Cincar-Markovic, would adhere to the end to the policy of friendship towards the Axis Powers inaugurated during recent years, and would tolerate nothing which was in contradiction to it. Recently this had not always been easy for him for I must know how deeply the Yugo- slav public had been disturbed by Italy's invasion of Albania; a . . . (1 group mutilated) ≫ which circles opposed to the Government we're naturally exploiting. He was always being asked about Germany's attitude and reference was always being made to rumours reported in the French press about German troop movements on the Yugoslav frontier. If he characterized these rumours as being without founda- tion and recalled statements made by Germany, that German policy wanted a strong Yugoslavia, he met with the objection that, in view of the rapid development of the present political situation of Greater Germany, this attitude on Germany's part might quickly change. In lln the Belgrade draft. (8419/E692833-35) this group reads: "disturbance \Beun- rtmigung] . L 234 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY these circumstances, it would mean a tremendous enhancement of Yugoslav foreign policy, as represented by Mm, and of his personal position, if the interest of German policy in a strong and internally consolidated Yugoslavia could again be stated by authoritative German quarters in a way which would impress Yugoslav public opinion. He asked the Reich Foreign Minister, as his old friend, to give him as much, support as possible in these difficult days for Yugoslavia. He had also been wondering if there were any possibility of a meeting with the Reich Foreign Minister. I promised Cincar-Markovid that I would transmit his request and also referred him to Italy's definite assurances regarding the integrity of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's loyal attitude to the events in Albania was naturally recognized to the full in Berlin, as it was in Rome, and I had not the slightest doubt that our fundamental attitude towards Yugoslavia was completely unchanged and in keeping with the sincere friendship which had long been felt by us for that country. As the completely impeccable attitude of the Government in the Albanian question is established, and as there is also no doubt of their firm resolve to reject categorically any attempt to involve Yugoslavia in a combination hostile to the Axis, I urgently recommend that the Foreign Minister's wishes may be granted as far as possible. Heebjen No. 192 509/285393 The Minister in Yugoslavia to the Foreign Ministry Telegram No. 106 of April 13 Belgrade, April 13, 1939 ? 7:00 p.m. Received April 14 ? 11:35 p.m. Pol. IV 2557. During a conversation on another subject, Simovic, Chief of the General Staff, today drew the attention of the Air Attache 1 to the present extremely nervous state of the population and expressed the fear that the agitation among the Volksdeutsche of the Voivodina, which has been increasing of late, might lead to incidents which would seriously prejudice German-Yugoslav relations. I am assured by volksdeutsch circles that, in our view, 2 Halwax and his friends, adherents of the Revival Movement [Erneuerungsbewegung], 1 Lt.-Col. von SchOnebeck. 2 In the Belgrade draft of this telegram (9538/E6723 13) this reads " in fact " and not "in our view ". Gustav Halwax -was one of the four signatories of the Declaration of Apr. 10, 1938, which set up the volksdetUsch United Front. Considerable material on volksdeulsdi activities in Yugoslavia has been filmed on Serial 7494. See also document No. 94. APRIL, 1939 IST ZTi l I h T St Tf Iy eXP ° Siag tkemse1 ^ in their work of agita- tion, and have been hinting that they are following Berlin's instruc- A.IIIZ T^ ? tL ?\* hat any UDreSt is at P"*≫* politically un- it 2 :i?r mmend that the ^^^^ xmiJL ^ m^ d Heeren aiffigft^ " The ma " er " Wg d6aH With by CuIW PoIi ^ ^P-tment. 6733/E513500 No. 193 Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department Berlin, April 13, 1939. WsilgiHI T i 6 ^^ f Mtaiy Attaeh ≪ 2 called on m ≪ today and informed me that the Netherlands Government continued to attach St portance to placzng the order for 120 light field howitzers S Z- 77;l I°l ITT" ° f *"*** h0We ?> ** ? absolutely eential
hatthe first 20 be made available as early as October 1, 1939 I had
the impression that the Netherlands Government atta h such j£j
importance to the fulfilment of this request that, were it not forth
coming, the order would not be placed with Germany

+ ^ 6 r + a ^fT 7 th th6 A " G - K - < Herr ? n Waltershausen) I told the Military Attache that I did not think it would be possible"" omp ly TutVthe 20 ? S ° f deH r y - ? C MUt ^ ' ≪≪** -S th" t surely the 20 guns, as it was SU ch a small number, could be taken from current manufacture for the German Array I promised the Military Attache that he would soon have a reply 4 II Xit ~ 1 *°, th t Ec ° n0mic Poli ^ Apartment, Son II, with the request for further action. Please keep me informed Clodius ! See document No. 119 K[reutzwald] 10/5." ≪"°?<>d the Netherlands Legation (M. v. Boetzelaer).


No. 194


The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania


No. 157 Berlin, April 14, 1939 ? 5:05 p.m.

zu Pol. IV 2506.1

With reference to your telegram No. 173. l

1) The communication of your telegram No. 167 [sic] 2 to Budapest
Legation was done not with a view to mediation but ? in accordance
with its contents ? with a view to verifying the facts in our own in-
terests. The instructions given in our telegram No. 152 3 to tell Gafencu
about the Hungarian dementi served merely to express our hope for an
early easing of tension. [As you know, we have always refused to
mediate up to now, and will not do so in the future. Please make this
clear to Gafencu when an opportunity occurs.] 4

2) For the declaration already given by the Hungarian Foreign
Minister to the Rumanian Minister on April 6,6 please see our despatch

by courier, Pol. IV 2483. 6


1 Document No. 180.

2 An error for No. 169. See document No. 180, footnote 2.

3 Not printed. See lot, tit.

* The passage in square brackets was deleted before despatch.

s See document No. 165.

6 Not printed (5985/E440377).

No, 195


The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry


No. 183 of April 14 Bucharest, April 14, 1939 ? 10:00 p.m.

Received April 15 ? 2:15 p.m.
Pol. II 1197.

In the last few days Foreign Minister Gafencu has repeatedly men-
tioned the Anglo-French declaration of guarantee. 1 Tremendous
pressure had been exerted on him from abroad and also from certain
circles at home to conclude a bilateral agreement. The King and the
Government, however, had been firm in their resolve not to enter into
any agreements which might be directed against Germany even in the
slightest degree. He had therefore sent Secretary General Cretzianu

1 Of Apr. 13. See documents Nos. 188, footnote 1, and If

APML, 1030 237

to London 2 and Paris to make it clear to the Governments there that
Rumania would enter into no agreements which might involve her
in the British encirclement policy. Minister President Calinescu, who
happened to take part in the conversation with me, emphatically con-
firmed this. On the other hand the Rumanian Government did not
think that they should decline a unilateral promise of a guarantee
especially as some of their neighbours had revisionist intentions
about Rumanian territory. It was, of course, clear to the Govern-
ment that this could not mean Germany as they were convinced
of Germany's good intentions. Rumania would in fact welcome it
if the German Government would also make such a declaration of
guarantee in Rumania's favour.

I replied that I considered the British declaration of guarantee as
being fairly worthless. It could have fruitful results perhaps only
against Soviet Russia. In my opinion, however, it had not been made
for the sake of its effectiveness, but only by way of British propaganda
against Germany. I ridiculed the shelter of the umbrella and recalled
that it had been of no avail to the Negus, Schuschnigg, Benes and del
Vayo: neither did I think it worthy of so great a country as Rumania
to have resort to such protection.

These remarks were not very pleasing to M. Gafencu; he said that
the British proposal had cost him many a sleepless night. In the end,
however, he had agreed, as, after mature reflection, he had been unable
to find anything in it which disturbed his relations with the Reich. He
had guided the press and that very day he had been reproached by
the French Ambassador because its tone was not cordial enough. He
referred in particular to articles in Timul [sic % Timpul] and Universal
which had been inspired by him. Curentul was going too far with its
flat rejection.

When in reply to this I referred to the telegram of the Jew Hefter in
Le Moment,* which mentions the special services of Tilea in bringing
about the declaration, by saying that Tilea's activity was based on the
instructions of the King, Gafencu thumped the table in fury and said
that behind this were Tilea's mean tricks.

Gafencu read me his telegram to his Minister in Berlin, which sets
out the above points of view on Rumania's attitude.

I urgently recommended that he should not allow himself to be mis-
led by Reuter reports from Paris and Bucharest which constituted in-
trigues aimed at discrediting the Rumanian Government, and thus
Gafencu, in our eyes. I urged Gafencu to stay in Berlin until'the parade
on April 20.-*


2 See also document No. 180, and footnote 7 thereto,
a French language newspaper published in Bucharest.
* i.e., for Hitler's birthday.


No. 196


Circular of the State Secretary 1

Berlin, April 14, 1939?9:40 p.m.
zu Pol. II 11662 Ang. I.
Drafting Officer: Senior Counsellor von Rintelen.

The Legation at Tallinn reports 2 that an authoritative Estonian
military personage stated informally that Estonia had received the
oSer of a guarantee of the integrity of the Estonian State and Estonian
sovereignty, not only from the Soviet Union, 3 but also from Britain.

If this is the case it can be assumed that a similar offer has been
made by Britain to the other Baltic States. If you can learn anything
about this without revealing our source, please report by telegram.*


1 Addressees were the Missions in London, Moscow, Helsinki, Riga and Kovno.

* Report A 157 of Apr. 8 (not printed, 1625/388507). In telegram No. 37 of Apr. 14
{not printed, 1625/388510) Woermann requested the Legation at Tallinn to check this
report with the Estonian Foreign Ministry. See also document No. 202.

3 In a circular telegram sent, for information, on Apr. 6 (not printed, 406/214341-42) to
Moscow, Warsaw, Helsinki, Riga, Kovno and Bucharest, Bismarck repeated an earlier
Tallinn telegram, the original of which has not been found, which reported that a Soviet
Note had been sent to the Estonian Minister in Moscow on Apr. 1, declaring Estonian
independence to be a matter of vital importance to the U.S.S.R.; that the Estonian
Note of Apr. 3, in reply, had stated that Estonia would defend her sovereignty against
all aggressors; and that a similar Soviet Note had been received on Apr. 1 by the Latvian
Government. The text, in French translation, of a Soviet declaration dated Mar. 28, and
an Estonian Note in reply, dated Apr. 7, were forwarded by the Legation at Tallinn to
Berlin on Apr. 15 with report No. A 166 (not printed, 466/226999-7003).

* Replies were sent from London on Apr. 21 (1625/388578-80), from Moscow on Apr.
17 (7891/E571169), from Helsinki on Apr. 17 (7891/E571152), from Riga on Apr. 19
(7637/E545407) and from Kovno on Apr. 15 (7637/E540405) and were all in the negative.

No. 197


Memorandum by the State Secretary

St.S. No. 337 Berlin, April 14, 1939.

After I had informed Ambassador Attolico this morning of the initial
draft of instructions to Athens and Bucharest and of similar instruc-
tions to Ankara, 1 in order thus to prepare the way for a conversa-
tion between the Reich Foreign Minister and Count Ciano, Attolico
telephoned me again towards evening to tell me of a conversation which
he had had shortly before with the Reich Foreign Minister. 2 Attolico

i Not printed (1625/388598-622). See document No. 203, footnote 2.
a No record has been found.

APRIL, 1030 900

he Duce Th. D P °S t0 ^ ^ that the iatter liad s P ok en to
S^ ? D ? *≪* ^t attach the slightest importance to the

British guarantee to Greece. He took the view that Greece was de
pendent on the grace of Italy and he would not go beyond the exchange
of views between Rome and Athens which had taken place a fe w S
ago As far as Rumania was concerned, Mussolini was of the opinion

vi sft I " ^ t0 ^ ^ d °? a Ut ' S d ^ ^ ≪2SS


3 Evidently Gafeneu is meant. See document No. 203.

No. 198


Note by the Deputy Director of the Information and Press

■g, ? -c ■ ,,. . Berlin, April 14, 1939.

For the Foreign Minister.

At 6:30 this afternoon Ministerialrat Bohmer 1 telephoned me and
told me the following:

He wanted to inform me that the Propaganda Minister, Dr. Goebbels
on the occasion of a meeting with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister
Cmcar-Markovic, had received a request from the latter that Yugo
da? s conduct during the last few days should receive special Re-
cognition m the German press.* He particularly desired this because it
would strengthen his (Cmcar-Markovie's) position in Yugoslavia In
reply I told Herr Bohmer that before such a desire could be fulfilled £
must be studied, and that it could not be carried out in the German press
without the consent of the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry
Thereupon Dr. Bohmer asked me to get in touch with MnisterialrS
Fritzsche 3 to whom he had already conveyed the wish of the Reich
Propaganda Minister. As far as he knew, Herr Fritzsche intended to
quote Yugoslav press comment in several newspapers and thus to make
special reference to Yugoslavia's attitude.

After I had ^cussed this question and also the question of ex-
pediency, what should be said, and presentation with the State Secre-
tary, I contacted Herr Fritzsche and gave him the following instruc-
tions: With reference to the fulfilment of the Propaganda Minister's
wish, the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry considers that in

Mllf. ^ tlTe Sh ° Uld be appUed and treated as

1 Dr. Karl Bohmer of the Ministry of Propaganda

2 Goebbels went on a tour of South East Europe and Eeypt Mar 25 T?? fi
* Director of the German Press Department i/the M^^o^nl


Favourable Yugoslav press views to be published in three news-
papers in a not too prominent position. A commentary in the following
terms to be given: "It must be admitted that, in the present general
uncertainty, Yugoslavia has displayed remarkable calm. It appears
at the same time that, in judging the situation, Yugoslav policy is con-
ducted with special skill and that Cincar-Markovi6 has adapted himself
realistically to events~in line with the pacific policy of the Axis Powers."

For his further information, I told Herr Fritzsche that this action
must on no account be made to appear too obvious as that would not
strengthen but weaken Cincar-Markovi6's position.

No comments:

Post a Comment